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ABSTRACT
The history of American medicine and public health 
is a relatively new field of endeavor for the academic 
historian; countless areas remain thus far almost complete­
ly unexplored. The subject of epidemic disease and its 
impact, for example, deserves a more thorough investigation 
and consideration as a significant aspect of social and 
intellectual history. Representing an essay into that 
particular area, this dissertation involves a study of 
yellow fever in Louisiana from the first recorded epidemic 
in New Orleans in 1796 through the final outbreak in the 
state in 1905.
Contemporary sources have supplied the bulk of 
material utilized. The abundance of references to yellow 
fever and its effects in virtually every type of historical 
source is itself a good commentary on the pervasive influ­
ence of the disease. Manuscript material such as personal 
and business correspondence, diaries and medical treatises, 
revealed individual reactions to epidemic yellow fever. 
Newspapers, medical journals, travel accounts, government
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documents, and contemporary works on yellow fever and 
health furnished ample information about epidemic conditions 
as well as an insight into medical and lay ideas, attitudes, 
and reactions regarding the pestilence and its behavior. 
Secondary sources included works on Louisiana history, 
medicine, and public health.
Introduced by infected persons or mosquitoes on 
vessels from Latin American centers of yellow fever endemi- 
city, the disease appeared in New Orleans almost every 
summer and frequently erupted into a severe outbreak, 
extending its ravages along the lines of trade and travel 
to other communities throughout Louisiana and the South. 
Between 1796 and 1850, New Orleans experienced a few cases 
every year and some twenty serious epidemics; the 1850's 
witnessed the climax of yellow fever's activity in Louisi­
ana when the scourge struck violently four times during the 
decade (1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858). During the second 
half of the nineteenth century, yellow fever outbreaks 
diminished in frequency and virulence, appearing in severe 
epidemic form only on three or four occasions. Neverthe­
less, the constant threat of the disease occupied the 
attention of Louisianians until its final conquest in 1905.
Vi
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Until the discovery of yellow fever's transmitter, 
the Aedes aegypti mosquito, in 1900-1901 by the United 
States Army Commission in Cuba, the erratic spread of the 
disease remained a mystery. Throughout the nineteenth 
century medical men and laymen attempted to adapt the age- 
old epidemiological theories, and later the germ theory, to 
the peculiar workings of the Saffron Scourge. The evolu­
tion of yellow fever etiology and epidemiology itself 
reflects an important phase in the history of medical 
thought.
The diversity of ideas regarding yellow fever's 
causation and transmission resulted in disagreement over 
means of prevention. As the battle raged among those who 
favored sanitation, quarantine, both, or neither, the con­
cept of public responsibility for community health gradu­
ally emerged, found public acceptance, and was crystallized 
into such institutional forms as the Louisiana State Board 
of Health, quarantine, and other regulatory health laws. A 
consciousness of the federal government's role in preserving
4T-
the nation's health also began to develop.
In its yearly appearances and at least thirty exten­
sive outbreaks spread over a century of Louisiana's history,
vii
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Yellow Jack destroyed thousands of lives, cost millions of 
dollars, and affected almost every aspect of human affairs 
with:.r< its sphere of influence --economic, social, political, 
intellectual, medical, and religious. Ultimately, medical 
science and public health operations triumphed over the 
pestilence in this country in the systematic campaign based 
on the newly-formulated mosquito theory and waged against 
the New Orleans epidemic of 1905. Protected by federal 
quarantine regulations, the United States since that date 
has been free of epidemic yellow fever.
viii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The history of yellow fever in Louisiana is a long 
and dramatic story with many interwoven themes, colorful 
and controversial characters, much tragedy, some irony, and 
ultimately a happy ending. Perhaps the fundamental theme 
involves man's struggle to understand, to explain, to fight, 
and to conquer this pestilence which harassed Louisiana for 
more than a hundred years.
From the late eighteenth century down to the early 
twentieth century, almost every question relating to yellow 
fever became a subject of major controversy, in Louisiana 
and in every other place where the disease appeared. Was 
yellow fever contagious or non-contagious, of local origin 
or imported, a specific entity or the most malignant grade 
of a related class of fevers? Should quarantine measures, 
sanitary reform, a combination of both, or nothing at all 
be employed against the disease? Which proved more dis­
astrous, the economic losses occasioned by the fever or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
those resulting from quarantine itself? Which of the many 
forms of treatment seemed most effective in curing the 
malady? These and a host of other issues furnished topics 
for endless debate among physicians and laymen alike. 
Throughout the entire nineteenth century countless theories 
were advanced and debated. Still nothing was settled about 
the nature and action of the complicated disease until 
1901, when the United States Army Commission in Cuba headed 
by Walter Reed clearly demonstrated the transmission of 
yellow fever from man to man by the Aedes aegypti mosquito. 
Not until after that discovery was man in a position to 
combat the pestilence successfully. For all but the last 
few years of its history in Louisiana yellow fever remained 
a mysterious malady--erratic, unpredictable, and deadly. 
Even with the considerable increase of knowledge regarding 
the disease which has slowly been uncovered during the 
course of the twentieth century, yellow fever still with­
holds many secrets from the probing intellect of scientific 
man. Yet in the light of present-day knowledge about the 
pathology, etiology, and epidemiology of yellow fever, the 
disease can be controlled to a high degree. Furthermore, 
armed with that knowledge, one can more readily understand 
the activities of yellow fever in epidemics of the past.
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those activities which so often seemed inexplicable to 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century observers.
One of the more complicated maladies of man, yellow 
fever is an acute infectious disease occurring primarily in 
tropical and subtropical zones and produced by a filtrable 
virus. The virus is transmitted from person to person by 
the female Aedes aegypti mosquito. In order to become 
infected, the mosquito must feed on the blood of a yellow 
fever patient within the first three or four days of his 
illness. After the Aedes aegypti acquires the virus, an 
incubation period of ten to twelve days is required before 
that mosquito can transmit the disease when biting another 
person; the mosquito then remains infective for the re­
mainder of its life, perhaps a month or more. When the 
infected mosquito bites a susceptible individual, the 
period of incubation before the onset of the fever is 
usually from three to six days.l
Obviously, then, a rather delicate balance of cir­
cumstantial factors is necessary for the development of an
^Charles E. Lyght, et al, (eds.). The Merck Manual 
of Diagnosis and Therapy (9th ed., Rahway, N. J., 1956), 
966-67; Richard P. Strong, Stittfs Diagnosis, Prevention and 
Treatment of Tropical Diseases (7th ed., 2 vols., Philadel­
phia, 1944), II, 872-73, 879-82, Hereinafter cited as 
Tropical Diseases.
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epidemic within an area where yellow fever is not endemic 
(that is, present at all times), First of all, the Aedes 
aegypti must be present in sufficient numbers to perform 
the act of transmission, and the weather must be warm 
enough to allow for mosquito activity. Further, an epi­
demic requires that a considerable number of susceptible 
persons be concentrated in a given area where the Aedes 
aegypti is active and that the virus be introduced into that 
area either by an infective mosquito or by a person in the 
incubation period or the earliest stage of the disease. The 
introduction of one infective mosquito or one case, unno­
ticed or unrecognized, may set off the chain reaction and 
result in a full-scale epidemic--or it may not, depending 
on the circumstances. If the imported mosquito bites only 
immune persons or dies before biting susceptibles, the virus 
does not become operative. Or if the imported case is not 
bitten by a female Aedes aegypti within the first three or 
four days of the attack, that case results in no others.
In the usual pattern of urban yellow fever (as opposed to 
jungle yellow fever, which is another story), the continued 
existence of the virus itself requires the constant trans­
mission back and forth from man to mosquito to man, and so 
on. Otherwise the disease will disappear completely. Only
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in areas where the climate is war" enough to permit year 
round activity of the mosquito can yellow fever be main­
tained as an endemic disease. In New Orleans, with the 
coming of cool weather and frost each winter, the mosquito 
ceased to be able to transmit the virus, and the disease 
spontaneously died out. But the close connections with 
Latin America facilitated its réintroduction in the summer 
of each year.
Unaware of the mosquito vector and its relation to 
the virus and man, medical thinkers before the twentieth 
century found it virtually impossible to account for the 
strange behavior of the disease in spreading from person to 
person and place to place without apparent rhyme or reason. 
Yellow fever's activity during warm weather and its cessa­
tion with the appearance of frost led to the belief that 
climate was somehow a factor in its development. Native- 
born persons in an area where yellow fever prevailed 
exhibited an immunity to the disease, while strangers pro­
vided the majority of victims. It was long believed that 
Creoles or natives were immune because they were accustomed 
to the climate. The real explanation, however, lies in 
their having contracted in childhood mild cases of yellow 
fever, of which they were never aware; and one attack, no
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
matter how mild, confers lasting immunity.
The symptoms and signs of yellow fever include a 
long list of physical reactions which may be present in 
different combinations and exhibit great variability in 
different cases. Some of the symptoms are essentially 
similar to those of other diseases (malaria, hepatitis, 
influenza, dengue, etc.) so that confusion in diagnosis, 
especially in mild cases, is highly possible. The illness 
begins with fever, together with slight or rigorous chills. 
The temperature early reaches 102° to 103°F, In the first 
two to five days of the disease, nausea, vomiting, con­
stipation, headache and muscular pain, especially in the 
legs and back, extreme prostration, and restlessness are 
characteristic. Within a few days the fever may rise to 
a maximum of 104°F«, seldom higher. In the acute stage of 
the disease, jaundice or yellowness of the skin ordinarily 
appears, along with passive hemorrhages from almost any 
part of the body--eyes, ears, nose, mouth, bladder, uterus. 
A serious sign, but one which does not invariably occur, is 
the so-called black vomit. The blood from hemorrhages with­
in the stomach is acted upon by stomach acids and the 
resulting product is the black vomit, which in appearance 
resembles coffee grounds. This material seems to gush
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7forth without any effort by the patient. Preceded by con­
vulsions or coma, death may result from the damage to the 
liver and kidneys, the organs principally affected by the 
disease. Or recovery may begin from one to two weeks after 
the beginning of the attack; convalescence ordinarily re­
quires several weeks.% Although the foregoing description 
is admittedly an oversimplification of yellow fever’s 
action, the general picture should provide a basis for 
understanding the terrifying nature and revolting symptoms 
of the deadly disease. Parson Theodore Clapp, who lived 
through a succession of yellow fever epidemics in 
nineteenth-century New Orleans, remarked that he found it 
almost impossible to sleep during the periods of pesti­
lence, so disturbed were his dreams by the agonizing sights 
of patients he had visited. His graphic description of a 
yellow fever victim could induce insomnia even today:
Often I have met and shook hands with some 
blooming, handsome young man today, and . . .
[later] I have been called to see him in the 
black vomit, with profuse hemorrhages from the 
mouth, nose, ears, eyes, and even the toes; 
the eyes prominent, glistening, yellow, and 
staring; the face discolored with orange color 
and dusky red.
Zphilip H. Manspn-Bahr (ed.). Manson's Tropical Dis­
eases , A Manual of the Diseases of Warm Climates (8th ed., 
London, 1925), 169-73; Merck Manual, 967-68.
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8The physiognomy of the yellow fever corpse is 
usually sad, sullen, and perturbed; the counten­
ance dark, mottled, livid, swollen, and stained 
with blood and black vomit; the veins of the 
face and whole body become distended, and look 
as if they were going to burst, . . .3
The characteristic jaundice or yellow tint of the 
skin gave rise to the now universally accepted name of the 
disease, yellow fever. But no other ailment has ever had 
so many different terms applied to it. In his classic 
work on the disease, George Augustin set forth a list of 
152 synonyms for yellow fever, compiled from American, 
English, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese sources. His 
list included such interesting appellations as American 
fever, American typhus, ardent fever, bilious putrid fever, 
bilious malignant fever, black vomit or vomito negro, 
maladie de la saison, maladie du diable, Yellow Jack, and 
Stranger's fever.^ In New Orleans there was a tendency to 
think of the pestilence in anthropomorphic terms as the 
disease became more and more common during the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Hence, popular names for yellow
3John Duffy (ed.), Parson Clapp of the Strangers 
Church of New Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1957), 95-97.
^George Augustin, History of Yellow Fever (New 
Orleans, 1909), 70-84.
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9fever developed, and newspaper editors and others frequently 
referred to that malady as "Bronze John on his Saffron 
Steed," "His Saffron Majesty," "The Saffron Warrior," and 
"The Saffron Scourge."
Whatever it might have been called at any given time, 
yellow fever always baffled the physicians in their attempts 
at treatment. Throughout the nineteenth century physicians 
employed various techniques and drugs for a time, and dis­
carded them one by one for still other patterns of therapy. 
Numerous observers remarked that some patients died and 
others recovered under every conceivable form of treatment. 
That form of therapy which worked rather well in one epi­
demic often failed completely in the next, and in various 
cases the same therapeutic method had different results.^ 
Still there is no specific treatment for yellow fever. 
Complete bed rest and good nursing care are considered of 
vital importance. Additional therapy may be employed, but 
it is designed primarily to alleviate the symptoms
^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XV 
(November, 1858), 731; William L. Robinson, The Diary of a 
Samaritan (New York, 1860), 77-78; Erasmus Darwin Fenner, 
History of the Epidemic Yellow Fever, at New Orleans, 
Louisiana, in 1853 (New York, 1854), 57-58. Hereinafter 
cited as Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever.
^Merck Manual, 969; Strong, Tropical Diseases, 900-
901.
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The long-standing medical issues regarding yellow 
fever have been partially solved in the twentieth century, 
but with the increasing knowledge of the disease has come 
an awareness of more and more unknowns relating to the nature 
of the virus and its sometimes inexplicable activity. In 
addition to the medical questions relative to yellow fever, 
some of which have been answered and others not, certain 
historical difficulties encountered by earlier yellow fever 
historians continue to present themselves. The origin and 
early history of the disease is by no means clear. Ap­
parently, it was unknown to Europeans before the discovery 
of the New World, Epidemics, later supposed to have been 
yellow fever, occurred in Vera Cruz and Santo Domingo 
between 1493 and 1496. Nineteenth-century opinion inclined 
toward accepting the southern portion of the western hemi­
sphere as the native clime of the disease. Even George 
Augustin, in his History of Yellow Fever published in 1909, 
declared that Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies 
might be considered "the original cradle of the awesome 
scourge." He had no patience with the opinion that Africa 
was yellow fever's place of origin, a hypothesis advanced 
from time to time in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, 
the most recent studies of the disease indicate a high
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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probability that yellow fever originated in Africa and that 
the disease, along with the Aedes aegypti, its transmitter, 
was introduced into the western hemisphere by vessels 
engaged in the Negro slave trade.^ That yellow fever in 
Negroes generally exhibits mild and rarely fatal effects 
is a factor which may be related to the African origin of 
the disease.
Transplanted to the New World from Africa, the 
yellow fever mosquito and the virus eventually gained a 
foothold in their new habitat. Exactly at what point this 
transfer was accomplished can never be determined, but 
apparently the first clearly recognized and definitely re­
corded yellow fever epidemics in the New World were those 
which occurred in Yucatan, Cuba, and Barbados in 1648, 
During the latter seventeenth century the disease establish­
ed itself in the West Indies, Central America, and South 
America. By the 1690's it began to appear in North America,
^Charles-Edward A. Winslow, The Conquest of Epidemic 
Disease, A Chapter in the History of Ideas (Princeton, N.J., 
1943), 193; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 85-130', 649; 
Strong, Tropical Diseases, 873; Josiah C. Trent (ed.), "The 
Men Who Conquered Yellow Fever," in Ashbel Smith, Yellow 
Fever in Galveston, Republic of Texas, 1839 . . . (Austin, 
1951), 85-86; see also Henry Rose Carter, Yellow Fever, An 
Epidemiological and Historical Study of its Place of 
Origin, edited by L. A. Carter and W. H. Frost (Baltimore, 
1931).
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and from time to time throughout the eighteenth century 
yellow fever was transmitted from Latin America to certain 
Atlantic port cities, particularly Charleston, New York, 
and Philadelphia,®
Occurrences of yellow fever in early colonial Louisi­
ana, as well as the date of the disease's first appearance 
in New Orleans, long have been subjects for historical 
speculation and disagreement, Joseph Jones, an eminent 
nineteenth-century Louisiana physician and prolific medical 
historian, carefully sifted through the evidence in an 
attempt to determine yellow fever's earliest history in 
Louisiana. He believed that the disease had been trans­
mitted occasionally in the very late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries to points on the American Gulf Coast 
through contacts with the West Indies where yellow fever 
prevailed. But he noted several factors which might have 
served to postpone the appearance of epidemic yellow fever 
in New Orleans: the long and tedious trip up the Missis­
sippi to the city, the sparse population, and the limited
8John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (Baton 
Rouge, 1953), 138-63; Wilson G. Smillie, Public Health, Its 
Promise for the Future, A Chronicle of the Development of 
Public Health in the United States, 1607-1914 (New York, 
1955), 37-38,
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commercial activity during the French colonial period. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Jones found it impossible to declare 
positively that the Saffron Scourge had never visited New 
Orleans under French rule. The record of disease in that 
city for a half-century after its establishment (1718) was 
"very imperfect." No medical journal or native medical 
work, which might have detailed the nature of prevailing 
diseases, ever appeared in French colonial Louisiana.
Jones wisely concluded that the mere absence of medical 
records failed to demonstrate the total absence of yellow 
fever.^
Admitting that little could be learned from the 
records about eighteenth-century epidemics, Alcee Fortier, 
one of Louisiana's major historians, asserted that the first 
trace of yellow fever in connection with Louisiana history 
was in the report of Governor Sauvolle's death at Fort 
Maurepas near Biloxi in August of 1701.^^ It is entirely 
possible, however, that the governor died of "tertian 
fever" (malaria) or some other unknown malady among the
9n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July, 
1879), 132-33, 146.
l^Alcee Fortier, Louisiana (3 vols., n.p., 1914), 
II, 661.
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sicknesses present in the settlement that summer.
A disease later supposed to be yellow fever appeared
in epidemic form at Biloxi in 1702 and 1704 and at Mobile
1 2
in 1704 and 1705. For a sixty-year period thereafter, no 
specific information is available on the subject of yellow 
fever in colonial Louisiana. Variable nomenclature and 
vague symptomatic descriptions of diseases in early records 
complicate the historian's problem of evaluating any par­
ticular epidemic. For example, in the interior of Louisiana 
a disease referred to as "Calenture" erupted in 1779 and 
made great ravages in the Spanish settlement of Galveztown 
on the Amite R i v e r . L i k e  yellow fever, this disease did
lljohn Duffy (ed.), The Rudolph Matas History of 
Medicine in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1958), I, 11-12. Here­
inafter cited as Medicine in La.
l^Bennet Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 
1853, with Topographical, Chronological and Historical 
Sketches of the Epidemics of New Orleans," Cohen's New 
Orleans Directory . . . of 1854 (New Orleans, 1854), 7;
N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July, 1879), 132; 
Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (4 vols.. New York, 
1904), I, 51.
In relating yellow fever to Louisiana history, it 
should be noted that in Havana, Cuba, in 1706, that disease 
claimed the life of Pierre le Moyne, Sieur d'Iberville, one 
of Louisiana's founding fathers. Fortier, A History of 
Louisiana, I, 48-49.
13v. M. Scramuzza, "Galveztown, A Spanish Settlement 
of Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XIII (October, 1930), 576-77.
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not decline until cool weather; unlike yellow fever, it 
first appeared in late April--a bit early for the Saffron 
Scourge. According to an army surgeon writing in 1899, 
calentura was a name applied by Cubans to a specific fever, 
symptomatically similar to yellow fever, sometimes existing 
simultaneously with it, but essentially different. He 
noted that a severe case of calentura might easily be con­
fused with yellow f e v e r . G e o r g e  Augustin, on the other 
hand, listed calentura as one of yellow fever's many 
synonyms, one which probably had originated from the notion 
that heat was a basic cause of the fever. Actually, the 
term, which described a symptom rather than a disease, could 
have referred to any one of a number of infectious diseases 
characterized by unusually high fever and d e l i r i u m .
Hence, we are left in doubt as to the exact nature of the 
illness in Galveztown in 1779.
The various years suggested by medical men and 
historians for the arrival of yellow fever in New Orleans 
include 1765, 1766, 1767, 1769, 1791, 1793, and 1796. That
l^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., LIT (September, 1899),
144-45.
l^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 73; Duffy (ed.). 
Medicine in La., I, 200.
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1796 represents the first unquestionable yellow fever epi­
demic in the Crescent City has been generally conceded by 
most writers on the subject. Certainly it was the first 
officially recorded one. Whether that epidemic also marks 
the initial appearance of the disease in New Orleans is 
the debatable issue.
In 1765 Mobile and Pensacola suffered yellow fever 
attacks, and New Orleans experienced an exceedingly un­
healthy fall season that year. Yellow fever might well 
have been present, but there is no record of the specific 
diseases involved in that sickly season. In 1766, the 
year Antonio de Ulloa arrived with troops from Cuba to 
take over the colony for Spain, New Orleans suffered from 
an epidemic said to have closely resembled yellow fever.
At least one historical work, without stating the source 
or supplying details, set forth 1767 as the date of yellow 
fever’s first appearance in New O r l e a n s .
l^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July, 
1879), 146; Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana (4th ed., 
4 vols.. New Orleans, 1903), II, 133; George W. Cable,
The Creoles of Louisiana (New York, 1889), 291; John 
Smith Kendall, History of New Orleans (3 vols., Chicago, 
1922), I, 174.
17james Alexander Robertson (ed.), Louisiana Under 
the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States, 1785- 
1807 (2 vols., Cleveland, 1911), I, 175n.
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A sketch of epidemics appearing in De Bow's Review 
in 1846 stated: "The Yellow Fever, according to tradition,
was first introduced into New Orleans in 1769, by a British 
vessel from Africa with slaves."^® Dr. Joseph Jones, how­
ever, found no evidence to indicate that yellow fever had 
been introduced into the city by slave s h i p s , B e n n e t  
Dowler, another outstanding nineteenth-century medical man 
and student of yellow fever's history, doubted that the epi­
demic of 1769 had been yellow fever. It was impossible, he 
declared, to determine the character of the disease in 
question from available records. Furthermore, said Dowler, 
within a single generation after 1769, the scourge had 
appeared in the unquestionable 1796 epidemic, and those 
persons writing soon after that epidemic who called it the 
first appearance of that disease could have questioned 
living witnesses about any previous occurrences. And, he 
continued, they "would have been contradicted, had they 
made erroneous statements as to the period of its in­
vasion."^0 Although Dowler was apparently willing to settle
ISDe Bow's Commercial Review, II (July, 1846), 73.
l^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July, 
1879), 132.
Z^Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," loc. 
cit., 8.
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for 1796 as the date of yellow fever's first appearance as 
well as the first epidemic, Joseph Jones, writing some 
twenty years later, felt that a careful consideration of 
all available testimony indicated that 1796 definitely was 
not the first occurrence of the fever, but rather that it 
certainly had been present to some degree in 1791, 1794, 
and 1795.21
Around 1840 Dr. Daniel Drake, eminent mid-western 
physician and medical author, visited New Orleans, made 
personal inquiries about the first yellow fever invasion, 
and decided upon 1791 as the fateful year, basing his con­
clusion on the testimony of "a venerable citizen” of the 
city. As John Duffy has pointed out in The Rudolph Matas 
History of Medicine in Louisiana, the testimony in this 
case, based on memory forty or fifty years after the fact, 
is hardly i n f a l l i b l e . ^ 2  The researches of Erasmus Darwin 
Fenner, active nineteenth-century Louisiana physician, 
editor, and medical historian, led him to conclude that
21n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July, 
1879), 146.
22Joseph Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs (3 
vols, in 4, New Orleans, 1876-1890), III, pt. 1, cxxxv; 
Duffy (ed.). Medicine in La., I, 206.
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the yellow pestilence first prevailed in New Orleans in 
1793. In the 1840's he discussed the problem-with five 
elderly gentlemen who had settled in the Crescent City 
between 1797 and 1804, and all commented that the disease 
was "spoken of familiarly" when they first arrived. One of 
them told Fenner that he distinctly remembered having heard 
an eminent physician frequently remark in the early 1800's 
that 1793 was the first yellow fever year.^3 Here again 
one must raise the question of human memory's possible 
unreliability many years after the event. On the other hand, 
Berquin-DuvalIon, who traveled through Louisiana in 1802, 
wrote: "This disease has now for seven years, made every
summer, great ravages at New-Orleans. . . . "  On the basis 
of his inquiries, he stated that yellow fever previously 
had been unknown in that city,^^ that is, before 1796.
Varying accounts and opinions, conflicting evidence
^^Erasmus Darwin Fenner, "The Yellow Fever Quaran­
tine at New Orleans," Transactions of the American Medical 
Association, II (1849), 624.
Z^Berquin-Duvallon, Vue de la Colonie Espagnole du 
Mississippi ou des Provinces de la Louisiane . « . en 
1'Annee 1802 (Paris, 1803), trans. by John Davis as Travels 
in Louisiana and the Floridas, in the year, 1802 . . . (New 
York, 1806), 114, 118. Hereinafter cited as Berquin- 
Duvallon, Travels.
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and testimony could be cited further; the foregoing should 
be sufficient to demonstrate the basic problem. In the 
final analysis, it can only be said that some yellow fever 
cases undoubtedly occurred at various points along the 
Gulf Coast and in the city of New Orleans in the years 
before 1796, The fact that the epidemic of that year at­
tacked newcomers in preference to native or long-resident 
New Orleanians indicates a fairly extensive period prior 
to 1796 during which immunity might have been acquired 
through mild attacks of the disease. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of clear records on the subject before that date, 
the appearance of the Saffron Scourge in previous years 
must remain a matter for speculation. Suffice it to say 
that 1796 marks the first visitation of yellow fever in 
New Orleans widespread enough to attract much attention, 
to call forth official mention, and to be identified with 
the pestilence of Philadelphia and other eastern and 
southern Atlantic seaport cities, where it had prevailed 
intermittently since the late seventeenth century.
For the most part, the history of yellow fever in 
Louisiana is synonymous with the history of yellow fever 
in New Orleans. Any study of the disease in Louisiana must 
necessarily concentrate on the Crescent City as the center
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of its pestilential activity. Always the most populous 
community in the state, New Orleans also served as the 
natural port of entry for the malady, introduced by infect­
ed persons or infected mosquitoes in ships coming from 
centers of yellow fever endemicity in Latin America. 
Essentially an urban disease transmitted by a household 
mosquito, yellow fever did not spread easily in rural areas. 
A certain concentration of population was required to sup­
port a full-fledged outbreak.
After Louisiana became an American territory and 
later a state, its population steadily increased during the 
first half of the nineteenth century as Americans and 
European immigrants came in to settle the area. From time 
to time, the villages along the waterways of Louisiana in 
constant communication with New Orleans experienced visita­
tions of the pestilence as it spread from the Crescent City 
through the medium of infected persons or mosquitoes. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the development 
of railroad transportation facilitated the dissemination 
of the infection to various points around the state. 
Unquestionably, the impact of a yellow fever epidemic on a 
small or medium-sized community resulted in terror, con­
fusion, disorder, and destruction, perhaps to an even
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greater extent than in the Crescent City itself, with a 
sizeable immune population and an acceptance of the disease 
as a customary foe. Nevertheless, for the state of Louisi­
ana, New Orleans served as the original host to the tropical 
fever. If that city enjoyed a relatively disease-free 
summer and autumn, the remainder of the state had almost no 
cause for worry; if New Orleans experienced a severe epi­
demic, other Louisiana towns might or might not be affected, 
depending largely on circumstantial factors involved in the 
transmission of the disease.
Hence, New Orleans was the yellow fever capital of 
the state, and in a very real sense, the yellow fever 
capital of the entire South because of its position as the 
center of trade with Latin America. Frequently, the wide­
spread outbreaks of yellow fever -in the southern states 
could be traced to an initial epidemic in the Crescent City. 
On this basis alone, it seems justifiable to devote the 
greatest attention to the fever’s activity in New Orleans. 
But there is still another fundamental reason. Source 
material on the epidemics of the Crescent City is available 
in abundance; whereas, for the outbreaks in the small 
interior communities of Louisiana, definite information is 
sparse and often lacking altogether. New Orleans served as
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the center of the articulate medical community, associated 
with the early medical schools and medical journals; and 
although the journals, particularly the New Orleans Medi­
cal and Surgical Journal, received and published com­
munications concerning yellow fever's activities in 
localities throughout Louisiana and in other states as 
well, the bulk of material related to the disease in New 
Orleans. Furthermore, the contributions from medical men 
of the interior often failed to include the specific de­
tails that are so vital to the historian.
In this study, then, an attempt has been made to 
relate the history of yellow fever throughout the state, 
to introduce material on epidemics in smaller communities 
whenever such pertinent information has been available, 
and to achieve some insight into the reactions of various 
Louisiana towns to the outbreaks of the yellow pesti­
lence; New Orleans, however, provides the focal point for 
the telling of Louisiana's story of yellow fever.
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CHAPTER II 
A HALF-CENTURY OF PESTILENCE, 1796-1847
During the first half-century of yellow fever's 
history in Louisiana, the Saffron Scourge clearly held the 
advantage in the age-old conflict between man and disease, 
and the pestilence seemed to gain in virulence with each 
succeeding epidemic. With epidemiological thought bogged 
down in theories sixteen-hundred years old and medical 
science in its infancy, physicians were scarcely able to 
cope with a disease whose nature, causation, and trans­
mission they failed to comprehend. The germ theory and 
the mosquito doctrine were yet to come.
Furthermore, as the fever was reintroduced into the 
Crescent City summer after summer in the years following 
1796, a fatalistic acceptance of its frequent recurrence 
became the prevailing attitude in New Orleans, The policy 
of the city government in matters of health was generally 
characterized by indifference and neglect. Physicians, 
commercial interests, and New Orleans newspapers fostered 
the delusion that New Orleans, in comparison with other
24
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cities was relatively healthy, and in the absence of ac­
curate mortality records, that delusion readily gained 
widespread acceptance within the community. Under such 
circumstances, one could hardly expect an enlightened pro­
gram of public health. In the darkness of ignorance and 
indifference then, periodically yellow fever ruled the 
city in a summer and autumn carnival of horrors.
Although the earliest history of the disease in 
Louisiana, as everywhere else, is virtually impossible to 
unravel and reconstruct with absolute certainty, one may 
accept the New Orleans epidemic of 1796 as the first 
definitely recorded yellow fever outbreak in that city.
Yet the apparent imn.unity of many Creoles exhibited in that 
epidemic indicates that the malady had been present to some 
degree in the area during previous years. In a series of 
letters to his wife, Baron Joseph Xavier Pontalba set forth 
an informative account of the epidemic of 1796, which to­
gether with the brief reports of the Spanish Attorney-gen­
eral and the Intendant, constitute the only available con­
temporary records of that first widespread visitation of 
yellow fever in the Crescent City. According to Intendant
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Juan Ventura Morales, the epidemic broke out in late 
August.1 On September 6 Pontalba wrote his wife that "the 
maladies are increasing here, and they are now more danger­
ous than e v e r T h r o u g h o u t  September, October, and early 
November his daily letters were filled with commentary on 
the raging pestilence. On several occasions the Baron 
noted an apparent abatement of the epidemic only to cor­
rect himself a few days later when the disease flared again.
From the very beginning Pontalba observed that the 
fever singled out the unacclimated, the newcomers--espec­
ially Americans and Englishmen--in preference to the 
Creole and long-resident population. Repeatedly he reas­
sured his wife that the disease presented little danger 
except to strangers, its principal victims.^ Intendant 
Morales also commented on the fever's peculiarity in pre­
ferring foreigners to the natives.^ Such an obvious
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
^Joseph X. Pontalba to wife, September 6, 1796, in 
"Letters of Baron Joseph X. Pontalba to his Wife, 1796" 
(W.P.A, trans, typescript, Louisiana State University 
Library, Baton Rouge), 274,
3jbid., September 6, 11, 24, 30, November 3, 1796, 
pp, 274, 284, 312, 323, 393.
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
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preference is a fairly good sign that yellow fever was not 
entirely new to the area.
As to the nature and origin of the fever, there 
seemed to be a considerable amount of doubt and uncertain­
ty, indicating that its appearance in epidemic form was 
something new. Pontalba asserted that "the maladies" 
resulted from an overflow of the river on the opposite 
shore, which caused "subsequent fetid exhalations to be 
given off by the earth" as it dried out. Attorney-gen­
eral Don Gabriel Fonvergne, in a report to the council, 
blamed "the stagnated waters that remain in the gutters 
. . . the little cleanliness and care given to them, the 
dead animals abandoned on them, and on the margin of the 
river" for the contamination of the atmosphere and the 
spread of infection.^ , This concept of "fetid exhalations" 
or noxious effluvia arising from animal and vegetable de­
composition was a common epidemiological tenet of the 
period, and would be echoed in medical and lay philosophy 
of fever causation for almost a century to come.
^Pontalba to wife, September 6, 11, 1796, loc. cit., 
274, 284; Records of the City Council of New Orleans, Book 
4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796 (W.P.A. trans. type­
script, Louisiana State Museum Library, New Orleans).
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In mid-September Pontalba reported to his wife the 
opinion of New Orleans physicians that the sickness was 
"the yellow fever of Philadelphia," but expressed his dis­
agreement with that explanation, A few days later he wrote: 
"In common accord, people now believe that it is the same 
yellow fever that has been breaking out every year in 
Philadelphia, and which the Americans have brought along 
with them," Apparently, tontalba remained unconvinced, 
for in late October he remarked, "I do not understand the 
nature of that deadly malady, but I think it to be a kind 
of pestilent f e v e r , i n  a dispatch of October 31 the 
Intendant summed up the several views of the epidemic which 
"has terrified and still keeps in a state of consternation 
the whole population of this town," Some called it "a 
malignant fever," others, "the black vomit," and still 
others believed it to be the yellow fever of Philadelphia,^
Confronted by a relatively new and terrifying malady, 
the people of New Orleans employed a variety of measures in 
the hope of staving off the disease, Pontalba commented on 
the great fear among the people, especially the women, who
^Pontalba to wife, September 19, 24, October 30, 
1796, loc. cj^., 300,312, 385.
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
carried bits of garlic in their clothing, and burned anunal 
skins, horns, hoofs, and tar to ward off the pestilential 
effluvia. In one letter he gave a full description of his 
precautionary measures: ”I always had camphor on me,” he 
wrote, "and also much vinegar; two demi-johns of the latter 
were used to sprinkle my apartments, , , , My servants, 
themselves, were soaked all over with the vinegar. I often 
chewed the quinquinia . . ." and, he added thoughtfully,
"I was doing all this for you. . . . "  The Baron attributed 
his own immunity and that of several friends to their 
chewing of "quinquinia" or quinine, which he thought helped 
to hold off the infection.®
In October Pontalba told about a recipe by Dr. Mas- 
devall, physician to the King of Spain, which was being 
circulated among the people of New Orleans as a preventive 
against the sickness. He felt it had been largely unsuc­
cessful. Intendant Morales, on the other hand, credited 
the recipe with "marvellous effects," attributing to it the 
relative immunity of the Spaniards and the Negroes.^
^Pontalba to wife, September 15, 28, October 30, 
1796, loc. cit., 291, 321, 386.
9lbid., October 10, 1796, p. 344; Gayarre, History 
of Louisiana, III, 375.
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Baronne Carondelet, the Governor's wife, placed her faith 
in the preventive powers of herb-tea compound and sarsa­
parilla .
Apparently Pontalba had little regard for the phy­
sicians' efforts at treating the fever's victims. When it 
seemed on one occasion that the epidemic was abating, he 
wrote: "The doctors pretend having found a remedy. . . ."
Pontalba, however, attributed the declining force of the 
disease to "the change in the weather." The physicians con­
tended that only "the emetics and the vesicatories" had 
arrested the epidemic, but the Baron refused to give any 
such credit to those gentlemen. He then cited several 
cases of successful recovery without any of the "so-called 
succors." Attorney-general Fonvergne reported to the city 
council that the "most up-to-date care and remedies" had 
been without results.
The epidemic of 1796 was without question a severe 
one. However, exact mortality figures are not available; 
no bureau of vital statistics, no board of health, no
lOpontalba to wife, October 15, 1796, loc. cit., 358
l^Ibid., September 14, 1796, p. 290; Records of the 
City Council of New Orleans, Book 4079, Document 259, 
October 21, 1796.
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systematic measures existed at that time for keeping such 
records. Prevailing from late August until early November, 
the Saffron Scourge levied a fairly heavy tribute on the 
Crescent City, In the second week of September Pontalba 
reported eight or nine victims per day. Later he wrote: 
"The doctors and the monks had been keeping the true num­
ber of deaths secret," For a time the death toll amounted 
to fifteen or seventeen deaths per day. In the last week 
of September the Baron reported that after an apparent 
decline the malady had continued to rage, claiming the 
!'ives of nine or ten Englishmen in a single day. By mid- 
October the main force of the epidemic was spent, but as 
late as November 6 the fever still caused "some ravage," 
The following day, November 7, Pontalba wrote that "we are 
now predicting the near end of the epidemic," and after 
that date he made no further mention of the pestilence in 
his l e t t e r s , T h e  arrival of cold weather obviously cur­
tailed the activities of the yellow fever mosquito.
On October 31 the Intendant stated that the parish 
registry listed nearly 200 deaths from all causes since
IZpontalba to wife, September 12, 15, 24, October 
13, November 6, 7, 1796, loc. cit., 285, 291, 312, 353, 
399, 402.
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the outbreak of the epidemic. This figure did not include 
those who died outside the town limits or "the protestants 
who perished (and they were n u m e r o u s ) S i n c e  the fever 
preferred strangers to Creoles, the number of Protestant 
victims probably outnumbered the Catholics by a consider­
able margin. According to the Attorney-general in a report 
dated October 21, the "cruel epidemic" had "led to the 
grave more than 250 persons.
The population of New Orleans in 1796 probably was 
about 6,000, representing a two-fold increase over the 
figure of 1769, and including large numbers of strangers 
particularly liable to the f e v e r . E v e n  if the Creole 
population possessed a degree of acquired immunity. New 
Orleans still provided a fertile field for a virulent epi­
demic of the Saffron Scourge. Raging from late August 
until early November, the epidemic covered a period of at 
least ten weeks, during which there must have been several 
deaths each day. On one occasion, Pontalba mentioned a
l^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
l^Records of the City Council of New Orleans, Book
4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796.
l^Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc. cit., 9; N, 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII
(July, 1879), 147.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
daily death count of eight or nine victims, and on another, 
as many as fifteen to seventeen per day. Even if this 
rate prevailed for only a short period, one might con­
jecture at least two to five fatalities per day for the 
remaining time. On that basis, a total of 350 to 400 
yellow fever deaths for the entire period is probably a 
fair estimate.
This first great visitation of the pestilence in 
its side-effects on the life of the community set a pat­
tern which would become a repetitive process during a 
century of epidemics to come. A general exodus from the 
city, a moratorium on business, a vain appeal for sani­
tary measures, and the expression of man's depravity as 
well as his humanitarianism invariably accompanied Yellow 
Jack's ravages in New Orleans.
As the fever gradually spread through the city in 
1796, many persons hoping to escape its attack fled the 
community. The émigrés sought refuge in the back country 
or left the colony entirely for regions far to the north. 
Pontalba, in commenting on this flight of the unac­
climated, revealed the sorry plight of business in New 
Orleans: "The city is almost deserted; my storehouses.
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which had all been rented, are now left v a c a n t . I n  
the following years New Orleans commercial interests suf­
fered untold losses from Yellow Jack's visits, losses so 
acute that every effort was put forth to conceal the 
existence of the disease from the people of the city and 
the outside world until the epidemic could no longer he 
hidden.
Those persons who did not wish to leave the city 
altogether but desired some measure of safety for them­
selves and their families, or who simply wanted a tempo­
rary respite from the depression of a city in despair, 
retired to resorts across the lake or to homes in the 
country or across the river. Along with his account of 
the grim aspects of the epidemic of 1796, Baron Pontalba 
also described his social activities during the pesti­
lence, which included frequent houseparties at a friend's 
plantation across the river. Escaping from the plague, a 
large group of people amused themselves with pranks, jokes, 
and games. It is all slightly reminiscent of Boccaccio's 
ten who sought diversion in the telling of tales while 
hiding from the Black Death, In one letter the Baron
IGpontalba to wife, October 13, 1796, loc, cit.,
353.
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described a party so noisy and wild that on retiring to 
his room he found it necessary to barricade the door with 
a large table to keep the crowd from dragging him out.
He justified the pranksters by pointing out that they 
"needed the air of the country, the maladies in town having 
driven them all into a state of deep melancholy," While 
in the city one heard nothing but talk of the epidemic, 
he continued, but across the river "all news of that sort 
is taboo, and they give themselves up to play," which in­
cluded riding, racing, and "other extravagant things,
In another letter Pontalba described more specifi­
cally some of the amusing "pleasantries" engaged in at one 
of the houseparties: "The ladies, on one side, found
pleasure in knotting my bed sheets together, [and] in 
throwing water at me , , , while I, on the other, smudged 
their bed clothes with lamp-black, so that they became 
smeared all over with it." In further retaliation he 
applied a foul-smelling drug powder to their pillows, threw 
water at them, dropped pieces of wood down their chimneys 
at night, made holes in their chamber-pots, and engaged 
in other forms of devilment. Probably realizing that such
l^Ibid., October 9, 1796, p, 342.
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goings-on with the ladies might provoke a spark of jeal­
ousy in his wife, who was absent from the scene, the Baron 
added that after paying them back in kind he became bored 
with such things and ceased to participate--"since all 
such pranks, mon-amie, cannot fill the void of my days, 
being only amusing for a time.*'^® Undoubtedly in the 
course of every epidemic which occurred there were groups 
of individuals who sought relief from the pressures of 
fear and desolation by some means of divers ion--drinking, 
joking, or playing games. Certainly no account of such 
diversion is quite as lively as Pontalba'sl
New Orleans' unsanitary condition, noted so often 
in travel accounts, was linked with the prevalence of dis­
ease from an early period, in conformity with the theory 
of atmospheric contamination. Filth was blamed repeatedly 
as a basic cause of disease, and from time to time through­
out most of the nineteenth century, appeals for sanitary 
reform came from newspapers, medical societies, and medi­
cal journals. Almost nothing was accomplished, however, 
until the latter nineteenth century. Yellow fever is not 
a filth disease, but sanitary improvements relating to
IBlbid., October 15, 1796, p. 358.
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drainage and water supply, when they finally came, cer­
tainly helped to eliminate the disease by removing the 
conditions conducive to mosquito breeding. Suffice it to 
say here that the Attorney-general in 1796 associated the 
epidemic with the filthy gutters and decaying animal 
bodies on the river bank, and, moreover, he suggested 
that the city council ameliorate those conditions to pre­
vent future e p i d e m i c s . Theu, as in later years, the 
recommendations resulted in little effective action.
The epidemic of 1796 and every epidemic which 
followed presented the opportunity for this question to 
be raised: Is man inherently good or bad, altruistic or
depraved? Epidemics created conditions which gave men the 
chance to rise to the heights of heroism or to sink to 
the depths of callousness. And as might be expected from 
the paradox that is man, there were examples of both 
extremes. In the over-all picture it seems that the people 
of New Orleans generally rose to the occasion and evidenced 
a high degree of benevolence, almost strikingly in con­
trast to the stereotyped picture of moral disintegration in 
a plague-stricken city. In the very first yellow fever
19Records of the City Council of New Orleans, Book 
4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796.
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epidemic, Pontalba recorded an incident which can be scored 
to the dark side of man's nature. He told about the dis­
covery of five bodies "in the backways merely covered with 
leaves, the trouble not having been taken to even bury
them." The Baron commented indignantly: "Such terrible
20negligence is enough to bring on the plague. . . ."
Similar cases in which bodies of yellow fever victims were 
abandoned, sometimes even by relatives, also occurred in 
later epidemics. However, one may safely say that these 
cases represented the exception rather than the rule.
On the other side of the ledger, Pontalba indirect­
ly recorded some examples of strength and humanitarianism.
He himself in ministering to the needs of several friends
victimized by the malady showed a considerable amount of 
benevolence and fearlessness. And Governor Carondelet, 
believing it might intensify the general panic if he left 
town, courageously resisted for a time the demands of his 
friends and his wife that he retire to the other s h o r e .
There is no evidence that any official or organized mea­
sures were adopted for the care and relief of indigent
ZOpontalba to wife, September 21, 1796, loc, cit.,
306.
^^Ibid., September 22, October 7, 30, 1796, pp.
307, 338, 385-88.
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victims in this initial surppise attack. Later, as the 
population increased and yellow fever became a familiar 
enemy, both official and unofficial emergency measures 
occasionally were adopted for the relief of the indigent 
sick during an epidemic season.
Some few cases of yellow fever probably occurred 
during the next two years, but not until 1799 did it recur 
in epidemic form. Virtually no evidence exists relative 
to this particular outbreak, but that it was a severe one 
is indicated by a letter to the city council from Attorney- 
general Don Pedro Dulcidio Barran written in January, 1800. 
The public had been terribly frightened by the dreadful 
epidemic of the previous summer, he reported, and they 
feared a possible repeat performance. Imploring the aid 
of the administration to prevent or at least "to minimize 
the dreadfulness of the calamity that justly terrifies 
this community,” he recommended certain "pressing and
essential" precautions, including sanitary reforms and
29quarantine measures. No mortality statistics are
22Records of the City Council of New Orleans and 
Documents Pertaining to the Government of Louisiana, 1800 
to 1803, Book 4088, Document 337, pp. 9-16 (W.P.A, trans. 
typescript, Louisiana State Museum Library, New Orleans).
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available for the epidemic of 1799, but apparently it was 
serious enough to provoke an even greater public reaction 
than the epidemic of 1796, if the Attorney-general's 
letter is a fair indication.
Although the records of yellow fever's visits in 
the early 1800's are rather sketchy and sometimes contra­
dictory, during the first two decades of the century New 
Orleans experienced at least five major outbreaks of the 
disease: 1804, 1809, 1811, 1817, and 1819, Practically
all the nineteenth-century doctor-historians, some of 
whom had access to records no longer extant, listed these 
years in their outlines of epidemics. Various writers 
have cited other dates as years in which the fever pre­
vailed, but these outbreaks do not seem to rank in the 
same category with the more devastating ones. Sufficient 
evidence, however, does exist for considering 1808 another 
rather critical year. Some cases probably occurred in 
New Orleans every single year from 1796 to 1817; and no 
year between 1817 and 1861 passed without a few recorded 
cases.
In August of 1804, less than eight months after 
the American acquisition of Louisiana, yellow fever again 
appeared in New Orleans, and, finding a bountiful supply
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of unacclimated individuals, subjected the city to a 
three-month period of death and desolation. In his of­
ficial letters Governor William C, C, Claiborne outlined 
the course of the epidemic and thus may be credited with 
providing the most comprehensive account of the pesti­
lence of 1804. By August 10 the fever had appeared, but 
the city was not yet considered "generally unhealthy."
On August 25 Claiborne's secretary, who fell victim to 
the scourge a few weeks later, wrote that the disease had 
carried off a number of "Americans, Strangers to the 
climate."23 The fever continued to increase its ravages 
during late August and September, and in his letters the 
Governor commented repeatedly on the malignant disease 
called yellow fever which was "particularly fatal" to 
Americans and other strangers. Having suffered a violent 
attack of the scourge early in the epidemic, Claiborne 
remarked, ". . . I am represented as the only American who
23william C. C. Claiborne to James Wilkinson, 
August 10, 1804, Dunbar Rowland (ed,). Official Letter 
Books of William C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816 (6 vols., 
Jackson, Mississippi, 1917), II, 306; Joseph Briggs to 
James Madison, August 25, 1804, ibid., 306-307; Claiborne 
to Madison, September 17, 1804, ibid., 337,
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had yet recovered,Apparently the disease did not con­
fine itself solely to strangers, for in mid-September the 
physicians of New Orleans began to observe cases of the 
prevailing fever among the "old Inhabitants,"^^
As if the problems of coping with the epidemic were 
not enough, another disturbing element appeared on the 
scene, perhaps as a corollary to the disorder occasioned 
by widespread disease. In September Claiborne wrote Presi­
dent Jefferson that the general distress of the city had 
been "considerably heightened by an alarm of Insurrection 
among the Negro's." Whether or not sufficient cause 
existed for such alarm, a "general Spirit of Insubordina­
tion" had been manifested, he added, and several armed 
Negroes had been found traveling about at night, intensi­
fying the element of fear already present in New Orleans, 
Although the Governor did not believe there was adequate
24ciaiborne to Thomas Jefferson, August 29, 30, 
1804, Clarence E, Carter (ed.). The Territory of Orleans, 
1803-1812 (Vol, IX of The Territorial Papers of the United 
States, Washington, 1940), 279-80, 286; Claiborne to 
Albert Gallatin, August 31, 1804, Rowland (ed,), Claiborne 
Letter Books, II, 314; Claiborne to Madison, September 8, 
1804, ibid,, 328.
25claiborne to Jefferson, September 13, 1804,
Carter (ed.). Territory of Orleans, 294.
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basis for alarm, he strengthened the night patrols and 
ordered the city militia and volunteers to be prepared for 
action.26 Apparently the insurrection failed to material­
ize as the letters contain no further mention of the 
subject. On at least one other occasion, during the 
yellow fever epidemic of 1837 in Alexandria, a slave up­
rising planned in the midst of the pestilence was thwarted 
by the early discovery of the plot and the lynching of its 
leaders.27
The epidemic of 1804 was indeed a source of heavy 
affliction for the American governor of the territory.
Not only did Claiborne suffer a debilitating attack of 
yellow fever himself, but in late September he lost both 
his wife and his young daughter to the dreadful m a l a d y . ^8 
Although no mortality records are available for this 
period, the extent of the fatalities must have been exceed­
ingly great. Claiborne believed that "more than a third
26ciaiborne to Jefferson, September 18, 1804, ibid.,
298.
27r , f . McGuire, Diary (Louisiana State University 
Archives, Baton Rouge), September-October, 1837.
28ciaiborne to Jefferson, September 27, 1804, Carter 
(ed.). Territory of Orleans, 299.
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of the Americans who emigrated thither in the course of 
the last 12 months have perished, and nearly every Person 
from Europe who arrived in the City during the Summer 
M o n t h s . "29 A New Orleans physician observed that "almost 
every person arriving from the country" experienced an 
attack. He also noted that with few exceptions the dis­
ease confined its activities to strangers, "Had it been 
otherwise," the doctor continued, "the distress would have 
been dreadfull i n d e e d . "^0 Another observer in New Orleans 
wrote in late October that the "calamitous Sickness goes 
on as direful in its effects as ever," Confirming the 
high fatility rate among strangers, he reported seven 
deaths among one group of nine persons who had come down 
river to the city,^^
On a brief excursion into the country in mid-October, 
Governor Claiborne had occasion to observe "the Humanity of 
several Planters who by detaining at their Houses several
29ciaiborne to Jefferson, October 5, 1804, ibid.,
309,
30o, H, Spencer to Nathaniel Evans, October 5, 1804, 
Nathaniel Evans Family Papers (Louisiana State University 
Archives, Baton Rouge),
31James Sterrett to Nathaniel Evans, October 23, 
1804, ibid.
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Americans destined for this City . . , probably rescued 
them from sudden death,” During the last days of October 
the malady still raged in New Orleans, but by November 4 
the Governor reported to President Jefferson his belief 
that "the Fever had entirely Abated in this City, and 
Industry & Commerce seem to have revived.
Until the latter nineteenth century, newspapers, 
not only in New Orleans but in any town stricken with 
epidemic disease, adopted a policy of ignoring its pres­
ence as long as possible, then minimizing its importance 
if commenting at all, and finally declaring the epidemic
3 0
ended--often prematurely. In the early period the jour­
nals frequently avoided direct commentary altogether and 
only indicated the existence of the disease in published 
bills of mortality and obituary notices. Such a policy 
was of course designed to prevent or at least to hinder
32ciaiborne to Madison, October 16, 1804, William 
C. C. Claiborne Letterbook, 1804-05 (Louisiana State Uni­
versity Archives, Baton Rouge); Sterrett to Nathaniel 
Evans, October 29, 1804, Nathaniel Evans Family Papers; 
Claiborne to Jefferson, November 4, 1804, Carter (ed.). 
Territory of Orleans, 319.
33see John Duffy, "A Sidelight on Colonial News­
papers," The Historian, XVIII (Spring, 1956), 230-48,
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the isolation of the community by other towns, which 
ordinarily cut off communications and commerce with the 
infected center as soon as the news of an epidemic leaked 
out. Usually it was only a matter of time until the word 
spread through the city, whence it was carried to other 
areas by the fleeing émigrés. The subterfuge of the jour­
nals, instead of actually helping the situation, ultimately 
created for them a widespread reputation of hypocrisy and 
unreliability.,
The Louisiana Gazette of New Orleans, following the 
accepted journalistic practice in 1804, avoided the subject 
of the pestilence. From August to November the newspaper 
occasionally noted the death of an individual from "the 
Prevailing sickness" and published several poems in memory 
of its victims. In the issue of September 28, which re­
ported the death of Mrs. Elizabeth Claiborne, the Governor’s 
Lady, the editors explained the temporary suspension of 
the Gazette, attributing it to "sickness" and expressing 
the hope that as the healthy season approached regular pub­
lication could be resumed.
In December of 1804 Governor Claiborne presented to
3^New Orleans Louisiana Gazette, August-November, 
1804; September 28, 1804.
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the Legislative Council a plan submitted to him by Presi­
dent Jefferson for the prevention of future epidemics. 
Observing that the geographical position of New Orleans, 
the gateway to the great Mississippi Valley, destined it 
to become a major commercial center, the President feared 
that epidemic disease would constitute a serious drawback 
to its growth and prosperity. Since the fever failed to 
spread to the "thin-built parts" of town, Jefferson suggest­
ed that the expansion of the city proceed along the lines 
of a checkerboard with the white squares left open and 
planted with trees. Although never effected, his suggestion 
does indicate that New Orleans' reputation as a yellow 
fever center was established almost from the beginning of 
its existence as an American city.^^ Another commentary 
on its growing reputation for insalubrity came from a resi­
dent of Bayou Sara who wrote in early 1805 that he would 
not even consider moving with his family to New Orleans-- 
"The Yellow fever which annually has visited that place for­
bade an idea of that kind."^^ The pestilence had rapidly
35Cayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 36-37; Duffy 
(ed.). Medicine in La., I, 348.
3&David Bradford to David Redick, July 1, 1805,
David Bradford Letters (Louisiana Sfate University Archives, 
Baton Rouge).
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made a name for itself in the Crescent City as a visitor 
to be expected annually, and during certain years unpre- 
dictably to spread a blanket of malignancy across the city, 
In spite of the attendant dangers, the lure of the Louisi­
ana frontier continued to attract large numbers of immi­
grants from other portions of America and from Europe as 
well. In the seven years between 1803 and 1810, the popu­
lation of the territory increased from approximately
50.000 to more than 76,000, and that of New Orleans from
8.000 to nearly 25,000.^7
The Crescent City seems to have escaped a drastic­
ally widespread flare-up of yellow fever during the years 
between 1804 and 1811, although 1809 is listed in most 
historical accounts as a year in which the fever prevailed 
to a greater extent than usual. Except for reporting the 
loss of the second Mrs. Claiborne to the "Same dreadful 
malady" which had claimed the lives of his first wife, his 
daughter, and his private secretary in 1804, Governor 
Claiborne had little to say about the disease in his cor­
respondence of 1809. On the occasion of his second wife's
^7n . 0. Med. & Surg, Jour., New Series, VII (July, 
1879), 152.
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death, he complained to President Madison that the "Govern­
ment House," provided for the governor's accommodation, was 
located in an exceedingly unhealthy area on the river front 
where accumulations of filth along the water's edge gave 
off a most offensive and pestilential atmosphere. In ad­
dition to his own personal losses, he noted that Governor 
Carondelet's brother and Governor Gayoso both had died 
there of yellow fever in previous years. These fatalities, 
he thought, clearly demonstrated the need for a more 
salubrious location.^8
In early December of 1809 a New Orleans resident 
wrote that "people die here this year without almost any 
warning," and he mentioned several persons who had fallen 
prey to yellow f e v e r , O f  some 2,000 United States troops 
concentrated in New Orleans in 1809, nearly 800 died, 
probably a large proportion from the yellow pestilence. 
Possibly the disease was introduced that year by French 
refugees from Cuba, Jamaica, and other West Indian islands.
88ciaiborne to Madison, December 17, 1809, Carter 
(ed.). Territory of Orleans, 859-60.
89sterrett to Nathaniel Evans, December 2, 1809, 
Nathaniel Evans Family Papers.
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whence they poured into New Orleans by the hundreds in 
June and July.40
Yellow fever had wrought a considerable amount of 
damage the previous year, although it appeared so late in 
the season that a full-scale three-month rampage was 
averted. The unseasonably hot weather throughout November 
and early December in 1808 apparently allowed a vagrant 
case of the fever to set off a late chain reaction. Dr. 
Oliver Spencer, a New Orleans physician, wrote on November 
5 that the weather had continued "hot, beyond example for 
this season of the year" and that the city was becoming 
unhealthy. He observed that the fever of the season had 
been characterized by an unusual number of cases terminat­
ing in "black vomit," a positive sign of yellow fever. On 
November 13 the doctor wrote a friend that he had been 
unusually busy since "disease, and death have of late been 
with us almost synonymous terms." Admitting he would like 
nothing better than to "forsake this scene of trouble and 
anxiety," he felt nevertheless that "honor and good faith"
40cayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 214-20, 222,
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made it necessary for him to remain "until this eventful 
period is past."^^
Indicating further the extent of the disease in 
1808, another New Orleanian wrote in mid-November : "I
wish I was out of town--for its very sickly--people are 
running into the Country very fast." As late as November 
20 he remarked again that "the Yellow fever is raging 
much in town."^^ Had the infection appeared earlier in 
the season, a major disaster would doubtless have resulted. 
During every sickly season which occurred, New Orleanians 
hoped and prayed for an early frost, the one factor which 
experience had demonstrated capable of terminating Yellow 
Jack’s activities.
The next major epidemic of the early nineteenth 
century occurred in 1811. In mid-August Governor Claiborne 
noted that the "Fevers of New-Orleans" had already com­
menced with "Symptoms which forbode much m o r t a l i t y . A
41gpencer to Nathaniel Evans, November 5, 13, 1808, 
Nathaniel Evans Family Papers,
^^Samuel Philips to John M. Pintard, November 13, 20, 
1808, John M. Pintard Papers (Louisiana State University 
Archives, Baton Rouge).
43ciaiborne to Gallatin, August 19, 1811, Carter 
(ed.). Territory of Orleans, 944.
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French physician theorized in early September that the 
prevailing fevers were not contagious but rather were due 
to the extremely hot weather and an imprudent "mode of 
living" among certain individuals. The common usage of 
"Strong and irritating medicineshe thought, helped to 
increase the death toll.^^ This criticism of harsh medi­
cine was directed against American physicians following 
the heroic practice, who administered large quantities of 
mercurials in an attempt to purge the fever from the 
system. The French on the other hand preferred a milder 
regimen.
In a letter of October 8 the Governor informed 
President Madison that New Orleans continued under the 
influence of "that dreadful Scourge, the Yellow Fever," 
and, as usual, the newcomers suffered the greatest losses, 
although the old settlers were not entirely exempt from 
attack. To the Secretary of the Navy in late October he 
wrote that the fever, still raging, had proved highly 
destructive to the Marine Corps, having carried off two
ibid., 947.
James Mather to Claiborne, September 9, 1811,
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valuable officers and more than a third of the privates,
A New Orleanian, commenting on the sad state of affairs in 
the fall of 1811, complained: "We have blue times of it
here--every kind of produce dull & no sale--and in expecta­
tions of a War with Eng--Cotton will not sell--and to crown 
all our City Continues very sickly--and a great scarcity 
of money."46
As usual, the Louisiana Courier and the Louisiana 
Gazette neglected the subject of yellow fever throughout 
the course of the epidemic. After nearly two months of 
sickness in the city, the Courier noted briefly on October 
2 that two young mothers had fallen victim the day before 
to the "autumnal fevers" raging in "our unfortunate 
country." Both the Courier and the Gazette alluded indi­
rectly to the disease in reporting on the constitutional 
convention, which was to draft the document in preparation 
for Louisiana's statehood. Assembling in New Orleans in 
early November, the convention members had agreed to
45ciaiborne to Madison, October 8, 1811, ibid., 948; 
Claiborne to Paul Hamilton, October 28, 1811, Rowland (ed.), 
Claiborne Letter Books, V, 369.
46william Montgomery to Nathaniel Evans, October 4, 
1811, Nathaniel Evans Family Papers.
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adjourn until November 18 because of the city's unhealthy
condition.
Reports from the Protestant sexton, the manager of 
Charity Hospital, and Father Antoine added up to a total 
mortality of 210 in August and 262 in September, and the 
city recorder listed 241 deaths during the month of October. 
Of the 713 fatalities during the three-month epidemic 
period of 1811, probably 500 or more represent yellow 
fever deaths.
It is noteworthy that the pestilence of 1811 was 
disseminated from New Orleans to St. Francisville, apparent­
ly the first time the disease had spread in Louisiana 
beyond the confines of the Crescent City.^^ In subsequent 
epidemics yellow fever gradually made inroads into other 
Louisiana towns, traveling along the lines of commerce 
from New Orleans.
4?New Orleans Louisiana Courier, October 2, November 
6, 1811; Louisiana Gazette, November 5, 1811.
^^Mather to Claiborne, September 9, October 12, 1811, 
Carter (ed.), Territory of Orleans, 946, 949; Duffy (ed.). 
Medicine in La., I, 350.
49j. M. Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever, The Dis­
tribution and Natural History of Yellow Fever as it has 
Occurred at Different Times in the United States," Reports 
and Papers of the American Public Health Association, I 
(1873), 373; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 899.
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After a respite of five years, the yellow pestilence 
once again devastated New Orleans in the violent epidemic 
of 1817, and still again only two years later in the even 
more destructive visitation of 1819. At the close of the 
epidemic of 1817, Drs, Adrien Gros and N. V. A. Gérardin 
presented a report on the disease to La Société Médicale, 
the first association of physicians in Louisiana, They 
stated that the fever had become fully epidemic in July, 
increased its intensity during August, and finally dis­
appeared in October, earlier than usual in both its arrival 
and its departure. As causes of the malady they listed the 
topographical situation of the city, abundant rainfall, 
stagnant water, excessive summer heat, and an aggregation 
of unacclimated strangers. Furthermore, they observed that 
frost and cold weather seemingly destroyed the deleterious 
gas in the atmosphere. In concluding the report. Gros and 
Gérardin suggested that the state of Louisiana, with its 
population and commerce increasing daily, should undertake 
the responsibility for screening out the morbific influ­
ences likely to be introduced by commerce, and that the 
state should double its efforts to maintain the public 
health without which there could be no lasting prosperity--
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an enlightened attitude indeed
Increasing sentiment in favor of state action 
against the pestilence led to the passage of an act by the 
state legislature early in 1818, creating a board of health 
for New Orleans and providing for quarantine regulations. 
When cases of yellow fever appeared in the summer.of 1818 
in spite of the attempt at quarantine, a reaction set in 
and the legislature repealed the law in March of 1819, The 
violent epidemic of 1819 and a moderate one in 1820 oc­
casioned another experiment with health regulations and 
quarantine, which were provided for in a state law of 1821. 
Again the defenses proved inadequate to stem the tide of 
the pestilence which continued to appear regularly each 
summer. Having lost all faith in quarantine and under 
pressure from commercial interests, Louisiana lawmakers re­
pealed that measure in 1825.^1 The theory of importation
A. Gros et N. V. A. Gérardin, Rapport fait a 
la Société Médicale sur la Fiivre Jaune qui a régné cPune 
Maniéré Épidémique pendant l'dté de 1817 (Nouvelle- 
Orleans, 1818), 5-6, 59-62.
51"An Act to Establish a Board of Health and Health 
Office, and to Prevent the Introduction of Malignant, 
Pestilential and Infectious Diseases into the City of New 
Orleans,” Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Third 
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . 1818 (New 
Orleans, 1818), 124-52; "An Act to Repeal an Act Entitled
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fell into disrepute and the idea of local causation con­
tinued to dominate yellow fever philosophy until the 
Great Epidemic of 1853 forced a re-evaluation.
Having escaped a drastic outbreak of the fever in 
1818 (only 115 victims),the citizens of New Orleans 
probably anticipated a few years of relative freedom be­
fore the next virulent wave of pestilence. Yellow fever, 
demonstrating its truly unpredictable nature, overwhelmed 
the city again in 1819. One resident said of the fever 
that season, "it's worse than I have ever known it."^3 
When the city returned to normal, a committee of 
the medical society again prepared a report on the scourge
'An Act to Establish a Board of Health and Health Office, 
and to Prevent the Introduction of Malignant, Pestilential 
and Infectious Diseases into the City of New Orleans,'"
Acts Passed at the First Session of the Fourth Legislature 
of the State of Louisiana . . . 1819 (New Orleans, 1819), 
70-72; "An Act to Provide Against the Introduction of In­
fectious Diseases . , , Acts Passed at the First Session 
of the Fifth Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . , 
1821 (New Orleans, 1821), 68-92; "An Act to Repeal an Act 
Entitled 'An Act to Provide Against the Introduction of in­
fectious Diseases,*" Acts Passed at the First Session of 
the Seventh Legislature of the State of Louisiana , . .
1824 (New Orleans, 1824 & 1825), 210-12.
S^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699.
53Kenny Laverty to A. P. Walsh, September 22, 1819, 
A. P. Walsh Papers (Louisiana State University Archives, 
Baton Rouge).
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of New Orleans. The report compared the epidemics of 1817 
and 1819, noting their similarities and their differences. 
Both years witnessed the first cases in May, but in 1817 
the epidemic period extended from July to late October, 
and in 1819, from August to mid-December, In both epi­
demics the fever centered its attacks mainly upon Euro­
peans or Americans fresh from the North, but its victims 
each time included some long-time residents and a few 
Creoles as well. Not a single Negro was affected by the 
fever of 1817; some died in 1819,^4 what absolute gen­
eralizations could one make about such a disease? From 
the earliest attempts at analysis until its ultimate con­
quest by science, yellow fever evidenced its variability 
and its apparent unpredictability.
Mortality statistics are available in abundance for 
the epidemics of 1817 and 1819; however, many conflicting 
sets of figures exist. The recording of deaths and 
burials then left much to be desired in regard to system­
atic procedure and accuracy. Even when fairly accurate 
burial lists are available, it is virtually impossible to
54&apport publié au nom de la Société Médicale de 
la Nouvelie-Orleans sur la Fièvre Jaune, qui ^ a régné 
S^idémiquement, durant l^té et l'Automne de 1819 
(Nouvelie-Orleans, 1820), 7, 35-36.
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determine the number of deaths caused by any one particular 
disease. Burial certificates too frequently failed to 
state the exact cause of death, and the problem is compli­
cated further by the difficulties of inexact diagnosis and 
haphazard nomenclature. From records of the various ceme­
teries, reports of the medical society, and other data 
available to him, Dr. Bennet Dowler in the mid-nineteenth 
century estimated some 800 deaths from yellow fever in 
1817, probably a conservative f i g u r e . ^ 5
Calculating the death toll of the even more destruc­
tive epidemic of 1819 presents similar stumbling blocks. 
Benjamin Latrobe, the great American architect, writing 
his Impressions during the epidemic, noted that "no exact 
register is any where kept of deaths and burials, & un­
certainty on this subject is inevitable on many accounts." 
He estimated the fatalities from August to mid-September 
at ten or twelve to forty-six per day, and considered a 
report he heard of fifty-three in one day as not at all 
improbable.56 The Louisiana Courier, rising to the defense
55jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cxliv,
5^Benjamin Latrobe, Impressions Respecting New 
Orleans, edited by Samuel Wilson, Jr. (New York, 1951), 
xxii, 146. Latrobe himself fell victim to yellow fever in 
the mild epidemic of 1820.
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of the city's reputation in mid-November, attempted to 
counteract the so-called exaggerations circulating inside 
and outside New Orleans. The editor denied the report of 
over fifty burials in one day and asserted that days of as 
many as twenty-five were hardly common. Furthermore, he 
felt the need to point out that, except for a few cases, 
the disease attacked only those persons having recently 
arrived in the area--as if this factor greatly lessened the 
seriousness of the situation.^7 Newspapers, medical jour­
nals, and other defenders of New Orleans' inherent 
salubrity often employed this kind of reasoning to justify 
the "seeming" unhealthiness of the Crescent City through­
out much of the nineteenth century.
Estimates of the yellow fever mortality in 1819
58vary from 425 to 6,000. A cautious conjecture based on 
the total mortality during the year would place the number 
of yellow fever deaths at less than 1,000. Since the 
available mortality reports listed only those deaths within
57i,ouisiana Courier, November 15, 1819.
58Yellow Fever Statistics (undated pamphlet in 
Rudolph Matas Medical Library Pamphlet Collection, Tulane 
University Medical Library, New Orleans), 57; Jones, 
Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1, cxliv.
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the incorporated limits of the city, however, additional 
yellow fever victims in the suburbs conceivably might have 
increased the figure to 1,500 or even 2,000.^9
In 1817 the scourge again had visited St, Francis­
ville in West Feliciana Parish, and on the way up the 
Mississippi stopped off at Baton Rouge as well. In 1819, 
in addition to New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and St, Francis­
ville, Yellow Jack victimized still another city--Alex- 
andria on the Red River, During both of these epidemics 
the seeds of pestilence traveled up the Mississippi to 
Natchez, and frequently thereafter that city served as
host to the f e v e r . 60
In the course of the 1820*s yellow fever appeared 
in New Orleans without fail every summer, If one includes 
the mild outbreaks, which by this time mean those claiming 
from 100 to 400 victims, seven years of the decade wit­
nessed epidemics of varying degrees.61 Their sensitivities
59ouffy (ed,), Medicine in La,, I, 360; Jones, Medi­
cal and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt, 1, cxliv,
60Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit,, 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 845, 899; N, 0, 
Med, & Surg, Jour,, V (September, 1848), 227,
61n ,0, Med, & Surg, Jour,, XV(November, 1858), 818- 
19; XXIII (January, 1870), 25,
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dulled by the tremendous human losses sustained in 1817 
and 1819, New Orleanians were scarcely impressed by a toll 
of 400, and an annual tribute to the fever of a mere hun­
dred, more or less, generally came to be expected as one 
of the inexorable facts of life. Two epidemics of this 
decade stand out as particularly severe ones: 1822 and
1829.
By August of 1822 a number of cases had occurred, 
and at the beginning of September the disease suddenly 
reached epidemic proportions. Raging violently until the 
end of October, the pestilence for a time carried off as 
many as thirty persons per day.^^ A Frenchman, residing 
in the vicinity of New Orleans, wrote his sister in mid- 
September: "The terrible yellow fever has made ravages in
the city since the first of the month, the unfortunate 
strangers being the principal victims." In his opinion, 
the malady had been transmitted from Pensacola to New 
Orleans by the Americans. "The foreigners who can are 
leaving," he remarked, "and the fight will end for lack of
62pierre Frederick Thomas, Essai sur la Fi&vre Jaune 
d'Amérique . . . avec l'Histoire de 1*Épidémie de la 
Nouvelle-OrléanF en 1822 . . . (Paris, 1823), 110.
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f i g h t e r s , A t  the beginning of the outbreak the mayor 
of New Orleans proclaimed that the necessary means would 
be provided for evacuating indigent unacclimated strangers 
to the other side of Pontchartrain until the conclusion of
the sickly season,^4
The Louisiana Gazette in mid-September advised all 
strangers to leave the Crescent City until the fever sub­
sided.^5 Although continuing the standard policy of 
delayed reporting and understatement, some newspaper edi­
tors had recognized the fact that when an epidemic was well 
under way and could no longer be ignored, a diminution of 
the unacclimated in the city meant less fuel for the fever 
and hence a more rapid dying out of the pestilential fire. 
Sometimes, however, the dispersion of the strangers only 
served to spread the disease. At any rate, the fever found 
ample fuel to keep it raging in New Orleans through October, 
and sporadically through November,
63perdinand de Feriet to Janica de Feriet, September 
15, 1822, Ferdinand de Feriet Letters, I (1816-1825) 
(Manuscripts Section, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, New 
Orleans),
G^Thomas, Essai sur la Fiivre Jaune d'Amérique, 111. 
65Louisiana Gazette, September 14, 1822,
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Ferdinand de Feriet, residing just outside New 
Orleans, described the diversionary activities which took 
place in his home during the epidemic of 1822; "To pass 
away the time, the neighborhood assembles sometimes at 
our house and play a comedy in a little theater which I 
have had arranged." There were two "troupes" of actors, 
"the children and company for the French pieces, and some 
American neighbors for the English pieces." He considered 
"this little distraction . . .  an antidote against the 
cursed yellow fever.
Mortality estimates for 1822 ranged from 800 to
67
2,000. Niles' Weekly Register reported in October that
700 to 800 persons had died of the fever in September
68alone. The final tally of Dr. Pierre F. Thomas, on 
the scene at the time, set the total yellow fever mortality 
at 1,400, a figure concurred in by the Louisiana Gazette.
66perdinand de Feriet to Janica de Feriet, October 
7, 1822, loc. cit.
G^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (January, 1870),
25.
G^Niles’ Weekly Register, October 26, 1822.
G9ouffy (ed.). Medicine in La., I, 367.
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The willingness of the journal editor to accept this total 
probably indicates that several hundred should be added to 
it.
After 1822 a six-year intermission ensued, broken 
only by relatively mild outbreaks of the disease. In 1829 
the pestilence again went on the rampage. The Louis iana 
Courier incurred the wrath of other New Orleans newspapers 
by printing as early as July 10 a letter to the editor 
announcing the appearance of yellow fever in the city and 
advising strangers to evacuate. A journalistic battle 
developed as the Price-Current and the Mercantile Adver­
tiser insisted the city was unusually healthy in spite of 
attempts to discredit its salubrity. Undaunted, the 
Courier editor continued his frank reporting and on August 
12 commented at length on the pestilence which "threatens 
entire desolation to our city." Again he warned the unac­
climated to disperse. The fever continued its ravages 
throughout August and September, but by October 12, accord­
ing to the Courier, the early arrival of cool weather had 
terminated the epidemic. Absent citizens were assured 
that they might return home in perfect safety.70 The
70Louisiana Courier, July 10, 11, 13, August 12, 
September 7, 23, October 5, 12, 1829.
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epidemic of 1829 resulted in at least 900 fatalities and 
probably more.^l
In the decade of the 1820's yellow fever traveled 
in Louisiana beyond New Orleans practically every year, 
varying its itinerary from season to season, sometimes 
appearing in Opelousas, Donaldsonville, Natchitoches, and 
Thibodaux, as well as its most frequently visited points-- 
Alexandria, Baton Rouge, and St, Francisville
During the 1830's and 1840's the scourge of New 
Orleans followed the same ill-defined pattern which vaguely 
characterized its activities in the three preceding 
decades: no year passed without the occurrence of at
least a few cases; five to seven years of each decade wit­
nessed outbreaks of the disease, varying from mild to
7lN. 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699.
^^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit., 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 845, 852, 893, 
899; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., V (September, 1848), 227;
G. P. Whittington, "Rapides Parish, Louisiana--A History," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVI (July, 1933), 431; 
Erasmus Darwin Fenner, "Report on the Epidemics of Louisi­
ana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas in the year 1853," 
Transactions of the American Medical Association. VII 
(1854), 512; McGuire Diary, 41; St. Francisville Asylum and 
Feliciana Advertiser, September 12, October 17, 24, 1822; 
Alexandria Louisiana Herald, September 7, 1822, September 
17, 1823; Louisiana Courier, October 5, 1827,
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violent; and of the five to seven outbreaks in each ten- 
year period, at least two or three wrought an extraordinary 
amount of damage in relation to the others. The major 
visitations of the thirties and forties occurred in 1833, 
1837, 1839, 1841, and 1847.
Although not particularly severe, the yellow fever 
epidemic of 1832 is noteworthy for its association with 
the first appearance of Asiatic cholera in New Orleans,
A mild outbreak of the Saffron Scourge was in progress 
when Asiatic cholera arrived on the scene in late O c t o b e r , 73 
and for a time the Crescent City suffered the simultaneous 
activities of two pestilences. When cool weather set in, 
yellow fever subsided, while the cholera continued its 
ravages unhindered throughout the winter months. According 
to Dr. Joseph Jones, the combined force of the two plagues 
raised the total mortality of New Orleans in 1832 to more 
than 8,000 in a population of about 55,000, and "marked 
this year as the most terrible in the annals of this city," 
a year in which one-seventh of the entire population died!
Of the 8,000 deaths that year from all causes, Asiatic
73houisiana Courier, September 29, October 20, 27,
1832.
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cholera claimed over 4,000 and yellow fever carried off 
about 400.74
Again in the following year New Orleanians bore the 
burden of the two deadly maladies, with Asiatic cholera 
taking 1,000 additional victims and Yellow Jack even more 
In an account of the yellow fever epidemic of 1833 written 
Immediately thereafter. Dr. Edward H. Barton of New Orleans 
described it as the "most violent and malignant of the Epi­
demic Yellow Fevers with which this city has ever been 
visited.” Following a general pattern which had become 
all too common, the fever commenced in early August and 
continued until early November. Dr. Barton made a rather 
interesting observation which could have furnished a clue 
for the solution of the perennial puzzle of yellow fever 
causation and transmission. He noticed the unusual quanti­
ty of flies and mosquitoes in New Orleans preceding the 
epidemic and remarked that ”the latter continued throughout
74jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1, 
cccvi; see also Leland A. Langridge, "Asiatic Cholera in 
Louisiana, 1832-1873" (M. A. Thesis, Louisiana State Uni­
versity, Baton Rouge, 1955).
75jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cccvi.
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the s e a s o n , O t h e r s  before Barton had noticed this 
phenomenon and others would do so in years to come, but 
not until 1900 was the connection between the Aedes aegypti 
mosquito and yellow fever definitely established.
In late August of 1833 the Louisiana Courier declared 
that the raging fever presented a more malignant type than
i
it had for many years, and the editor advised strangers and
absent citizens to stay away from the city. The interment
reports published through September and October indicated
a death toll ranging from twenty to fifty per day for at
7 7least six weeks, Drs, Barton and Jones both estimated 
1,000 yellow fever deaths for 1833,78 if this calculation 
is approximately correct, the yellow fever mortality in 
1819 and 1822 actually reached a higher figure within a 
smaller population. Possibly the allusion made by Barton 
and the Courier editor to the violent and malignant nature
76Edward Hall Barton, Account of the Epidemic Yellow 
Fever, which prevailed in New Orleans during the Autumn of 
1833 (Philadelphia, 1834), iii, 7, 9,
^^Louisiana Courier, August 31, September 10, 12, 
October 10, 1833,
78n , 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699,
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of the disease referred to an unusually high case fatality 
rate. This rate may vary in different epidemics and under 
different circumstances from seven to sixty per cent, and 
sometimes it may even go as high as eighty-five per c e n t . 79
Three summers went by before the next drastic visi­
tation of the Saffron Scourge, In late July of 1837 the 
New Orleans Picayune optimistically reported the city free 
of any widespread sickness and predicted the season would 
pass without an epidemic. “At present no city in the union 
is more healthy or more pleasant than New Orleans,” the 
editor proudly asserted. Nevertheless, he urged the city 
authorities to execute the “wholesome ordinances” pre­
viously enacted for the improvement of sanitary con­
ditions
In early August of 1837 the Picayune admitted the 
existence of a few scattered cases of fever in the city 
"as there is every summer,” but expressly denied any 
"general sickness." In late August and early September 
Crescent City newspapers finally admitted the epidemic
79Ceorge M. Sternberg, Report on the Etiology and 
Prevention of Yellow Fever (Washington, 1890), 73; Merck 
Manual, 968. ,
SÜNew Orleans Daily Picayune, July 25, 1837.
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proportions of the disease, and reported from seventy-five 
to a hundred deaths per day,®^ The editor of the Picayune 
in the first week of September set forth a graphic des­
cription of the unhappy situation:
The levee is dull, dreary and lifeless at this 
time. No business doing, and the few ships in 
port are losing money.for the want of cargoes.
Steamboats arrive but seldom, and bring neither 
news, money or goods. Every person feels like 
sleeping or running away for the next three weeks 
and a half--but most of those now in the city are 
bound to stay, to fulfil engagements, live or die.
We make out to bury our dead, drink juleps, or 
brandy toddies . . . talk to each other, [and] 
read letters and the news of the day. . . .82
Also noting the dullness of the market in early September, 
the editor of the New Orleans Price-Current asserted opti­
mistically that the pestilence would eventually come to a 
halt, crops would seek the great market of the southwest, 
and the wheels of trade would move again. By early November 
his prophecies came to pass as the epidemic waned, strang­
ers and absent citizens poured into the Crescent City, and 
business operations gradually showed improvement.^3
Bljbid., August 4, 31, 1837; New Orleans Bee,
August 24, September 5, 1837.
3^Picayune, September 6, 1837.
83New Orleans Price-Current and Commercial Intelli­
gencer , September 9, 23, November 4, 1837; Picayune, 
November 10, 1837.
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The recurring and vexatious problem of obtaining 
accurate mortality statistics attracted the attention of 
the Picayune editor, who considered the graveyard reports 
of doubtful accuracy and noted that five or six cemeteries 
in the city did not issue reports at all, "Until a Board 
of Health is organized," he complained, "and regular re­
ports kept . . .  we may expect a wide difference of opinion 
as to the mortality of our city at this season, , .
Later estimates of the yellow fever mortality of 1837 set 
the figure at 1,300,^5 But with the newspapers reporting 
a daily average of seventy-five to a hundred deaths early 
in the epidemic and thirty to forty when the malady had 
abated considerably,^^ it seems that the total should be 
much higher.
The sickly season of 1839 started off as usual in 
July with the Picayune's vehement denial of the reports and 
exaggerations circulating among the river towns on the
84picayune, September 13, 1837.
8^N. 0. Med. & Surg, Jour., New Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699,
86picayune, August 31, September 13, 1837; Price- 
Current . October 2, 1837,
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subject of disease in New O r l e a n s . ^7 On August 3, the Bee 
announced that yellow fever existed in the Crescent City, 
but not "to an alarming extent," Three days later the Pica­
yune also acknowledged its presence, while expressing full 
confidence that the disease would not assume an epidemic 
form. Pointing out that the victims thus far had been con­
fined to the laboring class, the editor felt certain that 
those persons following a program of moderation and pru­
dence had little to fear. Again on August 9 he reassured 
the readers that the malady preferred strangers, sailors, 
and laboring men. "To those who live regularly and pay 
attention to cleanliness," the Picayune editor declared,
"we think there is little cause for apprehension." Like­
wise, the editor of the Bee consoled the good citizens of 
New Orleans with the fact that the epidemic of 1837 had 
been much more "calamitous" and that the laboring classes 
and strangers were bearing the brunt of the current 
attack.88 Yellow Jack, no respector of persons, seemed to 
indicate class-consciousness only because the more settled
87picayune, July 13, 24, 26, 1839.
Q^Bee, August 3, September 3, 10, 1839; Picayune, 
August 6, 9, 11, 1839,
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well-to-do portions of the population, for the most part, 
belonged to the ranks of the acclimated. Whenever the 
fever did spread to the better sections of town, any 
nonimmune, no matter how wealthy, was fully liable to 
attack.
The epidemic of 1839 reached its peak by mid-Septem­
ber, probably because of the relatively small number of 
unacclimated persons remaining in the city who had not 
already suffered an attack. Still the Picayune warned 
strangers and "our absent friends” against flocking into 
New Orleans until the danger was clearly over, and not 
until late October did that journal declare New Orleans 
healthy once again and assure the absent citizens a safe 
return. By November 5 the Crescent City was characterized 
by brisk activity as strangers and returning citizens pour­
ed in and steamboats and vessels arrived at the wharves for 
a resumption of the normal hustle and bustle of city life,&9 
According to available records, inaccurate as they might 
be, the fever of 1839, somewhat less malignant than that 
of 1837, claimed about 800 victims,
89picayune, September 13, 15, 19, October 22, 
November 5, 1839,
90N,0,Med. & Surg. Jour,, New Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699,
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Demonstrating its capricious nature, the Saffron 
Scourge seems to have confined its activities to New Orleans 
during most of the 1830's, except in the major outbreaks of 
1837 and 1839 when it again visited some of its old haunts 
and extended its ravages to several new points. On one 
other occasion during that decade it appeared in Louisiana 
outside the Crescent City: in Alexandria in 1831, when
only two cases were reported in the Crescent City. During 
the epidemic of 1837 the fever spread to Baton Rouge, 
Plaquemine, Opelousas, Washington, and Alexandria. The 
year 1839 witnessed Louisiana’s most extensive outbreak of 
yellow fever up to that time, when the pestilence committed 
its ravages not only in New Orleans but appeared also in 
Thibodaux, Plaquemine, Port Hudson, St. Francisville and 
Bayou Sara, St. Martinville, Washington, New Iberia, 
Opelousas, Franklin, Donaldsonville, Baton Rouge, Alex­
andria, and Natchitoches.In November of 1839 a New 
Orleanian wrote his brother: "The sickness has not been
^^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit., 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 776, 844-902; 
Edwin A, Davis (ed.), Plantation Life in the Florida Par­
ishes of Louisiana, 1836-1846, as Reflected in the Diary 
of Bennet H. Barrow (New York, 1943), 163-69; François 
Charles Delery, Précis Historique de la Fièvre Jaune 
(Nouvelie-Orléans, 1859), 20; Picayune, October 3, 1839,
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half so bad this Season as in 1837 (when I had it)--not in 
the City but the country has been more troubled with it 
than ever it was before. & in most of the Towns on the 
coast and Rivers it has been very f a t a l . R i v e r  and 
coast towns outside Louisiana stricken with yellow fever 
that year included Vicksburg, Natchez, Fort Adams, Biloxi, 
Houston, Galveston, Mobile, Tampa, Savannah, Augusta, and 
Charleston.93
Having satiated its appetite in 1839, the pestilence 
gave the citizens of New Orleans a breathing spell in the 
summer of 1840 when only three yellow fever deaths were 
r e p o r t e d , 94 b u t  deluged the city again the following 
summer with a wave of virulence. Although New Orleans was 
supposed to be one of the healthiest cities in the Union 
throughout most of the summer of 1841, the Bee conceded 
on August 3 that several fatal cases of yellow fever had
92a . D, Gove to Lewis Gove, November 8, 1839, A. D. 
Gove Letters (Louisiana State University Archives, Baton 
Rouge).
93oelery, Precis Historique de la Fièvre Jaune, 21.
9‘^N. O.Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699.
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occurred in the city.^5 on August 18 the Board of Health 
announced an increase of "the acclimating fever," stated 
their "serious apprehensions in regard to the future," 
and requested that physicians report daily to the board
the number of new cases under treatment,
The epidemic grew steadily worse as August passed,
and the fever continued to rage in September. In early
October a temporary abatement occurred, but an influx of 
strangers furnished fresh fuel, and the pestilence flared 
again. Finally on October 26 the Picayune proclaimed:
"The Yellow Fever is dead-dead-dead!" Joyfully, the edi­
tor noted that only nine fever deaths had occurred the day 
before!^? The Bee waited until November 3 before report­
ing the conclusion of the epidemic. Graphically depicting 
the city in the act of casting off its blanket of gloom and 
dejection, the editor wrote :
Business dawns once more upon us; strangers 
begin to arrive, old friends are flocking in;
95picayune, June 27, July 22, August 1, 4, 7, 1841; 
Bee, July 20, August 3, 1841.
9Gpicayune, August 18, 1841.
97price-Current, August 28, September 11, 25, Oct­
ober 9, 1841; Bee, September 9, 16, 1841; Picayune, August 
20, 31, September 9, 22, October 3, 8, 9, 12, 20, 26, 1841.
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the streets are refilling; the thorough-fares 
wear a busy and thronged aspect; the cares, 
bustle, pleasure of the present, and anticipa­
tions of the future, occupy every mind, and 
the horrors of the past will soon be remem­
bered no more. Forgetfulness is sometimes a 
beneficent faculty.98
The pestilence of 1841 had raged "with a virulence 
rarely equalled during the most deadly seasons,"^9 The 
official count set the number of yellow fever deaths at 
1,325; Dr. Joseph Jones estimated 1,800.^00 Considering 
the fact that the editor of the Bee on November 3 set 
forth an estimate of 1,500 fatal cases^^l a^d realizing 
that editors had a tendency to minimize rather than to 
exaggerate such matters, one is inclined to accept Dr. 
Jones’ figure as a fair approximation of the actual 
mortality.
New Orleans enjoyed a five-year period of relative 
freedom from the fever between 1841 and 1847. In 1843 the 
malady claimed nearly 700 p e r s o n s , ^^2 ^  population
^^Bee, November 3, 1841.
99price-Current, September 25, 1841.
lOO^ew Orleans Directory for 1842 (New Orleans, 
1842), II, 16; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI 
(March, 1879), 699.
lOlBee, November 3, 1841.
lO^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., Mew Series, VI (March, 
1879), 699.
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of over 100,000, and after epidemics which carried off 
nearly 2,000, the outbreak of that year could only be con­
sidered a rather moderate one.
Yellow Jack began to appear early in July of 1847 
in various parts of the city, and the number of cases 
steadily increased. On August 2 the Board of Health 
announced the arrival of the epidemic. As usual, the dis­
ease attacked "the lower class" first, but by late August 
its influence had extended to "all ranks of society."^03 
On August 31 the editor of the Bee, observing the loss of 
five "gentlemen of the community," commented that "neither 
rich nor poor can now claim exemption."^^4 The pestilence 
increased in virulence throughout the weeks of August and 
ultimately reached its summit during the first week of 
September, after which a gradual decline followed. By 
October 18 the Board of Health felt safe in declaring the 
cessation of the epidemic, but cautioned that some cases 
might be expected to occur for at least another month. 
Cases continued to appear as late as December, and the
103ibid., IV (September, 1847), 274, 
lO^Bee, August 31, 1847.
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last fatality occurred during the week ending December 
25.105
As the nineteenth century progressed, practically 
every major outbreak of yellow fever seemed more devastat­
ing than the last, as if the disease were gradually gain­
ing momentum for the incredibly destructive epidemics of 
the 1850's. In terms of the increasing population of New 
Orleans, which almost tripled from 1830 to 1850,106 the 
pestilence encountered a constantly growing field for 
exploitation. Nevertheless, population growth does not 
furnish a complete explanation for the mounting impact of 
epidemics during the first half of the century. The 
mysterious and essentially erratic nature of epidemic dis­
ease cannot always be explained fully, even by modern 
science. During the second half of the nineteenth century, 
without apparent rhyme or reason, yellow fever epidemics 
diminished in frequency and virulence--even before the 
inauguration of truly effective sanitation and quarantine
l-05picayune, August 10, 29, September 5, 12, 19, 26, 
October 3, 10, 17, 19, 22, 1847; N. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour.,
V (September, 1848), 202.
lOÔQardner's New Orleans Directory for 1861 (n.t.p.),
5.
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measures and well before the discovery and control of the 
insect vector.
All observers present on the scene of destruction 
considered the visitation of 1847 the most widespread epi­
demic that had ever occurred in New Orleans• A New 
Orleans correspondent wrote in late October of that year:
”, . .we have had a season of deep distress--6e in all my 
experience I never saw the like.”^^? According to Dr. 
Erasmus Darwin Fenner in his account of the outbreak, the 
older physicians of New Orleans agreed that the fever of 
1847 was "the most extensive that ever prevailed” in that 
city, but considered it less "malignant” than that of 1841 
or 1839. He cited statistics from Charity Hospital in sup­
port of the latter opinion, showing the case fatality rate 
as less than one-third in 1847, whereas ordinarily it ran 
as high as fifty per cent or more. An estimated 20,000 to
25,000 cases occurred in the city. The number of yellow 
fever deaths reported to the Board of Health by sextons of 
New Orleans cemeteries totaled 2,306, not including the 613 
yellow fever interments reported from the Lafayette
lO^Charles Harrod to Mrs, S. B. Evans, October 23, 
1847, Nathaniel Evans Family Papers.
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cemetery by late October, Fenner felt that 3,000 would not 
be far from the number who died of the pestilence in New 
Orleans and Lafayette.
The theory of blending fevers so prevalent at the 
time undoubtedly added to the ordinary difficulties of 
medical diagnosis and hence contributed to the problem of 
ascertaining the exact yellow fever mortality. A medical 
concept of the period explained various kinds of fevers as 
degrees of one basic fever. During the course of an epi­
demic, it was believed that the milder grades blended 
together and sometimes merged into the most malignant 
form, yellow fever. The editor of the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal noted the presence of all forms and 
degrees of fevers during the epidemic of 1847--mild inter­
mittent, remittent, dysentery, congestive, and pernicious 
intermittent, as well as mild and grave yellow fever-- 
which occasionally blended together in various combina­
t i o n s , T h e  terms employed refer to vaguely understood 
symptom-complexes rather than to specific diseases ade­
quately diagnosed. Diagnoses based on superficial symptoms.
108#. 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., V (September, 1848), 
203-206.
lO^Ibid., IV (September, 1847), 274.
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so similar in a great variety of disorders, could not 
always pin-point accurately the nature of a patient's ill­
ness, Many cases of mild or severe yellow fever might well 
have been listed on the records under some other vague 
appellation. The problems of diagnosis and nomenclature 
are well illustrated by a list of "fevers" compiled from 
the Board of Health mortality reports for 1847, which in­
cluded twenty-seven different variations of fever, in 
addition to the yellow pestilence: "Fever," adynamic,
ataxic, bilious, bilious remittent, congestive, idiopathic, 
gastric, hectic, icterodes, intermittent, intermittent 
pernicious, intestinal, malignant, malignant putrid, ner­
vous, pernicious, pernicious congestive, puerperal, 
remittent, putrid, scarlet, scarlet malignant, traumatic, 
typhoid, typhoid congestive, and t y p h u s . gg the more 
than 600 deaths attributed to the twenty-seven fevers, 
probably at least 200 should be added to the yellow fever 
total. On the other hand, it is somewhat less likely 
that deaths attributed to the Saffron Scourge were due to 
other causes, since so many physicians insisted on the 
appearance of the "black vomit" (which did not invariably
llOibid., IV (January, 1848), 540-41.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
occur) and other obvious symptoms of yellowness and invol­
untary hemorrhage before pronouncing a case yellow fever.
In discussing the extent of the 1847 outbreak, Dr, 
Fenner and others commented at length on the fact that no 
extensive epidemic had occurred since 1841 and that the 
population had steadily increased during the period, pro­
viding new supplies of unacclimated individuals. According 
to one estimate, over 20,000 Europeans had settled in New 
Orleans in the four or five years prior to 1847, and the 
immigration in 1847 was said to have been particularly 
heavy, consisting mainly of "the poorer sort." In addition, 
large numbers of discharged soldiers returning from the 
Mexican War stopped in New O r l e a n s , T h e  editor of the 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal noted that, al­
though yellow fever was prevailing in Vera Cruz, very few 
cases had been brought from there to the Crescent City,^^^ 
Adhering to the theory of local causation, he failed to 
comprehend that one imported case from that city might well
llljbid., V (September, 1848), 205; De Bow’s Com- 
mercial Review, III (March, 1847), 250; Picayune, August 1, 
1847.
0, Med. & Surg. Jour., IV (September, 1847),
274.
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have set off the explosion.
The poverty of the class most liable to the disease 
intensified the suffering and distress occasioned by the 
epidemic. The Howard Association, a benevolent society 
first organized during the epidemic of 1837 to afford 
relief to the indigent sick, served to alleviate in some 
measure the suffering of the destitute victims in 1847,
Its members worked diligently that season, attending to 
the needs of about 1,200 yellow fever patients and pro­
viding sustenance for their families.
Almost every year in the 1840's the pestilence 
attacked one or two points in Louisiana outside New 
Orleans. Only in two outbreaks, however, did it spread 
extensively. In 1843 it appeared in Baton Rouge, St. 
Francisville, Port Hudson, and Thibodaux; in 1847 it 
visited Lafayette, Carrollton, Algiers, Covington, 
Madisonville, Mandeville, Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, Bayou 
Sara, and Alexandria.
llSportier, Louisiana, I, 515; Picayune, September 
5, 1847; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 86,
114Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit., 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; Davis 
(ed.), Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes, 306; 
Fenner, "Report on the Epidemics . . .  in the year 1853,"
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The spread of yellow fever through the normal chan­
nels of trade and travel was undoubtedly facilitated by 
émigrés fleeing New Orleans, many of whom carried the 
seeds of pestilence with tiem. For example, during the 
epidemic of 1847, several German and Dutch families left 
New Orleans for Covington, hoping to escape the disease. 
Three persons among them became ill and died of the fever 
shortly after arriving in Covington. From that beginning 
yellow fever eventually spread to the townspeople, result­
ing in 160 to 180 cases, of which about ten died,^^^ One 
Covington physician said of the outbreak: "I do not think
it genuine yellow f e v e r , P e r h a p s  he thought the 
"genuine yellow fever" should have resulted in a much 
higher case fatality rate.
The fever of 1847 prevailed to a considerable extent 
in the vicinity of New Orleans at Lafayette, Carrollton, 
and Algiers. Although some cases occurred in Plaquemine, 
Baton Rouge, and Bayou Sara, Dr. Fenner stated that the
loc. cit., 512; Corrine L, Saucier, History of Avoyelles 
Parish, Louisiana (New Orleans, 1943), 112; N. 0, Med. & 
Surg. Jour., V (September, 1848), 216,
^^^N, 0, Med,& Surg, Jour., IV (November, 1847),
409.
llGibid., V (September, 1848), 216,
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disease did not assume epidemic proportions in those 
t o w n s . 117 Alexandria, on the other hand, suffered a rather 
serious attack. On October 9 the editor of the Alexandria 
Red River Republican attempted to discount the severity of 
the outbreak. In declaring an epidemic in progress about 
ten days before, the physicians of Alexandria had alarmed 
the populace, he complained, and induced many persons to 
leave town. Admitting that a number of cases had occurred, 
especially among the destitute, he considered the fever 
rather mild in its effects and expressed the hope that no 
more cases would appear. Undue optimism failed to affect 
the activities of the pestilence, which steadily increased 
its ravages. In mid-October the editor described the town 
as gloomy and desolate; all those able to do so had re­
moved themselves and their families from the scene. Final­
ly, by early December the disease had completely run its 
course in Alexandria,
If epidemic yellow fever resulted in part from local 
unsanitary conditions, as it was widely believed, sanitary
I17lbid., 204, 213.
ll^Alexandria Red River Republican, October 9, 16, 
December 4, 1847.
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reform would seem the logical approach to the problem. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century boards of 
health existed intermittently in New Orleans, several 
created by the state, the others by the city council. Not 
one operated with any degree of efficacy. Dependent upon 
a generally uncooperative city council for funds and legal 
enforcement of health regulations, the boards, no matter 
how enlightened, could scarcely inaugurate a program of 
public health. Although willing to appoint a board, the 
council was seldom willing to appropriate funds for its 
use or to effect its suggestions. The prevailing laissez- 
faire philosophy provided little basis for positive action 
by such a bureau. Public health had not yet become a 
matter of public concern, and the highly individualistic 
citizen of early nineteenth century New Orleans consider­
ed it his inalienable right to clean his premises if and 
when he chose. The development of a public health con­
sciousness required still more time, more deaths, and more 
reformers.
A half-century of visitations established for yellow 
fever an accepted role in the Crescent City as an unfor­
tunate but inevitable scourge to be endured, but one which 
limited itself fortunately to two or three major
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flagellations per decade. As the disease carried off 
hundreds of victims, a fairly constant stream of immigra­
tion furnished more than sufficient replacements, and the 
population of New Orleans continued to grow in spite of 
the attendant dangers. Although the business season suf­
fered a temporary postponement during epidemic years, the 
vigorous activity which followed each time rapidly dimmed 
the memory of the earlier distress. As the population 
increased and the fever expanded its field of activity, 
raising the death count year by year, acclimated New 
Orleanians experienced a diminishing sensitivity to its 
ravages. The definition of a mild epidemic changed as 
the visitations became increasingly severe. For example, 
the outbreak of 1843, claiming only about 700 victims, was 
a moderate one in comparison with the yellow fever mortal­
ity in 1841, while in 1817 a mortality of 800 had con­
stituted a major disaster. The worse the epidemics became, 
the more loudly editors, physicians, and others protested 
that New Orleans was the healthiest city in the Union 
except during epidemic years. Unfortunately, that claim 
was not true at all. The delusion regarding the salubrity 
of the Crescent City, while generally accepted within the 
city itself, failed to gain credence in other parts of the
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country. Regardless of its protests to the contrary, New 
Orleans, largely because of the Saffron Scourge, had 
acquired for itself a widespread reputation as the "Necro­
polis of the South."
Medical men throughout the nineteenth century, and 
earlier, continually attempted to analyze and explain the 
nature, causation, and transmission of the yellow pesti­
lence, Unaware of the insect vector, physicians found it 
difficult to account for the unpredictable spread of the 
fever; its vagaries seemed to defy all attempts at clear 
analysis. Ample evidence existed to prove almost any 
point of view, depending upon what evidence one chose to 
select. Under the circumstances widespread controversy 
developed over the various possible answers to problems 
which remained essentially unsolved: Was the fever con­
tagious or non-contagious, imported or locally caused?
What was its relationship to other fevers? What form of 
treatment proved most effective? Why did the disease 
appear in certain places rather than others, and why in 
some years did it prove more malignant than in others? 
Medical controversy until the late nineteenth century 
resembled a philosophical debate in which the participants 
moved deductively from premise to premise, committed one
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logical fallacy after another, leaped to hasty conclusions, 
rationalized their own particular predilections, and in 
the process generated more heat than light.
On a subject about which no agreement existed among 
medical men, laymen felt equally qualified to argue and 
make pronouncements. In terms of the limited medical 
knowledge of the period, yellow fever could only remain a 
puzzle with which to exercise the intellect, a puzzle with 
several basic pieces missing. Until the discovery of the 
cause of transmission, little could be done toward prevent­
ing the recurrence of the disease, and at the close of 
yellow fever's first half-century in New Orleans, men had 
little more understanding of the pestilence than when it 
had first occurred.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS 
1796-1847
Year
*1796
1797
1798 
*1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
*1804
1805
1806 
1807
-1808
*1809
1810
*1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816 
*1817
1818
*1819
1820
1821
*1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828 
*1829
1830
1831
1832 
*1833
1834
Estimated Deaths
250 to 400 
?
No record
No record
No record 
?
500
800
115
425 to 2,000 
400 
7+
800 to 2,000 
1+
108
59+
5+
109+
130+
900
117+
2+
400
1,000
95+
Population (Approx.)
6,000 to 8,000
18,000
24.000
26.000
32,000
48,000
58,000
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1835
1836 
*1837
1838
*1839
1840
*1841
1842
-1843
1844
1845
1846 
*1847
(Continued)
Estimated Deaths
284+
5+
1,300
17+
800
3+
1,325 to 1,800 
211+
500 to 700 
148 
2
100 to 160 
2,300 to 3,000
93
Population (Approx.)
68,000
74.000
79.000
84.000
109,000
*Major epidemics.
+For many years, the only figures available for 
yellow fever mortality in the city are the figures for 
yellow fever deaths in Charity Hospital, indicated by a 
plus after the number. Presumably there were other 
deaths in New Orleans in private practice during those 
years.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CD
■D
O
Q.
C
g
Q.
■D
CD
C/Î
C/)
O
3.3"
CD
Q
■D
O
C/)
C/)
DISTRIBUTION OF YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA OUTSIDE OF NEW ORLEANS,
1811-1847*
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( O ' Alexandria X X X  X X X X  X
Algiers X
Baton Rouge X X X X X  X X X X X
X X
X
Covington X
DonaIdsonville ? X X
Bayou Sara 
Carrollton
Franklin X
Lafayette (N.O.) 
o Mandeville
Madisonville
Natchitoches ? X
S New Iberia X
^ Opelousas X X X  X X  X
% Plaquemine X X
° Port Hudson X X  X
■o St. Francisville X X X  ? X  X X X  X X X
3 St. Martinville X
Thibodaux X X X X
Washington___________________________________________________  X X
X
X
X
*This chart does not represent an all-inclusive view of yellow fever's appearances 
in Louisiana. To compile such a chart on the basis of available records would be impos­
sible. It is designed merely to indicate at least the major points affected by the dis- ^  
ease during this period, and by no means to exclude others not listed where yellow fever 
might well have occurred on many occasions.
CHAPTER III
THE GREAT EPIDEMICS OF THE FIFTIES;
1853, 1854, 1855, 1858
In a series of visitations spread over a century of 
Louisiana's history, the Saffron Scourge achieved a peak 
of virulence in the 1850's, striking four severe blows in 
the space of six years; in 1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858,
The survivors scarcely had time to forget one epidemic 
before the appearance of still another. In the four major 
attacks of the 1850's, the pestilence swept away over
18,000 persons in New Orleans alone, a sufficient number 
to populate several small towns.
Between the extensive outbreak of 1847 and that 
most malignant of all epidemics in 1853, New Orleans was 
not exempt entirely from the fever. During that five-year 
period, the disease claimed a total of more than 2,000 
lives. In the absence of a violent epidemic, however. New 
Orleanians allowed themselves to hope and then to believe 
that yellow fever was no longer a disease to be feared.
95
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In May of 1852 the editor of the New Orleans Medical and 
Surgical Journal confidently asserted that "the Yellow 
Fever--the dread of the stranger and sojourner in our midst, 
has long since been banished [from] the city. . . . "  Later, 
in another editorial, he noted a considerable improvement 
in the health of New Orleans and attributed that happy 
development to the recent attention given to street clean­
ing, paving, and the drainage of swamp land surrounding the 
city. Five years had passed, the editor observed, without 
the occurrence of epidemic yellow fever, and he felt con­
fident that the disease could be completely eliminated by 
a "crash" program of sanitary improvements.^
The ideal of cleanliness and the reality of effect­
ing such a condition in New Orleans remained unreconciled, 
and in the summer of 1853, with frequent rains and the 
sun's excessive heat, the sanitary condition of the city 
steadily worsened. The Crescent City newspapers complain­
ed indignantly of the filthy streets and repeatedly de­
nounced the city government and the Street Commissioner 
for neglecting their duties. In view of the unsanitary
In . 0. & Surg. Jour. , VIII (May, 1852), 819;
IX (November, 1852), 415-16.
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condition of the city, Dr. Erasmus Fenner thought it 
rather strange that anyone should look beyond New Orleans 
for the cause of the pestilence. "Indeed it was so bad," 
said Dr. Fenner, "that if it had given rise to Egyptian 
Plague instead of yellow fever, it ought not to have sur-
n
prised anyone. . . ."
In May of 1853 the earliest cases appeared and were 
pronounced yellow fever by' the attending physicians at 
Charity Hospital, but other physicians, who also viewed 
the cases, disagreed with the original diagnosis. Accord­
ing to Dr. Fenner, the discussion and debate proceeded 
along these lines:
Some thought the subjects were too yellow,
Others that the yellowness was not exactly of 
the right hue . . . some said what was pro­
nounced black vomit was not dark enough, others 
that it was too black; others, again that it was 
not black vomit because it was of a reddish hue ; 
whilst others, admitting a resemblance, still 
could not find 'the old fashioned Black Vomit.'
Some would not admit the cases were Yellow Fever, 
because they occurred 'too early in the season,'
--they had never known Yellow Fever to break out 
so early in this city, and therefore did not 
think it possible.
Finally, on June 10, an "unquestionable case" entered
Charity Hospital; an Irish girl from Tchoupitoulas Street
^Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 10-15.
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who turned quite yellow, provided large quantities of "un- 
mistakeable, old-fashioned, coffee-grounds black vomit," 
and thereby ended the medical controversy. "The skeptics 
all gave it up after seeing this," said Fenner. From 
late May and early June the fever made steady progress, 
but received little publicity until mid-July. New Orleans 
had no Board of Health at the time. Lacking sufficient 
authority to enforce its regulations and denied support 
by the city fathers, the last board had adjourned sine 
die in 1852, leaving only a secretary. Weekly interment 
reports then were issued under the direction of the mayor 
and the secretary of the late board. "This was all the 
correct information that was published," Fenner stated,
"and even this was complained of by some who thought it 
better to suppress the truth than cause a panic.
The Crescent City journals published the interment 
lists and an occasional report from Charity Hospital, but 
avoided commentary on the disease. Meanwhile the death 
count steadily increased. Finally on July 13 the Orleanian 
admitted the existence of yellow fever in the city but dis­
counted its importance. On the same day, several
3lbid., 15-25, 35; Picayune, June 28, 1853.
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newspapers printed a notice calling a meeting of the Howard 
Association, the organization which ministered to the needs 
of the poor during an epidemic. This should have furnished 
a clue to many readers that the situation was a serious one, 
By July 16 the pestilence had claimed over 300 lives, and 
as the word spread through the city along with the disease, 
citizens fled the scene by the thousands. During the week 
ending July 23, more than 400 persons died of the fever.^ 
Under pressure from the newspapers, which at last 
had begun to comment on the situation, and urged on by the 
Mayor, the City Council finally appointed a temporary board 
of health on July 25. Within two weeks* time, the board 
had established four infirmaries for the indigent sick and 
two temporary asylums for children orphaned by the epi­
demic. ^ At this point, horrible scenes of suffering and 
death could be witnessed throughout the city. Entire 
families fell victim to the raging pestilence, and "tenants 
for the cemeteries" multiplied faster than graves could be 
provided. In order to speed up the process, the grave-
^De Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 
597-611.
^Picayune, July 26, August 6, 1853; D£ Bow's Commer­
cial Review, XV (December, 1853), 613-14.
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diggers soon resorted to long ditches, eighteen to twenty- 
four inches deep, into which they tossed the coffins and 
threw on a "few shovelfuls of dirt." The daily rains 
soon washed away this thin covering and bared the coffins 
to the blistering heat of the sun which followed each 
brief downpour. Frequently the putrefying bodies burst 
through the hastily-built coffins and filled the air "far 
and near, with the most intolerable pestilential odors.
In August the mortality reached incredible heights: over
900 the first week, 1,200 the next, and two full weeks of 
over 1,300 each. Describing the plague-striken community 
in August, one observer wrote; "The whole city was a 
hospital, and every well man, woman, and child were instru­
mental, in one way or another, in relieving the sick."^
The streets were deserted except for "the hasty 
pedestrian on an errand of mercy" or physicians charging 
rapidly along in their gigs. Funeral trains in the morn­
ing and the evening lined the roads to the cemeteries.
^New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 11, 1853; De 
Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 614, 620-21.
^Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 38-44; Robinson, 
Diary of a Samaritan, 150.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
But the usual happy noises of busy activity, the sounds 
of shoppers, sellers, and workers, had been strangely 
silenced by death, disease, or fear. The wharves were all 
but deserted; virtually all business had ceased, and most 
of the shops were closed down,®
In the last week of July, after delegating their 
powers to the Finance Committee and creating a temporary 
board of health, the City Council had adjourned until 
October, leaving the city without a government for two 
months in the midst of a disaster. Some of the council 
members fled to places of safety in the North, some to 
resorts along the Gulf where the epidemic pursued them; 
some stayed on and extended their services during the 
crisis. One New Orleans newspaper commented disgustedly: 
"What a humiliating position I A City Council, in the 
midst of an unprecedented epidemic, adjourning for their 
own health, convenience, and comfort. , , , What a burles­
que on municipal government!*'^
Even the native and long-resident New Orleanians
8pe Bow*s Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 
615; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 150-52,
9pe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 
609-11, 620,
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became alarmed during the terrible month of August. Up 
to this point they had felt relatively secure in believing 
that only the newcomer, the imprudent, and the unclean 
fell victim to the raging fever. When several of New 
Orleans' oldest citizens were swept away by the pestilence, 
a new dread seized the city. Even the French inhabitants, 
always the last to fear the disease, became alarmed. Edi­
tors of the French newspapers attributed the fever's 
increasing virulence to the noxious effluvia emanating 
from the gutters and from the graveyards filled with 
rotting, half-buried corpses.
In mid-August the Mayor, on the recommendation of 
the Board of Health, ordered that 400 rounds of cannon be 
fired daily at sunset in the various public squares of the 
city in an attempt to purify the atmosphere and clear away 
the disease. Toward the same end, he ordered the burning 
of barrels of tar in the streets and in the cemeteries at 
nightfall. Since the noise was found to be disturbing as 
well as injurious to the sick, the cannon firing was dis­
continued after two days, but the tar-burning program 
remained in effect for some time. The roar of the guns
lOlbid., 621.
lllbid., 626-27; Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 38.
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and the fires in the night, together with the horrors of 
the creeping pestilence, which spread so insidiously and 
so mysteriously, must have presented a truly unnerving 
spectacle to those who were forced to endure it.
In addition to the four infirmaries established by 
the Board of Health, the Howard Association opened four 
more temporary hospitals for the indigent sick and one 
especially for convalescents. As all the public schools 
had been closed for the duration of the epidemic, the 
Howards obtained the Washington School building on Maga­
zine Street for use as a temporary hospital. A portion of 
the school house became a place of refuge for children who 
had lost both parents to the fever. Contributions to the 
Howard Association poured in from all over the country to 
the amount of over $200,000. The long list of contribu­
tors from Washington, D. C ., included the name of President 
Franklin Pierce. Before Baton Rouge fell victim to the 
disease, a deputation of citizens from that city came to 
aid the New Orleans Howards in relieving the sick.^^
The week ending August 27 had witnessed the peak of
12pe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 
626, 633; Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 42-43.
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the epidemic. Yellow fever had claimed almost 1,400 
victims in the space of seven days. By September 1 Dr. 
Fenner reported that the epidemic was rapidly declining, 
"deaths from it now only amounting to about 100 a day," 
Through September and early October, the weekly death toll 
decreased steadily; 700, 400, 200, 125, 85, 42, By 
October 31 the Board of Health felt safe in declaring the 
epidemic at an end and assured absentees and strangers a 
safe entry to New O r l e a n s . a few scattered cases 
occurred after that date, but for all intents and purposes 
the crisis was over, and the city could begin the work of 
regeneration for the delayed business season, while phy­
sicians could start the task of explaining New Orleans' 
most malignant plague, which also had made great ravages 
throughout the entire Gulf States area.
Writing soon after the epidemic. Dr. Bennet Dowler 
estimated a yellow fever mortality of 8,400 in New Orleans 
alone. "The bloodiest battle-fields of modern-time 
scarcely can compare with the New Orleans epidemic of 
1853," said Dr. Dowler, "which destroyed five times more
13penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 45-47.
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than the British Army lost on the field of Water loo. 
Created at the close of the epidemic to investigate the 
facts of the siege, the Sanitary Commission set forth a 
total of 8,101 yellow fever fatalities. Dr. Edward H. 
Barton, head of the commission, made an extensive statis­
tical study of the epidemic. He estimated a total popula­
tion of almost 159,000 in New Orleans in 1853, including 
some 5,000 transients. Supposedly, almost one-fourth of 
the population fled when the Saffron Scourge arrived, 
leaving approximately 125,000 in the Crescent City during 
the visitation. Hence, the fever claimed about one of 
every fifteen persons remaining in the city. A total of 
approximately 29,000 cases and 8,000 deaths indicated a 
case fatality rate of almost twenty-eight per cent,^^ On 
the other hand. Dr. Fenner estimated only about 100,000 
persons in the city during the epidemic, of which about 
eight per cent, or one in twelve, died of the fever; and 
of the total population in the city at the time, over
l^Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," 
loc. cit., 31, 60.
l^Edward Hall Barton, The Cause and Prevention of 
Yellow Fever, Contained in the Report of the Sanitary Com­
mission of New Orleans (Philadelphia, 1855), 41-44.
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one-fourth suffered attacks.
The pestilence of 1853 covered a more extensive area 
in Louisiana, and the South generally, than ever before. 
According to Dr. Fenner, it attacked every town along the 
Mississippi River as far north as Napoleon (Arkansas) at 
the mouth of the Arkansas River, practically every village 
in Mississippi and Louisiana south of Vicksburg, and almost 
every plantation along the Mississippi River south of 
N a t c h e z . Pensacola, Mobile, Biloxi, Galveston, and 
Houston also experienced severe visitations, and in each 
case the fever spread to the interior where it had never 
appeared before. It seemed to rage with equal force in 
clean and unclean areas, in high and dry regions and low 
and wet localities, in piney woods as well as filthy 
streets, a phenomenon which posed new problems for medical 
theorists.18 Some held firm to the concepts of local
IGpenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 71-72,
l?Fenner, "Report on the Epidemics . . .  in the year 
1853," ci^., 424.
IBpe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 
631-33; History of the Yellow Fever in New Orleans, during 
the Summer of 1853 . . . by a Physician of New Orleans. . 
(Philadelphia & St. Louis, 1854), 30.
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causation and "epidemic constitution of the atmosphere"
In explaining the fever's origin and transmission. Others 
were converted to the Idea of Importation, If not con- 
gatlon Itself.
In many Louisiana towns where the first case was 
directly traceable to a previous center of Infection, It 
was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the disease had 
been Imported from New Orleans, or from a neighboring town. 
There were, however, just enough exceptions where contacts 
had failed to spread the fever from one town to another, 
or where an Imported case failed to touch off an epidemic, 
to keep the local causatlonlsts In business. Points within 
the state of Louisiana outside of New Orleans where the 
fever appeared In 1853 Included Algiers, St. John Baptiste, 
DonaIdsonv11le, Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, Bayou Sara and St. 
Francisville (and nearby Clinton), Vldalla, and Lake 
Providence along the Mississippi River; Alexandria, 
Natchitoches, Grand Encore, and Shreveport on the Red 
River; Cloutlervllle on Old River, a branch of the Red 
River; Pattersonvllle, Franklin, Centrevllle, and Washing­
ton on Bayou Teche, together with Opelousas only a few 
miles away; Thibodaux on Bayou La Fourche; Trenton on the 
Ouachita River; Covington and Madisonville across Lake
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Pontchartrain from New Orleans; and several other towns in 
close proximity to one of the above centers,
There is every indication that the pestilence of 
1853 raged even more severely in some of the small towns 
than it did in New Orleans itself. In Baton Rouge, for 
example, out of a population of about .2,000, according to 
Bennet Dowler, about 200 died of the fever; a later esti­
mate set the figure as high as 400.^0 in early September 
a report from Thibodaux described a desolate situation 
there. The town had been largely abandoned, and almost 
every person remaining had the fever. In one day, twenty- 
two persons had fallen victim to the fever and about 160 
new cases had occurred. According to Dowler's figures, 
yellow fever claimed nearly 150 persons, or fifteen per 
cent of the Thibodaux resident p o p u l a t i o n , i n  his
19Tonet, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit., 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; De Bow's 
Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 631-63; Dowler, 
"Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," loc. cit., 26-27,
20oowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," 
loc, cit., 26; John McGrath, Scrapbook (Louisiana State 
University Archives, Baton Rouge), 32 left, 39 right.
2lDe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853) , 
631-32; Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," 
loc. cit., 26,
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well-known account of travels through "The Cotton King­
dom," Frederick Law Olmsted mentioned the epidemic in 
commenting on Alexandria, which city he visited in December 
of 1853, He noted that the coiranunity ordinarily had a popu­
lation of 1,000, but had been almost entirely deserted by 
its citizens when the pestilence struck. Of some 300 who 
had remained in town, he was told that 120 had died,^^
Dr. Dowler estimated that one-fifth to one-sixth of Alex­
andria's population had been wiped out by the disease and 
that Lake Providence, where yellow fever had never appeared 
before, had lost over half its small populationP
An experience such as the Great Epidemic of 1853 
could scarcely be forgotten by those who lived through it, 
not even by New Orleanians long accustomed to epidemic 
disease. This time, however, no intermission followed, no 
summer or two in which the memory of epidemic yellow fever 
might begin to fade. The very next year the disease again 
appeared in New Orleans and carried off almost 2,500
22prederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, edited 
by Arthur M, Schlesinger (New York, 1953), 278,
23oowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," 
loc, cit., 27,
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additional victims,Although a rather destructive epi­
demic in terms of fatalities, the pestilence of 1854 
claimed less than a third of the number lost in 1853, A 
resident of New Orleans wrote in his diary in September: 
"This is considered among the old residents one of the bad 
'epidemic years' yet coming after the frightful pestilence 
of last summer it seems to excite but little attention-- 
such is the power of 'contrast.'" In early November he 
noted that "the epidemic just closing is pronounced the 
worst that has ever existed in New Orleans except those of 
1847 and 1853, . .
Not once throughout the entire season did the 
Picayune admit the existence of a full-scale outbreak. 
While publishing the weekly interment figures and Charity 
Hospital reports, the editor repeatedly commented on the 
freedom of the city from anything resembling epidemic dis­
ease, apparently taking the disaster of 1853 as the new 
standard for epidemics,^6 And by comparison to the
24garton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever, 
comparative table, preceding p, 1.
^^Thomas K, Wharton, Diary (Louisiana State Univer­
sity Archives, Baton Rouge), September 21, November 6, 1854.
26picayune, August 4-December 4, 1854,
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epidemic of 1853, the visitation of 1854 was actually a 
rather mild one, According to a report in the New Orleans 
Medical and Surgical Journal, "in no former epidemic for 
eighteen years has yellow fever yielded more readily to
timely medication."^7
The City Council reassembled in early October-- 
after their recess during the sickly season. Sardonically, 
the Mayor informed the council members that in the absence 
of a Board of Health during the epidemic, he had been un­
able to obtain any information to present to them on the 
subject of the fever. However, he told them that it "was 
similar to the awful calamity of the previous year." In 
regard to the "lamentable inefficiency" of a city govern­
ment which failed to act in the interest of public health, 
one citizen of New Orleans felt that "the ever patient, 
enduring public has had enough of it--a change must come, 
and that soon."^®
Even as the pestilence of 1854 was considerably 
less virulent in New Orleans than its predecessor, so was 
its spread through the state less extensive. It did,
27n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XI (November, 1854), 416, 
28wharton Diary, October 4, 1854.
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however, revisit Bayou Sara, Franklin, Pattersonville, 
Washington, Thibodaux, Alexandria, and Cloutierville. 
Places apparently experiencing yellow fever for the first 
time included Jeanerette and Judge Baker's plantation in 
St. Mary Parish and three small settlements in Plaquemine 
Parish below New Orleans: Buras Settlement, Point a la
Hache, and Jesuit's B e n d . 29
The first two major epidemics of the 1850's result­
ed in an intensified investigation of the facts relating 
to yellow fever, its cause, transmission, and possible 
prevention. Thousands of words filling hundreds of pages . 
poured forth from the pens of physicians, newspapermen, 
and others on the subject of the disease. With so much 
new experiential data, the old theoretical fight became 
more intense than ever. There were those who still 
believed the fever to be non-contagious, locally-caused, 
and spread by that indefinable essence, the "epidemic 
constitution of the atmosphere." Others had come to 
believe that the disease was imported to New Orleans from 
Latin America and transmitted elsewhere, if not by
Z^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit., 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; Pica­
yune , September 29, 1854.
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infected persons then by goods or baggage infected in some 
yet unknown manner.
The old attitude of fatalistically accepting the 
inevitable recurrence of the pestilence received a fairly 
severe blow from the unparalleled impact of the disease 
in 1853. In the midst of the fever's worst ravages, the 
Picayune published a letter to the editor expressing the 
beginning of a change in public opinion. The writer com­
plained that New Orleans had suffered too long without 
exerting any real effort to thwart the recurring evil. 
Aware of the fact that many medical men ridiculed the 
idea of quarantine measures and that commercial interests 
opposed any such restrictions, he also knew, on the other 
hand, of reliable physicians who favored inspection and 
quarantine of incoming vessels as a possible means of hold­
ing out yellow fever. Furthermore, he noted, "public 
opinion is daily growing more and more strong in favor of 
such . , . regulations."30 The New Orleans Picayune pre­
sented a steady stream of editorials demanding both 
quarantine and sanitation measures against the Saffron 
Scourge. While the importationists and the local
3Qpicayune, August 11, 1853,
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causationists carried on the interminable argument, the 
two proposed weapons against yellow fever might be tested. 
"Amid all the uncertainty . . .  we think it may safely be 
assumed, that either they [the epidemics] are of local 
generation, or they are of foreign importation; or they 
are both," the editor reasoned. Hence, both internal and 
external sanitary measures should be established "to meet 
all the postulates."3*1
The Louisiana legislature considered the quarantine 
issue early in 1854, but reaching no agreement, postponed 
the final resolution of the problem until the following 
session. The epidemic visitation which occurred in the 
summer of 1854 strengthened the public demand for protec­
tive measures, and finally on March 15, 1855, the law­
makers passed "An Act to Establish Quarantine for the 
Protection of the State," therewith creating a board of 
health to administer the quarantine--Louisiana's first 
State Board of Health and the first state board in the 
country as well,^^
31lbid«, September 25, 1853.
^^Ibid,, March 9, 14, 18, 19, 1854; "An Act to Estab­
lish Quarantine for the Protection of the State," Acts 
Passed by the Second Legislature of the State of Louisiana,
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Unfortunately, Yellow Jack arrived in New Orleans 
in the summer of 1855 before the Board was able to make 
all the necessary arrangements for establishing the quaran­
tine stations,33 For the third time in three successive 
years the Crescent City experienced a yellow fever epi­
demic. In August the editor of the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journa1 wrote: "The Yellow Fever of 1853-4-
5, a triune or triennial epidemic, though temporarily 
suspended during the winter season, rages still in New 
Orleans." And, he added: "The illusory hopes and flat­
tering prognostications which many persons indulged, that 
the unparalleled epidemic of 1853 had exhausted itself or
at Its Second Session . . . 1855 (New Orleans, 1855), 471- 
77; see also Gordon E, Gillson, "The Louisiana State Board 
of Health: The Formative Years" (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1960),
33Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana to the Honorable Senate and House of Representa­
tives [for 1855] (New Orleans, 1856), 10. The reports of 
the Louisiana State Board of Health, which vary slightly 
in title form frcwf year to year, will be cited hereinafter 
as Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health with the 
year for which the report was made.
The Act of 1855 provided for three quarantine 
stations: down the Mississippi River from New Orleans;
at the mouth of the Atchafalaya River; and at the Rigo- 
lets, the entrance from the Gulf to Pontchartrain.
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rather the food on which it fed, have ended in disappoint­
ment,” The high point of the epidemic occurred in the 
third week of August, when the fever claimed almost 400 
victims. In gradually building up to that point from late 
June, the fever had caused a total mortality of almost 
1,300, and in its gradual decline from late August to late 
October, it destroyed approximately 1,300 more. At the 
close of the epidemic the editor of the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal commented rather poetically on the 
"pestilential storm" which once again had swept through New 
Orleans. In spite of all, he asserted proudly, "The be- 
leagured city, after a three years' pestilential siege, 
stands forth like a scarred veteran, yet strong, hopeful, 
undismayed, unconquered and ready to meet the inexorable 
decrees of fate quietly and without r e t r e a t i n g . A c c o r d ­
ing to the report of Louisiana's first State Board of
Health, the Crescent City had suffered a total loss of
3S2,670 yellow fever deaths that season,
A resident of New Orleans, writing in his diary in
^^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XII (September, 1855), 
285; XII (November, 1855), 432.
35Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1856, 25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
late September of 1855, expressed the opinion that the 
"worst feature" of the epidemic was "its general diffusion 
thro* this State and lower Mississippi," He noted that in 
previous years **the timid found a safe retreat from the 
scourge of the city in the country towns and on the Planta­
tions of the coast--[but] now the country is no longer 
safe." Since the epidemic of 1853, "the whole Southern 
portion of the United States seems to have become the home 
of 'the fever,'" he wrote, . particularly , , , along
the water courses and in the marshy Bays and inlets of the
36sea and Gulf Coasts." In spreading through the state of 
Louisiana the pestilence of 1855 touched more points than 
the previous one of 1854, but neither could rank with the 
outbreak of 1853 in extensiveness. The 1855 fever extended 
up the Mississippi to Baton Rouge, Plaquemine, and Point 
Coupee Parish; up the Red to Alexandria; all along the 
Ouachita and Black rivers ; and to various points in the 
southern part of the state, including Pattersonville, 
Centerville, and St, Martinville on the Teche, and also New 
Iberia,37
36wharton Diary, September 30, 1855,
3?Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit.,
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The next two years passed without epidemic incident. 
According to the Board of Health reports, only 74 yellow 
fever deaths occurred in New Orleans in 1856, and only 199 
in 1857.38 in the summer and fall of 1858, however, the 
Crescent City experienced another violent epidemic, out­
ranked only by the great visitation of 1853.
In the August issue of the New Orleans Medical News 
and Hospital Gazette, the editor reported that the fever 
of 1858 had first appeared in the middle of June. At that 
point, he said, it was yet impossible to predict its future 
progress. Almost entirely confined to the working classes, 
especially along the waterfront, the disease had not yet 
become "anything like epidemic." But, he noted, the mass 
exodus from New Orleans was already under way. In the 
September issue the editor admitted the impossibility of 
accurately predicting the course of yellow fever "until 
more is known of the coming and going of this terrible 
scourge." An epidemic was clearly in progress in the city
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; Pica­
yune , September 20, 25, 1855.
38Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1856, 34; New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, V 
(March, 1858), 42.
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and had been for some time.^^
In early August of 1858 a New Orleanian wrote in 
his diary: "The subject of Yellow Fever is beginning to
excite attention. The rapid increase of deaths in the 
Hospital , . . shows its epidemic character, and there is 
no doubt that it bears the genuine West India type."^®
He continued to write of its increasing prevalence, noting 
that "the fever this year is of a very vicious type." In 
late August he commented on the extent of the epidemic:
". . . it is everywherel--in the houses of the rich and 
the houses of the poor." This diarist, a keen observer, 
also recorded his impressions of the city, which seemed 
"subdued and still--more like a village in summertide as 
far as human action is concerned.
In late September and early October, the fever con­
tinued to carry off hundreds of victims weekly. In spite 
of repeated warnings in the newspapers, a steady stream of 
strangers poured into the city, "furnishing fresh food to
39n . 0. Med. News & Hosp. Gaz., V (August, 1858), 
390-91; V (September, 1858), 481.
^O^harton Diary, August 6, 1858.
41lbid., August 30, September 3, 1858.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
the destroyer,” Finally, by mid-November the worst was
over.42
Although disseminated widely through the South, 
apparently the fever of 1858 did not attack Louisiana 
extensively outside of New Orleans, It seems to have 
appeared only in Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, Algiers, Gretna, 
McDonoughville, and Franklin; however, there may have been 
outbreaks in many other small towns which were simply not 
recorded in the medical journals and larger newspapers.
The Saffron Scourge hit many points outside Louisiana that 
year, including Galveston, Houston, Brownsville, Pass 
Christian, Biloxi, Vicksburg, Natchez, Woodville, Mobile, 
Savannah, and Charleston,
Having failed to prevent a highly malignant epidemic, 
Louisiana's quarantine system came under attack from many 
quarters in 1858, The quarantine act had enemies from its 
very inception, particularly among the shipping and com­
mercial interests who opposed its economic effects and 
physicians who adamantly insisted that yellow fever was
42picayune, October 10, November 16, 23, 1858,
43xoner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit,, 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; N, 0. 
Med, & Surg, Jour,, XV (November, 1858), 811.
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not, and could not be, imported. The epidemic of 1858 
undoubtedly turned many New Orleanians against quarantine, 
many who had counted on the new system to protect the city 
from yellow fever's ravages. The editor of the New Orleans 
Bee in September of 1858 criticized the system as both use­
less and costly and insisted that the disease was obviously 
"of indigenous o r i g i n . xhere were two possible con­
clusions at this point; either yellow fever was an import­
ed disease, and the quarantine system had not been effective 
in screening it put; or yellow fever was of native origin, 
and quarantine an unnecessary expense.
The Board of Health chose the first alternative as 
the explanation for the epidemic of 1858. Insisting that 
the fever was an imported disease, the Board's Report for 
1858 stated that quarantine failed because legislative 
amendments to the original act had rendered it ineffective. 
In amending the act in March of 1858, the legislature had 
reduced the detention period of those vessels coming from 
infected ports which presented a clean bill of health on 
arrival. Denouncing this amendment as a concession to 
commercial interests, the Board of Health felt that it
44Bee, September 4, 1858.
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seriously compromised the practicality of the original act. 
Furthermore, they recommended a series of new amendments 
to increase the effectiveness of the quarantine program.
The epidemic of 1858, together with the three other 
serious visitations in the 1850's, represents the climax of 
yellow fever's activities and marks a turning point in its 
history in Louisiana. The Great Epidemic of 1853, so 
devastating in its effects, so widespread in extent, and 
followed by three more outbreaks within a five-year period, 
led to a revived interest in an old issue relating to 
yellow fever, an issue which had never been solved, although 
it had been shelved from time to time: what exactly was
the cause of the yellow pestilence, and how could it be 
prevented? Was it a gaseous substance spontaneously gen­
erated from filth and spread through the atmosphere? 
Influenced by heat and wet weather? A specific living 
entity transmitted from person to person? Preventable by 
sanitation, by quarantine, by both? Or what? No one knew. 
Hundreds of questions could be posed; none could be
45Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1858, 20, 28-32 ;~*TAn Act Supplementary to an Act entitled 
'An Act relative to Quarantine,'" Acts passed by the Fourth 
Legislature of Louisiana, at its First Session . . . 1858 
(Baton Rouge, 1858), 187-89.
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answered with any finality. One New Orleanian, writing in 
1853, summed up the problem in this manner: "The truth is,
that nothing--absolutely nothing--is known of its [yellow 
fever's] cause, although it has been studied attentively 
for more than a century, with all the aids that modern 
science could a f f o r d . T h e  battle between local causa- 
tionists and importationists raged fiercely through the 
decade of the fifties. Although a quarantine system had 
been effected in 1855, and continued with various modifi­
cations from then on, by no means was there anything like 
a unanimity of opinion of the subject. For the remainder 
of the nineteenth century, the issue of quarantine pro­
vided a continual topic for debate. At any rate, nothing 
short of absolute nonintercourse during the hot months, or 
a long detention period for vessels, together with a 
fumigation process thorough enough to destroy the yet 
unsuspected mosquito, could have proved effective in hold­
ing out the disease. Nevertheless, the new State Board of 
Health, operating under tremendous handicaps, tried des­
perately to effect measures designed to preserve the health 
of the Crescent City.
46oe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
632.
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The State Board of Health Itself, created originally 
to administer the quarantine system, was, in a sense, a by­
product of the Great Epidemic, and with the addition of 
further duties and powers, would in time evolve into a 
vital state institution. Furthermore, the epidemics of 
the fifties shocked the people of New Orleans into a re- 
evaluation of their mortality statistics, which would 
ultimately result in a great awakening on the subject of 
the city's insalubrity. Still the sanitary revolution 
was a long time coming.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS, 
1848-1858
Year
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852 
*1853 
*1854 
*1855
1856
1857 
*1858
Estimated Deaths
872
769
107
17
456
7,849 to 8,400 
2,300 to 2,500
2,670 
74
199
4,855
Population (Approx.)
116,000
154.000
157.000
159.000
166,000
*Major epidemics.
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DISTRIBUTION OF YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA 
OUTSIDE OF NEW ORLEANS, 1848-1858*
Places 1852 1853 1854 1855 1858
Alexandria X X X
Algiers X X
Baton Rouge X X X
Bayou Sara X X
Carrollton ? X
Centerville X X
Clinton X
Cloutierville X X
Covington X
Donaldsonville X
Franklin X X  X
Grand Encore X
Gretna ? X
Harrisonburg X
Lake Providence X
McDonoughville X
Madisonville X
Natchitoches X
New Iberia X
Opelousas X
Paincourtville X
Pattersonville X X X
Plaquemine X X X
Plaquemines Parish X
Point Coupee Parish X
St. Francisville X
St. John Baptiste X
St. Martinville X
St. Mary Parish X
Shreveport X
Thibodaux X X
Trenton X X
Vidalia X
Washington x X X
Waterproof______________________________________X_________
*Drawn up on the basis of scattered evidence and 
testimony. The disease probably occurred in many other 
small towns not listed here, and might well have prevailed 
to some degree in the listed points during years not checked.
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CHAPTER IV
AN INTERREGNUM, 1859-1866
After the succession of epidemics in the fifties, 
unparalleled both in frequency and malignancy. New Orleans 
enjoyed a respite from epidemic yellow fever, the like of 
which had not been experienced since the initial visita­
tion of 1796. In eight years, between the outbreaks of 
1858 and 1867, Yellow Jack claimed a total of only about 
300 victims, and in 1861, for the first time in over a half- 
century, not a single death from the yellow pestilence was 
reported in the Crescent City. For the better portion of 
that period in which yellow fever seemed to have abdicated 
its throne in New Orleans, the American nation suffered the 
agonies of its great Civil War, and New Orleans itself 
underwent the experience of military occupation by the 
forces of the Northern enemy.
The relationship between the Civil War and the health 
of New Orleans attracted the attention of the Louisiana 
State Board of Health even before the capture of the Cres­
cent City by the Yankees. Late in 1861 the Board reported
127
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a total mortality of only about 5,500 for the entire year, 
without a single death from yellow fever. They attributed 
this incredible phenomenon to the indirect benefits of the 
Federal blockade, "partial though it may have been," which, 
together with Louisiana's quarantine restrictions, had cut 
down the possibilities of introducing disease from a 
foreign port. It had been suggested, the Board stated, 
that the diminution of the usual summer population by the 
numbers then in military service would account for the 
decrease in mortality. However, the Board of Health con­
sidered this theory fallacious. They pointed out that the 
very conditions which had led away many to the army had 
resulted in the continued presence in New Orleans of those 
who ordinarily spent the summer in the North or in Europe,^ 
At least one resident of the Crescent City agreed with the 
Board's position on the indirect advantages resulting from 
the Yankee blockade, for he wrote in his diary in July of 
1861: , , the impudent 'Lincoln blockade' is acting in
our favor by keeping out the yellow fever, and stimulating 
our heretofore dormant industry and self-reliance.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1861, 4,
^Wharton Diary, July 28, 1861,
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The city of New Orleans fell to the Union forces in 
late April of 1362 and remained under military occupation 
for the duration of the war. Yellow fever, a subject much 
in the minds of both the conquerors and the conquered, was 
a source of great fear and dread to the one, of hope and 
encouragement to the other. General Benjamin F, Butler, in 
command of the Federal occupation forces during the first 
year, later wrote: ”1 learned that the rebels were actual­
ly relying largely upon the yellow fever to clear out the 
Northern troops, the men of New England and the Northwest 
. , , whom they had learned from experience were usually 
the first victims of the scourge.” Furthermore, he had 
also heard "that in the churches [of New Orleans] prayers 
were put up that the pestilence might come as a divine 
interposition on behalf of the brethren.Although he 
found this difficult to believe, Butler noticed "many 
things that render[ed] it almost probable," It seemed to 
him that New Orleanians deliberately cultivated a "condition 
of perfect nastiness" as if in the hope of generating the 
fever. But if they did offer up prayers, he said, they
^Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book (Boston, 1892),
396.
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did not do so aloud in the churches because Federal soldiers 
attended their services. However, "in the course of the 
liturgy the clergyman always gave out at a certain point 
. . .  an opportunity for silent prayer," the General noted, 
"and then the people either prayed for the yellow fever, or 
Jefferson Davis to come there victorious; neither of which 
was comforting to the Yankee worshiper. , ,
The hopeful expectation of an epidemic which would 
wipe out the Yankees in the Crescent City was apparently 
not confined solely to New Orleanians. One newspaper in 
Virginia consoled the people of the Confederacy over the 
Union capture of New Orleans with this thought: "They
have got the elephant, it is true, but it is a prize which 
will cost them vastly more to keep than the animal is 
worth, if his Saffron Majesty shall make his usual annual 
visit to the city and wave his sceptre in the hospitals 
there."5
^Benjamin F, Butler, "Some Experiences with Yellow 
Fever and its Prevention," North American Review, CXLVII 
(November, 1888), 530.
^Howard Palmer Johnson, "New Orleans under General 
Butler," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIV (April, 
1941), 478.
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Northern soldiers, aware of the terrors of the fatal 
pestilence for which New Orleans was infamous, also knew 
about its obvious preference for the unacclimated stranger. 
And not for one moment were the forces of occupation 
allowed by the acclimated residents of New Orleans to for­
get this terrifying fact. Wishing to intensify this fear 
among the troops, one citizen took a measuring tape, a 
notebook, and a compatriot along on a sardonic mission. 
Approaching a group of Federal soldiers, he began to 
measure their height with the tape and jot down notations 
of the same. When asked the meaning of this action, he 
replied that a contract had been obtained for making 10,000 
coffins, which would be needed ultimately for the steady 
stream of Yankee replacements sent in as yellow fever 
carried them off, one by one. Even the children of the 
Crescent City participated in the harassment of the United 
States troops. In late May and early June of 1862 they 
jeered at the soldiers in the streets:
Yellow Jack will grab them up 
And take them all away.&
^Elisabeth Joan Doyle, "Civilian Life in Occupied 
New Orleans, 1862-65” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State 
University, Baton Rouge, 1955), 56-57.
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The citizens of New Orleans would have welcomed the 
arrival of the Saffron Scourge in the summer of 1862, They 
would have accepted gladly the aid of their old enemy 
against the new adversary from the North. According to 
General Butler, all their conversations in the presence of 
his officers included descriptions of past epidemic horrors, 
especially the disaster of 1853. Under a constant barrage 
of this demoralizing propaganda, Butler's men soon began 
to evidence its effects. Many of the officers were panic- 
stricken and depressed; some requested a transfer to a 
different area; others offered every conceivable excuse 
for a leave. But the General held firm and proceeded to 
study the problem of yellow fever in order to circumvent 
the coming of an epidemic. First of all, he asked an old 
New Orleans physician about ways and means to keep out the 
fever. No means existed, he was told, and no way to pre­
vent its spread once under way. The physician admitted 
that quarantine of incoming vessels might be useful, but 
the presence of unacclimated troops together with the un­
sanitary condition of the city made it likely that the dis­
ease, if it broke out at all, would rage with great fury. 
Butler then obtained some books on the subject and a map of 
New Orleans indicating the localities where yellow fever
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usually prevailed. Upon investigation of those places, he 
found them uniformly "filthy with rotting matter,
After much reading, investigating, and thinking on 
the subject of the yellow pestilence. General Butler devel­
oped his own theory of the fever. He concluded that exhala­
tions from putrid animal matter produced typhus fever and 
that exhalations from rotting vegetable matter produced 
congestive fevers. But with morbific matter from both 
animal and vegetable sources present in an atmosphere and 
the seeds or germs of yellow fever added to it, the Saffron 
Scourge would be propagated in epidemic form and would 
spread through that portion of the atmosphere contaminated 
by both animal and vegetable effluvia. In Butler's con­
sidered opinion, yellow fever was not indigenous to New 
Orleans; its "seeds" had to be imported. It was possible, 
he thought, for the seeds to last through the winter hidden 
away in woolen clothing and protected from the frost. 
Without the dual contamination of the atmosphere, however, 
he believed the seeds, whether imported fresh or preserved 
through the winter, would be unable to propagate. Having 
settled upon three indispensable factors involved in the
^Butler*s Book, 398-400,
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production of an epidemic, Butler set out to deal with 
them. First of all, since he believed yellow fever seeds 
to be imported, he instituted a strict quarantine on the 
Mississippi River below New Orleans. Secondly, he rea­
lized it would be impossible to dispose of all decaying 
vegetable matter because of the dense growth around the 
city. But if a combination of animal and vegetable ele­
ments was required to produce an epidemic atmosphere, the 
disposal of either one of the two would suffice. He was 
convinced that putrid animal matter and filth could be 
cleared away. Having clearly outlined the problem in his 
mind. General Butler set to work to accomplish the two 
indicated objectives; instituting an effective quarantine
g
system and cleaning up the city of New Orleans. Interest­
ingly enough, his theory represented a composite of 
practically all the epidemiological concepts which had been 
floating around for centuries, and his program of prevention 
combined the two suggestions so long debated by yellow 
fever philosophers: quarantine and sanitation.
Although previous attempts had been made to institute 
such measures, never before had sanitation and quarantine
Sibid., 400-401, 407-408.
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been so rigorously enforced in New Orleans as they were 
under Butler, He established a very strict quarantine 
system at the regular station seventy miles below New 
Orleans where, in his words, "thirty-two and sixty-eight 
pound shots should be the messengers to execute the health 
orders," All vessels coming up river were required to 
stop below Fort St, Philip, about five miles down river 
from the quarantine station, for inspection by the health 
officer, who then reported to the General the condition of 
the vessel, its passengers, crew, and cargo. If the quaran­
tine physician reported a clean bill of health and Butler 
in turn telegraphed his consent, then and only then could 
the vessel proceed up river to the Crescent City, "If any 
vessel attempted to evade quarantine regulations and pass 
up without being examined," said General Butler, "the vessel 
was to be stopped if there was power enough in the fort to 
do it." Unlike Louisiana's lawmakers who had drafted the 
state's quarantine legislation, Butler accepted the literal 
meaning of the term quarantine and required any ship with 
any infectious sickness on board to remain at the station 
for forty days, after which another thorough inspection was 
necessary. Furthermore, all vessels from ports where 
yellow fever was prevailing had to spend forty days in
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quarantine, whether they arrived with a clean bill of 
health or not.*
General Butler obtained the services of a competent 
physician to administer the inspection and report on the 
condition of incoming vessels and paid him well for perform­
ing these duties. The General threatened to invoke the 
death penalty, however, should this physician make false 
reports and allow an infected ship to come up to New 
Orleans. According to Butler's account, only on one 
occasion during his command in 1862 did yellow fever slip 
through the stringent quarantine, and this was not because 
of negligence on the part of the quarantine physician.
Butler himself had allowed a tug carrying much-needed pro­
visions from New York to come up river without undergoing 
the forty-day detention, accepting the captain's oath that 
coal, and only coal, had been taken on at the Nassau stop 
where yellow fever prevailed. Several days later two cases 
of fever appeared in the French quarter in the persons of 
two passengers from Nassau who had come in on the tug. The 
military took over immediately and surrounded the square 
where the cases were located. Under Butler's order
9lbid., 401.
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certain acclimated persons went in to attend the patients 
and came out only after being thoroughly cleansed. Fires 
fed with tar and pitch burned day and night at the four 
corners of the square. When the two patients died, every­
thing in and around the building which Butler thought 
might harbor yellow fever seeds were burned; even the 
bodies were cremated. No other cases developed, but the 
deceitful captain of the tug spent three months in jail and 
paid a fine of $5 0 0 .
On first assuming control of New Orleans, General 
Butler had not intended to undertake the problem of sanitary 
reform, but rather expected to leave the administration of 
sanitary laws, together with other ordinary civic functions, 
in the hands of the duly constituted municipal government.
He soon realized, however, the necessity of positive action 
on his part against what he considered the causative forces 
of yellow f e v e r . A f t e r  having established quarantine
IQibid., 403; 408-10. Writing on another occasion, 
Butler mentioned only one case of yellow fever imported 
from Nassau. See Butler, "Some Experiences with Yellow 
Fever and its Prevention," loc. cit., 531, 536-37; and The 
Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, 
Part III, Vol. I (Washington, 1888), 675-76.
11James Parton. General Butler in New Orleans (New 
York, 1864), 295.
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regulations, Butler proceeded to the "Herculean task" of 
cleaning up the city of New Orleans, early in June of 1862. 
In a message to the Military Governor and the New Orleans 
City Council, General Butler directed that the city employ 
a force of two thousand men, fully equipped with the 
necessary tools and under adequate supervision, for a 
period of at least thirty working days, to clean the 
streets, squares, and unoccupied lands of the city. Seek­
ing the full cooperation of the council, Butler played 
upon their sentiment in this manner: "The epidemic so
earnestly prayed for by the wicked will hardly sweep away 
the strong man, although he may be armed, and leave the 
weaker woman and child untouched." Reminding them of the 
presence of many women and children who ordinarily left New 
Orleans during the summer months, he said, "The miasma 
which sickens the one [the troops] will harm the o t h e r . "^2 
One squad from the cleansing force was sent to the 
French Market with an order "accompanied by a few bayonets" 
that the area be cleaned. The superintendent in charge of 
the market said he could not have it done; nevertheless, 
the clean-up crew went ahead with the task, scraped up the
l^Butler's Book, 403-404.
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filth, sent it down the river, and charged him with the 
expense. It is not surprising that General Butler gave top 
priority to the cleansing of this particular area. On first 
inspecting the place, he had been shocked by its filthy 
state. "In the French market," he wrote, "the stall women 
were accustomed to drop on the floor around their stalls 
all the refuse made in cleaning their birds, meat, and 
fish." Furthermore, he added, "Here it was trodden in and 
in. This had been going on for a century more or less."^^
The sanitary forces then went through the streets, 
clearing away all putrefying animal matter, scraping and 
sweeping out every drain and ditch in the city. The city 
water-works was ordered to flush the streets with all its 
pumps, and as the water flowed through the freshly cleaned 
drains and ditches into the canals leading to Lake Pont- 
chartrain, the accumulated filth was forced out into the 
Lake and eventually into the Gulf.
Strict orders were issued to the people of New 
Orleans on the subject of cleanliness. The head of every
l^ibid., 400, 406; Butler, "Some Experiences with 
Yellow Fever and its Prevention," loc. cit », 536.
l^Butler's Book, 406-407; Butler, "Some Experiences 
with Yellow Fever and its Prevention," loc. cit., 536.
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household was forced to have his premises cleaned inside 
and out to meet the approval of military inspectors. It 
was directed that all refuse from each household be depo­
sited in a box or barrel acceptable to the inspector, and 
on two or three specified days a week that the receptacle 
be placed at the end of the street. From that point the 
receptacle's contents would be picked up and hauled off by 
mule teams. Those in charge of the wagons would disinfect 
the containers with chloride of lime if necessary. Further­
more, all persons were expressly forbidden to throw any­
thing of any kind into the streets, alleys, or any open 
spaces, including their own back yards.
One might expect that such strict regulations would 
be most difficult to enforce. Not at all, declared Butler, 
and he provided several examples to illustrate his point. 
One citizen, deliberately testing the order, walked along 
the street and called a policeman to watch him throw down 
a small piece of white paper. Informed of this willful 
disobedience, Butler sent for the man, who admitted the 
act and insisted it was his privilege to toss paper. The 
General replied that "the streets were made to pass
l^Butler's Book, 404.
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through, and when he took his privilege I would take mine 
and pass him through the streets into the parish prison to 
stay three months." Another case involved a "high-toned 
woman" who tried to ignore the sanitary regulations. A 
"fashionable lady" of New Orleans adamantly refused to 
clean her back yard, which contained a box of excrement 
not yet hauled off from the privy. She informed the 
military inspector that her back yard was "as I choose to
have it, and it won't be altered at the order of any
Yankee." When the officer told her to gather up whatever
clothes she wanted to take along to jail, she burst into
tears and agreed to accept another opportunity to comply 
with the regulations. By the next afternoon, "the yard 
was in apple-pie order.
Even Butler with all his efforts apparently was un­
able to attain a perfect state of purity in New Orleans,
In August of 1862 the editor of the Daily True Delta com­
plained of the filthy gutters. Having observed several 
with green scum on the water "thick enough to bear the 
weight of a small-sized bird," he recommended that the 
authorities attend to the removal of all such pestilential
IGibid,, 405-406,
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influences.17 Nevertheless, General Butler must be given 
credit for whipping New Orleans into what was perhaps a 
better sanitary condition than it had ever enjoyed before.
In November of 1862 the Picayune stated that only once 
before had the Crescent City been so clean; a relatively 
pristine condition had prevailed immediately after the dis­
aster of 1853 when the city government had been aroused 
temporarily to action. After the Civil War, even the most 
acrimonious rebel was willing to admit that General Benja­
min F, Butler had been "the best scavenger we ever had 
among us."l®
When the Union forces assumed control of New Orleans 
in the spring of 1862, none of Butler's surgeons had ever 
seen a case of yellow fever or possessed any knowledge about 
combatting the "hideous foe," In July, after the inaugura­
tion of sanitation and quarantine measures, a pamphlet was 
prepared, with the assistance of several New Orleans phy­
sicians, for the instruction of the Union surgeons in the 
Department of the Gulf, It outlined in detail the symptoms 
for diagnosis and prognosis, in addition to a course of
l^New Orleans Daily True Delta, August 20, 1862,
Johnson, "New Orleans under General Butler," loc, 
cit,, 478.
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treatment for yellow fever. The pamphlet stated that every 
precaution had been taken to prevent the fever’s occurrence, 
but emphasized the ever-present possibility of an outbreak, 
as well as the duty of an army surgeon to be prepared for 
all emergencies.19 Fortunately for the Yankees, the first 
year of the Federal occupation of New Orleans passed with 
only two known deaths from yellow fever. Since the records 
are imperfect, it is possible that several other deaths 
occurred. The significant fact is, however, that in spite 
of the appearance of a few cases, the pestilence did not 
spread to any noticeable extent.20
In November of 1862 General Nathaniel P. Banks was 
appointed to replace "Beast” Butler as Major-General Com­
manding the Department of the Gulf, When Butler left New 
Orleans in December, he stated in his Farewell Address to 
the citizens of the Crescent City: "I have demonstrated
that the pestilence can be kept from your borders. . , , I 
have cleansed and improved your streets, canals, and public
19Butler’s Book, 398; Some Practical Observations 
on Yellow Fever, Published for the Use of Surgeons of the 
Volunteer Forces ïn The Department of the Gulf (NewUrleans, 
1862).
2%. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870), 569,
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? 1squares. , . One Creole of New Orleans took a slight­
ly different view of the subject, according to a story 
printed in the Picayune several years later. When asked 
to admit that Butler had demonstrated great ability in pre­
serving the Crescent City from pestilence while in command 
there, the New Orleanian supposedly said: "By gar, vat you
take me vor? You no believe in a God? You no believe zere 
is mercie? Yellow fever and G-e-n-e-r-e-1 Butler at the 
same time 11!"^^
During the remainder of the war period, sanitary 
regulations were administered and enforced through the co­
operative efforts of General Banks (in command of the Depart­
ment) , the Military Governor, the Mayor of the city, the 
Provost-Marshal, the Medical Director of the Department, 
and specially appointed Sanitary Inspectors, Quarantine 
regulations continued in force, although never quite as 
strictly administered as under General Butler.^3 Among the
Zlparton, General Butler in New Orleans, 605. 
22picayune, November 14, 1867.
Z^Elisha Harris, "Hygienic Experience in New Orleans 
during the War: Illustrating the Importance of Efficient 
Sanitary Regulations," Southern Journal of the Medical 
Sciences, I (May, 1866), 25-30; Doyle, "Civilian Life in 
Occupied New Orleans, 1862-65," 66-67.
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civilian population of New Orleans, only two yellow fever 
deaths were reported in 1863, six in 1864, and one in 1865. 
In 1863 and 1864 yellow fever cases appeared on several 
vessels of the river fleet, spreading frcwn there to the 
Naval Hospital. But even there the spread was not exten­
sive: about 100 cases in 1863 and 200 in 1864.^4
Under war-time occupation, the Board of Health had 
been converted into a military bureau with the Medical 
Director of the Department of the Gulf serving as presi­
dent. Not until April of 1866 was the Louisiana State 
Board of Health reorganized on its pre-war basis, with six 
members appointed by the Governor and three by the New 
Orleans City Council. Almost immediately the Board en­
countered its traditional problems: no power, no funds,
no cooperation from the municipal authorities.^5 In July 
of 1866 the Picayune editor commented on the need for more 
energetic enforcement of sanitary measures to remove the 
potential sources of pestilence. The editor felt that the 
city authorities should pay more attention to "this cause
24n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870),
569-74.
ZSpeport of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1866-67, 3-4.
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of complaint and of danger,
Provost-Marshal James Bowen, who served in New 
Orleans for two years during the war, had predicted that 
with the return of the "usual lax administration" of sani­
tary regulations by the civil authorities New Orleans would 
again be visited by the yellow p e s t i l e n c e . ful­
fill his prophecy, both yellow fever and Asiatic cholera 
appeared in New Orleans in 1866. While cholera claimed 
more than 1,200 victims, the Saffron Scourge struck lightly 
that year, causing only 185 fatalities. But the following 
year, 1867, witnessed a two-fold increase in the city's 
total mortality over that of 1866 and a yellow fever epi­
demic which caused more than 3,000 d e a t h s .
In the spring of 1866 Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner 
reviewed the subject of health in New Orleans under military 
rule to determine what lessons might be learned for future 
application. He praised the tremendous efforts exerted by
26picayune, July 24, 1866.
Z^Harris, "Hygienic Experience in New Orleans during 
the War," loc. cit., 30.
28Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
June 1866-January 1867, 6, 12-13; Report of the Louisiana 
State Board of Health for 1867, 18, 20.
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the authorities throughout that period toward the problem 
of sanitary reform, "Such efforts were never made here 
before," he stated,"although so often urged by the medical 
profession in previous years." But, Dr. Fenner added, 
"perhaps, it may be said such motives were never presented 
before." In spite of the war and the dark side of its 
balance sheet, he felt that New Orleans should be grateful 
for "this great sanitary experiment." Compared to its pre­
vious condition, the city had been kept unbelievably clean 
throughout the period. "It was a Herculean task," Fenner 
declared, "and, in our humble opinion, nothing short of 
military despotism would have accomplished it."^9
To Dr. Fenner the great lesson of the episode con­
sisted in the validation of his theory of fever causation. 
He had long held the opinion that filth and atmospheric con­
tamination produced diseases of all sorts, including yellow 
fever. Following the premise of local causation, he had 
always reasoned that sanitary measures would prove the best 
means for preventing disease. In contrast to this, many
29e , D. Fenner, "Remarks on the Sanitary Condition 
of the City of New Orleans, during the period of Federal 
Military Occupation, from May 1862 to March 1866," Southern 
Journal of the Medical Sciences, I (May, 1866), 22-23.
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persons attributed the freedom of New Orleans from epi­
demic pestilences during war-time occupation to the 
stringent quarantine measures. But Fenner disagreed. 
Although quarantine had been enforced rather strictly 
through much of the period, he knew definitely about one 
case imported from Key West; there were probably others. 
Admitting the likelihood of several imported cases of 
yellow fever each year during the period, he thought it 
extraordinary that the disease had not become epidemic in 
the city. It could only be explained, of course, by the 
strict enforcement of sanitary regulations. And, as he 
reasoned further, how could quarantine be expected to 
afford complete protection against a disease which was 
indigenous to New Orleans?^®
The "sanitary experience" of the period between 
1862 and 1866 had provided "useful instruction," and Dr. 
Fenner felt it should not be overlooked by the citizens of 
New Orleans. Suggesting that Generals Butler and Banks 
deserved much credit for their achievements in the Crescent 
City, he remarked: "We may yet have occasion to mingle
some thanks among the many curses that have been heaped
30lbid., 23-24.
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upon their heads for their unnecessary severity upon the 
citizens of New Orleans," For twenty years or more, some 
physicians of the Crescent City had preached the gospel of 
cleanliness without appreciable effect. But, said Fenner, 
"In the mysterious course of events the hand of the tyrant 
has been brought to our aid, and the results are marvelous." 
Now that the true path had been clearly demonstrated, not 
only by logic but also by the Yankee experiment in not-so- 
gentle persuasion. Dr. Fenner hoped that New Orleanians 
would not fall by the wayside.
Dr. Stanford E. Chaille, eminent New Orleans phy­
sician, editor, and medical educator, studied the facts 
relating to yellow fever, and sanitation during the mili­
tary occupation of New Orleans and arrived at conclusions 
somewhat different from Dr. Fenner's. Writing in 1870, 
Chaille noted that many persons attributed the relative 
freedom from yellow fever during the war to effective sani­
tation measures. He felt that the conclusion was "not 
logically deducible from the true premises." The faulty 
syllogism went something like this: For years New Orleans
had been visited by yellow fever epidemics which carried
31lbid., 24-25.
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off thousands of victims, and during those years the city 
was incredibly filthy. During the four-year period from 
1862 through 1865 no epidemic occurred, and New Orleans was 
one of the cleanest cities in the country. Therefore, the 
exemption from epidemics was due to the unusually clean 
condition of the city. Chaille then proposed to state the 
"correct syllogism with the true premise" in this manner:
New Orleans enjoyed during eight years, 1859-66, 
an exemption, unexampled in her history, from 
yellow fever epidemics. During four of these 
eight years, viz., 1859-60-61-66, the city suf­
fered notoriously with its habitual filth, and 
during the four remaining years, viz., 1862-65, 
it enjoyed an unusual degree of cleanliness.
Therefore, --- -----what?
If sanitary measures protected the city during the war
years, what factor operated in the other non-epidemic
years before and after the war, when New Orleans was as
0 9
filthy as ever? Chaille*s question is a significant 
one, and not entirely answerable even in the light of 
modern medical knowledge.
The mortality from various diseases among the occupa­
tion forces in the Crescent City was great enough as it 
was; had the Saffron Scourge raged, as New Orleanians for
32n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870).
589-92.
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once hoped it might, the death toll would have been exceed­
ingly great. One can safely say that luck was with the 
Yankees! It is impossible to determine just how much the 
rigid enforcement of quarantine and sanitary measures had 
to do with the city's exemption from a yellow fever epi­
demic during war-time occupation. Quarantine, when 
literally enforced, would have held out the disease, but 
after Butler, the detention period was generally reduced 
from forty days to ten. Moreover, yellow fever was defi­
nitely imported on several occasions, but failed to spread 
extensively. Sanitary regulations might have reduced the 
incidence of certain endemic diseases and certainly eli­
minated some of the offensive, if not pestilential, odors 
of the city. Such measures would hardly have affected the 
yellow fever mosquito, however, which chose cisterns and 
indoor water receptacles as breeding places in preference 
to gutters, stagnant pools, and swamps. Many factors, some 
affected by chance, are necessary for the production of a 
full-scale yellow fever epidemic. In addition, there is 
the problem of the not-yet-fully understood virus itself, 
known only by its activities, and evidencing a considerable 
amount of variability in those activities over a long 
period of time. For whatever reason, yellow fever had
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already begun its gradual retreat from the New Orleans 
sector after reaching the height of its activity in the 
1850's. Although the disease continued to excite much 
interest in the second half of the century, except for two 
or three major outbreaks its appearances were mild in 
nature,
Unlike Dr. Chaille, many people tended to overlook 
the years immediately before and after the war when no epi­
demic had occurred. A tremendous impression had been 
created by the simultaneity of three factors during the war 
years: strictly enforced sanitary measures, rigid quaran­
tine, and the absence of a yellow fever epidemic. As a 
result, many were thoroughly convinced that either quaran­
tine or sanitation or both had prevented the occurrence of 
an epidemic. Medical opinion, although still divided, 
began to incline toward the support of quarantine, as well 
as sanitation.33 Public opinion moved one small step 
closer toward recognizing the validity of regulatory mea­
sures to preserve the health of the city. In spite of the 
faulty logic involved, an attitude slightly more favorable 
to the idea of public health had undoubtedly developed out 
of the events of the Civil War period.
33lbid., 563-64.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS, 
1859-1866
Year Estimated Deaths
1859 92
1860 15
1861 0
1862 2
*1863 2
*1864 6
1865 1
1866 185 to 192
Population (Approx,)
167,000
178,000
*During 1863 and 1864, some 100 and 200 cases, res­
pectively, occurred in the United States river fleet, 
resulting in a number of deaths, but the disease failed to 
spread to the city.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V 
INTERMITTENT VISITATIONS, 1867-1899
Yellow fever's activity in Louisiana in the last 
third of the nineteenth century presented a picture remark­
ably different from its earlier pattern. Prevailing ideas, 
attitudes, and reactions toward the fever also underwent 
some rather striking changes. On the other hand many 
characteristics of its earlier history, remained the same. 
Problems and controversies involving quarantine, sanita­
tion, the Board of Health, coranercial interests, and the 
New Orleans City Council continued throughout, with varia­
tions on old themes and the introduction of several new 
ones. The mystery of yellow fever causation and trans­
mission persisted to the end of the century. Although in 
the early 1880's Carlos Finlay of Cuba advanced the idea 
of yellow fever's transmission by the mosquito, that hypo­
thesis attracted little attention at the time. The germ 
theory, however, gained widespread acceptance in the 1870's 
and 1880's and led to an intensive but fruitless search 
for the yellow fever germ in the blood and excretions of
154
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patients.
In the thirty-three years from 1867 through 1899,
New Orleans and Louisiana experienced five epidemics: only
two, in 1867 and 1878, which could compare with earlier 
visitations in terms of mortality, and three relatively 
mild outbreaks, in 1870, 1873, and 1897. During seventeen 
of the thirty-three years, the annual yellow fever mortality
in New Orleans ranged from one to sixty, and eleven years
passed without a single yellow fever death,^ On a number 
of occasions the Saffron Scourge spread from the Crescent 
City to other points around the state. Except in 1867,
1873, and 1878, however, the disease exhibited a less 
virulent character than it had in an earlier period.
One of the two most serious yellow fever epidemics
in the post Civil War period occurred in 1867, during Re­
construction. The bitter conflict of the American Civil 
War, terminated in the spring of 1865, was followed by a 
long and turbulent period during which Union troops remain­
ed in the South to oversee the work of Reconstruction. 
Although the last of the troops were not removed from
Isee Chart, "Yellow Fever Mortality in New Orleans,
1867-1899," at the end of this chapter.
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Louisiana until the spring of 1877, the Board of Health 
had been returned to civilian control in the spring of 
1866, and the execution of sanitary regulations again be­
came the responsibility of local authorities. Without the 
incentive provided by bayonet and military arrest. New 
Orleans again succumbed to the elements of filth. In May 
of 1867 the editor of the New Orleans Picayune called 
attention to the crowded and unsanitary tenement houses 
and the drainage canals and gutters filled with garbage, 
giving off ”a stench so rank it smells to heaven.” 
Furthermore, he recommended that the Board of Health and 
the municipal authorities take action before an epidemic 
occurred, pointing out that after one started, there was
A
little anyone could do.^
After yellow fever appeared in the Crescent City in 
July of 1867 and carried off a few victims, the Board of 
Health then provided for the cleansing and disinfecting 
of the fever localities. Temporarily it seemed that the 
disease had been halted, but early in August a malady 
strongly resembling yellow fever erupted "with great 
violence” at military headquarters. Even then the
^Picayune, May 26, 1867.
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pestilence made slow progress for on August 14 the Board 
of Health reported only a slight increase in fever cases 
and declared New Orleans relatively healthy. Neverthe­
less, the Board strongly reccnnmended the use of carbolic 
acid and sulphur as disinfectants,^
On August 22 General Philip S, Sheridan, United 
States army commander in Louisiana, telegraphed to head­
quarters in Washington that yellow fever had assumed an 
epidemic character in New Orleans. He requested that the 
Chief Surgeon at New Orleans be authorized to employ 
nurses to attend the stricken troops; his request was 
granted immediately. In spite of Sheridan's concern, 
neither the Board of Health nor New Orleanians in general 
yet considered the disease epidemic. According to the 
Crescent City's accepted usage of the term, a disease be­
came epidemic only when its victims exceeded the total 
number of fatalities from all other causes in a given 
period. On August 27 the Picayune editor observed that 
most fever cases had occurred among the unacclimated 
Europeans and Northerners, and he noted calmly: "Seventy-
seven deaths in a week does not create much alarm in a
Sfbido, July 30, 31, August 3, 7, 14, 1867
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community that has suffered in the same space of time to 
the number of nearly twelve h u n d r e d .
In the September issue of the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal the editor commented on yellow fever's 
steady increase during August, He admitted that an epi­
demic might yet develop because of the high percentage of 
unacclimated persons in the population, but insisted that 
the malady thus far had been an unusually mild form of 
fever. At any rate, the editor remarked: "New Orleans
has long enjoyed the distinction of preeminence in sickli­
ness, as well as wickedness, among the cities of this 
happy country, and we are not disposed now to take these 
points up for controversy," Furthermore, he added 
sarcastically, "As we are a people governed by majorities, 
it is probably becoming to admit the logic and 'accept the 
situation,
In spite of all hopes to the contrary, "Bronze John 
on his Saffron Steed" continued to increase his ravages, 
visiting virtually every street, and leaving "the evidence
284-86.
4lbid., August 23, 27, 1867,
0, Med, & Surg, Jour., XX (September, 1867),
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of his malevolence” strewn about the city in September and 
October>-200, 300, 400 fatalities per week. On September 
22 one New Orleans newspaper commented on the city's un­
happy lot: "How sad to think, laboring for months as we
have pertinaciously to recover from our political adversi­
ties, that the trying ordeal of a terrible plague as we are 
now suffering from should be inflicted upon us,” Military 
occupation, Reconstruction, and Yellow Jack seemed a bitter 
potion to swallow simultaneously. But, the editor reasoned, 
the dispensations of the omniscient Almighty are undoubted­
ly all for the best, whatever they may be. By late 
October the fever mortality had declined considerably. On 
November 1 a light frost occurred, resulting in a prediction 
that the "Bronze Warrior” on his "saffron steed” soon 
would be charging away. The Board of Health declared the 
epidemic over on November 5.^
In the epidemic of 1867 the Saffron Scourge claimed 
3,107 victims in New Orleans, not including the fatalities 
among the United States forces stationed there. The Medi­
cal Director reported 213 yellow fever deaths among the
^Picayune, September 16, 21, 22, 24, October 8, 21, 
28, November 1, 3, 6, 1867.
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1,000 to 1,100 troops, making a total fever mortality of 
3,320 in the Crescent City. With an estimated case 
fatality rate of eight per cent, the disease had attacked 
about 41,500 persons, or about one-fourth of the popula­
tion in the city during the outbreak.^
Once again the scourge of New Orleans had broken 
through the barriers erected by Louisiana's quarantine 
regulations. Although they failed to prevent the fever’s 
entry, the Board of Health undertook an active campaign to 
limit its spread through the city. At the very onset of 
the pestilence, the Board placed every house where a fever 
case was reported under the direction of specially appoint­
ed health officers to attend to the cleansing of the 
premises and to fumigate the place with sulphurous acid 
gas and carbolic acid. Significantly, these measures 
represent the first systematic official action to combat 
the disease in a house-to-house campaign of disinfection.
A more positive approach to the yellow fever problem was 
in the making, faulty as the procedure might have been.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1867, 18; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXI (April, 1868), 413- 
14.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1867, 4-5,
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In the attempt to disinfect houses, the Board accidentally 
chose a weapon also destructive to mosquitoes, sulphurous 
acid gas. Unfortunately, by the time the health officers 
arrived on the scene, undoubtedly countless mosquitoes had 
already been infected from the patient. Nor is it likely 
that the Board was able to attend to every single house 
during an epidemic involving over 40,000 cases. Neverthe­
less, the efforts of the Louisiana State Board of Health 
represented a praiseworthy attempt to fight the pestilential 
foe.
But disinfection failed to arrest the progress of 
the epidemic in 1867, which was said to have been the most 
widespread epidemic ever in the history of the Crescent 
City, No class was exempt from its ravages; even a few 
Negroes and native New Orleanians, ordinarily less likely 
victims, were listed among the fatalities. The Board of 
Health tried to account for the tremendous number of cases 
in proportion to the number of deaths. Observing that the 
absence of epidemic yellow fever since 1858 had rendered 
all children under eight years of age susceptible to the 
disease, the Board also noted the influx of many emanci­
pated Negroes to New Orleans after the Civil War. Since 
both Negroes and children exhibited a strong tendency
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toward recovery from yellow fever attacks, the Board con­
sidered these factors partially responsible for the large 
number of cases and the low case fatality rate.^
Suffering among the poor during the summer and 
autumn of 1867 was terribly acute. One observer called 
that period "one of the most distressing to those of 
limited means ever experienced in New Orleans." The pesti­
lence disrupted summer business and delayed the fall 
business season about two months. In the midst of the 
crisis, high rents and high prices for the basic necessi­
ties of life intensified the distress of the indigent.
When one of the New Orleans banks failed during the epi­
demic, many persons among the laboring classes lost what­
ever savings they might have had at the time of greatest 
n e e d . As in previous epidemic disasters, the Howard 
Association came to the aid of the destitute fever victims 
and their families, and numerous physicians freely offered 
their services to those who could not pay. Even the recent
9n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XX (November, 1867), 
419; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1867. 6.
lOçardner* s New Orleans Directory for 1868 (New 
Orleans, 1868), 9, 11.
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enemy of the North supplied some assistance to the unfor­
tunate city. In November of 1867 the editor of the New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal expressed "the grati­
tude of this impoverished community" to all those Northern 
friends who had "with free hand and open purse, promoted 
the efforts of our self-sacrificing citizens,
Other communities in Louisiana also suffered the 
affliction of the yellow pestilence in 1867. The disease 
appeared in Plaquemine, Alexandria, Shreveport, Clarenton, 
Jeanerette, New Iberia, St. Martinville, Opelousas, Wash­
ington, Lafayette, Vermillionville, and Lake Charles, as
well as other hitherto unvisited towns in the southwestern
12portion of the state. The fever did not prevail with 
equal severity in all places where it appeared; some towns 
escaped with only a few cases, while others experienced 
serious epidemics. Two of the worst visitations in Louisi­
ana outside of New Orleans occurred in New Iberia and 
Washington.
^^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XX (November, 1867), 420,
l%Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit., 371- 
73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 861, 893, 902; 
Picayune, September 15, 18, October 16, 31, 1867; Plaque­
mine Weekly Iberville South, October 19, 26, December 21, 
1867; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1867. 7-8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
New Iberia, a small town in south Louisiana, about 
fifteen miles from the coast and over one hundred miles 
west of New Orleans, was in the throes of a serious out­
break long before the fever reached epidemic proportions 
in the Crescent City. Allegedly introduced from Galveston, 
the disease commenced its attacks in the latter part of 
July and raged violently in that small town for well over 
a month. In the second week of August the Mayor of New 
Iberia reported the illness of several of the town's phy­
sicians and requested that nurses and doctors be sent from 
New Orleans, Two faculty members of the New Orleans School 
of Medicine, a resident medical student from Charity Hos­
pital, and several Sisters of Charity went to the aid of 
the desperate community, where they immediately establish­
ed a temporary hospital. The New Orleans, Opelousas and 
Great Western Rail Road and the Attakapas Navigation Com­
pany both offered to transport nurses and supplies to New 
Iberia without charge, E, F, Schmidt, President of the New 
Orleans Howard Association, went in and helped organize a 
Howard Association of New Iberia, which immediately em­
ployed a number of nurses from the Crescent City.
Business came to a standstill, about half of the towns­
people were unemployed, and "the most complete destitution"
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prevailed. In addition to their work with the sick, the 
newly formed Howard Association attended to the needs of 
the most unfortunate citizens with assistance provided by 
contributions from Franklin, Lafayette, Opelousas, and New 
Orleans. The Shakespeare Club of New Orleans gave a bene­
fit performance for the relief of New Iberia; one New 
Orleanian shipped over two casks of ice weekly ; even the 
New Orleans City Council appropriated a thousand dollars 
as a contribution to the afflicted community. By the end 
of August the fever began to subside, and the New Iberia 
epidemic was virtually over when the New Orleans visita­
tion really got under way. In a population of 1,600 to 
1,800, considerably reduced by the flight of many citizens, 
no less than 700 cases and seventy deaths had occurred by 
August 31, One observer on the scene wrote: "It is heart­
rending . . .  to see and realize the affliction and desola­
tion of our community--scarce a family but is in mourning, 
and in many instances almost entire families have been 
swept to the grave by the 'fell destroyer. The 
devastation of a small community by the Saffron Scourge
13picayune, August 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, September 3, 
1867; Bee, August 28, 1867; Iberville South, September 7, 
1867.
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presented a tragedy perhaps even more intensely personal 
than the large-scale disaster produced within a metropolis. 
Another Louisiana town even smaller than New Iberia 
experienced a particularly severe yellow fever epidemic in 
1867. During September and October Yellow Jack attacked 
over 500 persons and claimed at least seventy-three vic­
tims in the small community of Washington, Louisiana, 
about forty miles north of New Iberia, In late October a 
letter from Washington stated: "All business is suspended.
, , , Our town has a deserted appearance. Provisions are 
getting scarce, and sometimes are not to be had." Among 
the citizens taking flight when the disease appeared were 
three of the four town council members and two of the 
town's three physicians. The one doctor remaining in 
Washington truly had more than he could handle, but it was 
said that he carried the burden well. Obviously, New 
Orleans, by this time fighting its own battle, was unable 
to send as much assistance to Washington as it had sent to 
New Iberia, Nevertheless, the New Orleans Howard Associa­
tion contributed one thousand dollars of its funds to aid 
the small community.
14picayune, October 28, 1867.
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Following the epidemic of 1867, Louisiana enjoyed 
two summers almost completely free of the yellow pestilence. 
In the Crescent City only three yellow fever deaths were 
reported in 1868 and three in 1 8 6 9 . With few exceptions, 
when New Orleans escaped an epidemic, so did the rest of 
the state. In the late summer and autumn of 1870, New 
Orleans suffered a mild outbreak, causing only 587 deaths 
in a population of more than 1 9 0 , 0 0 0 , Since the quaran­
tine had been applied to all vessels arriving from infected 
ports (counting days at sea as part of the detention period), 
the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journa1 
believed that yellow fever had originated in New Orleans in 
1870. By this time many physicians and laymen had combined 
both of the old opposing views into a belief that the fever 
was imported in some years and indigenous in others. It 
seemed that the pestilence had originated and for a time 
remained in the area of the French Market among a class 
"whose hygienic condition in their domiciles is about the 
most unfavorable in the whole city," Although the epidemic
15n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (April, 1870),
398.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1870, 74, 80,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
of 1870 had not been nearly as severe as he had feared it 
might be, the medical journal editor remarked: ” , , .
this hostile incursion has brought dismay upon our unac­
climated population, has revived the evil reputation of 
our city, and has done incalculable damage to its commer­
cial i n t e r e s t s . T h e  two preceding epidemic-free 
summers made the outbreak of 1870, although a mild one, 
seem rather unfortunate. The fever did not spread to any 
considerable extent in Louisiana that year. Apparently, 
New Iberia, Ville Platte, and Port Barre were the only 
points outside the Crescent City which experienced note­
worthy vis itations.
In 1871 New Orleans reported only fifty-four yellow 
fever fatalities; in 1872, only thirty-nine.^^ Then came 
the unique occurrence in 1873 when Shreveport suffered a 
more serious epidemic than the Crescent City, the only 
time that a sizeable interior community of Louisiana
17n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (October, 1870),
874-76.
l^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit., 
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902,
19Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1871, 98; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1872, 135.
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outranked New Orleans in terms of yellow fever mortality.
In New Orleans the disease claimed only 226 victims; in 
Shreveport, about 759, The State Board of Health attribut­
ed the difference in malignancy between the two outbreaks 
to the widespread use of disinfectants in New Orleans, a 
doubtful hypothesis at best. The Saffron Scourge probably 
caused more deaths in New Orleans than the reports indi­
cate. According to the Board’s report, about half the 
population suffered cases of "Dengue" during the epidemic 
season, some of which finally "assumed the appearance" of
nr\
yellow fever and terminated in death. Although seldom 
fatal, dengue fever is easily confused with the yellow 
pestilence in its early stages. Probably a number of cases, 
and especially the deaths, reported as dengue fever were 
actually caused by yellow fever. Nevertheless, the New 
Orleans disease was completely overshadowed by the 
devastating plague in Shreveport,
The numerous cases began to attract considerable 
attention in late August, and by the first of September the 
Shreveport epidemic was well under way. Of a population
20n . 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., L (May, 1898), 636; Re­
port of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 1873, 9, 55.
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numbering from 10,000 to 12,000, it was estimated that 
over half fled the city. By mid-September most business 
establishments had shut down and the streets were almost 
empty. The community had been completely quarantined by 
all neighboring towns, and the telegraph served as the 
only means of communication.^^
A Howard Association of Shreveport was organized 
and in mid-September established an infirmary for the 
indigent sick. Contributions poured in from New Orleans, 
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and all over the country. The 
Western Union Telegraph Company offered free use of its 
lines for the transfer of financial assistance to Shreve­
port. Since the town was isolated by the quarantine regu­
lations of neighboring communities with the consequent 
tie-up of railway transportation, special arrangements had 
to be made for getting nurses, physicians, and supplies 
into the stricken center. The Southern Express Company 
contracted with the New Orleans Howard Association to ship 
without charge all supplies destined for Shreveport as far
ZlReport of the Committee appointed by the Shreveport 
Medical Society on the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1873 at 
Shreveport, Louisiana (Shreveport, 1874), 12-13; Henry 
Smith, Report of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1873, Shreve­
port, Louisiana . . , (New Orleans, 1874), 3,
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as their terminus at Monroe, Louisiana* The agent in Mon­
roe promised that the goods would be "as promptly forwarded 
as practicable" and presumably by whatever means were pos­
sible, The Texas and Pacific Railroad provided relief 
trains twice a week throughout the epidemic to carry 
poultry, eggs, and other provisions to a point outside the 
city where they might be picked up and hauled into town by 
persons from within the contaminated area. Money, sup­
plies, and experienced nurses thus were channelled into 
Shreveport. New Orleans in particular empathized with the 
desperation of the victimized community. As its own small 
epidemic was almost eclipsed by the suffering of the town 
in northwest Louisiana, the Crescent City provided assist­
ance freely and generously. In addition to the contribu­
tions of individuals, businesses, and the Howard Association, 
the Shakespeare Club and the Orleans Dramatic Association, 
as they had done on previous occasions, again provided a
"dramatic entertainment," this time to raise funds for the
2 2Shreveport sufferers.
In late September as the fever continued to rage in
22smith, Report of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 
1873, 3; Picayune. September 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 1873.
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Shreveport, the editor of the New Orleans Picayune remark­
ed that the same mortality rate In New Orleans would 
amount to about a thousand deaths per day. In addition to 
the fierce mortality rate, the destitute circumstances of 
the citizenry were "as terrible as the disease." The 
Howard Association of Shreveport not only attended to 
yellow fever patients, but also fed the poor and opened an 
asylum for children made orphans by the epidemic. The ex­
penses of that association totalled $1,000 to $2,000 per 
day.%3
Conditions grew worse In late September and early 
October of 1873. The New Orleans Picayune considered the 
"terrible fever In Shreveport" at least four times worse 
than the "fearful epidemic that scourged this city In 
1853." On the last day of September the news telegraphed 
from Shreveport read: "We no longer have funerals. The
hearses, followed by one or two carriages, dash through the 
streets like a section of artillery In a battle seeking a 
position. . . o the coffins [are] shoved In the hearses 
and driven rapidly to the cemetery. This Is the case 
even with the most prominent citizens.'^ By this time the
23picayune, September 23, 26, 27, 1873.
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Howard Association was feeding about two-thirds of the resi­
dent population. Including white and Negro alike. Hundreds 
of citizens were without money, without work, without pros­
pects, Rapidly going through their resources, the Howards 
of Shreveport made a new appeal to the country for addition­
al aid, declaring: , the well are broken down, the
poor are threatened with actual starvation, the sick and 
dying are about to be deprived of the commonest comforts 
humanity can offer them.” On October 3 the commander of 
the United States troops In New Orleans, General W. H.
Emory, telegraphed President U, S, Grant requesting per­
mission to send 5,000 rations to the Shreveport victims; 
an immediate reply directed the commanding general to send 
the supplies at once.^^
The disorder of the disease-ridden city obviously 
provided a greater than usual opportunity for the criminal­
ly Inclined, In early October, dally reports of robberies 
led to the formation of a citizens committee of public 
safety, which posted a notice on the street corners stat­
ing:
Z^ibld., September 28, 30, October 1, 4, 1873,
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The committee of citizens on the safety of the
town hereby warn all parties concerned, that any
persons found depredating upon the property of our 
citizens will be summarily dealt with. It is our 
purpose to protect our city at all hazards, and 
evil [sic] disposed persons are warned to leave.
Although unable to prove the charge, the committee suspect­
ed four persons from New Orleans of having robbed a Catholic
priest "while on his deathbed," Of the four, two men were
driven out of town and warned to stgy away; the third man 
was allowed to remain temporarily with his wife, who was 
then a victim of the f e v e r , ^5
Finally as cold weather arrived in late October and 
early November, the pestilence gradually subsided. Busi­
ness establishments reopened one by one, cotton began to 
trickle in by the wagonload, and the atmosphere of utter 
hopelessness began to dissipate. Still the Howard Associa­
tion continued to feed the poor until positions of employ­
ment materialized. By November 4 all points had removed 
their quarantines against Shreveport, and after a suspen­
sion of two months the trains of the Texas and Pacific 
Railroad once again were able to run freely to and from
25lbid,, October 7, 11, 1873,
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the recently plagued city.^^
The serious obstructions to railroad transportation 
posed by town, parish, and out-of-state quarantine regula­
tions became an increasingly acute problem from the 1870's 
throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. In an 
earlier period sporadic attempts had been made by local 
authorities of some towns and parishes to seal themselves 
off from persons and goods coming from infected areas, but 
seldom had the regulations been enforced stringently or 
absolutely. The cessation of trade in previous years had 
been more a matter of voluntary individual action than of 
official policy. But after the Civil War as railroad 
lines began to span the state and the country, and as the 
belief in yellow fever’s transmission by infected persons, 
baggage, and goods gained widespread acceptance, people 
throughout Louisiana and neighboring states became in­
creasingly afraid of its spread from New Orleans by way 
of the railroads.
When the news of the Shreveport epidemic spread far 
and near in early September of 1873, a train from the
^^Smith, Report of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 
1873, 11; Picayune, October 30, November 4, 1873,
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Infected city to Dallas was halted at the Dallas city 
limits by a posse of policemen and citizenry, who threaten­
ed to shoot the engineer if he tried to proceed. After 
detaining the train until the following morning, the posse 
allowed it to return whence it came. Temporarily, the 
Texas and Pacific obtained permission from the Mayor of 
Marshall, Texas, to make regular trips to that town from 
Shreveport provided that a physician attested to the 
passengers' freedom from yellow fever. On that occasion, 
a Dallas newspaper remarked; "Things have come to a 
pretty pass when the Texas Pacific Railroad corporation 
have to apply to the Mayor of a one-horse town for permis­
sion to run their t r a i n s , S u c h  commentary seems rather 
strange coming from a city which had assumed the privilege 
of denying rather than granting permission for trains to 
enter its jurisdiction. At any rate, railroad companies 
either complied with the quarantine demands of towns, 
whether large or small, or ran the risk of burned bridges, 
torn tracks, and dead engineers. By late September of 
1873 there were only two mail routes out of Shreveport, 
both by stage: one to Monroe and another through
27picayune, September 10, 15, 1873.
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Trenton.Problems of quarantine and the transportation 
of passengers, freight, and the United States mail, would 
become increasingly entangled in the next three decades.
At the close of Shreveport’s epidemic of 1873, the 
Shreveport Medical Society appointed a committee to investi­
gate the origin and course of the recent scourge. The com­
mittee concluded that the disease had been imported from 
Havana to New Orleans, and thence transported to Shreve­
port by boatmen employed on the Red River packets. Since 
the population of Shreveport, approximately 12,000, had 
tripled since the last yellow fever epidemic in 1867, most 
of the citizens were susceptible to the disease. It was 
estimated that only about 4,500 persons remained in the 
city during the epidemic. Of that number at least 3,000 
suffered attacks of the fever and about 759 died. Hence, 
the case fatality rate was almost twenty-six per cent. Of 
the population in the city at the time, approximately 
seventeen per cent died of yellow fever. In the opinion 
of the medical committee, "No epidemic in America has yet 
occurred to show more plainly that we are not yet masters 
of this fearful disease, its proper treatment and the
28ibid., September 23, 1873.
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laws that govern it,”^^
In 1873 the fever spread from Shreveport to Green­
wood, Louisiana, a few miles from the Texas border; to 
Marshall, Texas, about forty miles west of Shreveport; 
and to Mansfield and Coushatta, Louisiana, south of 
Shreveport.30 According to a resident of Coushatta, the 
pestilence had made "sad havoc" in the entire area of the 
Red River Valley, "The country looks desolate," he wrote; 
"worse than ever it looked during and after Bank's raid 
through Red River," For a distance of at least fifty 
miles through the valley south of Coushatta, the area was 
practically deserted,31
Yellow fever traveled up the Mississippi River as 
high as Memphis, Tennessee, striking that city in what was 
undoubtedly the most destructive epidemic in the country 
in 1873, Only twice previously had Memphis experienced 
yellow fever epidemics, in 1855 and 1867, In 1873 out of
29Report of the Committee . , , on the Yellow Fever 
Epidemic of 1873 at Shreveport, 10, 12, 14, 20,
30n , 0, Med. & Surg, Jour,, New Series, I (January, 
1874), 626-28; Picayune, October 10, 16, 1873,
31picayune, October 2, 1873,
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a winter population of 50,000 only about 15,000 persons 
remained in the city during the epidemic, of which 7,000 
had the fever and from 1,800 to 2,000 died.3%
The pestilence seemed content with only a handful of 
victims in New Orleans each year from 1874 through 1877, 
but returned in 1878 to scourge New Orleans, the Gulf 
States, and the entire Mississippi Valley in the most 
extensive epidemic the country had ever known. The 
visitation of 1878 also marks a real turning point in news­
paper policy on reporting epidemic disease. As early as 
July 24 the editor of the New Orleans Picayune set forth a 
significant statement of policy. He admitted that both 
the authorities and the press heretofore had "generally 
refrained from specially mentioning" sporadic cases of 
yellow fever because of the exaggerations ordinarily re­
sulting from such an announcement. Nevertheless, informa­
tion about those cases had always been transmitted by 
letter-writers and by persons traveling from the city, 
"Hence what is not announced here has been known abroad," 
he said, "and the very precaution taken to avoid needless
32n . 0, Med. & Surg, Jour., New Series, I (May, 
1874), 791-93; L (May, 1898), 636.
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alarm and to prevent exaggerated and injurious reports has 
had a result the reverse of what was intended." Therefore, 
he believed that the Board of Health should publish all 
information relative to the city's health, including every 
death and every disease. The editor then announced that 
seven yellow fever deaths had occurred in the past few 
days, that the disease seemed to be an extremely virulent 
type, and that the Board of Health intended to fight its 
spread by disinfecting each locality where it a p p e a r e d . ^3 
Those early "sporadic" cases soon developed into a giant 
of an epidemic, yet the Picayune continued to provide com­
plete coverage on all aspects of the disaster.
Apparently the fever had been introduced in late 
June by the steamship, Emily B. Souder, which had stopped 
at Havana on the way to New Orleans. According to the 
quarantine physician, the vessel had a clean bill of 
health, except for one crew member with intermittent fever 
(malaria). Under those circumstances the ship was permitt­
ed to pass up to New Orleans without being detained the 
usual ten days. Shortly after its arrival at the city, 
several crew members sickened and died of yellow fever.
33picayune, July 24, 1878.
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Some two weeks later fever cases began to appear among the 
New Orleans population. As the news went out, various 
points inside and outside Louisiana instituted rigid 
quarantines against the Crescent City.^^ Still the news­
papers continued to provide what undoubtedly was the fullest 
reporting on any epidemic thus far; they filled their 
columns with yellow fever news, reports and statements 
from the Board of Health, the activities of the Howards 
and other benevolent associations, letters from readers, 
lists of charitable contributions from outside the state, 
and much editorial commentary. The journalistic revolu­
tion had finally come.
From July to mid-November the pestilence ravaged the 
Crescent City, resulting in well over 15,000 cases and 
4,046 deaths.35 Estimates of what the epidemic cost New 
Orleans varied from twelve million to a hundred million 
dollars, including such factors as the potential economic 
worth of persons lost to the plague and of labor diverted 
from productive endeavor by sickness or attendance to the
34ibid., July 25, 26, 27, 1878.
35&eport of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1878, 158-59; Picayune, November 10, 1878.
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sick; losses due to derangement of business, unused capital, 
and neglect of crops; the cost of medical attention and 
nursing, of funerals, of the extraordinary sanitary work 
of disinfection; as well as funds spent for charitable 
operations. The Board of Health calculated a cost to New 
Orleans of about twelve million dollars. Noting that the 
estimated profits of New Orleans' summer trade with yellow 
fever ports to the south only amounted to $1,500,000, the 
Board lashed out at the anti-quarantinist commercial 
interests by commenting that New Orleans undertook a 
sizeable risk for the paltry sum realized from the tropi­
cal trade.36
In its rampage along the Gulf coast and through the 
Mississippi Valley, the fever of 1878 attacked Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and 
Kentucky. Some cases even appeared in Cairo, Illinois;
St. Louis, Missouri; Cincinnati, Ohio; and New York City.
The disease spread extensively in the southern portion of 
Louisiana, particularly in the southeastern quarter.
3&United States Board of Experts, Proceedings of 
the Board of Experts Authorized by Congress to Investigate 
the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 . . . (New Orleans, 1878), 
31-35; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1878, 13.
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affecting New Orleans, Gretna, Buras Settlement, Port Eads, 
St. Bernard Parish, St. John the Baptist Parish, Pontcha- 
toula, Hammond, Tangipahoa, Clinton, Port Hudson, Bayou 
Sara, Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, DonaIdsonville, Thibodaux, 
Patterson, Napoleonville, Paincourtville, Labadieville, and 
Morgan City. Apparently the only points in the northern 
part of Louisiana visited by the pestilence were Lake 
Providence and Delta on the Mississippi River, and Delhi, 
linked by railroad to Delta (and to Vicksburg across the 
river where yellow fever prevailed severely).3? In 1878 
the railroad, together with the Mississippi River and 
other waterways, provided transportation for the fever in 
its dispersion through the state and through the country. 
Remembering the earlier visitation of Shreveport and the 
Red River Valley in 1873, some of the parishes in that 
area applied stringent quarantine measures in 1878, which
^^Commercial and Statistical Almanac, Containing a 
History of the Epidemic of 1878, with the Best Known 
Remedies and Treatments of Yellow Fever . . . (New Orleans, 
1879), 56; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; N.
0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (November, 1878),
410; ibid.. New Series, XI (September, 1883), 162; ibid., 
LVII (October, 1906), 291-92; Baton Rouge Advocate, Novem­
ber 15, 1878; Thibodaux Sentinel, September 14, October 5, 
November 30, 1878; Picayune, August 24, September 10, 20, 
21, October 11, 1878.
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might have had something to do with holding the fever out 
of that portion of the state.
Estimates of the yellow fever death toll in the 
entire country in 1878 varied from 13,000 to 20,000, out 
of at least 120,000 cases of the disease. Of the total 
death count. New Orleans supplied 4,046, and all other 
points in Louisiana, 1,000 to 1,500. The Board of Ex­
perts authorized by the United States Congress to investi­
gate the epidemic of 1878 calculated the various expendi­
tures and losses suffered from the visitation throughout 
the country and arrived at a sum exceeding thirty million 
dollars. In addition, they called attention to all the 
incalculable factors, such as the disturbance to business 
conditions and loss of capital investment in lands, houses, 
boats, railroads, machines, and other property unused and 
unproductive because of the epidemic. According to their 
final estimates, New Orleans alone suffered a loss of 
over fifteen million dollars; the nation itself, something
38police Jury Minutes, Avoyelles Parish, September 
3, November 11, 12, 1878 (W.P.A. Transcriptions of Parish 
Records of Louisiana, Louisiana State University Archives, 
Baton Rouge); ibid., Rapides Parish, August 26, 27, October 
9, 1878; ibid., Caddo Parish, August 23, 1878.
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between one hundred and two hundred million dollars
Not only was the visitation of 1878 the most exten­
sive and the most costly epidemic the country had ever 
known, but it was also the last "Great Epidemic" in the 
United States. Later outbreaks destroyed only a small 
fraction of the number struck down by the plague of 1878, 
That epidemic had several important results. It stimulated 
a widespread public demand for the national government to 
enter the business of quarantine; it led to the establish­
ment of an abortive National Board of Health, provoking 
an outburst of state-rights arguments; it influenced the 
Gulf States toward a policy of cooperation in regard to 
quarantine and the free exchange of information; and it 
intensified the scientific investigation of the disease.
On the other hand, the epidemic of 1878 also heightened 
the fear and dread of the fever in a more extensive area 
than ever before, resulting in increasingly acute problems 
for the railroads in coping with local quarantine barriers. 
Although no yellow fever epidemic worthy of the name
39Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1878, 158-59; Commercial and Statistical Almanac, Contain­
ing a History of the Epidemic of 1878, 56; Proceedings of 
the Board of Experts Authorized by Congress . , , 1878, 
31-35.
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occurred for eighteen years afterward, the memory of ’78 
together with the alarm aroused over occasional cases in 
Louisiana or elsewhere in the South kept the interest in 
yellow fever intensely alive.
The summer following the disaster of 1878 witnessed 
an exceedingly mild flare-up of the pestilence in Louisiana, 
Although touching twenty-six different points in the state, 
mainly in the southern portion, the fever of 1879 resulted 
in only 162 deaths in all Louisiana, nineteen of which 
occurred in the Crescent C i t y , ^ 0  New Orleans it was 
generally believed that the work of cleaning and disin­
fection performed by the State Board of Health and the 
Citizens Auxiliary Sanitary Association limited the 
virulence of the disease that year. In October of 1879 
the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 
suggested optimistically: ", , , our profession should
feel hopeful that the day is near at hand when we will be 
able to effectually banish this great arch enemy to our 
public health, commerce and p r o s p e r i t y , T h e  editor’s
^®N. 0, Med, & Surg, Jour,, New Series, XI (Septem­
ber, 1883), 198; Report of the Louisiana State Board of 
Health for 1879, 8.
4lN, 0, Med, & Surg, Jour,, New Series, VII (October, 
1879), 495,
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hopes seemed almost realized when during the 1880's and 
much of the 1890's Louisiana enjoyed an unprecedented 
exemption from the Saffron Scourge. From 1880 through 
1896 yellow fever claimed a total of only ten victims; in 
eleven of those seventeen years not a single yellow fever
death was reported.^2
Although the yellow pestilence remained in abeyance 
during that seventeen-year period, insofar as Louisiana 
was concerned, many significant developments relating to 
the disease occurred in the areas of public health, quaran­
tine, and scientific activity. The Louisiana State Board 
of Health acquired further duties and powers and pursued a 
more active program of sanitation and disinfection in New 
Orleans, The Board also engaged in a lengthy and ultimate­
ly successful court battle with shipping lines over the 
payment of quarantine fees. The quarantine system itself 
was modified to provide for "Maritime Sanitation," that 
is, the thorough disinfection and fumigation of incoming 
vessels by a specially designed apparatus. The United 
States government, through the National Board of Health,
42see Reports of the Louisiana State Board of Health, 
1880-1896,
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created in 1879, and the long-established United States 
Marine Hospital Service, exhibited an active interest in 
problems relating to yellow fever, maritime quarantine, 
and interstate quarantine. Special scientific commissions 
were appointed by the United States government to investi­
gate the nature, origin, and transmission of yellow fever 
in the South and in Latin America, Designed to cooperate 
with state and local boards in maintaining adequate mari­
time quarantine, the National Board of Health encountered 
many obstacles, not the least of which was the Louisiana 
State Board of Health. In a bitter fight to the finish, 
the National Board went down, partly because of intense 
opposition to federal interference with state quarantine 
powers, partly because of administrative difficulties. 
After the failure of the National Board, the federal 
government did not retreat completely from the scene, but 
rather entrusted to the United States Marine Hospital 
Service the duty of cooperating with state and local 
boards in the work of preventing or fighting epidemic dis­
ease. In 1897 that agency would render a valuable service 
in providing for inspection of passengers and merchandise 
on railroads and helping to untie transportation entangle­
ments ,
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In an attempt to remove the need for federal 
action in the realm of quarantine, conferences were held 
among representatives of various state and local boards of 
health in the yellow fever areas. The local and state 
boards attempted to provide for strict maritime regula­
tions to hold out the disease and agreed upon the free 
exchange of information regarding health conditions to pre­
vent unnecessary interstate quarantines based on groundless 
rumors of disease. In addition, attempts were made to 
establish a set of rules permitting certain types of 
merchandise, considered incapable of bearing yellow fever 
germs, to flow freely through the channels of interstate 
commerce during epidemic seasons. In the 1880's several 
bitter controversies developed in the Gulf States over the 
diagnosis of cases resembling yellow fever. Sometimes the 
fight broke out among members of a local or state board 
examining the case; sometimes between the National Board 
representative and the state board; sometimes among the 
representatives of various state and local boards sent into 
an area to investigate suspicious cases. Under circum­
stances characterized by confusion and recriminations, the 
problems of interstate and intrastate quarantine were by 
no means settled.
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During the 1880's and 1890's several different men 
discovered several different germs, each of which was pro­
claimed as the cause of yellow fever. An intense medical 
controversy developed as physicians lined up in support of 
their favorite germ, or attempted to discount the entire 
lot. In the midst of all the interest in germs and disin­
fection, the hypothesis advanced by the eccentric Cuban 
physician and scientist, Carlos Finlay, naming the culex 
mosquito as yellow fever's transmitter, was largely over­
looked- -until 1900 when the Reed Commission established its 
validity. The period between the epidemics of 1878 and 
1897 was without question a lively era, when the subject 
of yellow fever sparked much activity in the public health, 
quarantine, and scientific fields.
After a lengthy respite from epidemic yellow fever, 
in 1890 the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical 
Journal remarked: "It is now so long a time since the last
epidemic that many of our younger medical men who have 
practiced in this city during the past decade have never 
seen a case of yellow fever in their lives." During the 
past twelve years, he said, the few cases that slipped 
through quarantine had been discovered, isolated, and dis­
infected rapidly and effectively by the Board of Health,
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thereby preventing the fever's spread. Although praising 
New Orleans for its success in combating yellow fever, the 
editor strongly emphasized the necessity of constant vigi­
lance.
From 1890 through 1896 not a single case appeared 
in the Crescent City; then in 1897 the infection slipped 
in through a side door. Early in August of 1897 an epi­
demic disease resembling dengue and malaria broke out in 
Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Later in the month when 
several deaths resulted, the Louisiana State Board of 
Health sent over a commission to investigate the nature of 
the malady. The commission first declared it dengue fever. 
Shortly thereafter, more deaths occurred, and several 
cases exhibited black vomit. A second commission from the 
Louisiana State Board went over and this time pronounced 
the prevailing disease yellow fever, in concurrence with 
representatives from several other state boards. Immedi­
ately, a Louisiana quarantine was proclaimed against the 
Mississippi coast resorts, but it came a few days too 
late to prevent the alarmed summer visitors at Ocean
43N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, XVIII 
(December, 1890), 483-84.
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Springs from boarding the first trains home to New Orleans 
and e l s e w h e r e , O n  September 6 the Louisiana State Board 
of Health recorded the first yellow fever death in New 
Orleans in six years, a boy who had returned to the Cres­
cent City from Ocean Springs, Mississippi,^^
By September 10 several cases of fever, all trace­
able to Ocean Springs, had appeared in one city block.
The Board of Health arranged for the isolation of the area, 
stationed sanitary guards in front of the infected houses 
with orders to permit no person to enter or to leave, and 
arranged for the inspection and disinfection of the entire 
neighborhood where the disease had occurred. As cases con­
tinued to break out, the Board ultimately commissioned 
nearly 700 sanitary officers to enforce a policy of house 
quarantine, never before employed in a yellow fever epi­
demic. The officers were ordered to allow no person to 
enter or leave the infected premises without explicit per­
mission from the Board, to forbid pedestrians to gather 
about the area, and to arrest and send them to jail if 
necessary. Furthermore, the sanitary guards were
44ibid., L(October, 1897), 263-64, 
45picayune, September 7,' 1897,
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Instructed to remain constantly at the post until relieved, 
to transmit all orders from the household for groceries and 
other necessities, and to insist upon absolute non-inter­
course.^^
Enforced throughout the epidemic, the Board's policy 
of house isolation aroused considerable opposition among 
many citizens of New Orleans, Some persons even consulted 
their lawyers on the possibility of enjoining the Board or 
securing a writ of habeas corpus to obtain release from 
"enforced imprisonment," on the grounds that no one could 
be deprived of his liberty without a fair trial. The 
Picayune editor strongly supported the position of the 
Board, believing that the public health of the many should 
predominate over the unreasonable demands of the few. At 
a meeting of the Board of Health, one member, Dr, Felix 
Formento, proposed that house quarantine regulations be 
modified to apply only to the sick and their immediate 
attendants and not to every individual in the house, "The 
right of free ingress and egress of every citizen to his 
own home should not be denied," he insisted. Nevertheless, 
the Board rejected his proposal and decided in favor of
46lbid., September 10, 18, October 9, 1897,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
194
continuing the system as originally conceived. When many 
New Orleanians persisted in violent attempts to defy the 
health regulations, the attorney of the Board issued a pub­
lic statement on the matter. The policy was based on an 
ordinance dating back to 1879, he said, which provided for 
the regulation of entry to and departure from infected 
buildings, vessels, or areas, as well as for their fumiga­
tion and detention. Infected houses had been isolated and 
marked with flags many times before in dealing with diphth­
eria, scarlet fever, smallpox, leprosy, and other infec­
tious diseases. The attorney thought it strange that those 
diseases, although less malignant than yellow fever, 
inspired more fear in the New Orleans populace than the 
Saffron Scourge. "Men will walk four squares to get out of 
the way of a smallpox flag who would not pay any attention 
to a yellow fever flag," he said. Apparently the New 
Orleans public failed to "share the universal belief about 
its [yellow fever’s] danger." According to the attorney, 
their attitude proved the old saying that familiarity 
breeds contempt,^7 still the opposition continued. In 
their determination to avoid house quarantine, many persons
47lbid,, October 1, 2, 6, 1897,
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concealed yellow fever cases among their families and ada­
mantly refused to call in medical aid. Frequently, the 
inhabitants of quarantined houses successfully defied the
A Q
guards by sneaking out through rear exits.
On October 10 the Picayune published a letter to the 
editor which read: **I am an old resident of this city,
having gone through all the epidemics, and have never 
seen such tomfoolery carried on, as flagging houses and 
having old politicians stationed in front of doors, as if 
their presence could prevent the spread of fever,” Further­
more, the reader felt that "reckoning the new cases” day 
by day made conditions seem worse than they actually were.
He asked, ”, , « why demoralize a whole community, because 
a few people have fever?” The Picayune editor answered 
that conservatism in certain areas represented "the highest 
sort of civilization,” but he considered it nothing less 
than foolish to turn down the benefits of scientific ad­
vancement, After thirty-four days of yellow fever in the 
city, only fifty-six deaths and about 500 cases had occurr­
ed; still a few "conservatives" wanted a return to the
48New York Times, October 26, 1897,
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"good old days" when the fever raged without obstruc­
tion.^9
At one point, the Board decided to abandon the post­
ing of the red and yellow quarantine flags at infected 
houses because of the tremendous prejudice against them. 
However, their attorney reminded them that the flags were 
mandatory by a city ordinance of 1896 and a state law of 
1882, Continuing his vehement opposition to the whole 
operation. Dr. Formento demanded that the house guards be 
removed, even if the flags had to remain. The other Board 
members admitted that persons within the enclosures were 
forced to abandon their jobs for several weeks, but they 
pointed out that credit was readily available and that it 
was completely justifiable to inconvenience some 1,200 
persons in the interest of 260,000. In spite of the 
tremendous pressures brought to bear on the Board, it held 
firm until the second week of November. When cold weather 
ended further danger from the disease, the Board withdrew 
the quarantines, but continued to disinfect premises 
where the fever had occurred.^0
49picayune, October 10, 1897.
SOlbid., October 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, November 1, 2, 
12, 1897.
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Although some New Orleanians violently opposed the 
practice of house isolation, many persons in the city 
accepted the idea of cleansing and disinfection as preven­
tive measures. Early in the epidemic a Citizens Committee 
on Sanitation organized and made plans for residents in 
each block to organize and cooperate in cleaning their 
premises and the streets. The Board of Health agreed to 
supply the disinfectants free of charge if the citizens 
furnished the labor. According to plan, citizens in 
various wards throughout the city established voluntary 
sanitary associations to cooperate with the Board in the 
work of inspection, cleaning, and disinfection.While 
commending these voluntary efforts, the editor of the New 
Orleans Times-Democrat called attention to the slum areas 
where appeals for voluntary cleansing brought slight 
response. Long accustomed to filth, unaware of its pos­
sible dangers, and overworked to earn a bare subsistence, 
the slum inhabitants could scarcely be expected to parti­
cipate enthusiastically in a voluntary clean-up campaign. 
The editor strongly recommended that the city authorities
51lbid., September 19, 28, 29, 1897.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
undertake the task of cleaning those danger spots.^2
On one occasion during the epidemic, in trying to 
execute a public health measure, the health authorities 
and the mayor encountered extreme opposition in the form 
of mob violence. On the one hand, the incident seems to 
contradict the idea that New Orleanians had little fear 
of yellow fever; on the other, it may indicate something 
entirely different. It all started on September 17 of 
1897 when the Board of Health decided to establish a 
yellow fever hospital in the old marine hospital building 
on Tulane Avenue, offered for such use by the city govern­
ment. Appalled by the idea, the residents in the neigh­
boring area presented a petition to the Board requesting 
that some location outside the city be selected instead. 
Agreeing to reconsider, the Board decided on September 19 
to use the old hospital building as a detention hospital 
instead where indigent persons from crowded, infected 
localities might be kept for a time, and if yellow fever 
failed to develop they could be released. The new plan 
was no more satisfactory to the protesting citizens than
SZ^ few Orleans Times-Democrat, September 22, 1897.
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the old had been. That night "an Indignation meeting" of 
over a thousand persons, called by the ex-councilman from 
the third ward, gathered on the corner of Tulane Avenue and 
Broad Street. The group elected officers, listened to 
several "incendiary" speeches, and passed resolutions to 
be presented to the mayor on the following morning. They 
protested the proposed detention hospital, which "would 
not only ruin all property interests in that section," 
but would probably spread the disease through the area.
The resolutions warned the public officials that such a 
project tested "the patience of many good citizens."
Mayor Walter C. Flower received the resolutions on the 
morning of September 20 together with the suggestion of 
Oakland Park as a detention area. He was able to obtain 
the temporary use of Oakland Park, thereby appeasing the 
third ward citizens and at the same time attaining the 
detention area desired by the Board of Health.53 Thus a 
fortunate compromise had soothed the ruffled feelings and 
kept the peace, but not for long.
Although a detention camp had been provided for, a 
yellow fever hospital was still needed to keep indigent
53picayune, September 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 1897.
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yellow fever patients from spreading the disease to other 
patients in Charity Hospital. Several days after the 
original crisis. Mayor Flower secured the Beauregard School 
Building, a large airy structure located in the center of 
an otherwise vacant square, for use as a temporary hospi­
tal for destitute yellow fever patients. The announcement 
of this project provoked another uproar. A crowd of four 
or five hundred persons, consisting of "some substantial 
citizenry" and many of the "rabble," assembled in front of 
the school around 6 P.M. on the evening of September 23,
At the time, a physician from Charity Hospital and several 
Sisters of Charity were preparing the school for use as a 
hospital. According to the Picayune, several politicians 
were involved in the gathering, just as the ex-councilman 
had led the earlier protest, obviously for reasons that 
had little to do with yellow fever. The unruly crowd 
listened to speeches and heard arguments advanced against 
the hospital. Various speakers suggested that it was an 
attempt to make that portion of the city "the dumping 
ground for every sort of undesirable thing that came along," 
that it was not only an outrage but a threat to the entire 
vicinity, and that the lives of the nearby residents and 
their families were at stake. A committee from the
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assembly entered the school building to request that prepa­
rations be halted until the mayor could be consulted. 
Attempting to placate the "indignant populace," the Charity 
physician in charge and the Sisters agreed to evacuate the 
building for the night, but even after they left the scene 
most of the crowd stayed on. Some left, others arrived, 
and late into the night they milled about on Canal Street 
in front of the school, built bonfires in the street, and 
continued to talk angrily about the proposed hospital.
Some eight or ten policemen hovered around the area, watch­
ing the group of demonstrators. Some of the comments over­
heard by a Picayune reporter mingling with the group 
reflected an undercurrent of class-consciousness; for 
example, "IVhy don't they make a hospital out of some of 
those schools up in the rich and stylish neighborhood?" 
According to the reporter, some "responsible" persons 
remained in the crowd, although it consisted mainly of 
"toughs" of the third and fourth wards. The physician who 
had been persuaded to leave the building said later that 
most of the people in the mob resided some distance from 
the school, and why they should be afraid of the infection
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54was a mystery.
Eventually someone suggested that the place be 
burned down, and for a while this idea was passed about and 
discussed within the clusters of angry citizens. Shortly 
after midnight several unidentified persons, unnoticed by 
the few scattered policemen, managed to sneak onto the 
school ground and set fire to two outbuildings behind the 
school, the kindergarten and the residence of the portress. 
Firemen rushed to the scene, but encountered the obstruc­
tion of the mob, which cut the fire hoses and posed 
every possible hindrance to keep the fire wagons from 
reaching the burning buildings. Police reinforcements 
finally arrived, and the firemen ultimately put out the 
flames, but not before the two outbuildings had burned to 
the ground. Happily, the school building itself suffered 
only slight d a m a g e . ^5
On the following day when the committee of "respon­
sible” citizens representing the not-so-peaceable assembly
S^Report of the Board of Administrators of the 
Charity Hospital to the General Assembly of the State of 
Louisiana for 1897 (New Orleans, [1898]), 11-12; Picayune, 
September 24, 1897; N, 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., L (October,
1897), 262.
^^Picayune, September 24, 1897,
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of the preceding night arrived at the mayor's office to 
register a protest against the hospital, Mayor Flower 
chastised them severely for not having used their influ­
ence to call a halt to the mob activity and concluded the 
interview with this statement: "Gentlemen, Beauregard
School will be used," In a conference with the police 
chief, the mayor made special preparations to handle any 
further mob action. By the evening of September 26 the 
temporary fever hospital was ready for patients, guarded 
by police forces both day and n i g h t . O n  the surface, 
this incident seems to reflect a violent fear motivating 
large numbers of people to rise up in protest. Actually, 
it seems that ward politicians had something to do with 
engineering the gatherings, perhaps as a forum for dema- 
goguery and reputation-building. Playing upon a fear of 
the fever, however great or slight, playing upon the class- 
consciousness of that section of the city, politicians 
provided an outlet for whatever tensions or frustrations 
might have existed because of the epidemic and created a 
situation which, like all mob scenes, escaped their ulti­
mate control.
S^Ibid., September 25, 26, 1897.
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In many parts of the state outside of New Orleans 
other incidents of violence or threatened violence 
occurred in maintaining local quarantines, episodes in 
which fear was definitely a factor. The year 1897 was 
truly the year of the shot-gun quarantine. Between intra­
state and interstate quarantine barriers, the railroads 
were caught in an incredibly complex predicament. At the 
onset of the epidemic, neighboring states as well as the 
Louisiana interior raised absolute quarantine barriers 
against persons and merchandise from New Orleans and other 
infected points. Many areas would not even allow trains 
to run through at their highest possible rate of speed.^7 
People throughout the Gulf States area and the Mississippi 
Valley feared that this first epidemic since 1878 might 
turn into a repeat performance of that widespread disaster; 
panic-stricken, they were determined to prevent the intro­
duction of the disease if at all possible.
Providing full news coverage of the exciting 1897 
epidemic, the New York Times reported on September 15 that 
New Orleans was "so tightly tied up" that "there is no 
longer any commotion created when this, that, or another
^7Ibid,, September 17, 1897,
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town institutes quarantine." Within a radius of one 
thousand miles, "every town and hamlet has emphatically 
refused to have any intercourse with the city."^® The 
New Orleans Times-Democrat, like other New Orleans papers, 
complained indignantly of the quarantine imbroglio and 
suggested the advantages of state control of quarantine 
regulations in preference to local action. By the third 
week in September, some of the interior towns had begun to 
suffer shortages of food and other supplies because of 
their self-imposed isolation. Finding it impossible to 
run trains profitably while complying with the multitudi­
nous regulations of intrastate and interstate quarantines, 
many railroads temporarily abandoned some of the lines.
On September 18 the Texas and Pacific managed to run a 
train through from New Orleans to Shreveport, but was 
allowed to stop only at a few points along the way. Most 
villages would not even accept mail from the train.^9
Representatives of the United States Marine Hospital 
Service in cooperation with the railway mail service at­
tempted to institute measures for clearing the mail routes.
58New York Times, September 15, 1897, 
59Times-Democrat, September 13, 20, 1897.
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They set up a formaldehyde apparatus in New Orleans to 
fumigate letters and parcels for the purpose of killing 
the "yellow fever germs," Dr, Henry R, Carter of the 
Marine Hospital Service came to New Orleans to establish 
an inspection service on the railroads and attempt to raise 
the barriers against freight and passengers from New 
Orleans. In his own words, "My orders are to organize 
train inspections to the borders of Texas, Arkansas, Tennes­
see and Georgia, passing through Alabama and Mississippi,
It is useless to attempt anything in the latter two states, 
for the people are wild, panic-stricken." The Mississippi 
Board of Health would permit no train passenger to get off 
at any point within the state. Persons wanting to get on 
a train might do so, but once aboard they had to continue 
beyond the borders of Mississippi. Dr, Carter planned to 
appoint physicians as railroad inspectors to indicate to 
local authorities at each point along the way which passen­
gers had been given health certificates. He hoped this 
measure would bring about a relaxation of the prevailing 
shot-gun quarantines.60 Within a week a number of Louisiana 
towns had agreed to accept freight from New Orleans, if
GOpicayune, September 17, 1897.
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declared non-infected by the United States Marine Hospital 
Corps, although, for the most part, passengers from the 
Crescent City continued to be r e j e c t e d . W i t h  the lack 
of uniformity in local regulations, however, and with many 
towns prohibiting trains passage through their jurisdic­
tions, traffic was still hopelessly entangled.
In late September Dr. S. R, Olliphant, President of 
the State Board of Health; Drs. John Guiteras and Henry R, 
Carter of the United States Marine Hospital Service; and a 
representative of the Southern Pacific Railroad set out 
from the Crescent City on the Southern Pacific road in an 
attempt to clear a path westward to Lake Charles. They had 
invited local health authorities to board the train as it 
passed through their towns and a health officer from Texas 
to join them in Lake Charles, not far from the Texas 
border. Once in Lake Charles, the various health officials 
would attempt to open the Southern Pacific line for freight 
shipments from New Orleans to Texas, with inspection and 
supervision to be provided by the United States Marine 
Hospital Service, It had been planned that after completing 
the arrangements at Lake Charles, the group would travel
^^Times-Democrat, September 26, 1897,
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north to Shreveport and return to New Orleans on the Texas 
Pacific line in an attempt to clear the barricades from 
those roads. Unfortunately, the whole project failed.
From New Orleans through Lafayette, the plan worked well. 
Proceeding west of Lafayette, however, the train was met 
and halted at the Acadia Parish line by a party of armed 
citizens from the town of Rayne. They allowed no one to 
step off the train, they threatened to tear up the tracks, 
and they forced the train to return whence it came. Mean­
while, a message from Lake Charles had declared it impos­
sible for the health conference to meet in that area, and 
telegrams from Opelousas and from the parish authorities 
along the Alexandria branch of the Southern Pacific denied 
permission for the train's progress northward from Lafay­
ette along that route. Hence, the well-intentioned con­
gregation of officials found it necessary to return to New 
Orleans without having accomplished their mission on the 
western or the northwestern railroad channels. Dr. John 
Guiteras commented later that in all his travels throughout 
the civilized world he had never met "a more demented set 
of people" than the armed posse from Rayne, "They were
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scared to the very confines of stupidity,” he said.&2
Unlike many other newspapers, the Baton Rouge Advo­
cate did not condemn the action of the Rayne citizens as 
mob violence. Since the group had been led by the mayor, 
said the editor, it was simply a delegation with every 
legal right to enforce the town quarantine powers autho­
rized by previous legislative enactment. Although uphold­
ing the legality of the action, the editor questioned the 
necessity of turning back the expedition. The train could 
have "thundered through" the area at the tremendous speed 
of forty miles per hour, he declared, without danger of 
infection to any citizen of the parish, and the projected 
conference of health authorities might have accomplished 
something of value to science and commerce. Nevertheless, 
the Baton Rouge paper continued to support the right of 
local quarantine, denouncing certain businesses in New 
Orleans for calling country people cowards if they refused 
to buy New Orleans goods. Since early in the outbreak, the 
capital city itself had instituted rigid barriers against 
persons, baggage, and freight from all infected districts. 
Volunteer guards were posted on every road leading into
62picayune, September 30, October 1, 1897,
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the city, at the ferry landing, the steamboat wharf, and 
the railroad depot. Late in October a few cases appeared 
in Baton Rouge, but rigid isolation of cases and all those 
exposed to them was immediately effected, and no serious 
epidemic ever materialized.
Even where local health authorities had opposed 
quarantining against New Orleans, public pressure was fre­
quently such that the measures had to be instituted. For 
example, when the news of the first few yellow fever cases 
in New Orleans reached Natchitoches in 1897, the town 
board of health wanted to postpone quarantine for a time, 
but the citizenry, plagued by the memory of 1853 and 1878, 
demanded that the barriers be established immediately,
In late September the Picayune editor described the 
impossible situation created by the "wild and furious panic 
that has stopped the currents of trade, prevented the trans­
sit of passengers and the mails from one part of the Union 
to another, and has armed the population with deadly 
weapons and has set them at ferocious enmity against every
G^Baton Rouge Advocate, September 18, October 2, 23, 
30, November 6, 1897,
64ghreveport Journal, September 13, 1897,
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man, woman and child found outside their cordons of shot­
g u n s . "65 Eventually some people began to blame the econo­
mic blockade on the reporting of New Orleans papers. They 
suggested that if the journals had remained silent on 
yellow fever, business would have continued without inter­
ruption, The Picayune editor thought it incredible that 
anyone could entertain "such an erroneous and out-of-date 
notion in this age of telegraphing and eager search for 
and dissemination of news." Twenty years before, no 
federal health supervision had existed, "nor was the South 
gridironed with railways and spiderwebbed with telegraph 
wires as at p r e s e n t . W i t h  the New York Times carrying 
full accounts of the various incidents of the epidemic 
one day after their occurrence, it is unlikely that the 
fever could have been concealed for long,
A time had existed, said the New Orleans Times-Demo­
crat , when it was universally believed that nothing could 
stop the United States mail. Now the mail was quarantined 
by "the pettiest village and hamlet," excluding not only 
their own mail, but also keeping the mail from passing
65picayune, September 29, 1897^ 
66lbid,, October 13, 1897,
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through their limits for destinations elsewhere. Although 
a "bonanza” to Western Union, such a situation was truly 
deplorable. The fumigation and disinfection process help­
ed matters somewhat, but failed to solve the problem 
entirely,67 Late in October when conditions remained 
essentially unchanged, the Picayune noted that the damage 
of the epidemic of 1897 came not from the mild type of pre­
vailing fever, but from "the arbitrary and illegal stopping 
by wayside villagers of the United States mails, and the 
trains of great trunkline railways carrying interstate 
travel and commerce," Such action, said the editor, was 
clearly against the law; communities might forbid trains 
to unload passengers or goods in their jurisdictions, but 
had absolutely no right to prevent trains from proceeding 
to some point beyond. In the editor's opinion, the proper 
remedy was to be sought in the Federal courts--a radical 
stand for the states-rights Picayune. Earlier the New 
Orleans Board of Trade had requested first the President 
of the United States, then the Governor of Louisiana, to 
employ force to break the blockades. Both had replied 
that they lacked authority to use force for that purpose.
67Times-Democrat, September 22, 1897,
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The Picayune editor suggested that the first appeal should 
have been made to the United States courts for action 
against the illegal obstructions to mail and interstate 
commerce. When the courts issued injunctions and the in­
junctions were disregarded by the shotgun quarantinists, 
then the power of the army might be used to enforce the 
court orders. Apparently this approach was never employed. 
By late October the restrictions gradually began to ease 
up and it became possible to ship certain kinds of mer­
chandise to a number of places in Louisiana, but not 
before another outrage had occurred, A bridge on the 
Southern Pacific Railroad line east of Lake Charles burned 
one night shortly after an assembly of citizens in Calcas­
ieu Parish had resolved that Southern Pacific trains would 
not be allowed under any circumstances to enter the parish 
--"a significant coincidence,’*^ ^
On November 12, 1897, the State Board of Health 
declared all danger of infection over and removed the 
fever flags and house guards, setting an example for other 
areas to follow. On November 15 a newspaper headline read, 
"Quarantines Still Tumbling," Texas had removed all
GSpicayune, October 22, 24, 29, 1897,
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restrictions and various points in Louisiana gradually 
followed suit. By mid-November mail disinfection was dis­
continued, and the Marine Hospital Service made plans for 
terminating its inspection and freight fumigation service 
within a short time. As late as November 24 when the 
Marine Hospital Service finally ended its work, several 
parishes still maintained quarantines against the railroad 
lines, but they too would soon be removed.^9
In further cooperation with the state authorities 
in coping with problems arising from the epidemic, the 
United States Marine Hospital Service had established 
several detention camps in the neighborhood of New Orleans. 
By early October, a camp at Fontainebleau, across Pontchar- 
train from New Orleans, began to accept fifty people a day 
approved by the State Board. In this manner, any person 
wanting to leave the Crescent City might go to Fontaine­
bleau, remain ten days, and obtain a health certificate 
from the Marine Hospital Service. By this time the certi­
ficates were acceptable in Mississippi, Alabama, and 
T e n n e s s e e . 70 -jo facilitate the transportation of skilled
69lbid., November 12, 15, 24, 1897. 
70lbid., October 2, 1897.
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and unskilled laborers from New Orleans to the sugar plan­
tations of the state, the Marine Hospital Service authori­
ties provided for their detention and certification at 
Camp Hutton in nearby Jefferson Parish. Late in October 
with a clean bill of health, many workers set out by boat 
for plantations in Lafourche, Ascension, Iberville, 
Assumption, and West Baton Rouge p a r i s h e s . W h e n  the 
United States Marine Hospital Service brought its work to 
a close in late November of 1897, its officers had perform­
ed a number of valuable services for New Orleans, Louisiana, 
and other parts of the country as well, including passen­
ger and freight inspection and fumigation services on the 
railroads, mail fumigation, as well as the supervision of 
detention camps. Although many local quarantines failed 
to give an inch throughout the entire season, others had 
been modified to some extent at the suggestion of the 
government agency.
Never before in yellow fever's history had so mild 
an epidemic created so much panic and confusion. The 
pestilence appeared in forty-one different places through­
out the South, but the total deaths in all places amounted
71lbid., October 20, 21, 22, 24, 1897.
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to the paltry sum of 454. New Orleans reported 1,908 cases 
and 298 fatalities, almost three-fourths of the total 
yellow fever mortality in the country. Although several 
cases appeared in Baton Rouge, Clinton, Franklin, and 
Patterson in Louisiana, only about ten yellow fever fatal­
ities occurred in the entire state outside of New Orleans.
Compared with previous epidemics, the outbreak of 
1897 was unusually tame, yet it aroused more terror through 
the countryside than ever before. Even in New Orleans 
greater fear than usual found expression in the opposition 
to a yellow fever hospital--to whatever degree the mob 
incidents represent fear rather than other frustrations.
In countless epidemics before, yellow fever hospitals had 
been established in New Orleans without provoking notice­
able opposition. But nineteen years had passed, almost 
free from the disease, and perhaps as it became a less 
familiar foe, it also became a more dreaded one. On the 
other hand, as it has been suggested, city politics and 
class-consciousness might well have played the major role
72n . 0. & Surg. Jour., L (May, 1898), 635;
Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 1896- 
1897, 85; Picayune, October 19, November 23, 1897; 
Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 845, 853, 894.
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in that expression of mob protest. The violent opposition 
in some quarters to the Board's policy of house isolation 
and quarantine flags and the concealment of cases rather 
than submitting to health regulations seem to indicate 
greater fear of official measures than of the disease it­
self. However New Orleanians might have felt about the 
disease, other parts of the state and country were obvious­
ly terrified. Nineteen years had gone by since the Great 
Epidemic of 1878, so well-remembered by many; those too 
young to remember had heard the story told and re-told 
until the legend became even more dreadful than the reali­
ty. Hence, the one abiding thought outside the originally 
infected areas was to prevent the entry of the fever if at 
all possible. Although some of the restrictions were un­
necessarily harsh, undoubtedly the absolute quarantine 
against passengers kept the pestilence away from many small 
towns along the railroad lines where otherwise it might 
have spread.
An elderly physician of New Orleans, Dr, Just 
Touatre, called attention to an extraordinary feature of 
the 1897 epidemic: "For the first time in the history of
yellow fever, it came, [to New Orleans] this year, via the 
railroad," Always before it had come by way of the
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river.73 While the Louisiana State Board of Health main­
tained a firm grip on the quarantine door of the Missis­
sippi River and other Louisiana points of entry from the 
south, the yellow fever of 1897 had crept into the country 
at some other port of entry, and into New Orleans from 
Ocean Springs, Mississippi, by the railroad. At least two 
loopholes were later suggested as the means by which the 
fever entered American territory:' the Ship Island quaran­
tine off the Mississippi coast where Cuban refugees some­
times slipped through, or Mobile's lax quarantine system, 
allegedly designed to divert the Central and South 
American trade from the port of New Orleans.
Although praiseworthy for its cleansing and fumiga­
tion system, Louisiana's quarantine program still was not 
based on those principles necessary to prevent the intro­
duction of the fever. Placing their faith in disinfection 
and fumigation rather than adequate detention, the Board un­
wittingly left open the gate to cases of yellow fever. 
Although apparently in perfect health at the moment of 
arrival, a crewman or passenger might well be carrying the
73picayune, October 24, 1897.
7^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., L (October, 1897), 265.
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yellow fever virus within his system only to come down 
with the fever within a day or so after reaching the Cres­
cent City. At any rate, the Saffron Scourge reappeared in 
Louisiana in 1898 and 1899. Both outbreaks, however, were 
even less destructive than the mild epidemic of 1897.
In mid-September of 1898 when the first case was 
reported in New Orleans, the State Board of Health tele­
graphed the information to the health boards of neighbor­
ing states and to the United States Marine Hospital 
Service. Absolute quarantines again were established 
against New Orleans, However, since some areas accepted 
the set of regulations agreed upon by an interstate 
assembly of health officials at Atlanta in April of 1898, 
freight traffic was not entirely suspended. The people of 
the southern states exhibited less panic than in the pre­
vious year; perhaps because the fever of 1897 had not 
lived up to their original expectations. In 1898 New 
Orleans reported 118 cases in all, with fifty-seven deaths. 
Although mild, the fever of 1898 spread extensively in 
Louisiana. Cases appeared in Franklin, Houma, Baton Rouge, 
Wilson, Clinton, Plaquemine, Lutcher, St. James Parish, 
Jackson, East Feliciana Parish, West Feliciana Parish, 
Alexandria, Bowie, Iberville Parish, St. Charles Parish,
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Lake Charles, Slaughter, Morrow, and other towns and 
parishes, mainly in the southern portion of the s t a t e . ^5
The fever of 1899 claimed only twenty-three lives in 
New Orleans, and a few cases occurred in Plaquemines Parish, 
St. Charles Parish, and Baton Rouge, Again the familiar 
quarantines were applied within and without the state.
For the most part, however, freight shipments continued 
under the Atlanta Regulations of 1898, Northern and cen­
tral Louisiana quarantined against New Orleans, but almost 
the entire southern and eastern portion manifested confi­
dence in the State Board to handle the situation properly 
and withheld their local restrictions,^6
The first half of the nineteenth century had wit­
nessed a steady increase in the frequency and virulence of 
yellow fever; the 1850's marked something of a climax of 
its activities. In the last forty years of the century, 
although expected each year, the scourge struck rarely, 
and with two exceptions (1867 and 1878), lightly. The
75Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1898-1899, 45, 46; N. 0, Med, & Surg, Jour., LI (October,
1898), 209.
76Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1898-1899, 47, 242.
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decline of the pestilence coincided with increasingly 
positive action by Louisiana health authorities in the 
areas of sanitation, disinfection, and fumigation, as well 
as "Maritime Sanitation"--that is, the modified quarantine 
program. Although fallacious insofar as yellow fever was 
concerned, the conclusion that the sanitary efforts de­
served credit for reducing the incidence of the pestilence 
undoubtedly won increased support for a stronger and more 
active Board of Health and indirectly resulted in a more 
favorable climate of opinion for the concept of public 
health. For whatever reason, known only to the virus it­
self, by the 1890's the fever exhibited a less virulent 
character than in previous years. A Louisiana historian, 
writing in 1903, dismissed the visitation of 1897 with this 
brief statement: "There was an epidemic, called by some
yellow fever, in New Orleans in 1897; but the fever was so 
mild and the mortalities so few that the disease was known 
by the name of 'yellowoid.'"?? By 1899, not only had yellow 
fever diminished in virulence, but its secret mode of trans­
mission by the familiar pest, the Aedes aegypti mosquito.
77portier, A History of Louisiana, IV, 232-33.
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was soon to be discovered and proved beyond any reasonable 
doubt. The final conquest of the scourge of New Orleans, 
the South, and Latin America was just around the corner 
when the twentieth century arrived.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS, 1867-1899
[hs** Population (Approx.) 
181,000
192.000
199.000
Year Number of D
*1867 3,320
1868 3
1869 3
-1870 587
1871 54
1872 39
-1873 226
1874 11
1875 61
1876 42
1877 1
*1878 4,046
1879 19
1880 2
1881 0
1882 4
1883 1
1884 1
1885 1
1886 0
1887 0
1888 0
1889 1
1890 0
1891 0
1892 0
1893 0
1894 0
1895 0
1896 0
*1897 298
1898 57
1899 23
211,000
285,000
*Major epidemics.
**From Board of Health figures.
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DISTRIBUTION OF YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA OUTSIDE OF NEW ORLEANS, 1867-1899* 
Places 1867 1870 1873 1878 1879 1897 1898 1899
Alexandria 
Baton Rouge 
Coushatta 
Delhi 
Delta
Donaldsonville
East Feliciana Parish
Greenwood
Gretna
Hammond
Houma
Jackson
Jeanerette
Labadieville
Lafayette
Lafourche Crossing 
Lake Charles 
Lake Providence 
Mansfield 
Napoleonv i1le 
New Iberia 
Opelousas 
Pa inc our tville 
Plaquemine 
Plaquemines Parish 
Ponchatoula 
Port Barre 
Port Hudson
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
ro
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C/)
Places 1867 1870 1873 1878 1879 1897 1898 1899
8■D
CD
3.3"
CD
CD■D
O
Q .
C
aO3
"O
O
St. Bernard Parish
St. Charles Parish
St. James Parish
St. John the Baptist Parish
St. Martinville
St. Mary Parish
Shreveport
Tangipahoa
Thibodaux
Vermillionville
Ville Platte
Washington
West Feliciana Parish 
Wilson
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CD
Q. *Yellow fever also occurred in many small towns in Louisiana not included in the list. 
This chart is intended as a representative picture of the major areas affected, and not an 
exhaustive listing.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE LAST EPIDEMIC, 1905
Yellow fever appeared in New Orleans only once 
after 1899--for the last time. The epidemic of 1905 was 
not only the last outbreak of the yellow pestilence in the 
Crescent City, but also the last yellow fever epidemic in 
the United States. By this time the Saffron Scourge was 
operating under a grave disadvantage: its heretofore
secret mode of transmission had been discovered. In the 
latter nineteenth century the United States government had 
commissioned several individuals and expeditions to investi­
gate the yellow fever mystery, but without positive results, 
The Spanish-American War in 1898 and the subsequent mili­
tary occupation of Cuba brought the American forces in 
contact with the yellow foe in its own territory, where it 
had prevailed as an endemic disease for many years. In 
1900 a commission of United States Army surgeons went to 
Cuba on a special assignment: Operation Yellow Jack.
Chairman Walter Reed and his associates (James Carroll,
226
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Jesse W, Lazear, and Aristides Agramonte) followed the path 
suggested long before by Carlos Finlay, By using the 
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes which Finlay made available to 
them, they successfully demonstrated the role of the mos­
quito as the vector of yellow fever. In October of 1900 
they made a tentative announcement of their findings, and 
after further experimentation issued a full report in the 
spring of 1901, stating that yellow fever was transmitted 
by the Aedes aegypti mosquito and only in that manner,^
One might have expected that the announcement of 
this significant discovery would have stimulated the people 
of New Orleans and elsewhere in the South to embark immedi­
ately upon an anti-mosquito crusade to eliminate the 
possibility of future outbreaks. Such was not the case. 
Many persons refused to believe that the small, familiar 
pest, offensive and annoying though it might be, was 
actually the agent of the dreaded pestilence. Even the 
medical profession was divided; many who accepted the 
theory did so with reservations. The editor of the New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal in April of 1901 felt 
that it was too soon to consider the mosquito the only
^Winslow, Conquest of Epidemic Disease, 352-54.
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means of yellow fever transmission, although he did believe
in the "urgent necessity" for eradicating the culprit and
2
recommended a public campaign toward that end.
In its report for 1900 and 1901 the State Board of 
Health discussed the conclusions of the Reed Commission, 
Although admitting that the mosquito had been demonstrated 
as one factor in the conveyance of yellow fever, the Board 
stated that "we Southern Health Officers, charged with the 
grave duty of protecting our people against this most 
dreaded of all diseases, are unwilling to accept the 
dictum of the experimenters that yellow fever can be con­
veyed by no other agency." They were not yet prepared to 
give up the theory of the fever's spread by means of 
foraites, that is, substances capable of absorbing germs, 
such as woolen fabrics or articles of clothing.^
On the other hand, the New Orleans City Board of 
Health (created in 1898) and the Orleans Parish Medical 
Society exhibited considerable interest in the mosquito 
theory and shortly after the announcement of the theory
2n . 0. & Surg. Jour., LXII (April, 1901), 595.
3Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1900-1901, 77-79.
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began to take steps to investigate breeding places of the 
Aedes aegypti in New Orleans for the purpose of eradicat­
ing the species. Dr, Quitman Kohnke, chairman of the City 
Board of Health, had been thoroughly impressed by the 
striking results of William Gorgas' anti-mosquito campaign 
in Havana in 1901, and under Kohnke's leadership the City 
Board spearheaded a similar movement in New Orleans as 
early as July of 1901, Circulars were printed in the news­
papers and copies widely distributed giving information and 
advice on the Aedes aegypti and how to combat it. Confer­
ences were held and lectures given to educate the house­
holders on the necessity of screening and oiling their 
cisterns to eliminate the favorite breeding places of the 
yellow fever mosquito. In August the City Board undertook 
an experiment in a selected locality of the city, with the 
intention of visiting every house within a particular area 
and of oiling all cisterns in order to destroy mosquitoes 
while in the process of development. Many householders 
refused to participate in the program. Others allowed the 
oiling process the first time around, but refused on the 
second, insisting that they could taste and smell oil in 
their drinking water. Hence, what was designed as a demon­
stration which might be repeated throughout the city failed
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completely. Convinced that in the face of apathy and 
opposition the program could never be effected without 
special supporting law, the City Health Board attempted to 
secure an ordinance on the subject, but to no avail.^
From time to time between the summer of 1901 and the 
summer of 1905, the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Jour­
nal, the city newspapers, the State Board of Health, and 
the Orleans Parish Medical Association recommended the 
screening and oiling of cisterns in a war against the mos­
quito. Dr. Kohnke of the City Board kept up his agitation 
throughout the period, but because of ignorance, indiffer­
ence, or skepticism, New Orleanians failed to arouse them­
selves to the task. Not a single yellow fever death 
occurred in the Crescent City in the years 1900 through 
1904.5 While the disease was not present, few could bother 
to become disturbed about an unseen enemy. The challenge 
was not met until it occurred in the form of a yellow fever 
epidemic; then and only then were the health authorities
^Sir Rubert William Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis 
in New Orleans, 1905 (London [1906]), 8, 16; Report of the 
Louisiana State Board of Health for 1900-1901, 46-5ll 
Picayune, August 30, 1901,
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1900-1901, 7; Boyce, Yellow F:ver Prophylaxis, 1.
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able to arouse people to action. In spite of certain ob­
structions initially posed by the Italian segment of the 
population, the crusade against the yellow fever mosquito 
in the midst of the 1905 epidemic reflected a remarkable 
display of energy and enthusiasm by the people of New 
Orleans. The crusade was preached from pulpit and press, 
at indoor and outdoor educational mass meetings, and in 
several different languages. It was encouraged by of­
ficial and unofficial circulars containing advice and 
information and given legal sanction by city ordinances.
The State and City Boards of Health, the United States 
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, the Orleans 
Parish Medical Society, citizens ward volunteer groups, 
women's organizations, and Negro leagues all cooperated 
in the fight against yellow fever. Armed with the knowl­
edge of the mosquito as transmitter, the crusaders were 
able to employ effective weapons against the disease; the 
final conquest was at hand.
In 1905 the New Orleans population numbered about 
375,000, with less than a fourth immune to yellow fever by 
previous attack. In the preceding four or five years, 
numerous Italian immigrants had swelled the population, 
settling in the old portion of the city near the water front,
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It was later believed that yellow fever had slipped past 
the quarantine station sometime late in May by means of 
an infected passenger or an infected mosquito, probably 
from Central America. The fever spread first among the 
Italians, who were clannish, unfamiliar with both yellow 
fever and the English language, and reluctant to call in 
medical aid. Hence, the disease gained a foothold in that 
portion of the city, and not until July 13 were the first 
suspicious cases brought to the attention of the health 
authorities. Meanwhile, many Italians from the infected 
area had moved to other sections of the city and the 
state, carrying the fever with them and thus facilitating 
its spread. By July 21, when the first public announce­
ment came from the authorities, it was estimated that at 
least a hundred cases and twenty deaths had already
occurred.G
Organization of the anti-fever campaign started 
almost immediately after the discovery of the disease in 
New Orleans, Even before the public announcement. Dr. 
Kohnke had begun the work of fumigation in the infected
^Rudolph Matas, "A Yellow Fever Retrospect and Pros­
pect,*' Louisiana Historical Quarterly, VIII (July, 1925), 
462-63; Picayune, July 31, October 15, 1905.
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area. On July 21 the State and City Boards of Health, 
representatives of the United States Public Health and 
Marine Hospital Service, health officials from neighboring 
states, and members of the Orleans Parish Medical Society 
met in conference to discuss the problem at hand. The 
next day, July 22, the medical society created a special 
committee to work with the health authorities. On the 
same day several prominent citizens, the Mayor, and the 
chairmen of the State and City Boards of Health conferred, 
made plans for halting the spread of infection, and organ­
ized a Finance Committee to collect funds for the campaign. 
On July 23 the newspapers published an address to the 
citizens of New Orleans signed by Dr. Kohnke of the City 
Health Board and Dr. J. H. White of the United States 
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, and approved by 
the special committee of the Orleans Parish Medical Society. 
The message proclaimed the existence of an emergency "which 
demands the attention of every individual, with the view 
to limiting and preventing the spread of epidemic disease." 
The statement declared the mosquito as the only means of 
yellow fever's transmission and recommended to the citizens 
the following measures; screening and oiling cisterns and 
cesspools or privies, empyting all receptacles of stagnant
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water » sleeping under mosquito nets, and screening doors 
and windows,^
On Sunday, July 23, the Reverend Dr. Beverley 
Warner, rector of Trinity Church, spoke out for the crusade 
from his pulpit. In the following weeks other clergymen of 
all denominations would follow his example. On Monday,
July 24, the Fourteenth Ward of the city organized to 
clean all streets, yards, and gutters In the area, and to 
have every cistern screened, ffore than a hundred citizens 
attended the organizational meeting and made liberal 
financial contributions to Institute the program. They 
divided Into committees and planned to begin work on the 
following day. To facilitate the work they advertised for 
bids to screen some 250 cisterns. Within a day or two 
other wards followed their example, and by July 26 the 
health authorities decided to establish a central head­
quarters for the ward groups with Dr. Beverley Warner as 
chairman. His task was to coordinate the ward activities, 
report to the city board, and thereby eliminate duplication
^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 18, 20; Picayune, 
July 23, 1905.
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Q
of work.
On Wednesday, July 26, campaign procedure was being 
developed all over the city. In addition to appointing Dr, 
Warner superintendent of ward work, the City Board planned 
its own activities. It established a sanitary force of a 
hundred men to locate fever cases, fumigate and screen 
infected premises, and deal with each new focus of disease 
as it developed. Another force of 250 men was assigned to 
work in the field, and house-by-house, ward-by ward, to 
make war on the mosquito. The officers of all the Italian 
societies in New Orleans assembled that day to discuss the 
yellow fever problem. They appointed special committees 
to make house-to-house visits among the Italians, urging 
them to report all cases of disease and to comply with 
official measures,^ A yellow fever isolation hospital 
established by the city health authorities in the infected 
district opened on July 26 and received its first patients. 
Under the supervision of Dr, Hamilton Jones, who had also 
directed the yellow fever hospital in 1897, every precaution
^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 18, 20, 27, 28; 
Picayune, July 25, 27, 1905,
9Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 20, 27; Picayune, 
July 27, 1905,
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was taken to keep mosquitoes away from the patients.
Within less than a week after the first public 
announcement of yellow fever's existence in the city, sys^ 
tematic measures had been taken by the health authorities, 
the medical society, and the citizens of New Orleans to 
create the working machinery necessary for an all-out war 
of extermination against the disease-bearing Aedes aegypti. 
The machinery of organization would fail in its mission, 
however, unless supported by public understanding and 
enthusiastic cooperation. To stimulate the New Orleans 
populace, an educational campaign was a vital necessity, 
and in waging that campaign, all the forces of organization 
came to the fore. Contributing its full support to the 
educational drive, the New Orleans press published notices 
and circulars, described the activities of the health 
authorities and ward committees, and provided editorial 
propaganda for the cause. The Picayune editor assured the 
people of New Orleans that yellow fever could be transmitt­
ed only by the mosquito and that it was easily prevented 
"by the adoption of the strictest safeguards against the
lOAugustin, History of Yellow Fever, 885; Boyce, 
Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 19.
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pestiferous insect," Day after day New Orleanians were 
urged to oil and screen cisterns and to sleep under mos­
quito nets. Recognizing that the yellow pestilence no 
longer was "the vague terror, borne on the hot winds in 
waves or disseminated in unknown and mysterious fashion," 
the editor of the New Orleans Times-Democrat urged the 
citizenry to keep up the good fight against the scourge.
Throughout the epidemic the Orleans Parish Medical 
Society rendered a valuable service in sending out notices, 
circulars, and pamphlets. The members of the Society tried 
to impress upon all physicians the absolute necessity of 
reporting immediately all cases of fever, even doubtful 
ones. Further, they worked hand in hand with the health 
officials in the educational campaign, and were among the 
first to advocate the transfer of the yellow fever crusade 
from the direction of local authorities to the United 
States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service. When 
the federal authorities took charge of the campaign, the 
medical society continued to cooperate in the fight 
against yellow fever. Pamphlets containing instructions
llpicayune, July 23, 1905; Times-Democrat, August 
28, 1905; Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 52-53.
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and advice to physicians and nurses were prepared by Dr,
Rudolph Matas, renowned physician and surgeon of New Orleans.
These pamphlets were distributed by the medical society
and paid for by the United States Treasury Department. To
propagandize the anti-mosquito crusade, physicians lectured
in churches, in factories, and in school rooms throughout
the Crescent City, and in other parts of the state as 
12well. Almost every night during the epidemic someone 
lectured somewhere in New Orleans on the subject of the 
yellow fever mosquito. Dr. Kohnke was tireless in his 
efforts to convince the people of New Orleans that all 
activities should be directed against that one species of 
mosquito. Night after night he lectured, describing the 
life cycle of the mosquito with the aid of lantern slides, 
recommending the use of oil on cistern water to kill the 
"wiggle-tails" already there and to hinder mosquitoes from 
laying more eggs on the water. He assured the people that
oil could not hurt their drinking water. Further, he recom-
1 ?mended sulphur fumigation of all houses. Thousands of
l^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 1066-77; Boyce, 
Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 21-27.
^^Picayune, July 25, 27, 1905; Boyce, Yellow Fever 
Prophylaxis, 28, 59.
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people heard the lectures of Dr. Kohnke and other speakers 
and thereby were converted and enrolled in the campaign.
The Citizens Ward Committees, centralized under Dr. 
Warner of Trinity Church, sent in daily reports of work 
accomplished: houses inspected and fumigated, cisterns
oiled and screened. With Dr. Warner acting as coordinator, 
the city health authorities could then check the wards to 
see what else had to be done. The Ward Organizations also 
participated in the education campaign. They issued 
notices, set up posters in prominent places, and sponsored 
educational mass meetings to inform people that extinction 
of mosquitoes meant freedom from yellow fever in the 
future.
In addition to supervising the ward work. Dr. Warner 
also participated actively in the educational campaign. In 
a circular letter he made a special appeal to the clergy 
of all religious denominations to preach the anti-mosquito 
c r u s a d e . Dr, Warner and Dr, Kohnke addressed groups of 
New Orleanians almost every night during the epidemic, and
l^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 28; Picayune, 
July 28, 29, August 4, 1905,
ISpicayune, July 31, 1905,
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both were instrumental in organizing the Negroes of New 
Orleans to aid in the great war on yellow fever. In late 
July Dr. Warner addressed the first gathering of Negroes 
and explained that yellow fever was no longer the "bugbear 
it had been in former years." He mentioned the old belief 
that Negroes possessed immunity to the disease, but express­
ed his opinion that if an infected mosquito stung a Negro, 
it would be "just the same as though a white man had been 
stung." The prominent Negro men present at that first 
meeting, including doctors, lawyers, and ministers, organ­
ized the Central Sanitary Association and made plans to 
establish branches among the Negroes in the various wards 
of the city.^G
On August 16 Dr. Warner and several other speakers 
addressed a mass meeting of Negroes at the Second Baptist 
Church. Regarding the possibility of racial immunity, one 
Negro speaker declared: "Suppose we were immune, all per­
sons are not, and we must help them. We are a part of the 
community, and our prosperity depends upon their prosperity." 
Furthermore, he added, "When the white people get stirred 
up like this there is sure something doing. They don't
IGlbid., July 29, 1905.
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raise a big fuss like this over nothing. Let's help them 
kill this stegomyia [Aedes aegypti] Another large
assembly of Negroes met in the First Street A.M.E. Church 
on the night of August 22 to hear short lectures by a mem­
ber of the Woman's League, several Negro ministers, and Dr, 
Kohnke, A considerable number of Woman's League members 
attended that meeting, and many other white persons were 
scattered about in the audience. Dr. Kohnke encouraged 
the Negroes to organize and assist in the crusade. "There 
is no difference between white and black," he said. "We 
live the same way, we get sick the same way, we get well 
the same way, we die the same way." Emphasizing the 
equality theme, he continued, "There is no distinction of 
color with the stegomyia mosquito. He is just as ready to 
bite you as he is to bite me." If the mosquito happened 
to be an infected one, a Negro would take yellow fever 
just as a white man. Hence, it was necessary for them to 
follow the same precautionary measures as the whites. Dr. 
Kohnke then gave his usual lecture on the life cycle of 
the mosquito with stereoptico.n illustrations. When the
17lbid., August 17, 1905. Stegomyia was the term 
previously applied to the Aedes aegypti mosquito.
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Negro minister dismissed the meeting, he urged all persons
to go forth and fumigate their houses and oil and screen
1 Atheir cisterns, °
Interestingly enough, although susceptible to yellow 
fever, Negroes did exhibit a striking tendency toward re­
covery. Although, as Dr, Kohnke stated, the stegomyia did 
not recognize the color line, obviously the people of New 
Orleans did, for the Negroes were not invited to join the 
ward organizations, but were encouraged to form "separate 
but equal" associations instead. Nevertheless, some of the 
initial educational sessions among the Negroes were inte­
grated, at least to some degree.
In the campaign another segment of the New Orleans 
population, the women, worked actively with the health 
authorities and with the regular ward organizations although 
set apart in their own separate organizations. Especially 
active was the Home and Education Department of the Woman's 
League under the chairmanship of Mrs, W, J, Behan. That 
group participated wholeheartedly in the work of sponsoring 
popular lectures in public meeting places throughout the 
city. They had started something of an anti-mosquito
IGlbid., August 23, 1905.
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campaign even before the outbreak of the epidemic of 1905,
but like Dr. Kohnke, apparently had met with little success.
These civic-minded women not only organized and sponsored
lectures but also established Ward Clubs and undertook a
house-to-house campaign, urging householders to oil and
screen their cisterns and to fumigate their houses.
Another “progressive** women's organization, the Ladies of
the Era Club, worked diligently throughout the campaign.
The members visited homes and informed housewives of the
yellow fever mosquito and measures to eliminate it. Under
the leadership of these women's groups and perhaps others,
women in the different wards of the city formed associa-
IQtions to cooperate with the other volunteer forces.
One thing more should be noted in connection with 
the women's activities in the crusade, which reflects the 
early twentieth-century striving for female equality. In 
mid-September the New Orleans Health Association was organ­
ized to work for the benefit of the city's future health, 
to bring about changes in sanitary legislation along the 
lines of recent scientific discoveries, and to work for 
the enforcement of those laws. When Dr. Warner suggested
l^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 59; Picayune, 
August 3, September 3, 1905.
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to the members of the Woman's League that they form a 
"women's auxiliary" to the Health Association, they de­
clined. They agreed to cooperate with the new organization 
while continuing their own work, but if they could not be 
accepted as members of equal standing in the society, they 
refused to have any second-class connection with it,^® In 
1905, then, not only Negroes but also women found them­
selves relegated to segregated organizations, cooperating 
with, but not a part of, the central corps of white men.
In mid-August a new feature was introduced at one 
of the educational mass meetings sponsored by the Woman's 
League: Dr. Felix Formento agreed to deliver a speech in
Italian. Many persons of that nationality attended the 
lecture and seemed willing to accept Dr. Formento's advice. 
He explained to them the relationship of the mosquito to 
the disease and described the work of the United States 
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, which had taken 
over the campaign early in August. Furthermore, he told 
them why they could not be allowed to "throw obstacles in 
the way of the public health and safety" and requested
ZOpicayune, September 16, October 6, 1905.
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that they cooperate with the health authorities.21 The 
speeches of Dr. Formento and others in the Italian language, 
the influence of the prominent Italian citizens of the com­
munity working through their associations, and the influ­
ence of the Catholic clergy finally won the confidence and 
the cooperation of many previously obstructionist Italians, 
As the educational campaign began to win converts 
and the ward workers and city authorities went into action, 
the Citizens' Finance Committee ordered 25,000 lapel but­
tons bearing the words "My Cisterns are all right; How are 
Yours?" around an image of the Aedes aegypti. For the pur­
pose of further propagandizing the movement, these badges 
were to be worn by persons who had already attended to the 
screening and oiling of their cisterns.^2 Reflecting a 
clever imagination, a unique advertisement appeared in the 
Picayune shortly after the cistern-screening movement was 
initiated: "STEGOMYIA WIRE, in all size rolls, is one of
our specialties. If you don't know what a Stegomyia is, 
ask Dr. Kohnke,"2^
21lbid,, August 15, 1905 
22ibid,, July 28, 1905. 
23ibid,, July 25, 1905.
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Promoted by many diverse groups in the city with 
Dr. Kohnke, Dr. Warner, and the Woman's League in the van­
guard, the city-wide educational campaign was carried into 
the factories and the school roans. In early September Dr. 
Warner made arrangements with about half the factories in 
the city for thirty-minute sessions with the employees. 
Physicians and laymen volunteered to handle the discus­
sions and undoubtedly influenced thousands of persons in 
these forums who had not been reached otherwise.During 
one week in October, Dr. Warner and various New Orleans 
physicians visited some fifty-one schools and talked to
43,000 children, distributing among them printed instruc­
tions for fumigation and other measures against the yellow 
fever mosquito in the hope that the children would do 
"their missionary work at home."^^
At various times during the epidemic, certain dates 
were designated as General Fumigation Days when all 
citizens were urged to fumigate their homes by burning 
sulphur. The ward organizations provided the sulphur free 
of charge to those unable to purchase their own. The
Z^ibid., September 3, 1905. 
25lbid., October 5, 13, 1903.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
247
Citizens Volunteer Groups culminated their work on October 
14 and 15 with one day of general cleaning to clear away 
all bottles and cans where mosquitoes might breed and one 
day of general fumigation to clear the houses of the 
pests.
In spite of the general enthusiasm and cooperation 
among the citizens of New Orleans, it was still too much 
to expect unanimity of purpose in a city of that size.
Some persons simply would not screen their cisterns volun­
tarily or follow other recommendations made by the health 
authorities unless absolutely forced to do so. Hence, it 
soon became clear that an anti-mosquito ordinance was 
absolutely vital to provide legal support for the crusade. 
An ordinance was introduced in the City Council on July 25 
which authorized the Board of Health to treat water with 
oil when the receptacles had not been properly screened. 
Further, it required that cisterns, tanks, barrels, or 
other water containers be screened or otherwise covered 
in a manner satisfactory to the Board of Health. For any 
single violation, the ordinance provided a fine up to $25
26%bid., August 17, 21, 25, September 30, October 
5, 1905.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
248
or imprisonment up to thirty days, or both. The failure 
to comply with any provision of the ordinance was con­
sidered a separate violation for each day of noncompliance 
after notification by the health authorities. The measure 
passed the Council unanimously on August 1 and with the 
Mayor's signature became law on August 2. The property 
owner or agent bore the responsibility for oiling and 
screening cisterns. Cheese cloth could be used as a tempo­
rary cover until October 1, by which time it had to be 
replaced with a certain kind of screen wire. Several 
thousand copies of the ordinance were printed and distrib­
uted throughout the city, and every property owner was 
ordered to comply with the ordinance within forty-eight 
hours after its announcement or suffer the penalty. It 
was left to the Board of Health to decide if the cistern 
also needed oiling after its screening. By mid-August a 
number of persons had been fined and jailed for refusing 
to screen their cisterns, evidencing the serious intent 
of the city authorities to enforce the measure. In 
September the Orleans Parish Medical Society urged that 
the October 1 deadline for permanent screening be post­
poned until a later date because of the danger of releasing 
mosquitoes imprisoned within the cisterns. Accepting the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
249
society's advice, the City Council passed a new ordinance 
on September 26 to become effective on January 1, Present 
screens were to be retained; if wire screens were installed, 
they had to be placed over the cheesecloth without removing 
it.27
In early August an important change was effected in 
the administration of the anti-fever campaign: the trans­
fer of command from the local authorities to a federal 
force. In a conference held on August 4, the mayor, the 
President of the Orleans Parish Medical Society, represen­
tatives of the City and State Health Boards, and repre­
sentatives of New Orleans commercial bodies decided to 
request that the United States government take over the 
yellow fever campaign in the Crescent City. Accordingly, 
Governor Newton C. Blanchard sent a message to President 
Theodore Roosevelt requesting that the federal government 
assume control of the situation in New Orleans. At the 
same time Mayor Martin Behrman wired the President declar­
ing the general desire of New Orleans that federal autho­
rities take over the task of eradicating yellow fever.
27Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 27; Picayune, 
July 26, August 2, 3, 18, September 22, 27, 1905.
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Noting the success of the federal health officers in com­
bating yellow fever in Havana and elsewhere, the mayor 
appealed for "executive interposition in behalf of the 
people of New Orleans." President Roosevelt immediately 
directed the Surgeon-General of the United States to 
attack the problem in the Crescent City. In a public 
announcement, Dr. Quitman Kohnke informed the citizenry 
that the transfer of command to the federal government 
was no indication that the epidemic had become more 
serious, nor that the local authorities were unable to 
handle the situation. "Outside communities will have 
greater confidence in the United States Public Health 
authorities," he said, "than they appear to have in the 
local State officers." It was hoped that quarantines 
might ease up with New Orleans under federal health super­
vision. No radical administrative changes occurred; 
essentially the same men continued to carry on the work.^8 
From the onset of the epidemic. Dr. J. H, White of 
the United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Serv­
ice had worked with the local authorities. On August 7
28picayune, August 5, 1905; Boyce, Yellow Fever 
Prophylaxis, 35.
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he took charge of the campaign and proceeded to develop a 
more systematic and authoritative approach to the work 
already started by the local officials. Within a few days 
Dr. White had established a central headquarters, and with 
a staff of forty surgeons of the federal service he created 
subdivisional headquarters in each ward. Each ward center 
had a supply of materials for fumigating, oiling, and 
screening. House-by-house, block-by-block, gangs of work­
men in each ward proceeded each day to inspect, oil, screen, 
and fumigate. Whenever a case of fever was reported to 
ward headquarters, a squad of workmen was dispatched im­
mediately to attend to the necessary screening of the 
patient and fumigation of the house. Sometimes the patient 
was removed to the emergency yellow fever hospital; after­
ward, his house and others in the neighborhood were thor­
oughly fumigated to kill any infected mosquitoes. The new 
command coordinated the activities of the voluntary ward 
groups and made a systematic survey of every ward to see 
where further work was n e c e s s a r y . ^9
Dr, White went to great pains to convince the
Z^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 882-84; Boyce, 
Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 37-44; Picayune, August 8, 1905.
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citizenry that it was vitally necessary to obey the rules 
based on the principle of mosquito transmission. Further­
more, he assured them that house quarantines would not be 
invoked. In a letter to every doctor in the city, he 
urged the immediate reporting of all cases, not only posi­
tive cases of fever, "but also any case you may be unable, 
even at your first visit, to say is not yellow fever," Dr, 
White made every attempt to obtain the complete coopera­
tion of the medical profession "in the checking of the 
multiplication of new foci of infection, and the early 
destruction of those already existing."^0
The attempt to halt a yellow fever epidemic which 
had been slowly developing for almost two months before 
coming to the attention of the authorities was a task of 
gigantic proportions, even with the knowledge of the 
insect vector. In a city the size of New Orleans with
thousands upon thousands of cisterns, and millions of mos­
quitoes, such a task was not easy to accomplish. For the 
campaign to be effective it had to be complete. Since the
disease had obtained a head start, it was impossible to
stamp it out immediately. Nevertheless by early October
30Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 886.
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the number of new cases developing daily had declined con­
siderably, and on October 9 Dr, White ordered that the 
official ward forces gradually be cut down. By October 16 
out of nearly 1,300 men previously employed in the sub­
headquarters, only 400 remained at work, and that number 
was decreased steadily. The high point of the epidemic 
had occurred in mid-August after which its force had
declined. Still, a few cases continued to occur daily
31throughout October and early November. The epidemic of 
1905 lasted about as long as epidemics ordinarily did, but 
its decline came early in the season, and the number of 
cases definitely was held down.to a figure far below what 
it might have been if no fight had been waged.
The New Orleans Picayune had not been pleased with 
the transfer of control to the federal authorities, fearing 
that it would result in "Federal domination." Recalling 
the old fight against the National Board of Health to pre­
serve the "sovereignty and rights of the State" from "ab­
sorption by the Federal Government," the editor remarked: 
"Now we rush into the arms of Uncle Sam, and are only too
^^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 51; Picayune, 
October 11, 16, 1905,
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happy if we can trade our out-of-date Democratic State 
sovereignty trumpery for relief from the responsibility 
of a plain duty, and for money enough for a temporary 
sanitation of the city. Truly times change," Neverthe­
less, once the change had been effected the editor felt 
it the duty of the citizens to support the federal autho­
rities "so that the very best result may be obtained, a 
result that may be worth thousands of valuable lives and 
countless millions in values,
The Yellow Fever Crusade was an expensive venture, 
but worth every cent expended in terms of benefits obtain­
ed at the time and in the future. From the very beginning, 
a Citizens Yellow Fever Fund Committee was organized with 
Charles Janvier as chairman to collect money from the 
citizens of New Orleans and to handle the disbursement of 
the funds. When the federal forces assumed control, 
Surgeon-General Walter Wyman insisted that New Orleans 
supply the labor and materials for the campaign while the 
government would provide the medical officers, supervision, 
and inspection services on railroads and in detention 
camps. The State appropriated $100,000 for the work; the
32picayune, August 5, 23, 1905.
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City Council, $50,000; and the citizens of New Orleans 
contributed $160,000. Of the State appropriation, at 
least $20,000 went to aid the fight in the infected towns 
of Louisiana outside of New Orleans. In addition to the 
expenditure of the local funds, the federal authorities 
spent approximately $50,000 for salaries and expenses of 
the officers, for the maintenance of detention camps, and 
for inspecting and fumigating railroad freight cars. 
Additional funds collected by the volunteer ward groups 
and used for cistern-screening and oiling amounted to 
$30,000. Hence, in New Orleans alone, the crusade cost 
well over $J00,000, not including the expenditures of all 
those individuals who screened their own cisterns and 
houses. Thousands of additional dollars were spent in 
other portions of the state as the campaign was extended 
to those areas where yellow fever spread. The unused 
balance of the New Orleans funds, approximately thirty or 
forth thousand dollars, was set aside as an emergency 
hospital fund for future use.^^
S^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 884-85; 
Picayune, August 6, 7, 11, October 15, 18, 22, 29, 1905; 
Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 60-62.
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The first announcement of yellow fever in New 
Orleans had set off the usual chain reaction of interstate 
and intrastate quarantines. For the first time, a quaran­
tine barrier was erected against New Orleans by Havana, 
Cuba, a yellow fever center so frequently quarantined in 
the past by New Orleans and other port cities. The Pica­
yune called the Havana quarantine "one of the revenges of 
fate," but felt that Havana's success in eradicating 
yellow fever should give encouragement to New Orleans.
One big obstacle to the work was popular skepticism regard­
ing the mosquito as a transmitter of the fever. Pointing 
to the lesson to be learned from the anti-mosquito cam­
paign in that Cuban center, the Picayune editor said,
"let us no longer be old fogies," but attend to the prob­
lem immediately.34
In late July as the news of fever in New Orleans 
spread around the state and to neighboring states, restric­
tions were established against passengers and baggage from 
the Crescent City, but through-traffic and freight met 
with fewer obstructions than in previous years. After a 
conference with Dr. Edmond Souchon, President of the State
3'^ Picayune, July 24, 1905.
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Board of Health, and representatives of the Illinois 
Central, Texas Pacific, New Orleans and Northeastern, and 
Southern Pacific Railroads, Dr. White of the United States 
Marine Hospital Service proceeded to establish detention 
camps on all railroad lines so that after five days of 
detention, persons might secure health certificates to 
pass through quarantine lines.
On July 28 the Louisiana State Board of Health pro­
claimed quarantine for the entire state against unauthoriz­
ed passengers from New Orleans and other infected localities. 
Further, the Board forbade all railroad and transportation 
companies to sell tickets to any point in Louisiana from 
New Orleans or other infected points, under penalty of 
law.36 Only those persons from detention camps who had 
received health certificates from the federal health autho­
rities were permitted to travel from infected areas. Some 
parishes, although protected by the State Board regulations, 
continued to create even more stringent blockades. In 
early August when St. Landry Parish tried to exclude 
freight from New Orleans, Dr. Souchon, President of the
35New York Times, July 28, 1905; Picayune, July 23, 
24, 1905.
36picayune, July 29, 1905.
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State Board, reminded the parish board of the Act of 1898, 
That act gave the State Board power of supervision over 
all local 'quarantine regulations and provided that no 
local board of health could establish a rule in conflict 
with those set forth by the State Board. Dr. Souchon de­
clared that the St. Landry Parish health board had acted 
illegally in quarantining freight cars which had been fumi­
gated and inspected by the United States Public Health and 
Marine Hospital Service since the State Board considered 
such freight not liable to quarantine. Still many local 
boards tried to halt the passage of trains through their 
territory and otherwise interfered with the transportation 
of mail, freight, and passengers approved by the State 
Board and United States health officers. Such violations 
of the Act of 1898 led the State Board to issue a proclama­
tion declaring that those persons who continued to ignore 
State Board regulations might be liable to civil action 
for interference with interstate commerce. Furthermore, 
the Board firmly expressed the intention "to reform by 
persuasion, if possible, but forcibly if necessary, the 
present chaotic condition of quarantine matters in Louisi­
ana." If the local boards continued to pose unreasonable, 
as well as illegal restraints to commerce, the Board
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threatened to ask the Governor to call out the state
0 7
militia to remedy the situation.
The United States Post Office Department took 
action against the quarantines by abolishing the post of­
fice in .Vinton, Louisiana (Calcasieu Parish) when that 
town refused to accept mail. All mail directed to Vinton 
was to be returned to the sender or sent to the dead 
letter office. The post office authorities stated that 
Vinton would not enjoy the benefits of a post office for 
many weeks, perhaps even months, and threatened similar 
action against any town refusing to accept the United 
States m a i l . 38 obviously many persons outside New Orleans 
were hard to convince that yellow fever could be carried 
only by the mosquito and not by parcels, letters, or other 
fomites.
One of the most intense conflicts in relation to 
the quarantine problem arose between the sovereign state 
of Louisiana and the sovereign state of Mississippi, a con­
flict in which the two states reached a point just short
3?Louisiana State Board of Health, The Sanitary 
Code, 1899 (New Orleans, 1899), 8; Picayune, August 6, 9, 
1905.
38picayune, August 10, 1905,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
260
of war. On July 26 Governor James K, Vardaman of Missis­
sippi accused the health authorities of Louisiana of having 
attempted to conceal the existence of yellow fever from 
neighboring states. Governor Newton C, Blanchard of 
Louisiana vehemently denied the charge. Several state­
ments regarding the charge of evasion and concealment 
passed back and forth between the two governors, while 
tempers gradually reached the boiling point. On August 2 
a New Orleans newspaper ran this headline: "Vardaman
Mosquito Fleet Invades Louisiana Waters.” It seems that 
one of the Mississippi quarantine boats, patrolling the 
coast, had entered Lake Borgne. It not only interfered 
with Louisiana fishing boats in that body of water, but 
also tried to stop boats from entering Lake Borgne from 
Lake Pontchartrain and from the Lake Borgne Canal. Accord­
ing to the newspaper account, the Mississippi quarantine 
schooner had entered the lake in Louisiana territory and 
had "proceeded to act as if the Louisiana lake were a 
Mississippi puddle in the backyard of Governor Vardaman." 
Furthermore, it was reported that armed quarantine guards 
from Mississippi had crossed Pearl River into Louisiana 
territory and had taken their positions on the Louisiana 
shore. This "armed invasion" of Louisiana provoked an
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immediate protest to Vardaman from Governor Blanchard. In 
addition, the Louisiana Governor ordered the Louisiana 
Naval Brigade to arm a fleet of patrol boats and proceed to 
Lake Borgne to deal with the invaders. On August 3 Varda­
man wired an ambiguous reply to Blanchard’s protests, 
stating that he had ordered the Mississippi boats to stay 
out of Louisiana waters and the guards to refrain from 
entering Louisiana territory; but, he said, ”I am going 
to also see to it that the people of Louisiana are not per­
mitted to violate the quarantine regulations of Missis­
sippi,” Upon investigation, it was discovered that the 
Mississippi boats still patrolled Lake Borgne. At this 
point Governor Blanchard ordered the Louisiana Naval 
Brigade to take action to protect Louisiana interests in 
Lake Borgne, the Rigolets, and Pearl River. The sheriffs 
and district attorneys of Orleans and St. Bernard parishes 
were directed to accompany the Louisiana fleet and to 
seize those armed vessels illegally patrolling Louisiana 
waters, arrest the crewmen, and bring them before the 
grand jury of the appropriate parish. Justifying his 
course of action. Governor Blanchard stated: "It is not
my intention to invade the waters of Mississippi or take 
an aggressive course against the citizens of that State.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
But it is my intention to employ all the means at my com­
mand to protect the interests of the fishermen, oystermen 
and boatmen of Louisiana," He felt that the rights of 
Louisianians had been threatened by an unwarranted invasion, 
and "if those who were guilty of this interference put them­
selves in the way of the civil and military authorities of 
this State they must accept the consequences." Reading the 
newspapers, one might think that Louisiana and Mississippi 
were actually at war. The Rigolets was termed "the base 
of operations" in a bombastic description of an "encounter 
between the war vessels of the States of Louisiana and 
Mississippi," Reduced to its simplest terms, the "encount­
er" went something like this: the Mississippi boat ap­
proached the Louisiana boat and demanded its credentials 
and destination; when it was found to be a boat of the 
Louisiana Naval Brigade, the Mississippi vessel fled the 
scene. The highlight of the farcical war was the capture 
of one Mississippi quarantine vessel by the Louisiana Naval 
Brigade and the jailing of its crew in St, Bernard Parish.
By August 6 the "War of the Waters" was over. When the 
United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service 
took charge of the coastal area, the conflict between the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
263
two states subsided,
Modified quarantine regulations continued to prevail 
in neighboring states and uninfected areas in Louisiana 
until the latter part of October, On October 21 the Louisi­
ana State Board of Health removed the restrictions on 
travel from New Orleans and other infected towns in the 
state. The Board resolved that local health authorities 
might continue quarantines against persons, but prohibited 
them from interfering with the passage of trains and boats 
and from excluding freight s h i p m e n t s , ^0 Early in November 
as the fever died out completely in New Orleans and else­
where and as cold weather arrived, even the most cautious 
could no longer justify their quarantine regulations. The 
last barrier in the state fell on November 10 when La­
fourche Parish removed its embargo against infected points 
inside and outside the parish.
According to the report of the State Board of 
Health, the fever of 1905 had spread in Louisiana to
39lbid,, July 29, August 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1905, 
40lbid,, October 22, 1905,
4^Thibodaux Lafourche Comet, November 16, 1905,
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twenty-eight p a r i s h e s , resulting in a total of 9 , 3 2 1
cases and 9 8 8  deaths within the state. In Orleans Parish 
alone 3 , 4 0 2  cases had occurred, of which 4 5 2  died. In some 
manner which the Board was unable to determine, the fever 
had entered the state and established itself in a number of 
widely dispersed foci before the health authorities became 
aware of its existence.Italian immigrants played a 
significant role in concealing the early cases from the 
health officials, thus allowing the disease to gain a foot­
hold in New Orleans. Likewise, they contributed to the 
spread of the pestilence throughout the state by moving 
from the original focus of infection to Italian settle­
ments in various communities throughout Louisiana. Crowd­
ed together in the slum areas of the Crescent City, espe­
cially in the neighborhood of the French Market, the 
Italians suffered the first cases of fever as it erupted 
in the city. They tended to avoid contact with local phy­
sicians and medical authorities, and for six or eight weeks
42gee Chart, “Yellow Fever in Louisiana, 1 9 0 5 , “  at 
the end of this chapter.
43Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 5 ,  7 ,  4 5 ,  4 8 .
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yellow fever developed without hindrance,
Even after the epidemic came to light and the anti- 
fever campaign got under way, the Italians continued to 
pose obstructions to the health authorities by concealing 
cases and refusing to comply with official regulations.
One New Orleans physician blamed "Italian ignorance" for 
the "supposed high death rate" in the epidemic. Many of 
the fever cases had received no medical treatment at all, 
he said. Unaware of the dangers of heavy foods, some 
patients continued to eat "bananas and macaroni until in 
the last stages when a physician is notified, or the de­
partment gets word of it," The Picayune reported that 
mosquito nets had been distributed among the Italians in 
the infected districts, but noted that the authorities 
found it almost impossible to persuade them to sleep under 
the nets or even to keep one over a p a t i e n t . U n d e r  the 
circumstances it is not surprising that the disease con­
tinued to run its course in spite of the great crusade.
In a conference of New Orleans commercial interests, 
one argument set forth in favor of transferring control to
^^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 3-5. 
45picayune, August 3, 1905,
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the federal government involved the difficulties encount­
ered by local officials in dealing with Italians* The 
Picayune summarized the problem in a statement reflecting 
a considerable amount of prejudice, as well as an impatience 
that is readily understandable:
They [the Italians] do not speak the English 
language in the first place. It is impossible 
to reason with them. They are not submissive to 
modern medical treatment. When attacked with 
the fever they have been obstreperous, refractory 
and uncontrollable in many instances. When mos­
quito bars are placed over them they refuse to 
allow them to remain, tearing and cutting the 
bars down. When convalescent, Italian patients 
again and again have eaten freely of macaroni, 
bananas, etc., which has resulted in death al­
most immediately. They have slipped through 
quarantine lines and spread disease in spite of 
every effort to check the infection.46
By mid-August through the educational campaign and the ef­
forts of clergymen and prominent Italian leaders of organ­
izations, the people of that nationality in the Crescent 
City gradually became more cooperative and "amenable to 
reason," but some still exhibited a tendency to conceal 
fever cases from the authorities.47
In Patterson, Louisiana, where the fever raged 
severely, the Italians again provided serious trouble for
46lbid., August 5, 1905. 
47ibid., August 14, 1905.
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the health officials. The physician in charge reported 
to Dr. Souchon of the State Board that the Italians in 
Patterson were threatening riot and that he expected an 
attempt to burn the yellow fever hospital. Several Ital­
ians had died of the fever and their compatriots believed 
the doctors responsible. The Governor of Louisiana dis­
patched arms and ammunition to the frightened community 
so that the citizens might protect themselves and the hos­
pital. On the night of September 2 a large number of 
citizens assembled at the hospital and organized to patrol 
the town. They also planned to invite the Italians to a 
meeting to hear speeches by "prominent Italio-American 
citizens," the Italian Consular agent, a Catholic priest, 
and others able to speak the Italian language. Meanwhile, 
armed citizens patrolled the streets at night and guarded 
the hospital, and all nurses and doctors were armed in 
case of an assault on the hospital. The planned assembly 
of Italian people was prevented by rain, but some of the 
leading Italian citizens and the priest met on September 3 
and planned to talk with every Italian in the town and try 
to win their cooperation.^®
48lbid., September 3, 4, 1905.
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The educational campaign paid off; within a short 
time the situation had calmed down and many of the Italians 
agreed to allow the fumigation of premises and the trans­
fer of patients to the hospital. Through the combined 
efforts of the health officials, Catholic priests, and a 
few Italian leaders, the situation was explained to the 
panic-stricken people and their fear and distrust of the 
officials partially removed. The Very Reverend Abbot 
Paul Schaeuble, O.S.B., who spent several weeks in Pat­
terson during the epidemic and worked diligently to 
alleviate the existing frictions, displayed a great deal 
of patience, sympathy, and understanding in dealing with 
the problem, "The Italians are good people," he declared, 
"but the trouble lay in their simplicity and ignorance and 
in their inability to speak the English language." With 
the coming of the fever to Patterson, they had succumbed 
to sheer terror, "They mistrusted everything that was being 
done to help them," Father Schaeuble explained, "and 
believed that the medicines prescribed were poisons for 
the purpose of ridding the locality of the sick p e o p l e .  
Nevertheless, opposition to screening and fumigation
49lbid., September 12, 1905.
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together with the failure to report all cases kept the 
fever going in Patterson throughout October. After investi­
gating the situation there, a federal health officer 
called it the "worst fever-ridden town in the State" and 
reported that in the absence of full cooperation on the 
part of the residents, the disease undoubtedly would con­
tinue until the arrival of cold weather stamped it out.^O
The State Board of Health and officers of the United 
States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service provided 
some assistance to local authorities in parishes through­
out the state for their anti-fever campaigns. Some com­
munities began educational campaigns and anti-mosquito 
crusades before yellow fever approached them, while others 
failed to meet the challenge even with the fever in their 
midst. Shreveport belonged to the more active category.
The city instituted rigid quarantine measures, careful 
inspection of trains, fumigation of mail and freight, and 
detention of all passengers without proper health certifi­
cates. Inaugurated by a citizens educational campaign, a 
city-wide anti-mosquito crusade was made compulsory by 
ordinances requiring the screening of cisterns and
SOlbid., October 14, 1905.
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fumigation of houses. Several fever cases occurred at the
detention camp outside of Shreveport, but the city itself
51escaped the disease.
Outside of Orleans, the parishes hardest-hit by the 
pestilence in terms of cases and mortality were Lafourche, 
Jefferson, and East Carroll, with the twenty-four other 
parishes visited by the fever suffering to a lesser de­
g r e e . P r a i s i n g  the country doctors who fought the fever 
in 1905, the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical 
Journal observed: "It was a different condition in the
country, with infrequent trains and without necessary drugs 
or sulphur, or with scanty resources or supplies and lack­
ing trained assistants." Sometimes one doctor alone carried 
the burden in a large area. Such a condition was quite 
different, said the editor, from that in New Orleans,
"where the fight was made with the aid of the United 
States Government and almost unlimited money,
In the last days of the epidemic as the fever was
5Ishreveport Journal, July 22, 27, August 1, 2, 15, 
26, 29, September 1, October 30, 1905; Picayune, October 
15, 1905,
52picayune, October 15, 1905.
0, & Surg. Jour., LVIII (March, 1906), 751.
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rapidly fading in New Orleans, President Theodore Roose­
velt made a dramatic appearance in the Crescent City in 
defiance of advice and warnings from many quarters. Tour­
ing the South in the last two weeks of October, he arranged 
his itinerary so that New Orleans would be the last stop 
and he could return to Washington by boat to avoid any 
quarantine difficulties. New Orleanians presented him 
with an enthusiastic welcome, complete with parade, speech- 
making, banquet, and all the trimmings, The President 
responded to Mayor Behrman's public welcoming speech with 
a laudatory message to the people of New Orleans for their 
heroic fight against the pestilence, "and he declared with 
emotion that at any moment, if he had been asked to do so, 
he would have come in person to assist in this fight that 
was being so gallantly made."^^ What a battle that might 
have been: T,R, in combat with the Saffron Scourge, the
Aedes aegypti, and the Italians in New Orleans!
The campaign waged against the New Orleans yellow 
fever epidemic of 1905 stood forth as a shining example of 
what might be accomplished by the application of energy 
and scientific knowledge, and as such deserved the high
54picayune, October 3, 27, 1905,
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praise it received. Sir Rubert Boyce of the Liverpool 
School of Tropical Medicine, who had observed the crusade 
in person declared: ", , . the measures which the people
of New Orleans took to stamp out the epidemic . . , consti­
tute . . , the most brilliant demonstration upon a most 
extensive scale of the application of modern sanitary teach­
ing to the arrest and prevention of Yellow Fever." He 
felt that the people of New Orleans had set a precedent to 
be followed by every area within the yellow fever zone so 
that the dreaded pestilence might be entirely eradicated.^5 
George Augustin, the yellow fever historian, who was also 
on hand at the time, wrote: "The epidemic of 1905 is
memorable in many ways, but what has stamped it indelibly 
in the minds of the great thinking public of the entire 
civilized world, is the grand victory which science, with 
the modern weapon intelligently wielded, has achieved 
against a disease which is foreign to this country, and 
which," he added, "we sincerely hope, has been forever 
ostracised from our shores."56
The experience of the epidemic of 1905 settled once
55Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 6, 
S^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 881.
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and for all the widespread doubts about the role of the 
Aedes aegypti and transformed the mosquito theory into the 
mosquito doctrine. The 1 9 0 5  Report of the Board of Adminis­
trators of Charity Hospital stated that the experience with 
yellow fever patients in Charity had "confirmed in every 
respect, the soundness of the dogma of the mosquito being 
the sole transmitory agent in propagating yellow fever."
In handling about a hundred cases of yellow fever during 
the epidemic, the Charity Hospital authorities had taken 
great care to use mosquito bars and to screen the fever 
wards. Not one case developed among the other patients, 
physicians, nurses, students, or Sisters of Charity.^7
Regardless of the experience of 1 9 0 5  and the posi­
tive validation of mosquito transmission, at least one 
prominent New Orleans physician continued to oppose what 
he called "The Mosquito Craze." Dr. Charles Faget the 
younger wrote a lengthy article for the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal in October of 1 9 0 6 ,  expressing his 
skepticism regarding the mosquito theory and upholding the 
nineteenth-century view of the fever's transmission by
5?Report of the Board of Administrators of the 
Charity Hospital to the General Assembly of the State of 
Louisiana for 1 9 0 5  (Baton Rouge, 1 9 0 6 ) ,  3 9 .
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fomîtes. He recommended that articles of clothing and 
merchandise still be watched very carefully and disinfected 
as in previous years. Although admitting the possibility 
of mosquito transmission, he considered it the exceptional 
or the experimental case and not the normal avenue of 
transmission. Dr, Faget knew of many cases which he could 
not account for by the mosquito and of other cases where 
mosquitoes had been present but the fever failed to spread. 
Furthermore, he considered the compulsory screening pro­
cedure, the fumigations and refumigations to kill mos­
quitoes, and the hasty removal of patients to crowded 
hospitals not only annoying but actually dangerous to the 
lives of patients. "Such practices,” he declared, "remind 
one of the bear who, wishing to deliver his sleeping master 
of an obnoxious 'mosquito,' crushed his head with a huge 
r o c k . "58 Fortunately, Dr. Faget's views represented the 
exception and not the rule.
In 1906 Dr. C. H. Irion, new President of the Louisi­
ana State Board of Health, provided for over one hundred 
educational institutes in the areas infected by yellow 
fever in 1905, At these sessions the mosquito doctrine was
58n . 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., LIX (October, 1906), 253-
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set forth in a series of illustrated lectures in English, 
French, German, and Italian. The anti-mosquito campaign 
initiated by the lectures resulted in the widespread fumi­
gation of houses and the passage of compulsory screening 
ordinances in many towns of Louisiana.^9
The yellow fever campaign of 1905 indirectly pro­
duced a number of significant results. According to Dr, 
Rudolph Matas, the victorious crusade brought a renewed 
confidence in the future of the Crescent City and the 
entire American Gulf coast by demonstrating the means of 
eradicating the pestilence. "It put a new spirit and a 
new faith in a once apathetic plague stricken, discouraged 
population," he said. Furthermore, the episode shocked 
the community into an awareness of the obsolete methods of 
sanitation, or rather "insanitation," which. Dr. Matas 
maintained, "had long ceased to be fit even for a colonial 
regime." The experience of 1905 persuaded many that cis­
terns, open gutters, unpaved streets, and other "perpetual 
culture media" for mosquitoes had to go. The situation 
clearly called for immediate attention to a system of 
water supply, drainage, sewerage, and street paving that
S^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 1188,
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the city needed for the "hygienic existence and security 
of its population."GO
Under the impetus of the yellow fever outbreaks in 
the late 1890's, arrangements had been made for the in­
stallation in New Orleans of city-owned systems of drain­
age, sewerage, and water-supply. The drainage system was 
in partial operation by 1900, but active work on the 
sewerage system did not begin until 1903, nor on the water 
system until 1905. The epidemic of 1905 provided the 
necessary pressure for the completion of the drainage, 
sewerage, and water supply systems, all of which were in 
full operation by 1909. A historian of New Orleans called 
the installation of these systems "the most significant 
incident in the history of New Orleans" during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. After 1905 cisterns in 
the Crescent City were inspected annually to see that they 
were oiled and screened properly--until 1918 when all cis­
terns in the city were ordered removed,G1
In August of 1906 when one case of yellow fever
60Matas, "A Yellow Fever Retrospect and Prospect," 
loc. cit., 468.
G^Kendall, History of New Orleans, II, 525-26, 559,
575-79.
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occurred in New Iberia, Louisiana, the State 3oard of 
Health immediately took charge in that community and pro­
moted a thoroughgoing campaign of fumigating and screen­
ing. The patient recovered and no other cases occurred. 
The State Board was never able to determine the source of 
infection.62 Perhaps that case may be accounted for by an 
infected Aedes aegypti which survived the winter and enjoy­
ed an unusually long life; or perhaps the ailment was 
dengue fever rather than yellow fever. Whatever the expla­
nation for the New Iberia case, the state was otherwise 
free of the disease in 1906, and since the unprecedented 
campaign of 1905 it has continued to enjoy a freedom from 
yellow fever which the nineteenth-century man would never 
have believed possible. The last yellow fever epidemic in 
the Crescent City, in 1905, was also the last yellow fever 
epidemic within the United States. Actually, there was no 
excuse except skepticism, official neglect, and public 
apathy for the outbreak of yellow fever in New Orleans and 
elsewhere in 1905. Finally, under the lash of the Saffron 
Scourge, masses of persons aroused themselves from the
62&eport of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1906-1907, 21, 26-27.
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normal state of apathetic resignation to fight and to con­
quer the pestilence and furthermore to take the necessary 
precautions to avoid its future recurrence.
The necessary precautions included adequate quaran­
tine based on the principle of mosquito transmission, to­
gether with the attempt to eliminate the yellow fever 
mosquito in Louisiana and elsewhere. In spite of the pro­
tests of adamant states-righters, federal control of mari­
time quarantine came on the heels of the 1905 outbreak.
As for the Aedes aegypti, although controlled to a high 
degree, the pest is still with us. Yellow fever has been 
banished from the country and is kept in permanent exile 
through the vigilance of federal quarantine authorities 
and the careful supervision of travel to and from yellow 
fever areas which still exist in Latin America and Africa. 
Such public health protection in this day and age is taken 
for granted; people for the most part are blissfully un­
aware of the dangers lurking beyond the confines of pro­
tective barriers. As common through much of the nineteenth 
century as "cancer” is now, as much talked about, feared, 
and even less well understood, yellow fever today is about 
as unfamiliar to the man on the street as bubonic plague.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
279
YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA, 1905
Cases Deaths
Orleans Parish 3,402 452
All other parishes 5,919 536
Totals in Louisiana 9,321 988
TWENTY-EIGHT PARISHES AFFECTED:
Acadia
Avoyelles
Ascension
Assumption
Calcasieu
Caddo
East Baton Rouge
East Carroll
Iberia
Iberville
Jefferson
Lafourche
Lafayette
Madison
Natchitoches
Orleans
Plaquemines
Rapides
St. Charles
S t. John
St. Bernard
St. James
S t. Tammany
St. Mary
Terrebonne
Tangipahoa
Tensas
Vernon
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CHAPTER VII
THEORY AND CONTROVERSY: NATURE, CAUSATION, AND
TRANSMISSION OF YELLOW FEVER
For well over a century the mystery surrounding 
yellow fever's nature, causation, and transmission plagued 
every medical philosopher who attempted to formulate an 
explanation. The sudden appearance of the epidemic 
disease in a community, its irregular spread, revolting 
symptoms, and fatal effects created a terrifying situation 
which demanded explanation. Yet in terms of the epidemio­
logical concepts available in the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries, an adequate interpretation proved impos­
sible. Transmitted by the yet-unsuspected mosquito, yellow 
fever until after 1900 exhibited an enigmatic quality 
always just beyond the grasp of the theorists.
Nevertheless, theorists abounded, and in the dark 
arena of yellow fever philosophy each contender chose his 
weapons and dogmatically took up the combat with those 
defending opposite viewpoints. Once an individual had
280
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committed himself to a position, it became rather like an 
extension of his personality, and he felt compelled to 
defend it even as his honor. Sometimes the intense per­
sonal antipathy resulting from a controversy actually led 
one physician to invite another to a meeting on the duel­
ing field. On one occasion, two doctors in Jamaica 
terminated their debate on the nature of yellow fever with 
a duel in which both men were killed.1 Most of the 
battles, however, were waged on the field of the printed 
page, by means of scathing book reviews and rejoinders, 
journal articles contradicting other journal articles, and 
letters to editors. The quantity of literature produced on 
the subject of yellow fever therefore increased to a 
tremendous volume. Of all the medical questions of the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, probably none other 
provoked a greater consumption of ink and paper.
Debated, modified, and amplified into countless 
variations by the determined yellow fever philosophers, 
epidemiological concepts in the late eighteenth and through 
much of the nineteenth century were scarcely different from
^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., Ill (September, 1846),
165.
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those which had been employed ever since the cime of 
Hippocrates. For centuries three fundamental ideas had 
been used to explain disease; epidemic constitution of the 
atmosphere, local miasmatic influences, and contagion.
Some diseases were obviously communicable through direct 
contact or association and hence recognized as contagious. 
Other diseases were much more difficult to explain before 
the knowledge of germs, human and animal carriers, and 
insect vectors became available in the latter nineteenth 
century. Those maladies requiring unknown intermediary 
influences mysteriously seemed to travel from person to 
person and place to place. Laymen through the ages tend­
ed to support the doctrine of contagion as a primary force 
in the spread of almost all diseases, while physicians 
frequently opposed that view. Medical men emphasized 
atmospheric and local conditions to explain the causation 
and transmission of those epidemic diseases which seemed 
to depend on something other than direct contact.%
Defending the position of pre-modern medical think­
ers, a twentieth-century medical historian has contended 
that ”We cannot dismiss the resistance of the medical
^Winslow, Conquest of Epidemic Disease, 181-82.
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profession to the doctrine of contagion as merely an evi­
dence of hidebound conservatism. There were sound reasons 
for this attitude." The layman intuited the general out­
line of contagion in the progression of any epidemic dis­
ease as he observed its spread from one locality to 
another. The medical man, however, who knew the details 
and the erratic course of certain diseases understood that 
the theory of contagion as then formulated could not 
account for all the facts, Contagion was conceived by 
medical philosophers to be the direct transmission of some 
"chemical or physical influence" from a diseased person 
to the next victim by means of personal contact, or breath­
ing the infected air around the patient, or contact with 
materials infected by the patient. Some diseases clearly 
exhibited this tendency to spread on direct contact. But 
the medical philosopher also knew that all diseases did 
not operate in this manner. Cases frequently occurred 
without direct exposure to prior cases; furthermore, 
direct exposure to a patient often failed to produce the 
disease in the person exposed. Hence, the facts relating 
to the origin and spread of many epidemic diseases simply 
could not be explained by the narrow concept of direct 
transmission in the days before the role of living
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microorganisms, carriers, and insect vectors was under­
stood.^
Those widespread diseases which could not be account­
ed for by the theory of contagion could seemingly be more 
adequately explained by two other abstract but plausible 
concepts. These concepts as formulated in the second cen­
tury A.D, by Galen, a Graeco-Roman physician, dominated 
medical thinking until the validation of the germ theory 
by Louis Pasteur and others in the latter nineteenth cen­
tury. Although recognizing certain maladies as communi­
cable by direct contact (contagion), Galen explained 
widespread epidemics in terms of local miasms and the con­
dition of the atmosphere, both rather nebulous conceptions. 
Miasms included all those pestilential emanations supposed­
ly arising from decaying animal and vegetable materials, 
swamps, stagnant water, and filthy living conditions in 
general. Presumably, such noxious effluvia polluted the 
air and when inhaled or otherwise absorbed into the system 
resulted in disease. Epidemic constitution of the atmos­
phere is a somewhat broader concept and even more elusive.
It refers to an atmospheric condition produced in part by
3lbid.
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miasms, but also influenced by the weather, that is, by 
excessive heat and dampness. Sometimes even astronomical 
influences such as comets and meteors were believed to 
play a role in creating an appropriate atmospheric medium 
for the widespread occurrence of a particular disease.^
In addition to local disease-bearing effluvia and 
an atmosphere influenced by climatic and other forces, 
another factor had to be included in Galen's scheme: indi­
vidual predisposing causes, which were necessary to explain 
why the external causes in a given area affected some but 
not all persons. Within a contaminated atmosphere, those 
persons accustomed to an inactive and intemperate exis­
tence and suffering a "general obstruction of the pores" 
would be more prone, said Galen, to inhale and harbor the 
seeds of disease than would the active, temperate, whole­
some individual.5 Through the centuries Galen's epidemio­
logical constructs persisted as physicians applied the 
vague but then plausible explanations to various epidemic 
diseases, modifying the component causes to fit the situa­
tion at hand.
The severe yellow fever attacks along the Atlantic
4lbid., 72-73. 5Ibid., 74.
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coast of North America in the latter eighteenth century, 
and particularly the Great Epidemic of 1793 in Philadel­
phia, occasioned the application of existing epidemiolo­
gical opinions to explain the behavior of the Saffron 
Scourge, In the 1790's two important American epidemio­
logical thinkers, Benjamin Rush and Noah Webster, set 
forth the ideas regarding yellow fever which persisted in 
American medical thought throughout most of the nine­
teenth century. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a Philadelphia 
physician, was one of the most influential medical philoso­
phers of his time, not only in relation to yellow fever 
but to the subject of disease and therapeutics in general. 
And in an age before medical knowledge was far removed 
from other fields of thought, Noah Webster, famed Connecti­
cut journalist and lexicographer, also delved into 
epidemiology and in 1799 published a two-volume History of 
Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases. This work of 
Webster's recently has been evaluated as the best suammry 
of epidemiological thought at the beginning of the nine­
teenth century, as well as one of the best digests of 
earlier opinion on the subject.&
Gibid., 196, 215.
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Both Rush and Webster first toyed with the idea of 
contagion as a possible secondary factor in the spread of 
yellow fever, but both eventually came to deny altogether 
the influence of contagion in that disease. Ultimately 
insisting that yellow fever definitely was not contagious. 
Rush and Webster also denied that the disease was imported 
into the country, and hence opposed quarantine measures. 
Instead they declared yellow fever a product of local 
miasms generated by decaying animal and vegetable matter 
and influenced by heat and moisture. Therefore, they 
favored sanitary measures for the removal of local causes.^
Both men believed in the influence of the epidemic 
constitution of the atmosphere, but Webster emphasized 
this factor more strongly than Rush. Webster treated the 
pestilential condition of the atmosphere as a primary 
force which spread over many parts of the world at one 
time, interacting with epizootics (animal epidemics), 
earthquakes, volcanic action, and comets. While Rush 
noted the presence of mosquitoes in large numbers, the 
abundance of dead cats, and the occurrence of a meteor as 
signs of an essentially unhealthy atmosphere, he gave more
7Ibid., 196-235.
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attention to the Influence of local miasms In the produc­
tion of yellow fever. Furthermore, he believed that Indi­
vidual "predisposing" and "exciting" causes, such as 
fatigue. Intemperance, fear, and grief, supplemented local 
effluvia In the development of yellow fever,®
In the writings of these two men one finds all the 
component elements which would be juggled about Into 
varying combinations by countless nineteenth-century phy­
sicians In the attempt to describe those conditions which 
produced a yellow fever epidemic. Those who accepted 
contagion. Including many more laymen than physicians, 
ordinarily favored quarantine to halt the importation of 
the disease. Those who believed In local and atmospheric 
Influences generally denied contagion and Importation and 
thus opposed quarantine; Instead, they promoted sanitary 
measures designed to eliminate pestilential effluvia 
deriving from filth and decay.
During the decade In which Rush and Webster were 
writing on yellow fever. New Orleans experienced Its first 
great epidemic of that disease. According to Baron Joseph 
X, Pontalba, the people of New Orleans and many of the
8lbld.
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physicians identified the epidemic disease of 1796 with 
the yellow fever of Philadelphia and believed it had been 
brought into New Orleans by the Americans. On the other 
hand, Pontalba himself, as well as Attorney-general Don 
Gabriel Fonvergne, blamed noxious effluvia for contaminat­
ing the atmosphere and creating the pestilence in New 
Orleans.9
As yellow fever continued to appear almost annually 
in New Orleans after 1796, the doctrine of local miasms 
gradually took precedence over the importation theme. 
Travelers in New Orleans and Louisiana in the early 1800's 
invariably commented on the yellow pestilence for which 
New Orleans was rapidly acquiring a notorious reputation. 
Almost without exception, the commentators attributed 
yellow fever to morbific effluvia in the atmosphere, 
deriving from filth and acted upon by the excessive heat 
of the climate. Most of them emphatically denied that the 
disease was personally contagious.10
9pontalba to wife, September 6, 11, 19, 24, 1796, 
loc. cit., 274, 284, 300, 312; Gayarré, History of Louisi­
ana, III, 375; Records of the City Council of New Orleans, 
Book 4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796.
lOprançois Marie Perrin du Lac, Voyage dans les Deux 
Louisianes . . . en 1801, 1802 et 1803 . (Paris, 1805),
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The observations and cmnments of the travelers 
indicate that the theory of local causation was coming to 
predominate over contagion in both the medical and the lay 
mind. Nevertheless, the question was still a debatable 
one throughout the country wherever yellow fever appeared. 
For example, The Medical Repository, published in New York 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
filled its pages with articles, reviews, and notices con­
cerning yellow fever visitations in various American port 
cities. The journal articles dealt with recurring contro­
versial issues involving yellow fever's contagious or non- 
contagious nature; its imported or local origin; its pre­
vention by quarantine or sanitation--all issues which 
would persist for many decades. While some physicians 
advocated the doctrine of contagion, the majority of 
medical writers opposed that view and supported instead 
the influence of miasma
One of the most obscure abstractions advanced in the
trans. as Travels Through the Two Louisianas . . . in 1801, 
1802, & 1803 (London, 1807), 7; Amos Stoddard, Sketches^, 
Historical and Descriptive, of Louisiana (Philadelphia, 
1812), 171; Berquin-Duvallon, Travels, 115,
l^See The Medical Repository (New York), 1797-1809,
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nineteenth century to explain the origin and causation of 
pestilential yellow fever appeared in a pamphlet by an 
unnamed author, reviewed in The Medical Repository in 
1803, Accepting the ancient doctrine of the four basic 
elements which composed all things (earth, air, fire, and 
water), the author added two more elements from his own 
creative imagination, electrical fire and a universal 
agent which he termed '"Mother Th is last named metaphy­
sical entity, "Mother,” was described as "the great agent 
of vegetable and animal life." Ordinarily, "Mother in­
habited the earth's surface, but under certain circumstan­
ces (undefined), it was forced far down into the earth, 
eventually to rise again to the surface of its own power. 
Usually, "Mother" emerged in a pure state, but sometimes 
on the way up to the surface it became polluted by combin­
ing with putrefying elements, particularly in hot weather. 
Under those circumstances "Mother" became "vitiated and 
venomous" and in its transformed condition rose upward 
and Pdefile[d] the earth and the water through which it 
pass[ed]." The reviewer called this theory "an old woman's 
story" and dismissed the work as sheer nonsense.
IZlbid., VI (1803), 417.
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Unquestionably, the "Mother” notion was one of the more 
extreme among the many metaphysical constructions in the 
realm of epidemiology. But it should be noted that the 
concept of epidemic constitution, although widely accepted 
and taken seriously, was no more open to analysis and des­
cription than "Mother," One might almost suspect that the 
pamphlet was conceived as satire on the epidemiology of 
the age but for the numerous other conceptions produced at 
the time which are equally absurd today.
While American medical thought became more and more 
involved in elaborating the patterns of local and atmos­
pheric influences, an English physician, Colin Chisholm, 
published a work in 1809 to correct "the pernicious doc­
trine" so popular among American physicians regarding 
pestilential yellow fever. Arguing strongly against local 
causation by miasmata, heat, moisture, and putrefaction, 
he supported personal contagion and transmission through 
clothes or other fomites. If of local origin, why had 
yellow fever suddenly gone on a rampage in North America 
in the latter eighteenth century? Had the cities become 
filthier overnight? Dr. Chisholm did not think so. As 
evidence in favor of contagion and importation, he cited 
many examples of cases which had occurred after direct
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contact with persons or Incoming vessels. Furthermore, 
Chisholm dismissed the mystical epidemic constitution of 
the atmosphere along with the supposed connection of dis­
ease with eclipses, comets, volcanoes, and earthquakes as 
mere superstitions, coincidental factors but not causal, 
Nevertheless, the "pernicious doctrine" continued 
to find favor among American physicians, particularly in 
New Orleans where the annual appearance of the fever from 
1817 onward provided ample experiential data about which 
to theorize. In the midst of the New Orleans epidemic of 
1817, the Louisiana Courier published an article entitled 
"The Prevailing Fever" signed by "Philanthropy." Although 
a citizen with "no pretentions to medical knowledge" 
except that obtained from practical observation, the writer 
offered his conclusions to the public for consideration.
His observations had convinced him that the fever resulted 
from local causes and was not contagious at all. Common to
13See Colin Chisholm, A Letter to John Haygarth 
. . . from Colin Chisholm . , . author of An Essay on the 
Pestilential Fever ; Exhibiting Farther Evidence of the 
Infectious Nature of This Fatal Distemper in Granada, 
during 1793, 4, 2» and 6, and in the United States of 
America, from 1793 to 1803 : in order to Correct the Per­
nicious Doctrine Promulgated by Dr. Edward Miller, and 
other American Physicians . . , (London, 1809).
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the south Atlantic and the southwest states, the disease 
varied in malignancy not only because of variations in 
soil and climate from place to place and time to time, but 
also because of the predisposing influences within those 
persons residing in the area of contamination. In spite 
of the different degrees of virulence, he believed this 
"inflammatory bilious fever," wherever it occurred, was 
caused by "miasma1 exhalations produced by the ardent rays 
of a vertical sun, striking against the earth’s surface, 
and operating on putrescent vegetable matter.
Also in 1817 in a similar vein, Dr. Jabez Heustis, 
practitioner in New Orleans, summarized his views of 
yellow fever, delineating three types of causes. The 
remote cause consisted of "marsh miasmata"; the predispos­
ing cause, the constitution of an individual not accustomed 
to the climate; the exciting cause, a state of intoxication 
or exposure, perhaps to excessive heat or rain. Sometimes 
miasmata alone might be potent enough to produce a serious 
attack, he believed, even without the other influences. A 
confirmed non-contagionist, Heustis claimed he had never 
seen a case of yellow fever transmitted from one individual
14Louisiana Courier, September 10, 1817,
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to another.
Drs, Gros and Gerardin in reporting to W  Société 
Médicale on the New Orleans epidemic of 1817 concluded that 
the fever had been caused by the "peculiar topography'* of 
New Orleans, the abundant rains and excessive heat of the 
summer, and the influx of numerous strangers to the city. 
The disease had not been contagious, they declared, but 
under certain circumstances they believed it might assume 
the quality of contagion. The committee appointed by La 
Société Médicale to investigate the yellow fever epidemic 
of 1819 reached similar conclusions. They attributed the 
fever of that year to the burning heat of July, August, 
and September, frequent rains, and stagnant water in the 
swamps. The committee described the New Orleans fever of 
1819 as neither contagious nor imported, but rather in­
digenous, that is, of spontaneous origin,
In 1820 when the Physico-Medical Society of New
15Jabez W, Heustis, Physical Observations and Medi­
cal Tracts and Researches, on the Topography and Diseases 
of Louisiana (New York, 1817), 113-14,
Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cxlii.
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Orleans, the organization of American physicians, appoint­
ed a committee to investigate the yellow fever outbreak of 
that year, the committee decided to avoid the controversy 
over contagion and non-contagion and simply noted in their 
report that the earliest and latest cases had appeared on 
board ships at the wharves. Further, they suggested that 
the filthy condition of the vessels together with the ac­
cumulated filth of the city bore some relationship to
causation.17
In addition to the reports of medical societies, 
the writings of physicians in New Orleans reflect the in­
creasingly firm medical opinion in favor of local causation. 
Dr. Jean Louis Chabert, physician from France who practiced 
medicine for a time in New Orleans, published a work on 
yellow fever in 1821 in which he set forth his opinion that 
the fever was not caused by a specific contagion trans­
mitted from person to person, but instead by deleterious 
miasms intensified by heat and humidity.1® Another French
l^Report of the Committee of the Physico-Medical 
Society of New Orleans, on the Epidemic of 1820 (New Orleans. 
1821), 5.
18Jean Louis Chabert, Reflexions Médicales sur la 
Maladie Spasmodico-Lipyrienne des Pay Chauds Vulgairement 
Appeleé Fiivre Jaune (Nouvelie-Orleans, 1821), iii.
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physician, Dr. Pierre F. Thomas, on observing yellow fever 
in New Orleans in 1822, also attributed the pestilence to 
"les miasmes délétères" emanating from the putrefaction of 
stagnant waters and vegetable and animal matter. He saw no 
need to demonstrate the proposition of non-contagion, a 
proposition almost universally accepted by physicians who 
had observed several epidemics. As far as he was concerned, 
there was no room for argument; that yellow fever was not 
contagious seemed a clear truth.
The non-contagious nature of yellow fever might 
have been clear to Dr. Thomas, and by this time to the 
majority of the medical profession as well, but it was by 
no means clear to all observers of yellow fever epidemics 
in New Orleans, In his address to the Louisiana legis­
lature in January of 1818, Governor Jacques Villeré, a 
determined advocate of contagion and quarantine, urged the 
passage of laws to establish safeguards against the pesti­
lence. The Governor was not alone in his contagionist 
views; the Louisiana legislature in March of 1818 provided 
for the establishment of a quarantine station on the Missis­
sippi River and a Board of Health to administer the
19Thomas, Essai sur la Fièvre Jaune d'Amérique, v,
65.
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regulations. The appearance of yellow fever in the summer 
of 1818 seemed to discredit the efficacy of quarantine and 
with it the doctrine of contagion, and in March of 1819 
the quarantine act of 1818 was repealed.^0
In the summer and autumn of 1819 New Orleans experi­
enced another dreadful visitation of yellow fever, even 
worse than the epidemic of 1817. Again in 1820 the 
scourge carried off a considerable number of victims. In 
November of 1820 Governor Villeré, still arguing the cause 
for contagion, urged the legislature to pass new quarantine 
laws. Realizing that the medical profession of New 
Orleans generally subscribed to the opinion that yellow 
fever was not contagious, the Governor still contended
that the disease was both imported and contagious and not
21an indigenous product.
In his inaugural méssage in December of 1820,
Villeré's successor. Governor Thomas Bolling Robertson, 
also recommended the passage of quarantine legislation 
against yellow fever. Finally, in February of 1821 the
20Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt, 1,
cxliv.
^^Ibid., cxliv-cxlvi.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
299
Louisiana legislature again passed an act establishing 
quarantine on the Mississippi River and creating a Board 
of Health for New Orleans. That summer and autumn passed 
with only a few cases of fever and the quarantinists 
gained a point; but the following August, 1822, witnessed 
the outbreak of the most devastating epidemic up to that 
time, and the local causationists were quick to call 
attention to the futility of quarantine against a disease 
so obviously indigenous. After the epidemic of 1822, 
Governor Robertson was ready to admit that the efforts at 
legislating against the fever had been in vain. "It is an 
idle waste of time for me to inquire into the causes, 
origin and nature of this dreadful malady," declared the 
Governor. "The State resorted to quarantine, under the 
expectation that it would add to the chances of escape 
from this dreadful visitation. If this hope be fallacious, 
if no good effect has been produced . . , then should it 
be abandoned, and our commerce relieved from the expense 
and inconvenience which it occasions
In spite of the failure to prevent an epidemic in 
1822, the Board of Health expressed continued faith in the
22%bid., cxlvi-cxlviii.
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doctrine of contagion and the potential value of quaran­
tine, but the Board's arguments were not very convincing.
On January 23, 1823, a large meeting of New Orleans citizens 
resolved that the quarantine regulations, proved useless by 
the late epidemic, were not only ineffective but also 
"oppressive and injurious to the commerce of this city." 
Those citizens addressed a memorial to the legislature re­
questing that the act of 1821 be annulled. When the House 
Committee on Quarantine Laws reported in 1823, it admitted 
that in spite of "the strictest compliance" the measures 
had thus far proved ineffective against yellow fever. 
Nevertheless, the committee recommended that quarantine be 
continued in force "because it had not been tried suffi­
ciently long, and because other States had similar regula­
tions," Hence, for two more years Louisiana lawmakers 
took no action on the matter. The year 1823 was relatively 
healthy; but in 1824, although the fever did not rage on a 
grand scale, a sufficient number of yellow fever cases and 
deaths occurred to undermine still further the contagion- 
ist-quarantine position and give weight to the arguments 
of the local causationists. Ultimately, in February of 
1825 the Louisiana Legislature abolished its second experi­
ment with quarantine barriers, and not until 1855 did the
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State of Louisiana again provide for such restrictions,^^ 
For about three decades then the local causationists were 
in the ascendency. The pro-contagion and quarantinist 
viewpoint remained in abeyance until the widespread epi­
demics of the 1850's once more provided sufficient evi­
dence to shake the foundations of the miasmatic position.
Although the majority of the medical profession 
adhered to the theory of local causation, there was never 
a time when contagion was completely without supporters. 
The severe epidemics of the 1840's stimulated a renewed 
clash of opinion as heretical contagionists sought to dis­
sent from the prevailing medical doctrine. The establish­
ment in 1844 of the first medical journal in Louisiana and 
the South, the New Orleans Medical Journal, undoubtedly 
stimulated the philosophical jousting by providing a ready 
medium of expression for the contenders. The first two 
issues of the journal contained at least six or seven 
lengthy articles on yellow fever. In the second issue the 
editor expressed the hope that "we shall not fatigue our 
readers with the subject of Yellow Fever; [but] it is the 
great disease of our City and region, and in as much as
23ibid., cxlviii-cxlix.
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very discordant opinions in relation to it seem to prevail, 
we think it deserves a patient, and thorough investiga­
tion,”^^
In the July, 1844, issue of the New Orleans Medical 
Journal Dr. P. H, Lewis of Mobile reviewed two papers which 
had been read before the Mobile Medical Society in June, 
both advocating the contagious nature and foreign origin 
of yellow fever. The ideas set forth in the two works 
indicate the persistent strength of contagionism; the tone 
of Dr. Lewis's reviews and the rejoinder to one of those 
reviews is representative of the extremely personal nature 
of the nineteenth-century controversies and goes far in 
explaining how bitter antagonisms were developed.
In one of the papers, "Observations on the Epidemic 
Yellow Fever, of the South West," Dr. J, W. Monette of 
Washington, Mississippi, supported the view of yellow 
fever's contagious nature. Furthermore, he maintained that 
the disease was indigenous to the West Indies, but not to 
New Orleans nor to Mobile, where it only occurred when 
imported. According to Dr. Monette, the infection was 
transported from place to place in certain porous goods,
Z^New Orleans Medical Journal, I (July, 1844), 94.
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blankets, and feather beds, and was rendered more virulent 
by the heated atmosphere within the holds of vessels which 
transported those goods.^5
Point by point. Dr. Lewis disagreed with Monette, 
frequently destroying his position by reductlo ad absurdum, 
"As for the importation of porous goods and blankets," 
stated Lewis, "It Is a thing very improbable. We are con­
stantly importing sugar, coffee, rum, and molasses from 
the West-Indles, but I never heard that those Islands ex­
ported manufactured goods to the U.S." Continuing In this 
vein, he jibed: "The feather bed theory Is particularly
objectionable. Who ever heard of a feather bed being 
brought from the West-Indles In the warm season. If such 
a thing has ever occurred, I would ask If It Is possible 
any one could have slept upon It In July or August?" 
Ridiculing Monette still further, Lewis objected to his 
"anxiety to account for every thing. , . . The general 
outlines [of Monette's paper] would have done very well, 
but Its particularity had destroyed the force of the whole 
Instrument." Undoubtedly, If the case had been otherwise, 
Dr. Lewis would have criticized Its generality since he
25lbld., 3 1 ,  3 5 .
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basically disagreed with all of Dr. Monette*s premises.
In short, Lewis denied the doctrine of contagion altogether 
and cited many instances of close contact with fever 
patients which failed to produce new cases of the d i s e a s e .
Dr. Lewis also reviewed "Sketches from the History 
of Yellow Fever, Showing its Origin, together with Facts 
and Circumstances, disproving its Domestic Origin, and 
demonstrating its Transmissibility," by Dr. W. M. Carpen­
ter, professor in the Medical College of Louisiana in New 
Orleans. First of all, Lewis expressed his regrets that 
Dr. Carpenter should have been the author of such a work. 
Having looked forward to Carpenter's study, he was disap­
pointed to find that "it only contains a collection of 
questionable facts and errors, which have for many years, 
been considered by the ablest Reviews of the world, as 
not worthy of notice." Noting the basic similarity of 
the views advanced by Carpenter and Monette, Lewis con­
sidered both papers equally unacceptable. Carpenter, how­
ever, believed yellow fever to have been imported 
originally to the West Indies from Africa (a thesis 
generally accepted today), while Monette maintained that
26ibid., 31-41.
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the disease was indigenous to the West Indies. Except for 
this difference the papers followed a similar line of 
thought.27
The arrogant Dr. Lewis of Mobile summed up his dis­
dainful opinion of the two works under review with these 
remarks: "It is to be regretted that the labour and
talent employed on these works should have been so mis­
directed. Systems, doctrines and theories when embraced 
with zeal, imperceptibly bias and derange the judgment." 
Adding the final blow, he declared, "If we desire to enter 
the boundless field . . .  with a spirit of true philosophy, 
anxious to sift truth from the immense and ill digested 
mass of so called medical literature that encumbers our 
path, we must lay all these aéide. Then, and not till
no
then, will the truth be evolved."
Had Dr. Lewis not been a considerable distance from 
New Orleans and Washington, Mississippi, when the July 
issue of the medical journal came off the press, he might 
have had two challenges to deal with. Under the circum­
stances, however. Carpenter apparently ignored the denunci­
ation and Monette resorted to the printed page in rejoinder
27ibid., 42-43. ^Sxbid., 44.
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to Dr, Lewis, In the October issue of the New Orleans 
Medical Journal Dr, Monette acknowledged his respect for 
the Mobile Medical Society and all its members and their 
investigations of yellow fever, but stated that he failed 
to see "that this [Lewis's] review has thrown much light 
upon the difficulties , , . nor can I believe that the 
style of the article, or its mode of investigation, will 
ever become a model for the liberal and enlightened of 
the medical profession," He felt that "no display of wit 
or of ridicule itself" could ever substitute for "enlight­
ened research, or ingenuous argument, in confuting our 
errors, or in illuminating the path of truth." Noting 
that the subject of yellow fever, in spite of all pre­
vious investigation, was still shrouded in uncertainty.
Dr. Monette saw no other path to the truth except through 
observation, without prejudice or preconceptions, but with 
a liberal and open spirit of inquiry. Furthermore, he pro­
ceeded to correct Lewis's misinterpretations of his paper, 
claiming that he had not advocated the "unconditional con­
tagious nature of yellow fever" and denying other extreme 
views attributed to him by Dr. Lewis.
29ibid., I (October, 1844), 178-79,
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In retaliation for the harsh treatment of his work, 
Monette suggested that Lewis failed to comprehend the tr.iin 
of his argument. Otherwise, "the critic, would not deem 
it so strange, that I should have attempted to explain, or 
illustrate ^  many particulars ; and he might see the im­
propriety of hastily making general conclusions from 
isolated facts; a mode of reasoning so opposite to that 
laid down by the immortal Bacon." In conclusion, the 
Mississippi doctor rested his case with the medical profes­
sion at large, "believing that the intelligent and dis­
criminating will award to me such judgment as is right and 
proper."30 Such caustic controversy, illustrated so well 
by the Lewis-Monette encounter, was common throughout the 
nineteenth century. Highly articulate medical thinkers 
wielded their pens in venomous combat with each other, 
fighting within a rationalistic framework over fragmentary 
abstractions and partial truths, and, in the process, 
needlessly creating bitter enemies.
Even if one accepted the orthodox miasmatic theory, 
there were countless ways to arrange the various possible 
factors into different combinations, thereby multiplying
30lbid., 179-80.
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the theories and opening the way to further disagreement.
In 1843 Dr. P. A, Lambert read an essay on yellow fever in 
French before the Louisiana Medico-Chirurgical Society in 
which he set forth a slightly different formulation of the 
miasmatic view. In May, June, and July, he declared, under 
the influence of the burning sun, the stagnant waters 
around New Orleans evaporated, and in ascending, the parti­
cles saturated the air and later fell as rain. Thus the 
miasms were transported into higher regions of the atmos­
phere in the acquaeous vapor and later in descending as 
rain, scattered disease over many regions. As further 
evidence, he contended that the coming of frost terminated 
a yellow fever epidemic by condensing the deadly particles. 
"It is impossible," he admitted, "in the present state of 
science, to determine the nature of these miasms, and to 
say what are the material causes and conditions of their 
development." Their existence was known only by their 
effects, he affirmed; otherwise, nothing was clear. Varia­
tions in the quantity of miasms probably accounted for the 
different degrees of yellow fever's virulence. Further­
more, Dr. Lambert believed that miasms were clearly
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influenced by meteorological conditions.
In addition to those miasms arising from putre­
faction in stagnant water, he postulated as additional 
miasm expelled from the system of the yellow fever patient 
in his excretions and his breath. "This being premised," 
said Lambert, "we can understand how Yellow Fever may be 
communicated to unacclimated persons, by means of the 
miasm which is exhaled from a large number of persons, con­
gregated in small and badly ventilated apartments." With 
few exceptions, he believed the infection was acquired 
through "pulmonary a b s o r p t i o n . H e n c e ,  Dr. Lambert 
made room for a kind of "contingent contagion" within the 
framework of the miasmatic explanation.
In March of 1847 in the New Orleans Medical and 
Surgical Journal, Dr, John Harrison, professor of physiology 
and pathology at the Medical College of Louisiana, publish­
ed his "Speculations on the Cause of Yellow Fever," advo­
cating his own particular formulation of local causation.
In a lengthy demonstration he arrived at this conclusion: 
Under certain meteorological conditions, from the accumula­
ted filth of large cities (mainly the animal matter of
31lbid., I (July, 1844), 4-5. 32lbid., 13.
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urine and feces), a "poison” is generated, "which, either 
in the form of a volatile oil, or other organic matter, 
held in solution by ammonia, floats in the atmosphere; is 
inhaled during respiratory movements ; is taken into the 
circulation and poisons the system.” For remedial measures, 
he suggested the removal of filth from streets, gutters, 
private yards and lots, the emptying of privies at least 
once every three months, the paving of streets, and the con­
struction of an effective system of drainage and water-
Q O
works.
Dr. Harrison performed extremely well the task that 
most medical writers attempted, that is, the exercise of 
Aristotelian logic in the delineation of his argument.
Like some latter-day scholastic, he lined up the possible 
alternatives to the question at issue and posed objections 
which destroyed each proposition in turn except one. Then 
he proposed the possible objections to that proposition 
and answered them one by one, thereby disposing of the 
objections and leaving the victorious principle undisturbed 
and supposedly established as sound doctrine. In the
33n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., Ill (March, 1847), 580,
591-92.
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process he cited many cases as evidence and quoted liberal­
ly from "authorities." Unfortunately, such dabbling in 
metaphysics failed to solve the concrete problem of yellow 
fever.
When the severe epidemic of 1847 stimulated still 
further speculating and writing on yellow fever, the 
editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal com­
mented that it might seem useless to write anything more on 
the subject; "We really believe that the archives of the 
Profession already contain every thing that need be said 
on the subject; and yet the world is but little wiser in 
regard to it than it was half a century ago," All the 
questions regarding the cause, nature, transmission, and 
treatment of the disease remained undecided, and no real 
agreement existed on any aspect of the subject. The 
editor observed that "Medical are very much like religious 
controversies: in either case, when men have formed and
expressed opinions, they seem to shut their eyes against 
all farther light, and hold on to them with like perti­
nacity," Then why should anything further be written on a 
subject already so fully discussed? Not with the vain idea 
of changing those who had already formed opinions, the 
editor asserted. Nevertheless, he felt it necessary to
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pass along all observations to those who would come later 
with the hope that someday someone might be able to 
analyze the information, "winnow the grain from the chaff, 
and establish the truth by facts and logic," The late 
epidemic of 1847 had provided many interesting facts, 
which, said the editor, "would give rise to deductions 
which would probably vary according to the diversity of 
intellect by which they were e x a m i n e d , I n  dealing with 
so many unknown variables, every man was his own yellow 
fever philosopher. Such relativism in history, religion, 
or philosophy may be unavoidable, and although perplexing, 
its concomitant damages are confined largely to the intel­
lectual sphere; in medicine, it is more a matter of life 
and death. Yet the clues which would dissipate the cloud 
of relativism surrounding yellow fever long remained hidden 
from the human intellect.
In 1849 the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 
described one venture into the field of quasi-scientific 
activity which attempted to find a substitute for the vague 
action of malaria (polluted air) in the production of fever 
epidemics. Sir James Murray of Edinburgh, a distinguished
34ibid.. IV (January, 1848), 537, 540.
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physician and ’’elegant scholar,” had recently advanced a 
theory on the electrical cause of epidemic disease which 
excited some interest in America. In attempting to re­
place miasmata with electricity, however, the Scottish 
doctor simply exchanged one intangible for another. Des­
cribing the widespread influence of the new "mysterious 
agent,” he affirmed: "It is able to separate and again
unite the elements of water; to tear metals from their 
oxides; to shake the clouds in thunder ; and to operate in 
developing the evolutions of crystals.” But it possessed 
still further powers: ”In the form of currents, it con­
torts the muscles of lifeless animals; and it flies, in 
its condensed form, instantaneously, through a circuit of 
many persons, producing a manifest shock in them all.” 
Admitting that he was only hypothesizing a connection 
between electricity in the atmosphere and pestilential 
fevers, Sir James Murray promised to follow up his experi­
ments with further research. The editor of the New Orleans 
medical journal suggested that the idea was worthy of 
further investigation.^5
Apparently, it would take more than electricity to
35lbid., V (May, 1849), 779.
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shake the faith of Southern medical men in the wondrous 
powers of pestilential miasmata. In an article published 
in the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal in 1852,
Dr, J. C. Massie of Houston, Texas, set forth his observa­
tions and deductions regarding the "circumstances which 
conspire . , . to produce a pestilence,” Among the com­
ponent factors, he listed irregular weather and local 
impurities, including putrefying animal matter, marsh ef­
fluvia, accumulations of human secretions and excretions, 
and vegetable matter decaying in stagnant water. Although 
an anti-contagionist, Massie admitted that a filthy 
vessel might convey a disease from place to place and that 
the infection might in a filthy area "find an affinity in 
the atmosphere" and "act as a spark to ignite the whole 
material," He considered it a great error, however, to 
blame contagion for the work of effluvia from accumulated 
filth and putrefaction. Hence, Dr. Massie was one of the 
medical thinkers who had decided that yellow fever, although 
non-contagious, might be carried from place to place, that 
the characteristics of contagion and transmissibility need 
not be inseparable. Regarding contagion itself, he said,
"I hold that it is not a necessary incident to any disease 
of this [epidemic] class," Further, he denounced that
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doctrine as a product of the "Romish Church." According 
to Dr. Massie, in 1545 when Pope Paul III wanted to remove 
the Council of Trent to Bologna, he seized upon the pre­
vailing epidemic at Trent as a means to his own ends, pro­
claimed the disease contagious, and persuaded some phy­
sicians to support this view. Thus by authority of the 
Church, said Massie, the belief in contagion had been 
established and sustained through the ages. Even the 
traditional forty-day period of quarantine, he supposed, 
had been designed to correspond with the forty days of 
Lent, At least nine-tenths of the medical profession, he 
conjectured, would agree with him in saying that scientific 
investigation had failed to lend support to the doctrine 
of contagion in epidemic fevers.
If not nine-tenths, at least a preponderant majority 
of the medical profession would have agreed with Massie in 
1852 on the non-contagious nature of yellow fever. But 
the Great Epidemic of 1853 would attract a number of sup­
porters to the contagionist camp, for the extraordinary 
malignancy and widespread extent of that epidemic provoked 
a new outburst of speculation. Although some physicians
36ibid., IX (July, 1852), 35-40.
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were converted to contagionism by the experience of 1853, 
many others found even more evidence to bolster their 
faith in miasmata. Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner of New 
Orleans, for years a staunch exponent of local causation, 
fell back as usual on the traditional combination of filth 
and the epidemic constitution of the atmosphere to explain 
the disaster of 1853. By itself, putrescent effluvia 
could not be the "sole cause" of epidemic yellow fever, he 
maintained, or New Orleans would suffer an epidemic every 
single year. Therefore, a combinative action of miasma 
and a "peculiar constitution of the atmosphere" was re­
quired to produce the pestilence. To account for the 
spread of the fever in 1853 to many places never touched 
before, Fenner believed the "epidemic constitution" cover­
ed a more extensive region than ever before. Within the 
boundaries of this peculiar atmospheric condition, wher­
ever local causes were also present the two influences 
combined to generate the disease. Fenner did not say that 
yellow fever was never communicated from one person to 
another ; he admitted that sometimes the disease might 
exhibit the quality of contagion. Although he himself had 
never seen a case caused by contagion, reliable testimony 
indicated that such cases had occurred. The majority of
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the medical profession agreed that yellow fever seldom, if 
ever, spread by infected ships, goods, or persons. There­
fore, if the disease were so rarely communicated by con­
tact or association, independent of other influences, such 
communication might be considered the exception to the 
rule. Thus Dr. Fenner dismissed the doctrine of contagion 
in yellow fever.^7
At the close of the epidemic of 1853 a sanitary 
commission was created by the city government to investi­
gate the facts of the late siege. In his portion of the 
final report, Dr. Edward H. Barton, chairman of the com­
mission, concluded that yellow fever was not contagious 
and that the disease was only communicable within a foul 
atmosphere; that is, the disease could be propagated by 
an individual or a vessel only in an atmosphere favorable 
to its spread. Sporadic cases of fever might be produced 
by miasms from filth, but the meteorological element, or 
the unusual constitution of the atmosphere, also had to be 
present, he asserted, for the production of a full scale 
epidemic. Like Dr. Fenner, Barton believed that the 
conjunctive action of both influences, local and atmospheric.
37penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 72-75.
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was required for the development of an epidemic. Heat and 
moisture constituted the two most important elements in 
the climatic influence; malaria or miasmata included all 
impurities of the air resulting from filth and decomposi­
tion, such as street and kitchen offal and the refuse of 
stables, vacheries, soap and tallow factories, privies, 
cemeteries, swamps, hospitals, and crowded tenements. 
Whatever factors contaminated air, food, and water. Barton 
proposed to list among the local or terrene causes.38
Further, to explain the spread of yellow fever over 
a vast portion of the South in 1853, Dr. Barton postulated 
that some "vast influences" or "apparent irregularity" had 
developed within the ordinary state of the atmosphere "that 
was at war with its being." He described the epidemic con­
stitution as a combination of terrene and meteorological 
constituents arranged in some manner different from the 
normal condition. "We have no proof of anything specific," 
he said, "beyond this combination, and this is two-fold, 
the meteorological part probably forming the predisponent 
i« innocuous without the other . . . the second is the
38Barton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever, k, 
XV, 70, 134.
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local circumstances and Influence--the tx^e localising or
fixing power."39
The "false fact" of contagion had arisen. Barton 
declared, when a case of fever transported into an impure 
atmosphere was followed by other cases; but within a pure 
atmosphere other cases would not have developed. The 
defining characteristic of true contagion, he maintained, 
was its independence of climate, season, place, or atmos­
phere— its action under all circumstances. He considered 
the concept of contingent contagion a "medical misnomer." 
To say that yellow fever might become infectious under 
certain contingencies was to say only that it might be 
propagated in an impure atmosphere by the Impure air 
introduced by persons, ships, clothing, or otherwise. 
Independent circumstances then accounted for the "seem­
ingly contagious quality.
Finally, Dr. Barton felt that his facts and logic 
had demonstrated four postulates as clear truths: (1)
that a close combination of meteorological and terrene 
conditions was absolutely necessary to the origin and 
transmission of yellow fever, (2) that all the terrene
3 9 i b i d . ,  4 9 - 5 1 .  ^ O l b i d . ,  5 2 ,  6 1 - 6 2 .
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conditions might be removed by human effort, thereby (3) 
rendering the atmospheric element innocuous, and (4) that 
the "irrestibie corollary” followed "that yellow fever is 
an evil, remediable and extinguishable by human agency.” 
He hoped that a great sanitary reform movement might be 
instituted throughout the South. The idea that man could 
not alter the course of epidemic disease was positively 
un-American, he announced, and entirely out of step with 
the progressive spirit of the age. But he was convinced 
that sanitary measures to eliminate the local terrene 
influences would banish once and for all the scourge of 
epidemic yellow fever,
Regardless of what Fenner, Barton, and many others 
might have thought about the causative powers of filth, 
one New Orleans physician during the epidemic of 1853 
advanced a startling theory regarding the influence of 
filth. Dr. J, S. McFarlane, practitioner in New Orleans 
for some thirty years, addressed a letter to Mayor A, D. 
Crossman, which was published in the New Orleans Daily 
Delta on July 28, 1853. Observing that many physicians 
considered filth a factor in the production of yellow
41lbid., 5-8.
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fever, he stated, "That so far from believing that the 
filth, offal and impurities around and about us have any­
thing to do with the formation of what physicians desig­
nate an epidemic constitution of the atmosphere, I believe 
that these very impurities , . . to a certain extent • « • 
are calculated to retard its formation.
This theory, like every other, found some support­
ers, but for the most part McFarlane was much criticized 
for his heretical doctrine by the newspapers and many of 
his colleagues. In a tirade denouncing Dr. McFarlane*s 
extraordinary notion, the editor of the New Orleans 
Crescent sarcastically remarked that if filth were a pro­
tective influence. New Orleans was undoubtedly the Wealth­
iest city in the world. On another occasion, that editor 
suggested that a public laboratory be established to 
manufacture all sorts of nauseating fumes and that the 
citizenry be supplied with nose-bags containing these 
noxious vapors so highly praised by Dr. M c F a r l a n e . ^3
To defend himself against the bitter denunciations 
of his fellow physicians, McFarlane attempted to make his
4%De Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 599-600, 
43New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 2, 8, 1853.
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theory more explicit and intelligible in an article in De 
Bow*8 Review in May of 1854. In short, he believed that 
the pestilential atmosphere conducive to the production 
of intermittent, remittent, swamp, and congestive fevers 
served as a counteracting force to the development of a 
yellow fever atmosphere. As evidence, he pointed out that 
portions of the swamps behind New Orleans, into which the 
filth of the city drained, had been cleared of trees, 
partly drained, and bared to the burning heat of the sun 
during several years preceding 1853. In those years, the 
fumes emanating from filth exposed to the sun produced 
various forms of fever, but almost no yellow fever had 
occurred. In the summer of 1853, frequent rains and the 
interruption of the draining machines had left the filthy 
swamp covered with water which prevented the exhalations. 
Then intermittent and remittent fevers disappeared, and 
"yellow fever established his dread empire over our 
devoted city." Dr. McFarlane asked, "what extravagance 
could there be in describing the foul drainage and perco­
lations, vegetable and animal, of the city of New-Orleans, 
when combined with the perishable deposit of the swamp 
. . . and declaring it as my opinion, that to a certain 
extent we might be protected from yellow fever by an
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atmosphere teeming with their exhalations?" After his com­
plicated explanation, he restated his firm opinion that 
miasmata from filth and swamps, when exposed to the burning 
sun, created an atmosphere productive of other fevers, but 
basically antagonistic to that required by yellow fever.
In a pamphlet published in 1853, Dr. McFarlane 
admitted that thus far nothing was known regarding yellow 
fever because "We are . . .  as yet not even at the thresh- 
hold of science.” He then summarized his own "opinions" 
with force and vigor and an acid pen. He concluded that 
yellow fever was neither contagious nor produced by filth 
or decomposing matter. He considered quarantine, drainage, 
and sanitation futile efforts. Finally, McFarlane believed 
that yellow fever would eventually wear itself out in New 
Orleans and disappear, even as it had done in so many 
other places.
In the midst of all the medical philosophers, one 
physician in New Orleans more closely resembled a modern 
scientist in his approach to the yellow fever problem.
44De Bow's Review, XVI (May, 1854), 463-66,
45j. S. M'Farlane, A Review of the Yellow Fever, 
Its Causes, etc., and an Interesting and Useful Abstract 
of Mortuary Statistics (New Orleans, 1853), vii, xii.
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Dr. J. L. Riddell, a member of the Sanitary Commission of 
1853, had reached conclusions slightly different from those 
of Dr. Barton. He agreed with Barton that yellow fever 
had not been personally contagious in 1853. But more , 
chemist and scientist than philosopher, and not satisfied 
with the intangible properties of epidemic constitution.
Dr. Riddell had attempted to delve more deeply into the 
causative forces. Previously, he had devised experiments 
to measure the amount of "organized matter" in the atmos­
phere while yellow fever was prevailing in New Orleans,
From his investigations Riddell had discovered "myriads 
of microscopic motes" in the air and was convinced that 
the atmosphere contained countless other forms of organic 
life so minute as to elude observation even with the aid 
of the microscope. More important, he believed that the 
"living motes" in some manner produced the "miasmatic 
maladies."46 By his interest in microscopic and ultra- 
microscopic organisms. Dr. Riddell was on the path which 
ultimately would point the way to the germ theory.
In his conclusions regarding the yellow fever of
4&N. 0. >fed. & Surg. Jour., VII (September, 1850),
172-76.
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1853, Riddell attributed its infectious coranunicability to 
"poisonous matter (doubtless some of living organism) 
maturing its germs or spores . . . surrounded by confined 
or impure air; which germs became diffused in the impure 
atmosphere." Among the various conditions favorable to 
the development of the infection, he included emanations 
from putrefying matter, consisting of gaseous, liquid, 
and solid particles ("the pablum . . .  of cryptogamie 
growths") and the "presence of the specific organism whose 
perfected spores constitute the material cause of yellow 
fever," In calling attention to minute cryptogamia (plant 
life which propagates by spores) and in referring to a 
"specific organism" as yellow fever's "material cause," 
Riddell had obviously formed the conclusion that a speci­
fic microorganism, plant rather than animalcule, was the 
vital principle in the disease. With that conception, he 
was far ahead of his colleagues who were still dealing with 
the intangible compound essences of miasmata.
Writing in the 1850's. Dr. M, Morton Dowler of New 
Orleans assumed a rather negativistic position on the sub­
ject of yellow fever, rejecting all the various theories
^7Ibid., X (May, 1854), 813-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
326
proposed over the years. In rejecting the idea that filth 
promoted the development of yellow fever. Dr. Dowler was, 
at least to that extent, in agreement with McFarlane, but 
every other notion he denounced. As for the filth theory, 
promoted by Fenner and Barton, Dowler declared that al­
though he was no advocate of filth, it was "neither a 
basilisk nor a Gorgon's head; nor is it the cause of 
yellow fever." He considered the erratic spread of yellow 
fever sound evidence against the filth theory, since 
yellow fever exhibited no "special predilection" for loca­
tions characterized by excessive heat, moisture, or animal 
and vegetable putrefaction. "The ship-hold and gutter- 
philosophers desire to claim sway," he maintained, "and in 
their crusade against filth, on the yellow fever basis, go 
for expending millions of the public money, and devouring 
the commerce of New Orleans." He was of course referring 
th the increasing demand for sanitation and quarantine 
regulations. Not only did Dowler oppose the filth theory, 
but he also rejected Dr. Riddell's cryptogamie theory 
which he thought had been deduced primarily from the filth 
idea. "Strange fungi I strange gases! strange poisons! A 
strange foundation have the advocates of these theories!
A strange pretense for all the extravagant systems of
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disinfection, quarantines, and Quixotic schemes of drain-
4.8age,” exclaimed the iconoclastic Dr. Dowler.
On another occasion Dr. Morton Dowler made some 
interesting observations on the whole problem of yellow 
fever causation. In dismissing all the theories thus far 
advanced, he declared, "Whoever discovers the objective or 
external cause of yellow fever, must look beyond the crude 
dealings in gases, animalculae, cryptogamia, quarantine, 
filth, and meteorology which are now being exhibited 
before the world," Demonstrating considerable insight, 
he asserted, "It may or may not be in the power of man to 
grasp the secret, but if ever that is done new laws must 
be investigated and new problems solved. A higher 
scientific era will have been inaugurated."49
According to Dowler, few persons in the medical 
profession would deny that almost nothing was known about 
causation. But, he observed, almost all medical writings 
on the subject presented a fine display of causes. "The 
writers cautiously make out these by giving a little 
'meteorology,' a little 'medical topography,' a little
48%bid., XI (July, 1854), 43-44, 47-50. 
49ibid., XI (November, 1854), 429.
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'geology,' a little 'putrefaction and exhalation,' to­
gether with a very circumspect reference to the organic, 
microzoic, cryptogamie, electric, calorific, gaseous, and 
filth theories, and so forth." In this fashion a "very 
specious appearance" of knowledge and impartiality was 
created, and all the medical reader could determine was 
that no positive knowledge existed regarding causation. 
Sardonically, Dowler remarked, "It does not comport with 
the dignity of authorship or professorship to say, 'I 
don't know.' It must be said gradually, and with the 
appearance of knowing everything." After having been a 
practitioner and a student for some twenty years, and 
having read and reflected so long on the subject of yellow 
fever, Dowler claimed he had never discovered any explana­
tion of causation worthy of attention or belief.50
In 1855 Dr. Dowler propounded a doctrine of hope for 
the eventual spontaneous cessation of yellow fever, not 
unlike McFarlane's suggestion in 1853. Although he re­
jected all theories as well as the proposed sanitation and 
quarantine programs, Dowler insisted that he was not paint­
ing a hopeless picture for New Orleans. On the contrary.
SOlbid., 430.
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he proposed a "doctrine of hope and consolation." When 
the population became stabilized and acclimated by fever 
attacks, he believed the disease would disappear of its 
own accord. Since yellow fever fed on strangers and a 
shifting population, when European immigration slowed 
down and finally ceased, the fever would lack new victims. 
Furthermore, widespread occurrences of the disease, as in 
1853, would immunize many persons throughout the United 
States who might later move to New Orleans. Observing 
that yellow fever had been "emphatically a German and 
Irish disease," Dowler believed a halt to immigration 
would remove one source of the fever's fuel. The "unfea­
sible expedients" of sanitary reformism would bring 
nothing but "disappointment and heavy taxation," he main­
tained, but if allowed to run its course, ultimately the 
disease would burn itself out.^l Such a fatalistic, 
laissez-faire policy toward the pestilence found little 
favor with those who refused to believe the situation lay 
beyond the power of man.
Nevertheless, in the 1850's while the sanitationists 
preached reform, there were many others who failed to see
Sljbid., XI (January, 1855), 503-505.
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in filth all the demons supposedly lurking there. In 1859 
Dr. Edward Jenner Coxe, visiting physician at Charity 
Hospital, agreed with Drs. McFarlane and Dowler that filthy 
streets and gutters could not account for the development 
of yellow fever. Many localities filthier than New Orleans 
had never experienced yellow fever at all, he declared.
But Coxe hastened to state that the denial of yellow 
fever's origin in filth was no argument in favor of filth, 
since clean streets and gutters were certainly desirable 
on other grounds.
Even the recently created State Board of Health 
noted in its report for 1857 that filth alone was appar­
ently not sufficient to generate yellow fever. According 
to the Board, "If refuse organic matter in any of its 
forms . . . [has] any agency in the production of yellow 
fever, its attributes were fairly put to the proof this 
past summer on a scale of grandeur that would be shocking 
to the eyes of one accustomed to the filth of Constanti­
nople or Cairo." For weeks the streets had remained un­
cleaned, while two of the city's largest hotels poured 
the refuse from their privies into one of the main streets.
52ibid., XVI (March, 1859), 173-74.
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The refuse from Charity Hospital supplemented "the stifling 
current." Although gutters and canals were "seething and 
bubbling with their putrid waters," the several yellow 
fever cases which appeared in New Orleans, with few excep­
tions, remained in an unusually clean portion of the city. 
"If infectiousness were a property resulting from filth and 
putrescent organic matter," the Board of Health contended, 
"the whole city was a laboratory for its generation, unsur­
passed in magnitude and extent. . . ." Yet the yellow 
fever of 1857 did not assume epidemic form.^3
While the filth theory was debated pro and con, the 
questions of yellow fever's portability and local or 
foreign origin engaged the attention of others, especially 
since the epidode of 1853. In the report of the Sanitary 
Commission of 1853, Dr. Edward H. Barton had firmly denied 
the allegation of foreign importation, which "has proceeded 
from a patriotic, but mistaken impulse, which is pretty 
universal, as well among savages, as those more civilized, 
viz: never to acknowledge the paternity of a pestilence I"
He was positive that the epidemic of 1853 had originated
S^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1857, 23.
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in New O r l e a n s , O n  the other hand, Dr. J, L, Riddell 
had concluded that the yellow fever afflicting various 
towns and plantations throughout the South in 1853 had 
been transmitted fran New Orleans. Although he conceded 
that the disease might sometimes originate in New Orleans, 
he believed the germs of the 1853 epidemic had been intro­
duced from Latin America. Hence, Riddell advocated 
quarantine measures to detain and to fumigate filthy per­
sons, clothing, and ships, as well as all goods from the 
West Indies, South America, and Mexico.
Another Southern physician stimulated by the epi­
demic of 1853 to re-explore the questions of yellow 
fever's transportability and the highly controversial 
doctrine of contagion, was Dr. J. C. Nott of Mobile, Ala­
bama. The extraordinary spread of the pestilence in 1853 
reopened the "long neglected idea of contagion" which Nott, 
like the majority of the medical profession, had con­
sidered obsolete. Believing the behavior of yellow fever 
too irregular to be explained by gaseous effluvia in the 
atmosphere, he saw the need to search for a more plausible
S^Barton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever, 67. 
55n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., X (May, 1854), 814.
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thesis. Dr. Nott inclined toward the Idea that the cause 
of yellow fever "exists In an organic form and possesses 
the power of propagation and progression by organic laws," 
Attempting to distinguish between two questions so often 
confused; transportability and contagion, he maintained 
that a disease need not be communicable from one person 
to another like smallpox In order for Its germ to be 
transported from place to place In vessels or baggage. 
Earlier epidemics had provided evidence against contagion, 
but the conflicting facts of 1853 left Dr. Nott In a state 
of Indecision on the subject, although he admitted his In­
clination to believe In the contagiousness of the disease. 
Transportability, he asserted, rested on an even firmer 
foundation than contagion since the fever had traveled to 
the various points along the coast and rivers which were 
frequented by vessels and railroad trains.
In 1848 Dr. Nott had published an article advancing 
the anlmalcular hypothesis as a better explanation of the 
"erratic habits" of yellow fever than any other theory yet 
set forth. Coming closer to the truth than any other medi­
cal thinker In the mid-nineteenth century. Dr. Nott had
56ibld., X (March, 1854), 571, 577-79.
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also suggested the possibility that insects, the mosquito 
among others, might be related to the transmission of dis­
ease. But many objections were posed to the insect and 
anlmalcular hypothesis. One opponent said that none of 
the known animalculae (animal microorganisms) were poison­
ous; he had swallowed water on numerous occasions contain­
ing minute animal life without the least effect. Pointing 
out that one might also swallow viper's poison without 
perceptible effect. Dr, Nott declared, "By what various 
means the poison of insects or animalculae might be com­
municated through the air or directly to individuals, we 
know not."57 In attempting to break with tradition and 
for postulating something other than the customary miasms. 
Dr. Nott deserves special recognition along with Dr.
Riddell of New Orleans.
Like Dr. Nott, Dr. T, A, Cooke of Washington, Louisi­
ana, supported the idea of yellow fever's transportability, 
as well as the anlmalcular theory, but denied that yellow 
fever was personally contagious. Convinced that the fever 
of 1853 had been transmitted from New Orleans to other 
points where it prevailed, he believed the "morbific
5?Ibid,, IV (March, 1848), 563-601; X (March, 1854),
581.
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cause** had been conveyed ÿy effluvia from sick persons as 
well as by fomites. Fomites, however, carried the cause 
itself and if accumulated in a sufficient quantity would 
produce the disease in all persons "predisposed" to it.
On the other hand, emanations from the sick were harmless 
unless the surrounding atmosphere was appropriate to 
allow for the propagation of disease germs coming from 
the body of the patient. "The facts in proof of the 
importation of the disease through the medium of such 
persons, and of merchandize,** Dr. Cooke asserted, "are as 
numerous as the leaves on the trees, at least in the 
opinion of most country people destitute of prejudice, or 
a taste for metaphysical disquisitions." Believing in the 
foreign origin and importation of the disease to New 
Orleans and its transmission from that center to other 
Louisiana communities. Dr. Cooke along with many other 
"country people" strongly favored quarantine measures to 
prevent the future importation of the disease.58
Although as factors in the chain of causation he 
listed a crowded population, summer heat, and an extra­
ordinary condition of the atmosphere, in addition to the
58ibid., X (March, 1854), 606-608.
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imported morbific influence. Dr. Cooke apparently had 
serious doubts about the validity of the traditional 
causes. He had observed that miasms, heat, dryness or 
moisture, emanations from filth, organic or inorganic 
poisons, and meteorological conditions, alone or combined 
into any possible arrangement, always encountered contra­
dictions and therefore failed to provide an adequate 
explanation for the disease. Referring to the animalcular 
theory proposed several years before by Dr. Nott, Cooke 
declared, "I have long been inclined to the opinion that 
the time is fast approaching, when most febrile diseases 
will be attributed, and justly, to a similar cause— to an 
animalcular origin.” On the subject of contagion, however. 
Dr. Cooke recognized that the yellow fever poison was es­
sentially different in its action from contagion, which 
operated by personal contact without regard to zone, 
climate, season, or other influences. Somehow yellow 
fever was different; exactly in what manner it operated he 
could not s a y .
During the 1850's more and more people came to 
believe in the transportable nature of the disease, first
59lbid., 608-12.
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from Latin America to New Orleans, then from the Crescent 
City inland or along the coast. Many laymen, particularly 
in the interior, were convinced by the epidemics of the 
1850's that yellow fever was both transportable and con­
tagious. More and more physicians came to accept the trans­
mission of yellow fever from place to place by infected 
goods, but to most medical men the doctrine of personal 
contagion still remained unacceptable. There was too much 
evidence to the contrary. Contagious diseases like small­
pox and measles followed certain discernible laws; yellow 
fever did not. Sometimes cases appeared to result from 
contact with a patient, but too frequently no traceable 
connection between cases could be discovered. To account 
for the discrepancies in the facts, the concept of "con­
tingent contagion" was advanced--that is, the idea that 
under certain contingencies, which could not be defined, 
yellow fever might become contagious. But few considered 
this a satisfactory explanation.
The opponents of contagion, and they were many, had 
ample evidence to cite against that doctrine. Over the 
years many physicians had experimented with the saliva, 
perspiration, and even the black vomit of yellow fever 
patients. They had swallowed, inhaled, and inoculated
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themselves with those materials and yet experienced no ill 
effects. A physician in Philadelphia in the early nine­
teenth century fed dogs and cats on black vomit for weeks, 
inoculated the animals and himself many times, rubbed the 
matter into his eyes, drank a large amount in diluted and 
in pure form--all without harmful result. On one occasion, 
a surgeon in the British Army "swallowed a wine-glass full 
of fresh black vomit and felt no more effect from it than 
if so much water had been taken into the stomach. It did 
not impair his appetite for dinner."^®
In further experimentation, physicians had slept in 
beds where yellow fever victims had recently died and also 
had worn the victims* supposedly infected clothing without 
contracting the f e v e r . T h e o d o r e  Clapp, Unitarian minis­
ter in New Orleans, told of a man who, during the epidemic 
of 1822, had slept in the same bed with a friend who was 
dying of yellow fever. On one occasion he had been 
"absolutely inundated by a copious discharge of the
GORistory of the Yellow Fever in New Orleans, during 
the Summer of 1853, with Sketches of the Scenes of Horror 
which Occurred during the Epidemic . . . by a Physician of 
New Orleans, 38-39.
61#. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., VII (November, 1850),
362.
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vomlto." Even after his friend's death, the man continued 
to occupy the same room and enjoyed the best of health. Dr, 
Clapp said he knew of many other similar cases.
In 1855 in the midst of the increasing fyror over 
contagion, René La Roche, of the College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia, published a fourteen-hundred page, two-volume 
compendium of information on yellow fever, which demon­
strated, among other things, that there was more to be said 
against contagion than for it. His forty-five page biblio­
graphy, listing approximately a thousand items, is indica­
tive of the voluminous quantity of writing on the disease 
by the mid-nineteenth century. Volume One comprises a his­
torical sketch of yellow fever, its symptoms, pathology, 
complications, diagnosis, prognosis, incubation, and other 
medical aspects. Volume Two deals with acclimation, 
second attacks, predisposing factors, facts and arguments 
for and against contagion, contigent contagion, nature of 
the poison, treatment, and other related problems.
In one sense, this treatise represents a kind of
62i)uffy (ed.), Parson Clapp, 84.
G3see René La Roche, Yellow Fever, Considered in 
its Historical, Pathological, Etiological and Therapeuti­
cal Relations (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1855).
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Stmma of yellow fever philosophy up to the mid-nineteenth 
century. Yet it is by no means a synthesis, but perhaps 
more like a medical Sic et Non, quoting the various autho­
rities and presenting facts and arguments for this side, 
that side, and all sides without any real attempt to 
reconcile the conflicts. In dealing with the contagion 
issue, however. La Roche devoted about ten times more 
pages to the facts and arguments opposing contagion than 
to those favoring the doctrine. He noted that the pre­
vailing medical sentiment supported non-contagion and 
indicated his own inclination toward that idea. Other­
wise, his encyclopedic coverage of the subject was restric­
ted largely to a description of the many controversial 
opinions, theories, and conflicting evidence relating to 
yellow fever.
Reviewing the work of La Roche for the New Orleans 
Medical and Surgical Journal in January of 1856, Dr.
Bennet Dowler observed that almost one-fourth of the "huge 
volumes" had been devoted to the contagion question. But, 
he felt that even this "massive logic though wrought out 
with the patience of Job, will not convert the contagion- 
ists against their will." Pointing out the merits of the 
work as well as its defects and arguing vigorously over
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certain points of disagreement, Dowler was neither extreme­
ly unkind nor intensely personal like many other reviewers 
with particular axes to grind,
In a penetrating criticism of La Roche's digest of 
yellow fever, Dr. William Holcombe, homeopathic practition­
er in New Orleans, conceded that it was probably the most 
extensive and valuable monograph thus far contributed to 
medical literature. Yet in spite of Dr. La Roche's inde­
fatigable efforts in compiling fact and opinion, Holcombe 
felt that "his mind lacks the analytic, generalizing and 
constructive power, which is necessary for true philoso­
phic induction." The author had simply paraded forth 
arguments for all theories and all sides of the issues and 
then assumed a "negative, conservative, indefinite amalgam 
of opinion" or no opinion at all, "There is nothing 
positive and definite in all this pile of literary lumber"; 
said Holcombe, "not one proposition which others have not 
scouted, not one affirmation which many others have not 
denied,"65 And he was right. But even if La Roche had
64n , 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., XII (January, 1856),
555-74.
^%illiam H. Holcombe, Yellow Fever and Its Homeo­
pathic Treatment (New York, 1856), 61-65.
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set out to attempt a philosophical synthesis of the count­
less conflicting positions and even if he had succeeded in 
formulating concepts to reconcile the contradictory ideas, 
in the absence of the germ theory and the mosquito doc­
trine, he could not have created an abstraction in conform­
ity with reality.
Although he provided a gigantic reference work on 
yellow fever. La Roche settled no issue, ended no argument. 
His volumes appeared at the very time that yellow fever 
theories were being debated more furiously than ever and 
many old concepts were beginning to break down under the 
mass of conflicting evidence provided by the succession 
of epidemics in Louisiana and the South in the 1850's.
Local causation came under severe attack from many 
quarters, and traditional views underwent gradual modifi­
cation. Laymen, together with a small portion of the 
medical profession, began to advocate quarantine as well 
as Sanitary measures to fight the disease. Even if yellow 
fever were not contagious in the commonly accepted sense 
of the term, a patient laboring under the disease was 
obviously associated in some manner with the spread of 
yellow fever to other persons and places. And in 1855 for 
the first time in thirty years, the Louisiana legislature
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once again passed an act providing for quarantine and a 
State Board of Health.
In its report for 1856 the new Board of Health sug­
gested that some unknown essence emanated from a patient's 
body and was communicated to others in a yet unknown manner 
Admitting that meteorological and terrestial causes un­
doubtedly acted as contributing influences, the Board felt 
that neither alone nor both together could produce the 
disease. Great quantities of evidence and testimony col­
lected since 1853 indicated "that a material virus, origin­
ating in the body of the sick man, is also a potential 
means and perhaps the most so, under favorable circum­
stances, of all the others." But atmospheric and terrene 
influences must also be essential, the Board concluded, 
since the "morbific poison" from the patient's body, 
whether in the form of exhalations or transferred to 
fomites, did not always and invariably transmit the dis­
ease to susceptible individuals on e x p o s u r e .
Discussing the same problem in the Report for 1857, 
the Board of Health observed that the prevailing opinion 
prior to 1853 had considered yellow fever not infectious.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1856, 7-9.
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But the experience of 1853, 1854, and 1855 had necessitated 
a reconstructed view. According to the Board's Report,
"The common sense of the people, unskilled in the refine­
ments of scientific hypotheses, solved the problem, by a 
process quite as logical as, and certainly far more practi­
cal than the conjectures of the learned," To the layman, 
a yellow fever patient was in some unknown manner a source 
of disease. Yellow fever, if not directly contagious, was 
somehow infectious and communicable. Hence, came the 
general sentiment in favor of quarantine. "The policy [of 
quarantine] was then inaugurated," the Board Report stated, 
"not in obedience to the judgment of the medical community, 
but in spite of i t I n  this instance the popular belief 
in yellow fever's contagious nature overrode the opposition 
of the medical profession.
Although the medical profession continued to oppose 
the doctrine of direct contagion, with good reason, more 
and more physicians began to question some of the other 
traditionally accepted concepts. Several Louisiana phy­
sicians, writing on yellow fever theory after the epidemics 
of the 1850's, listed the usual contributing influences--
G^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1857, 4-5.
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miasmatic poison, filth, heat, humidity, and predisposing 
causes--but they admitted that essentially nothing was 
known of yellow fever's etiology. More clearly than ever 
before, they realized that something basic was lacking in
Co
all previous explanations.
One French Louisiana physician. Dr. D. Durac, 
raised this important question: exactly what is a miasm?
Observing that the majority of medical writers had long 
agreed that yellow fever resulted from miasmatic influences, 
he pointed out that science had not yet determined any 
means for analysing that mysterious something called a 
miasm. Perhaps the operative factor in miasmatic poison 
might be animalcules, he suggested, such as the ones black 
vomit exhibited under microscopic observation. Like 
Riddell, Dr. Durac felt that miasmata required further 
analysis. Nothing, absolu ely nothing, had been settled 
about the yellow pestilence, he insisted, and although 
many causal factors had been assigned to the disease, he 
felt there were others yet undiscovered: "Nous dirons.
68a , J. F. Cartier, W  Filvre Jaune de la Nouvelle- 
Orléans (Paris, 1859), 46-47; D. Durac, De la Fièvre Jaune 
et des Épidémies de 1853, 1854 et 1858 dans la paroisse 
Lafourche (Nouvelle-Orléans, 1863), 20-24, 65-72; Delery, 
Précis Historique de la Fièvre Jaune, 52, 147.
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nous, que nous croyons à l'existence d'autres causes, 
causes cachées & l'homme jusqu'ici et que Dieu peut-être 
un jour dévoilera 1 sa c r é a t u r e . ("We declare that we 
believe in the existence of other causes, causes thus far 
hidden to man, and which perhaps someday God will reveal 
to his creature,")
Disturbed by the theoretical conflicts since the 
1840's, on numerous occasions Dr. Bennet Dowler had tried 
to keep open to further investigation a path which was 
rapidly becoming cluttered with a proliferation of dogmatic 
abstractions. He characterized the "alleged causes" of 
yellow fever as completely inadequate in spite of, or 
because of, the "hundreds of inconclusive and contradictory 
volumes, filled with special pleadings, diluted logic, 
theoretical biases, and irrelevant facts." Dr. Dowler 
believed it was "better to acknowledge ignorance than to 
advocate an error," better to leave all questions open than 
dogmatically to close the door to further investigation.70 
Medical philosophers generally assumed a cause with­
out ample proof. When the effect appeared without that
69ixirac, De la Filvre Jaune, 65, 67, 69, 24. 
7®Duffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 105.
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cause they subtly substituted some closely related circum- 
stance. When their cause existed without any accompanying 
effect; a counteracting contingency was assumed. Dowler 
compared this kind of sophistry to the story of a French­
man who, observing that an Englishman recovered from an 
illness after eating a red herring, fed one to a fellow 
Frenchman with the same disease. When the sick Frenchman 
died, the would-be empiricist noted that a red herring 
would cure an Englishman of a fever, but the same treat­
ment would kill a Frenchman.^  ^
As for the epidemic constitution of the atmosphere, 
Dowler considered that assumption useless except as "a 
cloak to ignorance’* and suggested that it "might as well 
be called an epidemic d e c e p t i o n , T h e  Board of Health 
in 1858 struck another blow against the concept of the epi­
demic constitution. In the opinion of the Board, suf­
ficient evidence existed to demonstrate that yellow fever 
patients served as one clear means of diffusing and propa­
gating the poison of the disease. Although many cases 
occurred without traceable connection either to sick
7In. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., Ill (September, 1846),
174.
72lbid., XII (November, 1855), 322.
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persons or to fomites, the Board considered the "tradition­
al and hackneyed solution" so long employed to account for 
yellow fever's irregularities--epidemic constitution of 
the atmosphere— a completely inadequate explanation. The 
Board contended that "the assigning of an unknown cause 
. . . [was not] a whit more rational and satisfactory, 
than an unqualified denial of any causation whatever for 
the event,"73
And so the disagreement and uncertainty continued. 
Yankee quarantine and sanitation measures in New Orleans 
during the Civil War, based on General Butler's yellow 
fever philosophy (effluvia from both animal and vegetable 
decomposition plus an imported "seed"), was accompanied 
by a period of freedom from the disease. This phenomenon 
provided convincing evidence to many persons that either 
yellow fever was an imported disease which could be 
screened out by strict quarantine, or that the fever was 
indigenous but could be prevented by thoroughgoing sani­
tary measures. Still nothing was settled.
In 1870 Dr, Stanford E, Chaille remarked that a
73Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1858, 19-20.
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considerable extension of scientific boundaries was yet 
required "before the wearisome discussions of doctors can 
confer any substantial benefits on the p u b l i c I n  sum­
marizing the several theories competing for ascendancy in 
1870, Dr. Chaille listed three basic conceptions, together 
with a fourth representing the various possible modifica­
tions: (1) Yellow fever is both contagious and portable,
spread by persons as well as fomites. (2) Yellow fever is 
portable but not contagious, that is, communicable by fo­
mites but not by persons. (3) Yellow fever is neither 
portable nor contagious, transmitted by neither persons 
nor fomites, but the poison is present at times and under 
variable conditions in the atmosphere of certain localities. 
(4) Yellow fever may be produced by two different poisons, 
or by the same poison producing different results, depend­
ing on individual or atmospheric conditions. Therefore, 
at various times, the disease may be contagious or port­
able or both or neither.74
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century 
confusion and controversy still characterized the field of
7^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870), 
568, 597.
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theory, but several significant modifications occurred.
When a number of years passed in the 1880's and 1890's 
without a single case of yellow fever in New Orleans, it 
became harder to believe that the disease was indigenous. 
Naturally, the quarantinists took the credit for having 
protected the city and the state from the malady. As the 
germ theory gained acceptance from the 1870's onward, the 
position of those who would deny portability as well as 
contagion became less tenable, and the concepts of the 
spontaneous miasm and epidemic constitution gradually 
faded away. Although the formulation and validation of 
the germ theory in the second half of the nineteenth cen­
tury cleared away the miasmatic and atmospheric fallacies, 
the basic question of how persons contracted yellow fever 
germs remained a mystery. Direct contagion still had more 
opponents than advocates, but few in the latter nineteenth 
century would deny the transmission of infection by germ­
laden fomites. The connection between a case of fever 
and the specific source of infection was not always clearly 
discernible, but fomites provided the most plausible 
answer until the discovery of the insect vector.
In addition to the controversies regarding causation 
and transmission, another question which confounded the
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theorists until the latter nineteenth century involved the 
very nature of yellow fever; was it a disease sui generis 
or was it simply one among a class of interrelated fevers? 
For centuries physicians had encountered diagnostic dif­
ficulties in dealing with diseases which manifested super­
ficially similar symptoms. Some ailments, of course, 
exhibited marked characteristics which differentiated them 
from all others, such as smallpox, bubonic plague, venereal 
diseases, and others. Many other maladies not so readily 
defined included those producing high fever together with 
respiratory, intestinal, or nervous disorder in the system, 
but without characteristic skin eruptions or other clearly 
observable qualities to set them apart from all others.
The inherent difficulty already present in the field 
of diagnosis was crystallized into a methodology and pro­
vided with a theoretical basis by Dr, Benjamin Rush, the 
most widely known American physician of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. Dr, Rush believed that the 
multiplication of diseases was "as repugnant to truth in 
medicine, as polytheism is to truth in religion." The 
physician who considered every different bodily disorder 
as a distinct disease, according to Dr. Rush, resembled 
"the Indian or African savage, who considers wàter, dew.
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ice, frost; and snow, as different essences; while the 
physician who considers the morbid affections of every part 
of the body (however diversified . . ,) as derived from one 
cause, resembles the philosopher, who considers dew, ice, 
frost, and snow, as different modifications of water." To 
Dr. Rush, yellow fever was simply the most malignant form 
in the hierarchy of fevers produced by marsh miasmata.
His lexicographer-epidemiologist contemporary, Noah Web­
ster, also concluded that yellow fever was nothing more 
than a high grade bilious f e v e r . ^5
The idea of yellow fever as the most malignant 
degree of a fever which assumed many interchangeable forms 
prevailed throughout the first half of the nineteenth cen­
tury. Writing in 1817, Dr. Jabez Heustis described yellow 
fever as a "more aggravated degree of intermitting and re­
mitting fever," which represented "the grand climax of 
malignity, analogous in its origin and nature [to the other 
forms], and standing at the top of the same scale." All 
those fevers, he maintained, were only modifications of the 
same basic disease, differing only in degree of force. 
Furthermore, the forms were interchangeable; one type could
75winslow, Conquest of Epidemic Disease, 200, 214.
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develop Into another or assume another form during an epi­
demic . Any observer who had ever witnessed this phenome­
non and yet doubted the identity of fevers, said Dr. 
Heustis, *hnust be a skeptic in physics, and a disbeliever 
in the demonstrative evidence of his own senses.
It was generally believed by both laymen and phy­
sicians that during the course of an epidemic all forms of 
fever tended to merge into the most malignant grade and 
assume the form of yellow fever.^7 By the 1840's some 
persons had concluded that yellow fever was a specific 
entity, separate and distinct from all other fevers,7® 
but the opposite opinion prevailed until the middle of 
the century.
In 1844 Dr. P. A. Lambert of New Orleans undertook 
the task of classifying the forms of yellow fever epidem­
ics as well as the various types of yellow fever. Forms 
of epidemics, he said, included inflammatory, bilious, 
bilious inflammatory, mucous, putrid, and nervous, depend­
ing on the dominant symptoms characterizing the fever
219.
76Heustis, Physical Observations, 114.
77Picayune, August 21, 1841.
78New Orleans Medical Journal, I (October, 1844),
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during an epidemic. As types of yellow fever, Dr. Lambert 
listed continued, remittent, and intermittent, categories 
based on the pattern of fever activity in an individual.
He announced that it was not his intention to devise "an 
algebraic formula" for the solution of problems regarding 
the theory of types since the variations were too subtle 
to allow for precision.
Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner was among the outstanding 
exponents and defenders of the philosophy of interrelated 
fevers. Reflecting this view, he wrote, "the terms of 
bilious remittent, yellow and typhus, applied to the fevers 
seen in New Orleans, in the months of August and September, 
more properly designate certain conditions of the system 
produced by a common cause, or rather, certain stages of 
some general disease, than they do the existence of dis­
eases altogether separate and distinct. . . . "  In one 
case he had witnessed all the various types of fever 
exhibited in one individual during one illness.®®
Dr. Fenner disagreed with Rush and others who had 
classified yellow fever as the highest grade of bilious
79ibid., I (July, 1844), 7-11, 23-24.
80n . 0. & Surg. Jour., VI (July, 1849), 48.
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fever, for he had observed occasions when ordinary bilious 
fever displayed an even more malignant quality than yellow 
fever without exhibiting the hemorrhagic tendency which 
characterized the yellow form. To attribute the varied 
forms of fever to modifications of one basic cause was, 
in his opinion, "certainly a more rational supposition 
than to attribute the various types of concomitant fever 
to the 8imultaneous action of separate distinct and speci­
fic c a u s e s Addressing himself to those who considered 
yellow fever a distinct disease, Fenner asked, "If you 
maintain that one of these types (yellow fever) is a dis­
ease sui generis, why not contend for the same in respect 
to intermittent, typhus, typhoid, remittent, bilious, con­
gestive, malignant, pernicious, ephemeral, continued, 
gastric and solar fever . . .
In the Sanitary Commission Report on the epidemic 
of 1853, Dr. Edward H. Barton stated that bilious, inter­
mittent, and yellow fevers had been observed to "run into 
each other" and that the blending of symptoms' had occurred
SlErasmus Darwin Fenner (ed.). Southern Medical 
Reports (2 vols.. New Orleans, 1849-1850), I, 111-13.
GZlbid., II, 85.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
356
frequently in the same individual. Many cases began with 
the symptoms of intermittent or remittent fever, he de­
clared, and ultimately assumed the yellow fever form and 
terminated in black vomit and hemorrhagic activity. Other 
cases which early exhibited the signs of yellow fever 
terminated favorably as intermittent fever. Barton at­
tributed the convertibility of fevers to the varying con­
centration of the same basic cause as well as the differ­
ing degrees of individual susceptibility. The epidemic of 
1853 had settled once and for all, as far as he was con­
cerned, the disputed question of the identity of bilious 
and yellow fever.
The issue might have been settled for Dr. Barton, 
but it was by no means settled for all others. Several 
medical men writing in the 1850's indicated a belief in 
yellow fever's separate and distinct nature. Dr. A. J. F. 
Cartier, in a study of yellow fever in New Orleans, called 
attention to what he considered certain fundamental differ­
ences between yellow fever and the intermittent fevers: 
Yellow fever conferred lasting immunity after one attack;
83Barton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever,
113-14.
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the others did not. Although it seemed that the diseases 
sometimes intermingled, yellow fever always disappeared as 
winter approached, while the other fevers did not seem to 
be so clearly affected by the season. Yellow fever ex­
hibited a different pattern of chills and fever, a continu­
ed type rather than intermittent. It was clearly evident 
to Cartier that yellow fever was distinguished from all 
other fevers by its own essential characteristics, includ­
ing yellowness, passive hemorrhage, and black vomit, 
symptoms not occurring together in any other fever known.
Others in the 1850's who argued that yellow fever 
constituted a specific disease with a specific cause, 
separate from all the others, were Drs, T. A. Cooke of 
Washington, Louisiana,85 W. J. Tuck of M e m p h i s ,86 and 
James Jones of New O r l e a n s . 8? Dr. Cooke maintained that 
"the time is approaching when many diseases now assembled 
into one group or family, considered mere modifications of
2-5.
84cartier, Filvre Jaune de la Nouvelle-Orleans.
85n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., X (March, 1854), 625. 
86ibid., XI (September, 1854), 175-84.
87Ibid., XV (July, 1858), 500-17.
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a type, having a presumed identity of causes and similarity 
if not idéntity of nature, will take separate and distinct 
places in nosology.”®® In foreseeing the ultimate break­
down of symptom-complexes into distinct diseases with 
specific causes. Dr. Cooke was in the stream of modern 
medical science.
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, as medical 
science advanced with every-increasing rapidity, the ap­
proach to an investigation of yellow fever became more 
methodical, quantitative, technical, and concrete--less 
argumentative, dogmatic, speculative, and abstract. In­
stead of wandering through the maze of nebulous concepts 
and loose generalizations, some medical thinkers began to 
delve into the particulars.
For example. Dr. Joseph Jones undertook a number of 
painstaking post-mortem examinations of yellow fever victims 
in Charity Hospital in the early 1870's. With the aid of 
the microscope, he made intensive studies of the blood, 
black vomit, urine, heart, brains, lungs, liver, spleen, 
and kidneys of the patients who died. He filled a research 
notebook with close descriptions of the cases, their
®®Ibid., X (March, 1834), 623.
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symptoms, comparative results of autopsies, and urinalyses, 
as well as.drawings of the various organ tissues under 
microscopic view.89
Dr. Jones felt that a systematic investigation of 
this nature was necessary to extend the boundaries of 
knowledge relating to "this terrible scourge of tropical 
and sub-tropical America." Not until crude observations 
and hasty generalizations had been replaced by careful, 
accurate, quantitative and comparative analysis could 
yellow fever's effects on the various organs of the body 
be understood. Realizing the importance of this kind of 
research, Jones set out on the path of scientific investi­
gation and inquiry which was attracting more and more 
interest and attention in the latter nineteenth century.90 
From his study of specific pathological features, he con­
cluded that yellow fever "differs essentially from the 
different forms of Malarial fever. . . ."9^ Since the
89«Yellow Fever Research Notebook, 1870-1872,"
Joseph Jones Papers (Louisiana State University Archives, 
Baton Rouge); N, 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, IV 
(September, 1876), 159-165.
90”Composition and Character of the Urine in Yellow- 
Fever," Joseph Jones Papers.
91"Yellow Fever Research Notbeook, 1870-1872," Joseph 
Jones Papers, 5-6.
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diagnostic confusion of fevers resulted mainly from the 
similarity of superficial symptoms, a probing beneath the 
surface disclosed certain positive symptomatic differences 
and thereby provided a basis for differentiating one dis­
ease from another. .
Another Louisiana physician, Jean Charles Faget, 
Investigated the specific action of yellow fever In rela­
tion to the patient's pulse and temperature, and In the 
early 1870's set forth the principle which came to be known 
as "Paget's Law," That principle Is still cited today In 
modern medical works as a basic diagnostic sign of the dis­
ease. In the New Orleans epidemic of 1870 and the Memphis 
epidemic of 1873, Dr. Faget studied the behavior of the 
pulse and temperature In a great number of cases and found 
that the pulse rate did not speed up with the ascent of 
the temperature, as In other fevers, but Instead gradually 
fell as the temperature rose. This phenomenon, he con­
tended, was one of the best diagnostic signs for detecting 
yellow fever In Its early stages. Faget also argued that 
this peculiar sign demonstrated the specific nature of 
yellow fever as a disease separate and distinct from all
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other f e v e r s . 9 2  Other observers had noticed the diver­
gence between the pulse rate and the temperature (that is,
g o
the falling pulse in conjunction with the rising fever), 
but until Faget no one had systematically charted the rela­
tion between the two indications or formulated a clear 
principle to be followed in diagnosis and prognosis. His 
work represents a forward leap in scientific observation 
as well as a lasting contribution to medical theory and 
practice. Faget's distinguishing principle also provided 
convincing evidence in favor of the specificity of yellow 
fever.
In 1878 the members of the Orleans Parish Medical 
Society voted on several long disputed questions regarding 
the yellow pestilence. Although no unanimity existed on 
any one position, the majority agreed that yellow fever 
was a specific disease caused by a microorganism and hence
92Jean Charles Faget, Monographie sur le Type et 
la Spécificité de la Filvre Jaune, Etablis avec l'Aide de 
la Montre et du Thermomètre (Nouvelle-Orleans, 1875); N,
0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, I (September, 1873), 
145-68.
93i)urac, De 1^ Fièvre Jaune, 65; Cartier, ^  Filvre 
Jaune de la Nouvelle-Orléans, 7; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., 
LI (July, 1898), 56.
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not Interchangeable with any other fevers.*4 As the germ 
theory became more and more widely accepted, the abandon­
ment of the monistic theory of fevers followed as a natural 
corollary. Nevertheless, there were always some who lagged 
behind. In an address before the New Orleans Academy of 
Sciences in December of 1879, Dr. U. R. Milner paraded 
forth all the traditional conceptions of yellow fever's 
nature, causation, and transmission. Neither imported nor 
contagious, the fever was indigenous to the area, he insist­
ed, and spread by "infectious gases" generated from animal 
and vegetable effluvia. Further, Dr. Milner asserted,
"The true yellow fever is the topmost grade in a regular 
ascension from the simplest intermittent. . .
Not until yellow fever had been banished from the 
land by the great crusade of 1905 and by other preventive
9^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (Septem­
ber, 1878), 240-55.
95u. R. Milner, Yellow Fever, not imported, nor Con­
tagious , but Indigenous, and Intrinsically Identical with 
our Paludal Fevers. Preventable by Well Determined an? 
Wisely Executed Local Sanitary Measures. Quarantine a 
Wide-spread Calamity and Should no longer be Tolerated. A 
Lecture before the Academy of Sciences of New Orleans . . . 
1879 (Miscellaneous Publications on Yellow Fever in Louisi­
ana and Adjoining States, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, 
New Orleans), 3-18, 22, 26.
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measures based on the mosquito doctrine, not until then 
was there anything resembling universal agreement on the 
nature, causation, and transmission of what was probably 
the most controversial disease in all medical history.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VIII
THEORY AND CONTROVERSY; SUSCEPTIBILITY, 
ACCLIMATION, AND IMMUNITY
As if the questions regarding yellow fever's nature, 
causation, and transmission were not enough to confound 
and perplex the truthseekers frcnn the late eighteenth cen­
tury until the early twentieth century, several other 
issues arose in connection with the activity of that seem­
ingly unpredictable disease. Why did certain persons and 
groups exhibit greater and lesser degrees of suscepti­
bility to yellow fever than others? Did acclimation, that 
is, becoming accustomed to the climate of the extreme 
South, carry with it immunity to the Saffron Scourge? Or 
could immunity be acquired only by living through an 
attack of the disease? What roles did age, race, sex, 
nationality, or economic class play in determining degrees 
of susceptibility? As usual, with so many variables and 
unknowns involved in the problem, it was exceedingly dif­
ficult to settle upon one precise equation which would 
invariably account for all the facts,
364
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
365
Beginning with the first recorded yellow fever epi­
demic in New Orleans in 1796, observers noticed the 
obvious preference cf the disease for newcomers to the area. 
In the many epidemics which followed, the Creole (that is, 
native) inhabitants as well as those persons who had re­
sided in New Orleans for a number of years always seemed 
less liable to attack, while the strangers were repeatedly 
swept off in great numbers. Both Baron Joseph Xavier 
Pontalba and Governor William C, C, Claiborne in writing 
about the early epidemics in New Orleans continually re­
iterated the extraordinary susceptibility of strangers to 
the disease. Undoubtedly, the tendency of the time to 
relate climate and disease, together with the obvious sus­
ceptibility of persons recently having moved from a cooler 
climate into the subtropical heat and humidity of New 
Orleans, led to the belief that the "unacclimated strang­
er" was more prone to yellow fever attack than the native 
or the acclimated simply because he was not yet accustomed 
to the climate.
In discussing the scourge of New Orleans, Berquin- 
Duvallon, French traveler in Louisiana in 1802, observed 
that among the inhabitants of New Orleans the Americans 
were yellow fever's principal objects of attack, while
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the French were less susceptible and the Spanish almost 
not at all. He noted that the Spaniard was accustomed 
already to a warm climate, but the American, coming from 
a colder climate, had his veins "copiously" filled with 
blood and therefore suffered from the intense heat which 
rendered him more "susceptible of inflammation and cor­
ruption." Furthermore, Berquin-Duvallon asserted that 
the Spaniard lived a more temperate existence than the 
American who "revels on succulent meats, and spices, and 
has often the bottle or glass to his mouth." These 
reasons, he believed, would go far in determining why the 
disease proved so fatal to Americans, only slightly dis­
turbed the French, and gave the Spanish almost no trouble 
at all.l
After the purchase of Louisiana by the United 
States in 1803, more and more Americans poured into the 
Crescent City; and as yellow fever paid its annual visits 
and periodically raged in epidemic form, the recently 
arrived Americans continued to furnish the great preponder­
ance of victims. In 1817 Dr. Jabez Heustis, like Berquin- 
Duvallon, noted that yellow fever occurred more frequently
^Berquin-Duvallon, Travels, 116.
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among the Americans than among the French, To account for 
this phenomenon, he emphasized the difference in their 
attitudes toward temperance and sobriety. While the French 
drank wine, the American consumed great quantities of dis­
tilled spirits, on the incorrect assumption, said Heustis, 
that hard liquor was necessary "to preserve them against 
the fogs, damps, and sickly vapours of the climate." Dr. 
Heustis also attributed American susceptibility to their 
excessive use of animal food, especially when it was 
likely to be in a partially spoiled condition.^
As the population of New Orleans became increasing­
ly American in the first few decades of the nineteenth 
century and as the tide of European immigration began to 
flow into the population, yellow fever continued to ex­
hibit a marked tendency to attack those persons, whether 
American or European, who had only recently arrived in 
New Orleans. Sometimes yellow fever was even called the 
stranger's disease or the acclimating disease, and the 
term acclimation itself acquired a rather ambiguous mean­
ing. Apparently, a person might be considered acclimated 
if he were a native or long-resident New Orleanian,
^Heustis, Physical Observations, 113.
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supposedly adjusted to the climate without ever having 
experienced an attack of the disease; or one might become 
acclimated by surviving a case of yellow fever.
Summarizing current opinion on susceptibility, ac­
climation, and immunity to yellow fever in the 1840's,
Dr. John Harrison, Professor of Physiology and Pathology 
in the Medical College of Louisiana, stated that yellow 
fever attacked "only strangers, those born in the city 
being perfectly exempt from the disease, though it is 
still a question whether they do not pass through it in 
infancy." Creoles living outside New Orleans and unac­
customed to the disease, he declared, were as liable to 
attack as Northerners or Europeans when coming into an 
area where yellow fever prevailed. On the other hand, 
persons coming to New Orleans from localities where yellow 
fever was common seemed to enjoy immunity. Those who 
lived through a violent epidemic without contracting the 
disease were considered "fully acclimated," but, he assert­
ed, passing through a mild epidemic without being affected 
was no guarantee of immunity. And persons recovering from 
a case of fever were said to be acclimated, that is, im­
mune to further attack; however, he maintained that even 
such immunity acquired through an attack was not always
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positive since second attacks, although rare, had been
O
known to occur. Dr. Harrison also pointed out that yellow 
fever in Negroes and in children was ordinarily mild and 
seldom fatal,^
Although the explanations advanced by different phy­
sicians to account for the observed phenomena were often 
contradictory, the broad outlines of susceptibility and 
immunity were fairly clear and largely agreed upon by both 
physicians and laymen in nineteenth-century New Orleans. 
Nevertheless, there were always exceptions to the general 
rules. In the absence of certainty, it was necessary to 
fall back on degrees of probability. A stranger from the 
North or from Europe might reasonably fear for his life; a 
native or long-resident New Orleanian who had not, to his 
knowledge, experienced the disease, but who had lived 
through several yellow fever epidemics, might feel rela­
tively safe; but the most secure individual of all was the 
person who had passed successfully through an attack of
^Actually, the idea of second attacks was only a 
product of mistaken diagnosis; in one of the two supposed 
cases a physician had confused some other fever with the 
yellow pestilence, because one case of true yellow fever 
confers life-long immunity.
^N, 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., II (September, 1845),
130,
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the disease.
Characterizing the confident, self-assured "accli­
mated man" in the midst of the dreadful epidemic of 1853, 
the editor of the New Orleans Weekly Delta declared: "You
can tell this man the moment you see him. He walkb along 
the street with a tremendously bold swagger." Unaffected 
by the offensive odors from the filthy streets and gutters, 
that brave individual "turns up his nose at nothing but 
the unacclimated man . . .  [who goes about] timidly and 
nervously recounting the mortality of the previous twenty- 
four hours.” To the acclimated fellow, yellow fever was a 
'*mere nothing"; in fact, it was "rather a pleasure to have 
it than not, it results in such a splendid appetite when 
you get over i t U n d o u b t e d l y ,  the confidence which came 
from acclimation, in the sense of Immunity, helps to ex­
plain the New Orleanian's tendency to discount the severity 
of epidemics and to insist that New Orleans was not really 
an unhealthy city.
Seemingly, many persons believed that a case of 
yellow fever, if one lived through it, conferred certain 
praiseworthy advantages. In July of 1853 Clarissa Town
5now Orleans Weekly Delta, August 7, 1853
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of West Baton Rouge Parish wrote in her diary that although 
there were many cases of yellow fever in New Orleans, "It 
is not as much feared in the City as Congestive Typhus, or 
shipfever, for it only requires gentle medicines and good 
care, when taken in time to insure recovery, and then the 
system is invigorated by it and the health is usually 
better after than b e f o r e . A  member of the New Orleans 
Howard Association in 1853 also maintained that a yellow 
fever patient, if cured of the disease, then enjoyed "im­
munity not only from all fevers, but from the rheumatisms 
and complaints generally of the nervous system," Believing 
this principle confirmed by his years of observation, he 
comforted a sick friend with the thought that "a success­
ful issue was a safeguard against all other ills indigenous 
to a southern latitude.Unfortunately, over 8,000 
persons in the New Orleans epidemic of 1833 did not sur­
vive to enjoy those supposed benefits of good health and 
an invigorated system.
^Clarissa E. Leavitt Town, Diary (Louisiana State 
University Archives, Baton Rouge), July 21, 1853, p. 202,
^Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 61, 88; see also 
New Orleans Weekly Delta, July 24, 1853.
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Persons coming to the Crescent City to live must 
have looked forward with some measure of dread to the 
"acclimating fever," yet at the same time they hoped that 
they might have an attack, recover, and settle the matter 
once and for all. A young man in New Orleans wrote his 
Philadelphia cousin in September of 1847, "It is with 
great pleasure that I am able to tell you with certainty, 
that both [brother] Dick & I are acclimated," The epi­
demic had been severe that summer, he remarked, and "I 
knew that we were running some risk by remaining here dur­
ing the sickly season, but as we expect to reside here 
altogether, it was much better to get through with it at 
once, . , Further, he mentioned that they had not been 
extremely fearful of death from the disease, since yellow 
fever when treated in time was not as deadly as many 
believed. Already weakened by a previous attack of "the 
Chills & Fever" (malaria), his brother had "a very hard 
time of it," but "My attack was just sufficient to answer 
all purposes of Acclimation," he said, and "I feel strong 
as ever."®
®Isaac H, Charles to John Edward Siddall, September 
18, 1847, Isaac H, Charles Letters (Louisiana State Uni­
versity Archives, Baton Rouge).
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This letter must have provoked a sharp response 
from the cousin in Philadelphia regarding the subject of 
health in New Orleans, for young Isaac Charles, the newly 
acclimated New Orleanian, felt it necessary in his next 
letter northward to defend his adopted city with as much 
patriotism as any native. "As for our Fevers Ned, I must 
beg of you to speak of them in a more respectful manner. 
You seem to place your 'City of Brotherly love,' against 
or rather before, our beloved 'Crescent,' as regards 
health--But there I think you are wrong," he contended. 
Actually, the Philadelphian was right; New Orleans suffer­
ed an annual mortality rate far above that in the City of 
Brotherly Love. Nevertheless, Isaac Charles, like all 
good New Orleanians, proceeded to set forth the usual 
pattern of argument. Within a six-year period, he declar­
ed, from 1842 to 1847, only one yellow fever epidemic had 
occurred, and he believed the total mortality for that six- 
year period in New Orleans was probably no greater than 
that in Philadelphia during the same time. Furthermore, 
New Orleans suffered a sickly season only about once every 
six or seven years; "And besides--the Yellow Fever is not 
so terrible a disease after all." At this point, young 
Charles introduced a line of defense which recurs
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throughout the period of yellow fever's prevalence in 
Louisiana, a notion involving some degree of class con­
sciousness. He admitted that the disease carried off great 
numbers of persons, "but by far the greater part of the 
victims are the Irish & the Dutch, who have just arrived 
from a country where the Climate is totally different to 
ours -- And if you could accompany me thro' some parts of 
this place," he continued, "& see the miserable, filthy, 
loathsome manner in which the lower orders live, you would 
not be at all surprised, that when a fever once broke out, 
that it should spread & become as malignant as it does 
here.” He then described a portion of the citÿ with its 
^long ranges of one story frame houses" which gàve off 
such a "stench" that one could hardly stand to walk near 
the area. This section of New Orleans, he declared, was 
crowded with "the lower order of men, women & children--a 
set of rumdrinking, fighting people," After closing his 
letter, the snobbish young New Orleanian decided to write 
an additional page describing the better aspects of the 
city such as the areas "inhabited by very respectable 
people."9 This inclination to blame the high mortality
9lbid., November 1 8 ,  1 8 4 7 .
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rate from yellow fever in New Orleans on the lower orders 
of society, particularly the recently arrived European im­
migrants, was a typical theme in the writings of many 
observers.
Some New Orleanians seem to have considered epi­
demics as providential instruments for keeping down the 
numbers of undesirables in the population. In a discussion 
calling attention to the pressing need for sanitary reform 
in the Crescent City, the editor of the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal in 1845 declared that he was "aware of 
the opinions of some narrow-minded and selfish individuals, 
that our city is already too healthy, and that nothing but 
frequent and severe epidemics can keep off the million who 
are eager to come here, and who, they say, would divide 
and fritter away the business of the place until it would 
be worth nothing to any one," Nevertheless, the editor 
did not believe these opinions were held by "the liberal 
and philanthropic members of the medical profession, nor, 
we trust of our enlightened councilmen." On the contrary, 
he suggested that business and prosperity would grow with 
an increasing population.^®
IOn . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., II (November, 1845),
397-98.
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Those who favored the periodic occurrence of epi­
demics to clear away a portion of the unwelcome strangers 
and lower classes probably constituted a very small minor­
ity in New Orleans. But almost every commentator on yellow 
fever, whether a newspaper editor, a physician, or a layman 
writing a letter, associated the origin and prevalence of 
the disease and its most fatal effects with the lower 
orders of society and their filthy living habits. Even 
when the disease leaped across the socio-economic bound­
aries and attacked members of all classes, the chances for 
recovery seemed to increase in proportion to one's status. 
One observer of the epidemic of 1847 wrote, "It [yellow 
fever] attacks indiscriminately but proves fatal to but 
few except the dissipated and filthy -- Nine tenths of the 
funerals that have been seen by the writer within a fort­
night were Irish. These die as a matter of course.
Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner pointed out that the poor 
classes suffered more than others, not only from yellow 
fever, but from all kinds of fevers. In a superior tone 
reflecting the attitude of his social order. Dr. Fenner
^Bartlett for Smith & Bro. to T. Smith & Co., 
August 12, 1847, T. Smith and Company Papers (Louisiana 
State University Archives, Baton Rouge).
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declared, "No one aware of the stupid imprudence and 
negligence of the laboring classes can be surprised at the 
mortality amongst them. They receive high wages for their 
labour, and having no Idea of economy. It too often causes 
their ruin." On the other hand, the better classes In the 
city, according to Fenner, suffered only slightly from any 
kind of fever,
After a limited outbreak of yellow fever In 1849, 
the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 
noted that the disease that season had been "confined 
almost exclusively to the laboring and lower class of the 
community." Few In the upper "walks of life" who attended 
to the usual "hygienic precautions" suffered an attack.
Did the difference In living habits account for "this pre­
ference of the disease for a particular class of persons?" 
the editor asked. Believing this to be the case, he sug­
gested that if the social and moral condition of the lower 
class could be "ameliorated and raised to a level with the 
better class of our citizens, the yellow fever would seldom 
visit our city." As additional evidence for his argument, 
the editor observed that even among the unacclimated
12n , 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., V(July, 1848), 52-53.
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strangers having recently arrived in the city, the "respect­
able portion" of that group had been relatively untouched
1 0
by the disease.
Defending New Orleans against the charge of insalu­
brity, one New Orleans physician. Dr. J, S, McFarlane, 
became rather vehement in blaming the situation on the 
strangers. Except during epidemic seasons, which did not 
affect the residents at all, he claimed. New Orleans 
enjoyed unusually good health. Not only were the strang­
ers responsible for New Orleans' reputation for bad 
health, but also its reputation for immorality. "Every 
evil with which we have to contend," declared Dr, McFar­
lane, "is introduced by strangers. Go and survey the 
seats of impurity, -- who are their conductors? who 
their occupants? who their supporters, and who their fre­
quenters? Strangers; who periodically visit this city."
It was the "floating population," the temporary residents, 
that he blamed for swelling the lists of crime and disease 
in the Crescent City and for causing the smear on the 
city's good name. Dr. McFarlane felt it was high time 
that New Orleanians "fix the charge of vice and insalubrity
13lbid., VI (November, 1849), 407-409.
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where it properly belongs— on those who, coming temporarily 
among us . . . indulge . . .  in every evil propensity and 
passion, until they are overtaken by those retributive dis­
eases which have been ordained as the punishment of vice 
and immorality."14 whether he came with the intention of 
residing temporarily or permanently, whether his filthy 
living habits and his intemperance provoked the fever by 
natural law, or his ungodliness and immorality brought 
down divine retribution upon his head, the stranger, the 
newcomer to New Orleans, most frequently received the 
blame for the high mortality and severe epidemics which 
blackened the city's reputation.
Richard Shryock in Medicine and Society has noted 
that the public reaction to any disease varies according 
to the nature of the disease as well as the class of persons 
most generally affected. Those ailments mainly affecting 
the poor, particularly the endemic diseases, were largely 
taken for granted and aroused little public concern. But, 
according to Shryock, an epidemic disease like yellow 
fever which spread in a mysterious manner with terrible 
and fatal effects, and which affected the upper classes as
^4m *Farlane, A Review of the Yellow Fever, viii.
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well as the lower, and whites even more than Negroes, was 
certain to create a strong public r e a c t i o n . I n  areas 
where yellow fever was not an annual occurrence, the dis­
ease was particularly terrifying and caused a great up­
roar among all classes whenever it did strike. New 
Orleans, however, represents an exceptional situation.
For many years in that city yellow fever was so common an 
occurrence that it was taken for granted. Furthermore, 
circumstances provided some basis for the view that it was 
a disease of the lower classes.
While yellow fever never became fully endemic 
because of the winter season which temporarily curtailed 
the activity of the yellow fever mosquito and broke the 
chain of causation, for over a half-century the disease 
seems to have been re-introduced every single year, so 
that it became the next thing to an endemic malady. Under 
these circumstances the children of New Orleans had ample 
opportunity to contract a case of the fever and recover 
from the mild unrecognized attack with lifetime protection 
of full immunity. Hence, in the Crescent City yellow
ISRichard Harrison Shryock, Medicine and Society in 
America, 1660-1860 (New York, 1960), 93-94.
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fever did not present the same pattern of indiscriminate 
activity that it did in areas where it was less common, 
and native or long-resident New Orleanians always enjoyed 
a noticeable exemption from the disease which mowed down 
the newcomers.
As yellow fever almost always raged first in the 
slum areas along the waterfront after its introduction in 
the shipping, it seemed logical to relate that disease to 
the unhygienic living conditions of the lower classes 
living in those run-down areas. Sometimes the pestilence 
crossed the social boundaries and spread among the well- 
to-do; but even when this situation developed, the fever 
seemed less severe among the upper strata of society, 
undoubtedly because the wealthier patients sought medical 
attention immediately and obtained the best possible nurs­
ing care, while the daily laborers forced themselves to 
continue the business of earning a living until it was 
often too late for any treatment to suffice.
At any rate, the well-established New Orleanian, 
generally confident of his immunity to the yellow pesti­
lence, tended to dismiss the scourge of New Orleans as the 
disease of strangers and the laboring classes. This at­
titude probably accounts for the years of disinterest in
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preventive measures. In the latter half of the nineteenth 
century when the Crescent City enjoyed a number of years 
of complete exemption from the disease and the pestilence 
became a less familiar phenomenon, the native born indi­
vidual, having missed the opportunity to acquire immunity 
through a mild case in childhood, found himself in young 
adulthood as susceptible as the immigrant. Then the New 
Orleanian began to take more cognizance of the disease 
which was discovered after all to be no respector of 
persons.
That New Orleans Creoles exhibited an apparent im­
munity to yellow fever was a clearly observed phenomenon; 
why they did so was not a matter of certainty. In the 
1850’s and 1860's the question of Creole immunity flared 
into a full-fledged controversy. Before the epidemic of 
1853 the New Orleans medical profession almost unanimously 
believed that persons born in New Orleans and gradually 
acclimated to the meteorological influences were not liable
to yellow fever. But a few medical men had come to
believe that Creole children did experience the disease in 
cases so mild as to escape diagnosis.
During the epidemic of 1858 the editor of the New
Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette declared that
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the Idea of Creole exemption from yellow fever was .a 
fallacious notion which should have been set aside after 
the considerable number of cases and deaths among Creoles 
in 1853. But that doctrine was still generally accepted, 
he observed; and although Creole children were dying 
daily of fever exhibiting yellowness, black vomit, and 
the other obvious symptoms of the disease during the 
epidemic of 1858, the malady among those children was 
called pernicious fever simply because of the firm belief 
that Creoles could not have yellow fever,
That epidemic disease among Creole children in 
1858 set off a lively discussion among the French phy­
sicians in New Orleans, with Dr. Charles Faget and Dr. 
Charles Delery representing the two opposing views. Dr. 
Faget insisted that both Creoles and Negroes were immune 
to yellow fever and that the fever among them, sometimes 
incorrectly diagnosed as yellow fever, was actually 
"fievre paludeene.” On the other hand, Dr. Delery con­
tended that neither Creoles nor Negroes were ipso facto 
exempt from the disease. The discussion of the issue grew
^^N. 0. Med. News & Hosp. Gaz., V (October, 1858),
553.
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more and more heated in tone, with physicians throughout 
the city joining one side or the other and writing spirit­
ed articles in the medical journals and the newspapers. 
Eventually, the personal element in the debate between the 
leading contenders became so intense that Delery challeng­
ed Faget to a duel. Declaring himself a Christian, Faget 
refused to accept the challenge. If the average man had 
turned down a fight to the finish on such grounds, he 
might have been considered a coward, but not Dr. Faget, 
who was noted for being religious to the point of fanatic-
ism.
Still the controversy persisted. After the epi­
demic of 1867, the next severe visitation after that of 
1858, Dr. Delery wrote a book with the intention of des­
troying the prejudice in favor of Creole immunity. His 
opposition to the traditional view in 1858 had only been 
reinforced by further observations. Explaining how the 
tradition had begun, he pointed out that time after time 
in epidemics, while strangers had borne the chief burden 
of the pestilence, attacks among Creoles had been exceed­
ingly rare. Finally, the conclusion had been drawn that
l^Edward Larocque Tinker, Pen, Pills, and Pistols, 
A Louisiana Chronicle (New York, 1934), 7.
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Creoles were ioxmune. Therefore, when a disease resembling 
yellow fever occurred In Creole children, IC was called 
malignant, putrid, or ataxic fever--anything else but 
yellow fever. The tradition had long been sustained by 
prejudice, he contended, a powerful prejudice which made 
of the Creole families a privileged class. And, he under­
stood why It was extremely difficult to destroy a belief 
so dear to those among the supposedly privileged class.
But Dr. Delery described a number of cases, carefully 
bolstered his argument with Irrefutable facts, and once 
again concluded that, contrary to the opinion of Dr.
Faget, yellow fever did occur among Creole children.^®
In 1880 Dr. Stanford Challle wrote an article for 
the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal In which he 
discussed the problem of Creole immunity, and with ad­
ditional evidence obtained In Cuba, argued that yellow 
fever attacked native born children as well as newcomers 
in an area where the disease occurred endemlcally or 
regularly. By 1880 this view was generally accepted by
l®Françols Charles Delery, Mémoire sur l'ËpIdémIe 
de Fl&vre Jaune, qui a Régné à Nouvelle-Orleans et dans
les Campagnes pendant l'Année 1867 (Nouvelle-Orléans, 
1867), 111-lv, 7-10, 94.
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the medical profession in New Orleans, except for Drs. 
Charles Faget and Armand Mercier who still clung to the 
traditional belief in Creole immunity by virtue of birth. 
Chaîné explained the change of opinion in this manner :
. until 1858, New Orleans was ravaged by almost bien­
nial epidemics, while since 1858 there have been only two 
serious invasions, in 1867 and 1878. The longer the 
intervals between epidemics, the larger necessarily must 
be the number of those who have failed to acquire immunity, 
and the more glaring becomes their liability to the dis­
ease." Wherever the fever occurred only occasionally, the 
Creoles seemed as open to attack as anyone else; but where 
the fever occurred regularly, Creole adults seemed gener­
ally exempt from the disease, obviously because they had 
acquired immunity by mild attacks in childhood. In con­
clusion, Dr. Chaille rejected once and for all the old 
notion that becoming accustomed to the climate conferred 
any degree of immunity. He felt it was "an abuse of 
language" to refer to yellow fever immunity as acclimation 
--two different things altogether
Another question relating to susceptibility arose
0, Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VIII 
(August, 1880), 11, 114, 122.
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in regard to the noticeable preponderance of yellow fever 
deaths among men over those among women. Naturally, these 
circumstances led some to believe that women possessed a 
kind of Inherent resistance to yellow fever simply on the 
basis of sex. One explanation suggested that while women 
were confined largely to their homes, men by their dally 
occupations were exposed to the harsh elements of the 
weather and to more numerous opportunities for contracting 
the yellow fever poison as they circulated about the city 
and experienced dally contacts with ^  variety of persons. 
Furthermore, It was postulated that men were more sus­
ceptible to the fever than women because they were univer­
sally more reckless and Intemperate In their living 
habits.20
In the 1850's Dr. Elisha Bartlett In his History of 
the Diagnosis and Treatment of the Fevers of the United 
States noted that yellow fever destroyed more males than 
females, but felt that further Investigation was required 
before one could state definitely that the sexes really 
possessed a different degree of susceptibility. That more 
men than women died In yellow fever epidemics proved
20picayune, September 9, 1867.
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nothing regarding a partial immunity of females, he con­
tended,^ since the number of males exposed to the disease 
was always greater than females. The major portion of the 
mortality always occurred among the stranger population in 
a city, and among immigrants, men always greatly outnumber­
ed women. And although the incidence of male deaths from 
yellow fever in the port cities exceeded the female mor­
tality, in several large inland cities, away from the coast 
and with fewer strangers and sailors, the female fatalities 
from yellow fever had at times been the greater, Bartlett 
did not deny absolutely that women were by nature less 
susceptible to the disease; he merely wanted to indicate 
that mortality figures alone could not warrant such a con­
clusion.21 By 1880, on the basis of his research. Dr. 
Chaille had concluded that what seemed to be a lesser 
degree of susceptibility among women might well be explain­
ed by the circumstances of exposure, and that the supposed
22resistance of females was thus more apparent than real.
Throughout the history of yellow fever the question
2lElisha Bartlett, The History, Diagnosis, and Treat- 
ment of the Fevers of the United States (4th ed., Philadel­
phia, 1856), 509.
22n , 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VIII 
(August, 1880), 101-36.
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of the Negro's reaction to the disease has perplexed the 
medical profession. The contrast between yellow fever's 
activity in the white and Negro races was so great that 
for the first half of the nineteenth century, many 
believed that Negroes enjoyed an almost complete immunity 
from the disease. From time to time, however, exceptions 
occurred and Negroes did contract observable cases of the 
fever, but its effects were almost always exceedingly 
mild. Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner in writing of the epi­
demic of 1853 stated, "It is a well established fact that 
there is some thing in the negro constitution which 
affords him protection against the worst effects of Yellow 
Fever; but what it is I am unable to say," He observed 
that the Negro came down with the fever as readily as the 
white man, but its action was seldom fatal. Fenner believ­
ed that "the least mixture of the white race with the black 
seems to increase the liability of the latter to the 
dangers of Yellow Fever; and the danger is in proportion 
to the amount of white blood in the mixture.
In 1853 Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright, exponent of a 
specialized medical practice designed for the peculiarities
23penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 56.
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of the Negro constitution, advanced a rather strange 
theory regarding yellow fever in relation to the white and 
Negro races. Classifying the yellow pestilence as a form 
of tropical typhus, he was convinced that it resulted from 
the violation of nature's laws, ’’Nature scorns to see the 
aristocracy of the white skin--the only kind known to 
American institutions--reduced to drudgery work under a 
Southern sun, and has issued her fiat," Dr. Cartwright con­
tended, "that here at least, whether of Celtic or Teutonic 
origin they shall not be hewers of wood or drawers of 
water, or wallow in the sloughs of intemperance, under 
pain of three fourths of their number being cut off." 
Furthermore, he insisted, "Until this immutable law, which 
has made the white race rulers . . .  be properly respected, 
the deaths arising from its violation will continue to 
swell the bills of mortality, and to lead the world into 
the error that New Orleans is a most sickly location."
Who were the prime sufferers from yellow fever? None 
other than Northern emigrants, said Cartwright, who fell 
prey to an artificial complaint of their own creation.
They produced the disease by their intemperate living 
habits and their "drudgery" labor in the hot summer sun.
The annual cases of yellow fever in the Crescent City,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
391
Cartwright claimed, occurred for the most part among those 
"unacclimated persons who attempt to jostle the negro from 
his stool, and to take from him those outdoor, laborious 
employments in the sun, wisely given to him as a precious 
inheritance to lift him up from brutish barbarism upon the 
platform of civilization, by forcing him to expand his 
lungs and oxygenate his blood,
When in 1853 the New York Tribune suggested that 
yellow fever was a consequence of slavery, introduced from 
Africa by the slave trade, and continually tormenting those 
areas where slavery prevailed, the New Orleans Weekly 
Delta, in a Cartwrightian vein, countered with the medical 
pro-slavery argument and pointed to the extraordinary 
exemption of the Negro from the disease. Considering the 
tremendous death rate among the white laboring classes, 
the editor wondered at the disastrous results which might 
be expected if slave labor were completely replaced by 
members of the white race.^^
In August of 1853 the Delta had published an article 
signed "Tuckahoe," which might have been written by Dr.
Z^N, 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., X (November, 1853), 312-
13.
25New Orleans Weekly Delta, October 2, 1853.
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Cartwright himself. The author intended to correct the 
belief then finding support in many quarters that even the 
states of the extreme South were "not too hot to be culti­
vated by white labor." He maintained that the large 
majority of yellow fever fatalities occurred among that 
class of people which put into practice a popular aboli­
tionist theory; that is, the white laborers who violated 
the laws of nature "in making negroes of themselves by 
doing the work in hot noon-day summer sun that negroes 
ought to do," Such practices were roundly denounced as 
"rank poison abolitionism," Admitting that those persons 
who had Negroes"to perform drudgery work and to fan them" 
were not entirely exempt from yellow fever, "Tuckahoe" 
contended that they were almost certain to recover from 
an attack. "Slaves and masters rarely die; if they do 
it is because they have been practicing on the abolition 
theory," which consisted in the masters exposing themselves 
to the hot sun and the slaves slipping away from white 
supervision. The lesson to be learned was that Negro 
slavery was not a curse, but rather a blessing to both 
races in the South. Finally, "Tuckahoe" suggested that 
the most effective quarantine against the yellow pesti­
lence would be to prevent the practice of abolitionist
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theories.26 if the "Tuckahoe" article was not authored by 
Dr. Cartwright himself, the writer was at any rate ideolo­
gically very close to that physician.
Although the epidemic of 1853 affected more Negroes 
than any yellow fever epidemic ever had before, Cartwright 
continued to support his peculiar theory. The yellow fever 
fatalities among New Orleans Negroes in 1833, he explained, 
resulted more from panic than from the disease itself.
"A negro never dies with it [yellow fever] in any locality, 
when treated with regard to his ethnical peculiarities;
. . . even under mal-practice," he insisted, "death is the 
exception--and recovery, the rule,"2?
In 1854 Dr. M, Morton Dowler attacked Cartwright's 
view of a special medical methodology adapted for the 
treatment of the Negro. In his practice during the epi­
demic of 1854, Dowler had dealt with five cases of yellow 
fever among Negroes. "I treated them without reference 
either to free-soilism or the ultraism of . . . Dr. Cart­
wright, who, whatever he may expect from the laity, cannot 
expect any medical man, be he fire-eater, unionist or
26lbid., August 14, 1853.
27n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XV (March, 1858), 150.
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abolitionist, to swallow his paradoxes with regard to 
negroes." Describing one case of yellow fever in a Negro 
woman whom he had treated "on the same principles I would 
have treated a golden-haired daughter of Japhet," he 
claimed that she had responded rather well and had exhibit­
ed no ill effects from "white folks' diet" or the other
O Q
usual treatment for Caucasians.
When in the epidemic of 1867 a considerable number 
of Negroes experienced yellow fever attacks, the editor of 
the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal commented on 
that phenomenon as an unusual characteristic of the epi­
demic, "following the solitary precedent of 1853,"
Further, mixing a bit of politics with pathology, he 
declared, "We infer that this is one of the civil rights 
conferred on that fortunate class by the late enlightened 
Congress, of which they are already availing themselves."^9 
Whether the mildness of yellow fever exhibited in 
Negroes was based on a genuine or only an apparent im­
munity was a question which continued to intrigue the 
medical thinker. After the epidemic of 1905, Dr. Charles
28ibid., XI (November, 1854), 375. 
29ibid., XX (September, 1867), 286.
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Chassalgnac of New Orleans concluded that the evidence of 
that epidemic clearly indicated that Negroes were as sus­
ceptible to the disease as whites, although as a rule they 
experienced only a mild form of the fever. He cited the 
mortality statistics from the vicinity of Tallulah, Louisi­
ana, to support his conclusion. In that area, of ninety 
white cases, eighteen died, or about twenty per cent; of 
950 Negro cases, only five died, or about one-half of one 
per cent. In the neighborhood of Patterson, Louisiana, of 
about 500 white cases, fifty-one died, but of the 200 
Negro cases, only one died. Attempting to account for the 
racial difference, Dr. Chassaignac set forth the possibi­
lity of a greater resistance, by the Negro to the yellow 
fever poison after it entered the system; but he was more 
inclined to believe that the Negro actually received a 
lesser dose of the infection in the first place because he 
was bitten less by the mosquito. "This may be due to his 
tougher skin," the doctor speculated, "or to the strong 
musky smell coming from his surface which may keep the 
mosquitoes away in a way analagous to that of pennyroyal 
and other strong scents which are used with that end
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in vleWo’*^ ®
Even in the mid-twentieth century the existence of 
a partial Immunity based on race has not been settled 
absolutely. It has been suggested, however, that the 
Negro's reaction to the disease is what one might expect 
to develop in a race exposed to yellow fever for countless 
generations. In fact, the mild and seldom fatal form of 
the disease in the Negro is one point in the argument for 
Africa as yellow fever's place of origin. During the 
course of any yellow fever epidemic, the disease has 
always evidenced a considerable amount of variation in the 
severity of its effects on individuals, regardless of the 
race factor. The reasons for this variability cannot be 
explained completely even today.
At any rate, there was an obvious susceptibility 
on the part of immigrants recently having come into the 
yellow fever locality, not because they were unaccustomed 
to the climate, but because they had not been previously 
exposed to the malady. Native or long-resident inhabitants.
^Ocharles Chassaignac, "Some Lessons Taught by the 
Epidemic of 1905," in Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 
1054-55.
S^Trent (ed.), "The Men Who Conquered Yellow Fever," 
loc. cit., 85.
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on the other hand, exhibited a striking immunity by con­
trast, not because they were acclimated, but because many 
or most had experienced mild, undiagnosed cases at some 
previous time, probably as children. The connection be­
tween the lower classes and the prevalence and severity of 
the disease so often proposed by yellow fever theorists 
had a very real basis, but not for the reasons generally 
assumed by the upper class medical and lay philosophers-- 
not because the Saffron Scourge was a class-conscious dis­
ease , nor because the Almighty sent down the plague upon 
the unclean, intemperate, and immoral portions of the 
population. But the slum areas were located near the 
waterfront, and the laboring classes who worked on the 
docks were most likely to contract the first cases of 
yellow fever after its initial introduction by vessels 
coming from Latin America. Also, the laborers were more 
likely to ignore the beginning symptoms of illness and to 
keep working until the disease became so far advanced that 
by the time they sought medical aid, it was frequently too 
late. Nevertheless, those of the well-to-do classes of 
New Orleans, if not immune by prior attack, were just as 
susceptible to yellow fever when bitten by an infected 
mosquito as the lowest man on the socio-economic scale.
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Although the pattern of yellow fever’s activity at 
times seemed to bolster the Creole's idea of himself as a 
member of a privileged immune class, and to tie in with 
pro-slavery, class consciousness, and opposition to im­
migration, the erratic behavior of the disease may be 
attributed primarily to circumstantial factors, in addition 
to the likelihood of a racial resistance on the part of the 
Negro. But to the nineteenth-century theorist, the related 
problems of susceptibility, immunity, and acclimation 
simply furnished more issues to be debated. As in all 
other questions relating to the disease, some evidence 
seemed to indicate a general pattern, but sufficient evi­
dence always existed on the opposite side of every issue 
to taunt the intellect in its search for the rules of 
consistency.
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CHAPTER IX
IMPACT OF EPIDEMIC YELLOW FEVER ON THE 
LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY
Directly or Indirectly, epidemic yellow fever 
affected virtually every aspect of human affairs within a 
conamunity under its influence. The inexorable march of a 
death-dealing epidemic malady against which medical science 
seemed helpless could scarcely be ignored by any suscepti­
ble individual within its path, and many Louisianians 
(particularly in New Orleans) lived and died under the 
shadow cast intermittently by the yellow pestilence for 
more than a century.
Reactions to the crisis precipitated by an epidemic 
in New Orleans and in the interior towns were different in 
some respects and similar in others. In 1854 Dr, T, A. 
Cooke of Washington, Louisiana, commented on the differ­
ence between city and country attitudes: "The effect of a
fatal pestilence in towns of the country cannot well be con­
ceived by those who have not witnessed it. It spreads 
alarm; the people are panic-stricken; and every death adds
to the consternation, which sweeps over the land."
399
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Ultimately, "every house becomes a barricaded castle," he 
said; "then ensues a disruption of the bonds which hold men 
together, and for the time society is dissolved." An epi­
demic in the country was not so easily forgotten as in the 
city, "In the country the dead were known to all," Dr. 
Cooke declared, "and the remembrance of virtue and merit 
is not buried with the mortal remains of the dead." On the 
other hand, the city, after the termination of a destruc­
tive visitation, was "like the sea, more tranquil after 
the tempest had subsided and the surge ceases to roll." 
While the country folk long retained an intense memory of 
pestilential terrors and suffering, the large populace of 
New Orleans rapidly fell back into the "coldest apathy" and 
the past was soon forgotten.^ In the interior rural com­
munities, the large majority of victims lost to the pesti­
lence were known personally to nearly all the survivors; 
in New Orleans, while many persons grieved over lost 
friends and family, the thousands of fatalities could 
represent little more to the individual than an impersonal 
item of mortality statistics.
There were a number of reasons for this difference
^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., X (March, 1854), 603.
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between the Crescent C ty's attitude and that of the 
interior communities. In the first place. New Orleans 
experienced frequent visitations of yellow fever, and 
fairly early in the nineteenth century had come to accept 
the disease as a customary foe. Many New Orleanians, im­
mune to the fever by childhood attacks, or at least 
believing themselves "acclimated," felt relatively secure. 
But the country towns only suffered occasional outbreaks; 
hence, when yellow fever did strike, almost everyone was 
fully liable to attack. The fear of the disease outside 
the Crescent City, then, was greatly intensified because 
of yellow fever's unfamiliar status. Furthermore, the 
ravages of the fever had a greater personal impact within 
the close-knit relationships of families and friends in 
rural communities.
Throughout the literature on yellow fever in nine­
teenth-century New Orleans, one can find expressions of 
this passive acceptance of periodic epidemics. Probably 
this indifference was felt mainly by those who could afford 
to be apathetic--the so-called "acclimated" native-born 
residents or those who had already experienced an attack of 
the fever. Undoubtedly, there were those remaining in the 
city who feared the disease; certainly there were many who
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
402
fled in terror at the approach of an epidemic, as well as 
those who journeyed elsewhere each summer before the coming 
of the fever. But those persons who always provided the 
bulk of yellow fever's vietims--immigrants, particularly 
poor ones--unfortunately were not among the articulate and 
active business and civic community. Therefore, one can 
only speculate as to their relative fear or indifference 
regarding the pestilence. Perhaps they were generally 
unaware of the scourge of New Orleans, and hence could 
suffer no anticipatory terrors. Perhaps they considered 
yellow fever simply one more gamble along with countless 
other risks in the uncertainty of their existence. At any 
rate. New Orleans continued to attract large numbers of 
immigrants from Europe and other parts of America, and in 
spite of its reputation in the early nineteenth century as 
the Necropolis of the South, its population increased by 
leaps and bounds.
According to one nineteenth-century Louisiana his­
torian, yellow fever had no more terrors for New Orleanians 
"than had for the ancients the skull which used to figure 
among the roses and other luxuries that adorned their 
banqueting tables." Some inhabitants of the Crescent City 
even "felt friendly to the scourge," believing that "it
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checked that tide of immigration which, otherwise, would 
have speedily rolled its waves over the old population, 
and swept away all those landmarks in legislation, cus­
toms, language and social habits to which they were fondly
2
attached."
Describing this general indifference displayed in 
New Orleans, another nineteenth-century Louisiana writer 
noted that the Creole, who as a rule enjoyed immunity, 
worried little about the strangers victimized by the 
yellow pestilence. After all, nobody asked them to come 
to New Orleans, As for the American in the Crescent City, 
his primary interest was the immediate gain derived from 
commercial activity. And even if the summer brought the 
Saffron Scourge, nevertheless, the winter brought trade
O
and prosperity! In the words of another historian, "the 
community was too busy with gainful pursuits to concern 
itself much about the fever, which was looked on rather as 
an established institution." Minimizing the importance of 
the disease, influential New Orleanians insisted over and 
over that the city was an unusually healthy place and
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 636. 
3Cable, The Creoles of Louisiana, 292,
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that their epidemic fevers affected only the indigent im­
migrant and the intemperate,^
During the violent epidemic of 1858, the editor of 
the New Orleans Daily Delta remarked that the outsider un­
doubtedly would be interested to know that in New Orleans 
"Everywhere he would find but comparatively little atten­
tion paid to the scourge on the part of the great body of 
citizens." The first announcement of yellow fever in the 
city resulted in panic among the unacclimated, and those 
able to do so fled the scene. But, claimed the editor, 
the acclimated (in this case, those accustomed to the 
climate) felt no fear. In fact, "they seem to take the 
matter as cooly as if it was something expected annually, 
and about which it were idle to become alarmed." That 
editor also remarked that it was strange to observe how 
quickly those among the unacclimated unable to leave the 
city fell into "this prevailing state of indifference.
On one occasion, a Crescent City minister allegedly 
commented, "I like the people of New Orleans; they are not 
afraid of epidemics, and when they die, do not whine about
^Kendall, History of New Orleans, I, 132-33. 
^New Orleans Daily Delta, September 10, 1858.
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it.” Such a sentiment about such an attitude illustrates 
the apathy resulting from the frequency of yellow fever 
epidemics during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Pestilential visitations were common, ordinary, expected, 
and accepted as apparently unavoidable disasters,^
In spite of the divergent attitudes and reactions 
toward the Saffron Scourge exhibited in the Crescent City 
and the other towns of Louisiana where the disease was less 
common, all epidemics produced certain common effects 
regardless of where they occurred. People suffered and 
died everywhere. The sick and their families had to be 
cared for. The normal channels of trade, travel, and 
transportation were disrupted. Hard times and unemploy­
ment followed. Because of the close economic relationship 
between New Orleans and its hinterland, an epidemic in the 
Crescent City, whether or not the disease spread inland, 
interrupted the flow of crops to New Orleans and supplies 
to the interior.
That epidemic yellow fever had serious economic 
consequences is unquestionable, although it is impossible 
to calculate in terms of dollars and cents the losses
^N. 0. Med. 6t Surg. Jour., New Series, XIV (June, 
1887), 920.
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sustained by the business and laboring community. Almost 
every commentator noted the impact of the pestilence on 
commercial activity whenever and wherever it occurred. 
During severe epidemic visitations, business in New Orleans 
slowed to an almost complete standstill. Many commercial 
establishments closed down entirely, or remained open only 
during a portion of the day. Motivated by dread of the 
fever, thousands of persons left New Orleans during the 
summer, whether or not an epidemic occurred. Thousands 
more fled with the approach of the disease in epidemic 
form. Persons in the interior were afraid to go anywhere 
near the plague-stricken city until the coming of frost,^ 
Official or unofficial quarantine, which inevitably 
resulted, hindered the shipment of products to and from 
New Orleans, Most country merchants and planters refused 
to accept goods from New Orleans while yellow fever raged 
in the city. Furthermore, the spread of disease to the
^Latrobe, Impressions Respecting New Orleans, 147; 
Crescent, June 22, 1853; Picayune, October 8, 1833; Price- 
Current , August 20, 1853; Cable, The Creoles of Louisiana, 
298-99; Smith and Son Company to Smith Company, September 
3, October 3, November 14, 1839, October 17, 1840, October 
22, 1841, T, Smith and Company Papers; Thomas W, Compton 
to Charles Mathews, July 4, 1856, Charles L, Mathews 
Family Papers (Louisiana State University Archives, Baton 
Rouge); Anonymous Letter, September 18, 1871, Miscellaneous 
Papers, ibid.
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interior interfered with the harvesting of crops, causing 
severe losses, or at least resulting in a period of delay 
in the process of economic exchange.
In late August of 1853 the New Orleans Price-Current 
reported that the dreadful epidemic had completely deranged 
all business operations. Little produce of any kind was 
sent to New Orleans from the interior. Shipments of cotton 
were halted because of sickness in the port city and the 
river towns. In early October that journal again lamented 
the disruption of "the whole machinery of our commerce" 
and predicted that many weeks would be required for the 
process of readjustment. The epidemic, asserted the 
editor, had almost completely suspended intercourse with 
interior communities. Moreover, it had prevented northern 
and European vessels from coming to New Orleans, and many 
ships loaded with goods found it necessary to postpone 
their departure from the Crescent City because of strict
Q
quarantine regulations in northern ports.
Voicing a sentiment which was becoming more and 
more prevalent during the 1850's, the editor of the New 
Orleans Bee commented in 1858: "Everyone is aware that
Bprice-Current, August 20, 27, October 1, 1853.
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the prevalence of yellow fever in our city is the chief 
drawback to our prosperity; that but for this haunting 
apprehension our summer population would not be materially 
reduced, nor would the tide of business recede from our 
shores." Since the progress of the Crescent City would be 
at least ten times greater "if our city were absolutely 
free from the terrors of the epidemic," the editor consider­
ed it the duty of New Orleanians, for the good of humanity 
as well as for the city's commercial interest, to inquire 
into the possibility of combating the pestilence.^ The 
Great Epidemics of the 1850's had brought about a greater 
concern regarding the customary foe and the possibility of 
doing something to solve that chronic problem, as much on 
economic grounds as any other.
The epidemic of 1867, like every other, disturbed 
the operations of commerce, and Crescent City newspapers 
reported daily the usual difficulties attendant upon the 
presence of the Saffron Scourge. In mid-September one 
editor remarked that business was "in a state of stagna­
tion" because of the obstacles to trade and travel result­
ing from the unhealthy condition of the city.^O Another
^Bee, October 22, 1858, 
lOlbid., September 15, 1867.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
409
editor in early October complained of the business dead­
lock and the scarcity of money. Payment was due on notes 
held by northern firms for goods purchased several months 
before by New Orleans merchants. In ordinary times, the 
editor declared, such notes would have been paid off 
promptly; under the circumstances, however, he hoped the 
northern creditors would appreciate "the difficulties and 
stagnation caused by the dreadful scourge paralyzing the 
arm of trade” and would agree to wait until the coming of 
frost and the renewal of trade before demanding payment.
A series of letters from Thomas C, Porteous, a New 
Orleans merchant, to a Paris business associate during the 
epidemic of 1878 illustrates the serious concern felt by 
businessmen during epidemic seasons. In early August he 
wrote: "I regret very much to say that the health of the
city continues to give much uneasiness as to its effect on 
the fall trade. . . ." Even in ordinary times August was 
the dullest month of the year for trade, but in 1878 "the 
yellow fever panic has driven nearly all our customers 
away and caused a rigid quarantine to be enforced all 
around us, which must almost paralyze the general trade
llpicayune, October 11, 1867.
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of New Orleans while it lasts,”
Several days later Porteous complained that the 
streets of the Crescent City seemed almost deserted. Quaran­
tine had been imposed by every little village in every 
direction from New Orleans, and "in the store we are having
the dullest time I ever remember, no cash sales & collec-
1 1tions almost impossible." Because of the shortage of 
cash receipts, he continued to worry about the financial 
situation of the business. And even if the fever died out 
within a few weeks, Porteous was afraid that quarantines 
would not be raised nor would families return to the city 
until October, "so that our trade will be bad in September 
as well as August." To this businessman, the situation was 
a "great drawback & a bitter disappointment . . .  as I 
anticipated a fair business in August & September, based 
upon the fine condition of the crops & good prospects of 
our planters.
Every letter from the pen of this unhappy merchant 
described the progress of the epidemic and its disastrous
12Thomas C. Porteous to I. Levois, August 3, 1878, 
Thomas C, Porteous Letter Book (Louisiana State University 
Archives, Baton Rouge).
l^Ibid., August 6, 1878. 
l^ibid., August 9, 1878.
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effects upon commerce. In mid-August Porteous declared 
that "the present state of affairs is fairly killing busi­
ness in New O r l e a n s , O n  August 23 when the disease 
raging in the Crescent City had spread to many other places 
as well, he wrote his associate: "At present everything is
excessively dull, the city seems dead & one does not know 
what to do, I fret myself that here with a store full of 
goods & with prices advancing in New York, we cannot sell 
anything. , , ." To make matters worse, he continued,
"with plenty of good accounts on the books, which I examine 
every day, we cannot get any money, almost all our city 
people are away & with the quarantine we do not know if 
our letters to the country reach their destination,"^^ 
Continuing his complaint that retail trade was almost at a 
standstill, Porteous noted that few persons ventured out 
on the streets or into stores, "so there is no opportunity 
to push s a l e s , I n  early September one of his salesmen 
and one of his business associates came down with the 
fever.
ISlbid., August 13, 1878, l^ Tbid,, August 23, 1878,
l^Ibid,, August 30, 1878,
IBlbid., September 3, 10, 1878,
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Finally, by October 15 when the epidemic began to 
subside, business activity gradually increased, as "ladies 
who have been staying in doors a great deal for the past 2 
or 3 months, now begin to venture out & visit the stores & 
though not yet asking for fine goods, buy small articles 
which they s e e T r a d e  continued to improve and cash 
sales were increasing daily by early November. By late 
November, there was "no longer any sickness here & our 
absentees are returning daily by the hundreds, all we want 
now is a little cool weather & our trade will become quite 
active. . .
Even when New Orleans escaped a widespread epidemic 
and suffered only a few sporadic cases of yellow fever, the 
fear and alarm on the part of the inhabitants of the inte­
rior sometimes resulted in rigid quarantines. Those 
barriers affected business in almost the same manner as if 
a bad epidemic had occurred, by limiting the exchange of
goods and postponing for several weeks the usual brisk
21trading activity based on the late summer harvest.^
19lbid., October 15, 1878.
ZOlbid., November 2, 5, 15, 22, 1878.
Zlporteous to R, Heydenreich, July 18, August 1, 
September 12, 1879, Thomas C, Porteous Letter Book; Porteous 
to E, Bourbon, July 22, September 2, 23, 1879, ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
413
Particularly in the latter nineteenth century, intra­
state and interstate quarantine restrictions established 
against New Orleans and other infected (or supposedly in­
fected) points throughout the South entangled trade and 
transportation to such an extent that contact between many 
areas was cut off altogether. New Orleans merchants and 
the railroad interests complained bitterly about losses due 
to the paralyzing effects of unreasonable quarantines. As 
for maritime quarantine, the commercial interests of the 
Crescent City were almost always at odds with the Louisiana 
State Board of Health over the cost and delay resulting 
from ship quarantine and disinfection. The Board, however, 
invariably countered with the argument that the direct and 
indirect losses suffered because of a yellow fever epidemic 
were so great that business interests should be willing to 
support quarantine and disinfection measures as the best 
insurance against an outbreak of the highly expensive dis­
ease .
Yellow fever epidemics invariably resulted in 
severe economic distress among the laboring classes of the 
population by interfering with the normal working of the 
economic system. The more widespread the epidemic, the 
greater the destitution among the laboring poor. The
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economic hardship, for example, occasioned by the extensive 
spread of the pestilence through the South in 1878 neces­
sitated an appeal for relief to the "Chambers of Commerce 
and the Charitable of the Chief Cities of the Union.”
This appeal was signed by the president of the New Orleans 
Chamber of Commerce and by several other persons on behalf 
of the afflicted areas in Mississippi and Alabama. Re­
questing a comprehensive system of relief, the appeal 
suggested that a central headquarters, to receive donations 
of supplies, medicines, and clothing, be established in a 
number of large cities around the country. Transportation 
lines had volunteered to ship all provisions without charge
to New Orleans, from which location the relief could be dis-
22tributed to other desperate towns,
"All business is entirely suspended," the appeal 
declared. "It is estimated that in the suspension of 
business on the Mississippi River, south of Memphis, over 
fifty steamboats are tied up and their crews discharged." 
All those laborers who had been engaged in handling the 
freight were out of work. Moreover, four railroad lines 
had ceased to function, leaving their employees idle.
22picayune, September 12, 1878,
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Wherever the fever prevailed, almost all business opera­
tions had ceased, and their employees joined the ranks of 
the unemployed. All those persons completely dependent 
on their labor for a living found themselves in destitute 
circumstances. It was estimated that at least 1 3 , 0 0 0  
heads of households were unemployed in New Orleans, 8 , 0 0 0  
in Memphis, and several thousands in scattered small towns, 
representing a total of over 100,000 persons in dire need. 
"For them there is no labor, no wages, no bread--nothing 
but death, or starvation; and this condition must last at 
least for fifty days . . . until frost," Somehow these 
people had to be fed. In addition to the provision of 
bare subsistence, funds were also required for necessary 
clothing, medicines, care of the sick, and burial of the 
d e a d . 23 Not only in 1 8 7 8 ,  but in every other severe 
epidemic which devastated New Orleans and other southern 
communities, contributions poured forth from generous 
individuals, businesses, and communities all around the 
country.
In terms of human lives and property, the cost of 
epidemic yellow fever to New Orleans, the State of
23ibid.
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Louisiana, and the South during a hundred-year period 
incalculable. Including such factors as the potential 
economic worth of human lives, the value of labor diverted 
from productive endeavor by illness or care of the sick, 
the cost of medical attendance, supplies, burials, charity, 
crop spoilage, investment losses, and the general dis­
turbance to business conditions, the cost of one epidemic 
--that of 1878--to the Crescent City alone was estimated 
at twelve to one hundred million d o l l a r s F r o m  1796 
through 1905 New Orleans experienced no less than thirty 
serious epidemics--and many more if one included all 
those outbreaks which were mild only in comparison with 
the violent ones. Thousands upon thousands of lives, 
millions of dollars, and untold and immeasurable quantities 
of intangible human suffering, anxiety, and grief were 
expended in tribute to the pestilence before the ultimate 
triumph of medical science and public health in banishing 
the Saffron Scourge from the shores of the United States, 
The field of life insurance provides another 
example of yellow fever's influence on the various aspects
^^Proceedings of the Board of Experts Authorized 
by Congress , , , 1878, 31-35,
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of business arrangements. In 1848 De Bow's Review pro­
tested against the ignorance of the North regarding the 
health of southern states: "Their insurance companies
exact a higher premium if the party, being a southerner, 
remain at home during summer . , , yet permit him to spend 
his winter in New-England, where, perhaps, his chances of 
life would be diminished one-half!" Furthermore, complain­
ed that southern journal, "For New-Orleans many of the com­
panies refuse to insure altogether! Sapient statisticians 
t h e s e . "25 gut there was ample evidence to justify the 
policy of the Yankee companies. A New Orleanian, unless 
he could supply evidence of his having survived an attack 
of yellow fever, was definitely a bad risk.
The increased demand for certain goods during an 
epidemic always encouraged some shrewd and unscrupulous 
businessmen to take advantage of the situation. Examples 
may be cited in regard to three items in great demand 
during a yellow fever outbreak: coffins, ice, and medi­
cines, In the midst of the epidemic of 1839, the New 
Orleans Picayune editor angrily reported an incident relat­
ing to traffic in coffins, "Speculations in wooden
25De Bow's Review, VI (September, 1848), 226.
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nut-megs, bass-wood hams and horn flints we look upon as 
'fair business transactions,*" he asserted indignantly, 
**but the man who can look complacently forward to a season 
of epidemic and mortality, and prepare to turn a time of 
death and mourning to profitable account, we view as a 
soulless, unsympathising scoundrel; with a heart--if he 
have one at a11--as black as the plumes of a hearse."
Early that summer a New York speculator had made a large 
shipment of coffins under a false bill of lading to a New 
Orleans mercantile house. The coffins, of assorted sizes, 
had been packed one inside another into nine cases and 
labeled "Pianos--With Care." The New Yorker's letter to 
the New Orleans business establishment regarding the 
"piano-fortes" stated: "As the taste for music appears to
be making rapid strides in the South, and as instruments 
such as 1 send you, must inevitably increase in value, I 
would advise, that at present you merely take them into 
your warerooms, permitting them to remain in the cases, 
subject to my future directions. . . ." According to the 
Picayune, the New Orleans merchants involved in the trans­
action, on discovering the true nature of the merchandise, 
had become so enraged by the "endeavor to make them a tool 
in so disreputable a 'commission business'" that they sold
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the coffins to the Charity Hospital for one dollar each,^^ 
Unfortunately for the New Yorker, he chose the wrong firm, 
or the wrong method, and failed in his scheme to profit 
from the harvest of the pestilence.
Others had better luck in profiteering. The exces­
sively high price of ice in New Orleans during the epidemic 
of 1878 became a matter of concern to the Board of Health 
as well as the city government. Monopolizing the importa­
tion and sale of ice in New Orleans, the Crescent City Ice 
Company set the price beyond the reach of many persons 
while the yellow fever epidemic was in progress. When the 
mayor and the Board of Health began to make inquiries about 
purchasing and transporting ice from several northern 
cities, representatives of the ice company felt it neces­
sary to call on the mayor to stave off such a drastic 
measure. Although their present supply of ice was small, 
they explained, large amounts were then on the way to New 
Orleans and there was absolutely no danger of an ice famine 
in the city. On behalf of the company, they promised to 
reduce the price immediately to forty dollars per ton, and 
when the new shipments arrived, the price would be reduced
26Picayune, August 31, September 1, 1839,
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still further. Under the circumstances, the mayor decided 
to take no further action on the matter. Nevertheless, the 
Picayune complained of the unreasonable prices set by the 
monopolists who were obviously taking advantage of the 
temporary ice shortage together with the increased demand 
during the epidemic. On the basis of figures showing that 
ice could be purchased from a firm in Maine for two dollars 
per ton and shipped to New Orleans for three dollars or 
less, the editor felt there was no justification whatsoever 
for the ice company's high charges exacted from a city in
t h e  t h r o e s  o f  a  d i s a s t e r . ^ 7
During New Orleans' worst epidemic of all times, 
the visitation of 1853, there were numerous complaints 
against druggists who charged extremely high prices for 
medicines. In ordinary times the drugs would have been 
considered expensive at one-half or one-third the rate 
charged during the crisis. One Crescent City journal con­
tended that no conscientious apothecary could possibly 
engage in such unethical profiteering and expressed the 
hope that the reports circulating about that practice were
Z^Ibid., July 26, 27, 28, 1878.
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28gross exaggerations. But not all apothecaries were as 
conscientious as that journalist wanted to believe.
During the epidemic of 1853 the Howard Association 
discovered several cases of collusion between physicians 
and druggists to overcharge for prescriptions paid for by 
the benevolent society. To increase the drug bill for 
each patient cared for by the Howards, the physician pre­
scribed a greater quantity of medicines than the yellow 
fever victims could possibly consume. The druggist then 
shared his increased profits with that physician. But 
when the Howards pointed out to certain apothecaries that 
no man, sick or well, could have taken as much medication 
as was claimed and suggested that the bill be inspected by 
another druggist or physician, the fraudulent claim was
OQ
almost invariably reduced.  ^ Certainly in every epidemic 
there must have been instances of greedy individuals who 
turned a calamity into an opportunity for unreasonable 
profits. For most businessmen, however. Yellow Jack 
brought losses rather than profits.
Yet despite the adverse influence of epidemic yellow
28ibid,, August 17, 1853.
29Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 271-72
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fever upon New Orleans' economic affairs, the set-back each 
time proved to be only a temporary one. As cool weather set 
in and the epidemic subsided, the business season opened 
gradually, then very rapidly moved into full swing. Ships 
arrived and departed from the port of New Orleans, and the 
crops of the interior poured into the city along with 
orders for supplies and goods of every variety. New 
Orleans filled up with thousands of newcomers as well as 
the returning summer absentees, and the gaiety of social 
life along with serious business activity dispelled the 
gloom of the previous months. The previously desolate 
city was transformed almost overnight into a gay, lively, 
dynamic scene of feverish activity, and every memory of 
the painful scenes of the summer and early fall months was 
relentlessly shoved into the background.^®
Strangely, the menace of yellow fever did not seem 
to discourage great hordes of persons who flocked to the 
Crescent City annually, swelling the city's population 
from 8,000 to nearly 300,000 in the course of the nine­
teenth century. In the last days of the epidemic of 1817, 
one resident remarked that "New Orleans may be compared
Olbid., 297-98.
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to a Plate of Honey, Thousands of insects come & satiate
themselves with the sweet food, and die--but where one dies,
a thousand visit the delicious repast. So it is with men--
where their interests lie, they'll come to the place, tho'
31death may stare them in the face," But, assuming that 
the constant threat of the pestilence did hinder many per­
sons who might otherwise have moved to New Orleans, and 
taking into consideration the thousands who died there each 
year (not only from yellow fever but from the many other 
endemic and epidemic maladies present in that sickly city), 
one can only speculate about what the growth of the Cres­
cent City might have been without its unhealthy influences. 
Not even the prospect of disease and early death 
could interrupt "the forward march of the city" during the 
first half of the nineteenth century; "even the memory and 
grief of it were passing shadows," wrote Grace King in New 
Orleans ; The Place and the People. On the contrary, she 
declared. New Orleans in that period enjoyed "more emi­
grants, more imports, more exports, more trade, more cotton, 
sugar, plantations, slaves; and to off-set, the more death.
31walter Prichard (ed,), "Three Letters of Richard 
Claiborne to William Miller, 1816-1818," Louisiana His­
torical Quarterly, XXIV (July, 1941), 739,
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the more life, the city's gayety, like the city's gold, 
mounting in the flood tide over it."
Even in the midst of a paralyzing epidemic, such as 
that of 1853, optimism remained the prevalent note among 
some elements in New Orleans. For example, in August the 
editor of the Daily Crescent, maintaining a high level of 
enthusiasm, discounted the notion that the epidemic would 
ruin the city. Many epidemics had come and gone and never 
ruined New Orleans, he declared; furthermore, they never 
would I Instead of diminishing the population, the epi­
demic would actually increase it as people flocked in to 
seek those positions left vacant by yellow fever's victims. 
The death of one man would attract two to fill his place, 
and business would be more active than ever. The pesti­
lence did not drive people away, the editor asserted, but, 
on the contrary, attracted those adventurers who would 
brave any danger. The editorial concluded with an optimis­
tic, although at the same time rather callous, reflection: 
"There is a good time coming for the fortunate who live to 
see it,"^^
32crace King, New Orleans; The Place and the People 
(New York, 1895), 287-88.
33Çrescent, August 31, 1853.
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The attitudes and policies dominating the world of 
journalism were intimately related to the outlook of the 
business community. Until the latter nineteenth century. 
Crescent City journals failed to provide prompt or accurate 
reporting on yellow fever in the city, always attempted to 
discount the severity of an epidemic, and falsely praised 
New Orleans as an extraordinarily healthy place. These 
characteristics of newspaper policy have been discussed to 
some extent in earlier chapters. It should be noted 
further that the direct influence of commercial interests 
often dictated that policy.
In 1819 Benjamin Latrobe asked a newspaper editor 
why the journals avoided the subject of yellow fever's 
prevalence in New Orleans when the knowledge was general 
throughout the city. The editor answered "that the princi­
pal profit of a newspaper arising from advertisements, the 
merchants, their principal customers, had absolutely for­
bid the least notice of fever, under a threat that their 
custom should otherwise be withdrawn. . . ." Thus, said 
Latrobe, the merchants and editors sacrificed "to commer­
cial policy the lives of all those who, believing from the 
silence of the public papers that no danger existed, might
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come to the city."^^
Before the news of the prevailing fever became 
generally known in 1853, the Howard Association had already 
begun their relief work among the indigent sick in the Cres­
cent City. The notice of the Howards' initial meeting 
published in the city papers did not even mention the words 
yellow fever. In fact, they "were requested by editors 
and merchants to withhold publication of our acts, as the 
report of an epidemic--which might yet be checked--would 
entail severe loss on merchants and shopkeepers,"^^
An article in De Bow's Review describing the des­
tructive visitation of 1853 noted the reluctance of New 
Orleans journals to report information regarding the 
presence of yellow fever. Not until the last possible 
moment, when the daily mortality was too great to ignore 
and alarm was general throughout the city, were the papers 
willing to publish any reference to the disease. Frequent­
ly, the first news of fever in the Crescent City came to 
its inhabitants through the country papers, "New-Orleans 
being an entirely commercial city, the love of money and
^^Latrobe, Impressions Respecting New Orleans, 146. 
35Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 122.
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self-interest prevail there as much as in other commercial 
communities,” the article stated; "and it is a standing 
maxim in the commercial world that nothing must be said 
that might injure trade,
In its report for 1873 the Board of Health declared 
that as soon as yellow fever made its appearance in New 
Orleans that year, a deputation of merchants called upon 
the policy-makers of the Crescent City journals and re­
quested that the weekly mortality reports supplied by the 
Board of Health not be published. All agreed except the 
editor of the German Gazette, Consequently, as the Board 
had predicted, exaggerations spread throughout the country, 
and no official information was readily available to 
"control the public imagination."^7
While the newspapers sometimes refused to publish 
information furnished by the Board of Health and almost 
always set forth a distorted view of health in the city, 
at the same time they went to great pains to correct the 
so-called exaggerations and erroneous opinions appearing 
in the journals of the interior, the North, and even
36pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 598,
37Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 
1873, 74-75.
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England, In April of 1852, for example, the Picayune com­
plained of reports in northern papers to the effect that 
the unfortunate Crescent City was anxiously "expecting the 
near approach of the plague." Sarcastically, the Picayune 
editor remarked that "we of New Orleans are expected not 
only to submit with resignation to any sanitary evils, but 
actually to welcome them with unalloyed delight as a neces­
sary accompaniment of our existence," The outsider's con­
ception of life in New Orleans, according to that editor, 
consisted of "cotton bales and yellow fever, balls, duels, 
operas and cholera. . , .” New Orleanians knew they had a 
healthy city and should never be disturbed by nonsense set 
forth by those who knew nothing of the true situation, the 
editor reassured the citizenry.^8
In June of 1853 while yellow fever was steadily 
gaining ground in New Orleans with no paper as yet discuss­
ing its presence, the Delta editor undertook to explain how 
"by accident" a report from Charity Hospital found its way 
into that journal’s columns "without the supervision we 
usually give to such matters." The report had listed two 
cases of fatal black vomit, and the editor feared that such
88picayune, April 8, 1852.
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an isolated fact, without explanation, might produce an 
erroneous impression in the city and elsewhere. But those 
two cases had been imported from Havana, he contended, and 
hence there was nothing to fear. Reminding the proud 
citizens that New Orleans was "one of the healthiest cities 
of the Union," he maintained that the Crescent City had 
suffered too long from "traditionary vileness and bug-bear 
stories" propagated by outsiders. Therefore, the Delta 
editor felt it necessary that "nothing calculated to mis­
lead persons abroad or citizens at home, should have 
publicity
During the epidemic of 1867 the New Orleans Bee 
criticized several northern newspapers for reporting that 
the New Orleans authorities and the journals were in col­
lusion to withhold information regarding the severity of 
the pestilence. Such a statement, declared the Bee editor, 
was nothing less than an "abominable lie," He was not 
surprised, however, that such a notion could gain credence 
in the North, "for they are ready to believe anything un­
favorable about us."^^
S^New Orleasn Weekly Delta, June 12, 1853 
40Bee, September 4, 1867.
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On countless occasions the New Orleans press pro­
tested bitterly against the so-called exaggerations in 
country newspapers on the subject of yellow fever in the 
city.^1 People in the hinterland soon learned not to trust 
the New Orleans journals on the health of the Crescent 
City. They listened instead to reports supplied by émigrés 
passing through, or relied on information furnished by cor­
respondents in New Orleans. Naturally, the city news­
papers attempted to discredit the reports of disease 
advanced by the journals of the interior--whether or not 
they were true.
Sometimes even the English press received a share 
of criticism for "distorting" the picture of health in New 
Orleans, In 1853 the Picayune lashed out at several 
English journals for their allegedly unfair treatment of 
the disease-ridden city. "They find the ordinary sanitary, 
physical and moral condition of New Orleans to be horrid," 
the Picayune editor stated. He thought it strange indeed 
that outsiders always professed to know so much more about 
the affairs of the city than those present on the s c e n e . ^2
41picayune. July 26, August 19, 1853; New Orleans 
Daily Delta, August 10, 1858,
42picayune, September 29, 1853,
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The problem was that New Orleanians did not always tell, 
or even admit, all that they knew.
Finally, in the latter nineteenth century as im­
proved means of transportation and communication knit the 
country ever more closely together, it became completely 
impossible to conceal the presence of disease in the Cres­
cent City, especially after the United States government 
began to take a greater interest in fighting the introduc­
tion and spread of epidemic disease. In the midst of the 
epidemic of 1 8 9 7  the editor of the New Orleans Times- 
Democrat declared that the old policy of not reporting on 
yellow fever until it had become fully epidemic had 
"brought New Orleans to the verge of ruin."^^ In a 
similar declaration the Picayune editor maintained that 
the concealment of disease was not only unwise but also 
impossible and could result only in ultimate exposure and 
harsh criticism for the deception.
Along with many other economic and social activities 
and institutions affected by the disruptive influence of 
epidemic yellow fever, educational institutions also felt
'^ T^imes-Democrat, September 7 ,  1 8 9 7 .  
44picayune, October 1 3 ,  1 8 9 7 .
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the impact of the pestilence. Yellow fever epidemics 
ordinarily erupted in July or August and lasted until some­
time in October, November, or even early December. Hence, 
during epidemic years, it was usually necessary to post­
pone the opening of the public schools until the disease 
had subsided, causing a delay of at least a month or more 
after the regularly scheduled opening date.^S
The colleges and the medical schools also found it 
necessary to postpone the beginning of their regular 
s e s s i o n s . I n  addition to the problem of sickness and 
death from yellow fever itself, which claimed the lives of 
some faculty members and students and discouraged the 
attendance of others, quarantine barriers in the later 
period also hindered the arrival of out-of-town students.
In fact, the epidemic of 1905 and the resulting quarantine 
entanglement all but ruined Tulane’s football season.
Since the players were scattered over the state, quarantine 
restrictions made it virtually impossible to gather them
45pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 626; 
Wharton Diary, August 28, October 1, 7, 1858; Picayune, 
August 29, 1858, September 4, 1867, October 3, 1905.
46picayune, October 28, 1905; N. 0. Med. & Surg. 
Jour., LI (October, 1898), 213,
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together and whip them into shape before the end of the 
47season, '
Another instance in which yellow fever influenced 
educational institutions in New Orleans involved its 
"retarding effect" upon the growth of the Charity Hospital 
Training School for Female Nurses, established in 1894.
In her report for 1905, Sister Agnes, Directress of the 
Training School, stated that the epidemic not only had dis­
couraged many applicants, but also had raised the question 
of the "advisability" of accepting non-immunes. Of some 
300 application forms sent out on request that season, 
only fifty-two had been returned. According to J. M. 
Batchelor, Chairman of the Training School Faculty, the 
largest class thus far was graduated in 1905; but, he 
noted, the school had not yet reached its full capacity. 
Although an increase in the number of trainees had been 
contemplated, "owing to circumstances over which we had 
no control, and which forbade entrance of non-immunes into 
this city, our intentions were not fulfilled."^®
Sometimes during epidemic seasons in New Orleans,
47picayune, October 13, 1905.
48Report of the Board of Administrators of the 
Charity Hospital , , , for 1905, $0, 52,
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public school buildings served as temporary yellow fever 
hospitals and orphan asylums under the direction of the 
Howard Association, the Board of Health, or the Charity 
Hospital a u t h o r i t i e s . 1905 the public schools, in 
full operation by early October, provided one more theater 
in the educational campaign against the Aedes aegypti 
mosquito. Children heard lectures on the deadly culprit 
of transmission and carried home pamphlets containing 
instructions for fumigating, oiling, and screening.
In the grim battle against epidemic yellow fever, 
waged time after time in the communities of Louisiana and 
the South, the medical profession, above all, bore the 
greatest burden of responsibility. For over a hundred 
years physicians faced the task of combating a deadly dis­
ease which spread from person to person and place to place 
in a strange and unpredictable manner and which operated 
in seeming defiance of all forms of therapy. Some patients 
lived and others died regardless of the varied treatment 
employed. From the late eighteenth century until the early 
twentieth century, no doctor who practiced for any length
49pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 626; 
Picayune, September 24, 1897.
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of time in New Orleans or certain other Louisiana com­
munities could ignore the yellow fever enigma. And among 
medical riddles probably none other provoked so much con­
troversy, diversity of opinion, and professional antagonism.
Yet the Saffron Scourge seems to have been one of 
the principal forces in bringing together the French phy­
sicians of New Orleans in their first professional organ­
ization, W  Société Médicale de la Nouvelle Orléans, estab­
lished in 1817. The devastating epidemic of 1817, the 
most violent up to that time, must have convinced the New 
Orleans medical profession that it was necessary to pool 
their intellectual resources in a cooperative effort 
against the deadly scourge of the Crescent City. One of 
the first official actions of the society was the appoint­
ment of a committee to inquire into the causes and treat­
ment of the recent epidemic fever. In 1820 when the 
English-speaking physicians joined to form the Physico- 
Medical Society, they too directed their initial efforts 
toward a study of the yellow pestilence. Alternately 
active and inactive, these medical organizations and others 
which developed in nineteenth-century Louisiana always 
devoted a great deal of attention to yellow fever, a sub­
ject which gradually led to a consideration of the vitally
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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important question of public health.^®
In the course of service during the hundred years' 
war against the pestilence, the medical profession of New 
Orleans and elsewhere lost a considerable number of prac­
titioners from its own ranks to the deadly foe, particular­
ly among the "unacclimated" from other sections of the 
country.51 Strangely like Camus' existentialist physician 
in ^  Peste, many medical men labored on day after day, 
week after week, month after month; operating in the dark­
ness of seeming helplessness against the malady's ravages, 
yet exerting all their energies toward alleviating the dis­
comfort and anxiety of as many patients as possible; 
frequently unable to effect a cure and seldom knowing 
exactly why. Describing the role of the medical man in 
epidemic disasters, one observer wrote: "I have always
sympathized with the physicians in New Orleans. Their 
duties in a sickly season are most arduous and responsible. 
Often have I seen them in a few weeks reduced to their 
beds by anxiety, toil, watchings, and disappointment, . , ." 
And to make matters worse, he added, "multitudes, instead
50william Dosite Postell, "The Medical Societies of 
Louisiana Prior to the War Between the States," New Orleans 
Medical and Surgical Journal, XCIII (August, 1940), 69-72.
5^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., X (September, 1853), 279.
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of thanking them, have cursed them, because they did not 
at once expel the epidemic from the city, which they could
C O
no more control than they could raise the dead,”
In a similar vein Dr. Erasmus Fenner declared:
"There is, perhaps, no place in the world where more
charity service is done by the medical profession than in
New Orleans , , , but I am sorry to add, that I know of no
place where these benevolent services are more lightly
53appreciated than here." During pestilential visitations, 
physicians often ran notices in the newspapers offering to 
"attend gratuitously" to the indigent sick.^^
In general, the members of the New Orleans medical 
profession throughout the period of yellow fever's des­
tructive activities merited high praise for their generos­
ity, humanitarianism, and tireless labors in attending to 
the fever's victims. As in all fields of human activity, 
however, one can find examples of ignorance, greed, and 
callousness. A member of the Howard Association in the 
mid-nineteenth century criticised those medical
52ouffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 106,
53penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 70»
54picayune, August 23, 28, 1839; N. 0, Med, & Surg. 
Jour., X (November, 1853), 387,
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practitioners who "wring the last dollar from suffering 
humanity in advance of every service performed, and, when 
no more can be exacted, abandon them for nature to do the 
rest." Some physicians offered their services to the 
Howard Association, accepted the salary provided, then pro­
ceeded to extort additional payment from the association's 
patients, "If they did not succeed in obtaining money from 
our patients," complained one Howard Association member, 
"they would divide with the apothecary the bill of expen­
sive prescriptions."^5
Epidemic conditions, which supplied the regular 
medical profession with more work than could easily be 
handled, provided ample opportunity for the practice of 
quackery by anyone who wished to pass himself off as a 
doctor. Yellow fever sufferers and their families seldom 
demanded that the attending physician present his creden­
tials, nor could they have evaluated his ability in any 
case.56 Many forms of quackery prevailed. During epidemic 
seasons, numerous advertisements for yellow fever preventives
SSRobinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 79-80,
SGÇrescent, August 22, 1853; New Orleans Weekly 
Delta, September 4, 1853; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 
80.
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and remedies appeared in the Crescent City newspapers-- 
sometimes even before the journals had discussed the dis­
ease editorially. The preposterous claims, accompanied 
by testimonials, endorsed by self-styled doctors, and 
advanced to ensnare the gullible were only slightly less 
subtle than the techniques of the twentieth-century "hidden 
persuaders." Brandreth's Vegetable Universal Pills and 
Holt's Prescription and Remedies for Yellow Fever, along 
with countless other preparations, could be purchased for 
home treatment of the disease. Dr. Radway's Ready 
Relief, Regulating Pills and Resolvent were supposed to 
prevent and cure not only yellow fever but also typhoid 
and ship fever; fever and ague ; bilious, remittent or 
intermittent fever; cholera, dysentery, flux, and 
diarrhea; smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, croup; as well 
as "all diseases or complaints incidental to the human 
race."58 If one "carefully and constantly" used Duffy's 
Pure Malt Whiskey, "A SCIENTIFIC REMEDY, NOT A BEVERAGE," 
according to the advertisement, "No disease germ can
57picayune, May 25, 1838, October 1, 1843. 
58ibid., December 7, 1859.
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POSSIBLY remain lodged in the body, , , A sparkling
mineral water called Red Raven was also proclaimed as a 
yellow fever prophylactic, "which cleanses the system and 
is absolute death to g e r m s . T h e n  there were also Dr.
J. N. Lee's invention of the Portable Hot-Air Bath Chamber 
and the Thermal Wrap announced in the 1880*s, which he 
insisted would serve to prevent as well as cure yellow 
fever along with every other ailment known to man,^^
After the discovery of the mosquito vector, another 
advertising angle came to light. During the yellow fever 
epidemic and anti-mosquito crusade of 1905, this restrain­
ed, if slightly misleading, advertisement appeared in the 
Picayune ;
TO THE PUBLIC:
Mosquito Bites Rendered Harmless 
by the use of Dr. G, H.
_______TICHENOR'S ANTISEPTIC___________
rub in we11^2
S^lbid., September 21, 1888.
^^Ibid., August 7, 1905.
Glj. N. Lee, Life. The Philosophy of its Origin 
and Preservation. A Brief Outline of the Fundamental 
Principles of Scientific Medicine. The Nature of Endemic 
Yellow Fever . . .  with an Infallible, Preventive and 
Cure for it, as well as the Epidemic Yellow Fever . . . 
(New Orleans, 1883).
62Picayune, August 6, 1905.
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Several other products were advertised more flamboyantly 
and specifically as yellow fever preventives. Disinfec- 
tine, "the modern toilet Soap," which "opens and searches 
the pores— destroys and removes the germs," was guaranteed 
to heal mosquito bites and prevent yellow fever as well as 
many other diseases. Littell's Liquid Sulphur, taken 
internally and added to the bath water, "absolutely" pre­
vented mosquito bites and put the blood in such good con­
dition that the consumer was promised complete immunity 
"from all contagious or infectious d i s e a s e s , A s  in 
every age, shrewd operators profited from the fear and 
credulity of those persons, who for one reason or another 
would not call on a physician. It should be noted, how­
ever, that the inadequacies of nineteenth-century medical 
practice itself actually encouraged the development of 
irregular medicine in the days before the medical profes­
sion was truly a profession.
The clergyman, like the physician, was called upon 
for an extraordinary performance of services during epi­
demic seasons. Protestant ministers and Catholic priests 
were in constant demand day and night to "soothe the last
63lbid., August 4, 6, 1905.
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hours of the dying," to administer the last rites in the 
case of Catholics, and to comfort the surviving members 
of the family. Amid the disorder of a raging epidemic, it 
was impossible for the clergy to perform all services at 
the grave. Consequently, brief services were held in the 
homes of the deceased or in the chapels. Many were buried 
without benefit of clergy; in some cases, laymen adminis­
tered the final prayers over the grave.
Although some Protestant ministers fled the scene 
in fear and trembling along with the other émigrés, they 
seemed to represent the exception rather than the rule.
Many a clergyman, both Protestant and Catholic, fell prey 
to the pestilence while performing his pastoral duties.
In addition to the arduous task of attending to last rites 
and funeral services of the hundreds of yellow fever vic­
tims, clergymen were constantly occupied in visiting the 
sick and sometimes even acting as doctor and nurse, adminis­
tering to the sickness of the body as well as that of the
64&obinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 119, 259-60.
65[A. Walker], "History and Incidents of the Plague 
in New Orleans," Harper * s Magazine, VII (June-November, 
1853), 806; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 119, 259-60; 
Joseph B. Stratton Diary, Joseph B, Stratton Papers (Louisi­
ana State University Archives, Baton Rouge), November 22, 
1853, January 18, 1854.
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soul.^G And after an epidemic subsided, the work of the 
clergyman was by no means over. Destitute families, widows, 
and orphans looked to the minister or priest for advice 
and assistance. In a small community, the distraught epi­
demic-scarred populace sometimes turned to the clergyman 
for leadership in the task of reorganization and readjust­
ment. His residence often served as a headquarters for 
the collection and distribution of clothing and provisions 
contributed for the relief of the needy.
Throughout the nineteenth century while the essen­
tially mysterious nature, origin, and transmission of 
yellow fever remained beyond the comprehension of medical 
scientists as well as laymen, a particular religious 
significance was attached to pestilential visitations. 
Helpless in the face of an epidemic calamity, the people 
of an afflicted community turned to God to beg forgiveness 
and a cessation of his wrathful punishment. During the 
awful visitation of 1853, the Presbyterian ministers of
^^alker, "History and Incidents of the Plague in 
New Orleans," loc. cit., 806; Stratton Diary, January 18, 
1854.
^^Duffy (ed,). Parson Clapp, 102-104; Autobiography, 
Emily Caroline Douglas Papers (Louisiana State University 
Archives, Baton Rouge), 318, 320-22,
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New Orleans called for a "Union Meeting for humiliation 
and prayer" to be held at 5 P.M. daily throughout the re­
mainder of the epidemic. They invited the members of all 
churches "to unite with us in humbling ourselves before 
our Maker and in acknowledging His Severeighty over us, 
and in supplicating Him to deliver us from the pestilence 
that now desolates our city." Furthermore, they asked 
that all Christians pray in behalf of New Orleans "that 
God will be pleased to turn His anger away from us,"^®
A special prayer was prepared by Bishop Leonidas 
Polk in 1853 and recommended for use in all the churches 
in the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Louisiana during 
the prevailing epidemic. The prayer acknowledged that 
"we, thy servants" had "grievously sinned, by thought, 
word and deed and that by our sins we have most justly 
provoked thy wrath and indignation against us." In a 
long and eloquent petition Bishop Polk's prayer begged 
for mercy and forgiveness and asked that God "turn from 
us the ravage of the pestilence, wherewith for our 
iniquities, thou art now visiting us."^^ Also in 1853
68çrescent, August 31, 1853. 
^^Picayune, August 24, 1853.
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the Mayor of New Orleans set aside a special day "for the 
general voice to rise in supplication to Almighty God, that 
he may be pleased to lighten the heavy burthen of grief, 
sickness and death."^0
At least one dissenting voice was raised in protest 
against blaming God for the epidemic. In a statement pub­
lished in the Picayune, Theodore Clapp, Unitarian minister, 
refused to accept the proposition that "the epidemic 
ravaging our city is a display of God's anger." Were New 
Orleanians any more "deserving at present of Heaven's 
wrath" than the people of London, Paris, Boston, New York, 
or any other city? Dr. Clapp did not think so. The af­
flictions of human life might be "a test of moral charac­
ter," he declared, but to credit God with indiscriminate 
wrath and vengeance poured out upon the faithful and the 
wicked alike was to place God beyond all love and re- 
spect.71
But Dr. Clapp and others like him remained in the 
minority as long as the pestilence remained a mystery.
Even as a day of humiliation and prayer had been recommended
70xbid., August 31, 1853. 
71lbid., September 2, 1853.
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by municipal or state authorities during and after epidemic 
visitations in an earlier period, so during the widespread 
epidemic of 1878 Governor Francis T. Nicholls proclaimed 
October 9 as a day of "fasting, humiliation, and prayer," 
All Louisianians were asked to "join in a concert of devout
petition to the Almighty to stay his severe chastisement
72and to spare an afflicted people."
In 1897 some persons still considered the wrath of 
God a factor in pestilential visitations. The Picayune 
printed the full text of a sermon delivered by the minister 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, in which he called the 
epidemic a "chastisement" sent down upon New Orleans by 
God "for wise purposes of his own," The mild scourge of 
1897, declared the minister, should be considered "a warn­
ing for our citizens to repent." Advocating moral sanita­
tion, he felt that the impure moral atmosphere of New
Orleans called for as thorough a cleansing as the streets,
7gutters, and other filthy aspects of the city. Also in 
1897 the Picayune reprinted Bishop Polk's prayer of 1853,74
72see, November 3, 1841; New Orleans Democrat, 
October 2, 1878; Picayune, October 3, 1878,
73picayune, October 7, 1897,
74ibid., October 25, 1897,
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In the epidemic of 1905, after yellow fever's trans­
mitter had been positively identified, the New Orleans 
clergy participated actively in the anti-mosquito campaign, 
preaching frmn their pulpits the crusade against the Aedes 
aegypti as if it had been the devil himself. Apparently, 
however, almost nothing was said about the wrath of God as 
a factor in that last epidemic.
In spite of the constant exertions of the medical 
profession and the clergy, severe epidemic conditions 
required the labors of countless volunteer relief workers 
and an extraordinary amount of charity. The indigent sick 
and their families had to be cared for, and the problem 
became progressively acute as the population of New 
Orleans increased. On a number of occasions in the early 
nineteenth century, the municipal government attempted to 
provide some measure of assistance to the destitute victims 
of yellow fever by appointing and paying several physicians 
to attend to their needs and by providing funds for the 
necessary medicines and food.^S
75proceedings of the City Council of New Orleans, 
Vol. 3, Book 1, June 7, 1817 to December 29, 1818 (W.P.A, 
typescript, New Orleans Public Library), 40, 48-50; 
Louisiana Courier, September 8, 1819, August 28, 1820, 
October 2, 1822; Picayune, September 7, 1837.
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In the course of the nineteenth century dozens of 
societies were organized in the Crescent City and in other 
communities visited by yellow fever to provide emergency 
relief for their own members or for the indigent sick in 
general. Without such organized endeavors, starvation it­
self would have added thousands to the mortality lists, 
and countless yellow fever victims would have died without 
attention of any kind. The vast array of organizations 
differed considerably in form and procedure, but all 
engaged in the common task of ameliorating the distress 
produced by epidemic yellow fever. The Masons, the Odd 
Fellows, the Young Men's Christian Association, labor 
unions, and various other professional, social, and reli­
gious groups established special relief committees to 
minister to the needs of their members or to extend 
charitable services to destitute fever patients and their 
families.76
Other societies, especially among national groups 
and laborers, were established in the 1840's and 1850's 
for the express purpose of providing a form of mutual
76pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 629; Cres­
cent, August 31, 1853; Picayune, August 29, 1858; Bee, 
September 3, 1858; Baton Rouge AdvocateNovember 29, 
1878.
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insurance for the members, such as the Ibera Benevolent 
Association, the Portuguese Benevolent Association, the 
Italian Mutual Benevolent Society, the German Benevolent 
Association, the Jewish Benevolent Relief Association, 
the United Laborers' Benevolent Association, and the Fire­
men's Charitable Association. Particularly significant 
during epidemics, these organizations supplied financial 
aid to any member who fell prey to sickness, and in the 
event of his death, made seme provision for his widow and 
orphans. The Ibera Benevolent Association, for example, 
was designed "to provide for and assist those of its mem­
bers who through sickness or other , , . circumstances, 
may become destitute, and also to inter with preper cere­
monies, the bodies of such as demise," Only a native 
Spaniard might become president, but anyone "of irreproach­
able character" might join the society by paying an initia­
tion fee of three dollars and monthly dues of fifty cents. 
In 1878 the Mutual Benevolent Relief Association, a Negro 
group in New Orleans, and Negro organizations elsewhere 
attended to the destitute sick among their race,^^
77çardner & Wharton's New Orleans Directory, for the 
Year 1858 . . . (New Orleans, 1857), 389-90; Picayune, 
September 7, 14, 22, 1878; Bee, October 16, 1858; Baton 
Rouge Advocate, November 29, 1878.
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Another mutual aid society called the Young Men's 
Crescent and Star Benevolent Association was established 
in 1867 by "the elite of the Second and Third Districts" 
of New Orleans. Membership requirements included "an un­
stained character," a five dollar initiation fee, and dues 
of one dollar per month. The association promised to pro­
vide medical attention and the necessary drugs to any sick 
member, to pay seven dollars per week during the period of 
his illness, to provide proper burial insurance, and to
furnish assistance to the widow and orphans of any deceased
78member.
Women in New Orleans participated actively in the 
work of epidemic relief through such organizations as the 
Ladies' Benevolent Society, the Ladies' Physiological 
Society, and Les Dames de la Providence. They collected 
and distributed funds and provisions; they called upon the 
sick and supplied kindness and encouragement to the desti­
tute families along with food, medicine, and clothing.^9
78Bee, October 20, 1867; Picayune, October 20, 1867.
79picayune, September 9, 1841, August 23, 1878;
Baton Rouge Advocate, November 29, 1878; Gardner & Wharton's 
New Orleans Directory for . . , 1858, 389; Robinson, Diary 
of a Samaritan, 194-95.
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Les Dames de la Providence, an association of 
"married ladies belonging to the most respectable class 
of our Creole population," went about in groups of three 
or four, attending to the needs of yellow fever patients
of their own sex, and liberally dispensing relief with
80their funds collected from generous donors. Among the 
lot of female societies, undoubtedly there were some do- 
gooders and busy-bodies who accomplished little of value. 
But, in general, the women's groups seem to have con­
tributed a creditable share in carrying out the overwhelm­
ing task of relieving the distress occasioned by epidemic 
yellow fever. One other group of unusually active women 
should be noted here--women whose tireless efforts in 
nursing the sick was of unquestionable importance: the
Sisters of Charity.®^
Probably the most notable of all the New Orleans 
benevolent societies established specifically to relieve 
the sick and the destitute in epidemic seasons was the 
Howard Association, named after the eighteenth-century 
English philanthropist, John Howard. Not only was that
SORobinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 194, 266. 
Sllbid., 194-93.
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association the first of its kind to be organized in the 
Crescent City, but its activities continued throughout 
the nineteenth century, and its work extended to many 
other disease-ridden comnunities of the South. Founded in 
1837 as an informal group, the Howard Association was in­
corporated in 1842 by the Louisiana Legislature and granted 
a twenty-five year charter. On the expiration of its 
charter, the association was reincorporated in 1867, and 
again in 1893.®^
With the appearance of epidemic yellow fever in New 
Orleans, the Howards set to work to alleviate the unfor­
tunate circumstances of the indigent sick and of those 
families suffering deprivation because of the epidemic 
situation. The city was divided into districts, and each 
member was assigned to work within a certain district. 
Advertisements in newspapers and placards at the street 
corners furnished the names and addresses of the Howard 
Association members. Before breakfast and before dinner 
the member was supposed to be on hand at his residence to
82portier, Louisiana, I, 515: Report of the Howard 
Association of New Orleans, of Receipts, Expenditures. and 
Their Work in the Epidemic of 1878 , , , (New Orleans, 
1878), 5-7; Stuart 0, Landry, "New Orleans' Predecessor of 
Red Cross," New Orleans Times-Picayune Magazine Section, 
December 19, 26, 1937.
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interview the applicants for relief who gathered there.
After making a record of the names and addresses of yellow 
fever cases reported to him and of those persons request­
ing special relief, he set out on his daily and nightly 
rounds. First delivering the list of new cases to the 
physicians employed by the Howards, the member than pro­
ceeded with his tasks, visiting old patients, checking on 
persons requesting relief, visiting new cases, purchasing 
and even administering medicine, hiring and assigning
Q  O
nurses--and so on, day after day, night after night.
In addition to the house-to-house visits, the pro­
vision of medical care, nursing, and medicines, and the 
granting of outright relief to the poor, the Howard 
Association also established and supervised temporary 
yellow fever hospitals, convalescent infirmaries, and
QA
orphan asylums.
In 1847 the Howards attended to about 1,200 yellow 
fever cases; in 1853, over 11,000 cases; and in 1878, more 
than 21,000 cases in New Orleans and nearly 12,000 in other 
communities. Their expenditures in the extensive visitation
B^Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 72, 125-2$, 134-35. 
84ibid., 166-67, 280-85.
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of 1878 totaled almost $400,000. During every epidemic 
which occurred, contributions poured Into the associa­
tion's treasury from all sections of the country. The 
Howards of New Orleans then forwarded supplies, medicine, 
nurses, and financial aid to other afflicted communities 
In Louisiana and neighboring states as well. Sometimes a 
few members of the New Orleans association actually went 
In person to the other plague-stricken towns and helped 
to organize the relief work. The Influence of the Cres­
cent City's Howard Association led to the establishment 
of Howard Associations In many southern towns for the 
purpose of dealing with their own pestilential calami­
ties.®^
Throughout the period of yellow fever epidemics In 
Louisiana, although other organized groups performed 
valuable services and shared In the work of relief, no 
other single association engaged In as many different 
activities as did the Howards of New Orleans. Their work
®5penner. Epidemic Yellow Fever, 69-70; Robinson, 
Diary of a Samaritan, 86, 321-22; Report of the Howard 
Association of New Orleans, Epidemic of 1853 (New Orleans, 
1853), 3, 23-26; Report of the Howard Association of New 
Orleans . , . 1878, 17-24; Howard Association Memorandum 
Books, Addendum, 1878, John B. Vlnet Papers (Louisiana 
State University Archives, Baton Rouge).
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benefited thousands of persons in dozens of southern com­
munities during more than a half-century of pestilential 
visitations. In an age before man had learned how to com­
bat yellow fever, epidemics could neither be prevented nor 
controlled. They simply had to run their course until 
cold weather arrived or until the supply of susceptible 
victims gave out. Under the circumstances, the only way 
men could fight the pestilence was by attempting to 
alleviate its effects--the suffering and distress which 
resulted from the presence of widespread disease. The 
Howard Association deserves special recognition for its 
persistent efforts toward that end.
The epidemic of 1878 directly and indirectly af­
fected so many persons that a division of labor in the 
relief work became necessary. While the Howard Association 
restricted its activities to the provision of physicians, 
nurses, and medicines for yellow fever patients, the Pea­
body Subsistence Association was organized to handle the 
collection of food and supplies and to dispense those pro­
visions to the destitute,®^
In 1905 when the city, state, and federal public
BGpicayune, August 31, September 5, 1878,
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health authorities assumed control of locating and isolat­
ing yellow fever cases, the Howard Association's tradition­
al medical aid services were no longer the vital necessity 
they had been in an earlier period. The need for charita­
ble activities, however, persisted. The Charity Organiza­
tion Society was established that year in an attempt to 
coordinate all such activities by means of a single 
association which would receive and distribute all funds 
and provisions contributed for the relief of those persons 
affected by the temporary economic dislocation resulting
from the epidemic.^7
Nineteenth-century commentators repeatedly praised 
New Orleans for exhibiting an extraordinary degree of
benevolence, unexcelled by any other community in the
88world. Certainly the activities of the Howards and the 
numerous other benevolent organizations, as well as the 
unceasing efforts of the physicians and clergymen, seem to 
substantiate the judgment that the people of the Crescent 
City displayed an unusual spirit of charity and a
87lbid., August 13, 1905.
®®N. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., IV (September, 1847), 275; 
Bee, September 16, 1841, September 4, 1847; Picayune, 
September 12, 1858; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 71;
Duffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 109.
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willingness to minister to the needs of their suffering 
fellowmen. Such altruistic behavior in the midst of a 
pestilential visitation, however, stands in striking con­
trast to the callous, indifferent attitudes so often ex­
pressed in regard to the fever: Although periodically the
disease added thousands to the mortality lists, its princi­
pal victims— the indigent immigrants— were expendable; New 
Orleans would always attract more than sufficient new­
comers to fill their places!
Many persons in the Crescent City were capable of 
voicing such opinions which seemed utterly indifferent to 
the loss of thousands of lives, and time after time the 
city's inhabitants managed to suppress the unpleasant 
memories of destructive epidemics. But, when faced with 
the grim reality of pestilential yellow fever, a consider­
able number of New Orleanians manifested a benevolence of 
action during the crisis which scarcely reflected those 
views supposedly prevailing in the city.
In discussing the outstanding display of "Christian 
philanthropy" in the Crescent City during epidemic out­
breaks, Theodore Clapp noted that accounts of plague- 
stricken cities in ancient Greece and medieval Europe 
described a situation in which complete demoralization
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accompanied the ravages of the disease, destroying the 
customary bonds of friendship, moral responsibility, honor, 
and religion. Epidemics had ordinarily resulted in "wild, 
frantic excesses, neglect of the sick and dying, the plun­
der of houses, murder, and other atrocities too awful to 
mention."89 That description of European plagues would 
hardly apply to the epidemic conditions resulting in the 
Crescent City, although numerous instances of drunkenness, 
neglect, plunder, extortion, and profiteering undoubtedly 
occurred in every yellow fever epidemic which New Orleans 
suffered.
According to an article in D£ Bow's Review on the 
New Orleans epidemic of 1853, "Crime was very prevalent, 
if we may judge from the lengthened police reports in the 
journals. , . ." Outlining the various aspects of the 
"moral epidemic," the author mentioned the "utter th sight­
lessness and indifference to even the most horrid things 
in life," such as the morbid curiosity of the crowds who 
gathered about the cemeteries to watch the process of 
interment and seemed undisturbed by the ghastly sights and 
putrid fumes. As additional symptoms of the "moral
B^Duffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 110,
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epidemic,” he included the "songs and obscene jests of the 
grave-diggers,” the presence of the "huxter-women vending 
their confections" just outside the cemetery gates, and 
the cursing and disrespectful whistling of the men who 
drove the hearses,^® Such illustrations of man's depravi­
ty, however, could hardly compare with the "wild excesses" 
occurring in other places, other times.
The state of confusion, disorder, suffering, and 
despair engendered by any serious pestilential visitation 
was greatly intensified in several particularly violent 
outbreaks. Probably the most unpleasant aspect of any 
yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans, as well as the most 
difficult problem to handle, involved the burial of the 
dead; and in that most destructive of all the epidemics, 
in 1853, carrying out the task of prompt interment became 
almost impossible. Within a period of about four months 
in 1853, over 8,000 persons died in New Orleans of yellow 
fever alone; within a single week over 1,300 persons fell 
victim to the pestilence. People died faster than graves 
could be provided. On one occasion, an accumulation of 
coffins at a cemetery gate remained unburied for well
90oe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 624.
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over twenty-four hours. The chairman of the municipal 
Committee on Cemeteries upon checking that graveyard found 
seventy-one bodies "piled on the ground, swollen and burst­
ing their coffins, and enveloped In swarms of flies." In 
order to speed up the process of Interment, long, shallow 
trenches received the coffins which were packed In and 
covered with a thin layer of earth. As the dally rains 
rapidly washed away the earth and exposed row after row of 
coffins to the blistering sun, "The coffins, made of plain 
pine corporation lumber, and but slightly put together, 
allowed the putrefaction of the bodies to oope out, fill­
ing the air, far and near, with the most Intolerable 
pestilential odors,
One of the most graphic descriptions of the grave­
yard situation appeared In the New Orleans Dally Crescent 
of August 11, 1853:
At the gates, the winds brought Intimation 
of the corruption working within. Not a puff 
but was laden with the rank atmosphere from 
rotting corpses. Inside they were piled by 
fifties, exposed to the heat of the sun, 
swollen with corruption, bursting their coffin 
lids, and sundering, as If by physical effort.
9lR6blnson, Diary of a Samaritan, 151; De Bow's Re­
view, XV (December, 1853), 620-21, 629; Crescent, August 9, 
1853; Picayune, August 8, 1853,
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the ligaments that bound their hands and 
feet. . . , What a feast of horrors! Inside, 
corpses piled in pyramids, and without the 
gates, old and withered crones and fat huxter 
women . . . dispensing ice creams and con­
fections, and brushing away , , , the green
bottle-flies that hovered on their merchan­
dise, and that anon buzzed away to drink 
dainty inhalations from the green and fester­
ing corpses.
Under these revolting circumstances it was difficult to 
keep enough gravediggers working to bury the bodies that 
poured into the cemeteries. Both Negroes and whites were 
hired at five dollars per hour. Even strong stomachs 
required bracing with frequent draughts of potent spirits 
to endure such sights and s m e l l s . 9%
At the height of the scourge’s activity, death 
claimed entire families, and corpses were discovered in
bed, in stores, and in the streets. Many a grim scene and
tragic incident presented itself in the course of every 
epidemic which occurred. During the simultaneous epidemic 
activity of Asiatic cholera and yellow fever in New 
Orleans in 1832, for example, one of the hospitals, com­
pletely filled with corpses and abandoned by all the sur­
viving medical attendants, was burned together "with its
92çrescent, August 11, 1853.
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9 3ghastly contents" by the order of the mayor.
During several yellow fever epidemics in New Orleans, 
cannons were fired and barrels of tar burned in the streets 
in an attempt to counteract the pestilential atmosphere. 
Added to all the other horrors of black vomit and delirium, 
death and funeral processions, the roaring cannons and the 
rising columns of smoke made the city seem even more the 
headquarters of the "King of Terrors."
Demonstrating its highly pervasive influence, yellow 
fever even made its way into the arena of politics, at 
least on the level of speculative discussion and contro­
versy. For example, in the convention assembled in 1845 to 
revise the constitution of Louisiana, the question of a 
suitable time for holding general elections became a matter 
for debate. Some delegates argued that the elections should 
be held sometime during the period when yellow fever ordi­
narily prevailed. By so doing, it was contended, "the 
birds of passage" (that is, the strangers who, fearing the 
pestilence, left the city each sunroer) would be denied the 
vote, which they did not deserve in any case, "having only 
temporary interest and residence" in New Orleans. Other
93Rendall, History of New Orleans, I, 134, 177-78.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
463
delegates argued that such a provision would prevent at 
least half the "resident" population from exercising the 
vote since so many natives and long-time residents also 
were absent from the Crescent City during the sick&y season 
Dr. Bennet Dowler referred to this particular debate as an 
illustration of yellow fever's political implications.^^ 
Another instance in which the Saffron Scourge be­
came a factor in a bit of political speculation occurred 
during the Great Epidemic of 1853. It was reported in one 
Crescent City journal that the "vile whigs" were rejoic­
ing at the "thinning of the ranks of the democracy by the 
great leveller, death." According to the Crescent editor, 
the vast majority of those persons leaving New Orleans to 
spend the suiraner at the Gulf shore watering places or in 
the North belonged to the Whig Party; whereas, the majori­
ty of inhabitants remaining in the city--including many 
"unacclimated"-- were Democrats. The editor judged it 
"horrible . . . that men should cooly reason, in the midst 
of a pestilence, on the probable good or bad fortune to 
befall a political party in consequence of a terrible 
mortality. . .
94n . 0. & Surg. Jour. , XV (November, 1858), 733
95çrescent, August 18, 1853.
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But yellow fever was not merely a topic sometimes 
alluded to in political conversation; on numerous occasions, 
state and local authorities found it necessary to enact 
measures in the fields of quarantine and public health, 
mainly because of public pressures deriving from the im­
pact of epidemic yellow fever. That disease undoubtedly 
had more influence on the development of public health in 
Louisiana than any other single factor.
Even in the worst of the yellow fever epidemics 
with all their calamitous and depressing aspects, there 
were always those who added comic relief to the scene of 
adversity--those persons who exercised a bizarre sende of 
humor and contrived peculiar jokes or stories based on 
extreme and ridiculous exaggerations of epidemic conditions. 
One epidemic "tall tale" which circulated around New Orleans 
in 1853 declared that "the fever was so bad at the St, 
Charles Hotel, that as soon as a man arrived and registered 
his name they immediately took his measure for a coffin, 
and asked him to note down in which cemetery he desired to 
be interred." According to another story of the same 
variety, "as soon as a man arrived on one of the steamboats, 
the officers of the Board of Health immediately took his 
name and entered it in their books as deceased, to save all
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trouble in calling upon him again,
Operating upon the creative imaginations of various 
individuals, the Saffron Scourge stimulated the production 
of a number of poems and at least one satirical novel. In 
a highly amusing narrative with a serious purpose, Doctor 
Dispachemquic; A Story of the Great Southern Plague of 
1878, James Dugan of New Orleans satirized the attitudes 
and activities of "so-called physicians" and some of the 
benevolent associations. The scene of the story was New 
Orleans during the epidemic of 1878; the three principal 
characters were Drs. Dispachemquic, Kwarantenus, and Kan- 
curum. Characterized by pomposity, pedantry, arrogance, 
and superficiality. Dr. Dispachemquic hastened most of 
his patients to their final destiny. But, as he explained 
it, the fatalities were neither his fault nor the fault of 
the system, but simply nature's will. Kwarantenus was Dis­
pachemquic 's colleague, friend, and echo. Dr, Kancurum, on 
the other hand, had spent a lifetime studying yellow fever 
and was rather skillful in treating his patients. Observ­
ing that many "nurses" hired by a certain benevolent
96History of the Yellow Fever in New Orleans, during 
the Summer of 1853 with Sketches of the Scenes of Horror 
which Occurred during the Epidemic • • • ^  a Physician of 
New Orleans, 98-99.
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association were persons of low character and interested 
only in easy money, who neglected their duties and instead 
consumed the brandy and champagne provided for the yellow 
fever patients, Dr. Kancurum commented at length on the 
serious need for a nurses training school in New Orleans. 
Indirectly criticizing the inadequacy of most medical educa­
tion in that period, the author also directed a bit of 
not-so-gentle satire at some of the ladies' benevolent 
societies. Active participants in the ridiculous narrative, 
the "Ladies Good Samaritan, Christian Flower Mission and 
Theological Association of New Orleans" visited the poor 
and sick, offered gratuitous advice, and distributed 
flowers among the lower classes for the purpose of culti­
vating among them a love of beauty. Dugan portrayed these 
"charitable" ladies going about doing their duty, dis­
tastefully, but determinedly, with their noses in the air.^?
After the epidemic of 1853, Dr. Bennet Dowler ex­
plained that the "contrast between the beauty and repose 
of nature and the march of death" had provided the in­
spiration for "several poetical contributions" relating to
James Dugan, Doctor Dispachemquic; A Story of the 
Great Southern Plague of 1878 (New Orleans, 1879).
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the pestilence. Some of the poems had been cut short by 
the very "pest-king" whose activities the poetasters were 
attempting to describe as, Dowler related, "the muse , , . 
[trailed] her fast-failing wings in the polluting streams 
of blood and black v o m i t . "*8 Dowler himself was capable 
of devising rather graphic images, even in his medical 
writing.
The destructive visitation of 1878 gave rise to 
several long poetic works, among which were "Dorothy-- 
Gift of God, A Ballad of the New Orleans Plague of 1878" 
by Paul H. Hayne, "Andromeda Unchàined" by Henry Guy 
Carleton, and "The Welded Link" by Judge J, F, Simmons. 
Simmons, of Sardis, Mississippi, also wrote numerous 
short poems based on epidemic themes, including "The 
Little Faded Dress," "Minnie's Farewell," and "I am 
Ready."99 Although none of these works even approach the
98])owler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," 
loc. cit., 62.
99paul H, Hayne, "Dorothy--Gift of God. A Ballad 
of the New Orleans Plague of 1878" (undated pamphlet in 
Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, New Orleans); Henry Guy 
Carleton, "Andromeda Unchained" (New Orleans, 1878, clip­
ping in Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, New Orleans); J, 
F. Simmons, The Welded Link, & Other Poems (Philadelphia, 
1881).
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level of great (or perhaps even good) poetry, they are all 
interesting as additional examples of yellow fever's 
ubiquitous influence on man's intellect and imagination as 
well as his more mundane social and economic activities.
In "The Welded Link" Judge Simmons maintained that 
the generosity, charity, and kindness of the North toward 
the South during its pestilential disaster of 1878 had 
accomplished "what arms never could have done. It con­
quered the Southern people and the Southern heart.
Simmons was apparently not alone in subscribing to that 
view. The editor of the New Orleans Picayune had declared 
in September of 1878 that the generous contributions from 
the North went far in relieving "the Southern heart of its 
bitterness and memory of its wrongs." Furthermore, he said, 
"In the name of that philanthropy which has overswept all 
geographical and party lines, we declare that the war is 
over, now at last and forever.
These descriptive lines by Simmons portray rather 
effectively something of the impact of epidemic yellow 
fever on communities which fell under its devastating 
influence ;
^^^Simmons, The Welded Link, 13-14. 
^Picayune, September 22, 1878.
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'Contagion' swept like wave of solid fire-- 
Death in its train and desolation dire-- 
O'er ho .es and hearthstones, towns and cities fair, 
And left its countless sad mementoes there.
• • •
And over all, as with a leprous blight.
Spread gloom more dismal than the darkest night.
The busy hum was hushed on mart and street.
The latter pressed alone by hurrying feet 
Of Good Samaritan or anxious nurse.
Or— their work ended--overladen hearse.
Devoted priest and pastor, hand in hand,
Gentile and Jew alike together band.
Some consolation, some relief, to bring 
To stricken victims, or to sooth death's sting.
While Dugan's novel emphasized the callous, unscru­
pulous, insensitive, hypocritical, and other deplorable 
human traits, Simmons concentrated on the manifestations 
of generosity, kindness, and altruism. But, a more accu* 
rate evaluation of epidemic circumstances was provided by 
a New Orleanian writing on the visitation of 1853. "There 
are few events in history which afford more striking 
illustrations of the good and bad qualities of humanity," 
he declared, or "which contain more of the 'romance of real 
life'— and present more impressive and startling pictures 
of virtue and vice, of sorrow and suffering, of generosity 
and selfishness, of true courage and cowardice, of charity
^°^Simmons, The Welded Link, 24, 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
470
and meanness, than the visitation of a destructive 
pestilence. . . ,*’^ 03
I03yjalker, "History and Incidents of the Plague in 
New Orleans," loc. cit., 797,
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CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From 1796 through 1905 yellow fever visited New 
Orleans almost every summer and on at least thirty occasions 
developed into a full-fledged epidemic. Frequently extend­
ing from the Crescent City along the avenues of trade and 
travel to other communities in Louisiana, the pestilence 
disrupted the normal functioning of the economic system 
together with every phase of human activity, and spread 
death and destruction, suffering, anxiety, and grief all 
along its path.
Between 1796 and 1850, New Orleans played host to 
the fever every summer and suffered some twenty extensive 
epidemics, Each seemed more virulent than the previous 
one, as succeeding epidemics first claimed hundreds of lives, 
then thousands. Mainly because of the Saffron Scourge, the 
Crescent City acquired a reputation as the "Necropolis of 
the South." Still its population increased year after year 
as immigrants poured in from Europe and other sections of
471
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the United States to take advantage of the economic oppor­
tunities available in that port city so favorably located 
for commercial activity.
Faced with the frequent occurrences of a death-deal­
ing epidemic malady which sometimes seemed to appear spon­
taneously without obvious connection to a prior case and 
which spread in an erratic and mysterious fashion, perplex­
ed physicians and laymen debated the nature, causation, 
and transmission of yellow fever in their search for a 
satisfactory explanation of its peculiar behavior. lacking 
a knowledge of disease-producing microorganisms, human 
carriers, and insect vectors, they became hopelessly in­
volved in the maze of existing etiological and epidemiolo­
gical conceptions as they tried to apply those conceptions 
to the activity of the yellow pestilence. Theoretical 
positions stood in direct relation to the method of action 
suggested to combat the disease. Those who believed yellow 
fever to be a contagious and imported malady favored quaran­
tine measures to prevent its introduction; those who believed 
that it originated locally in filth and putrefaction pro­
moted sanitary regulations.
Municipal boards of health designed to supervise the 
work of sanitation in New Orleans were established on
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several occasions during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, but they failed to function effectively, lacking 
financial support and the power of enforcement. Neither 
the citizenry at large nor the governing authorities were 
yet ready to accept strict regulatory legislation in the 
interest of public health. Several legislative experi­
ments with quarantine measures (by city and state) were 
also attempted. But without a clear knowledge of yellow 
fever epidemiology, neither the legislators nor the quaran­
tine officials could close all the loopholes through which 
the pestilence might enter. The continued appearance of 
yellow fever in New Orleans in spite of quarantine, to­
gether with the vociferous opposition and pressure by com­
mercial interests, led to the abandonment of quarantine 
measures in 1825. No further state legislation was passed 
on that subject until the 1850*s--the decade of the Great 
Epidemics. The visitations of 1853 and 1854 again forced 
the issue and stimulated a public demand for state action 
against the destructive malady.
During that first half-century of yellow fever's 
activity in New Orleans, many inhabitants of the Crescent 
City developed an attitude of indifference toward the 
scourge. It was expected to appear each year and to claim
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at least a few hundred victims, perhaps more. Those per­
sons who had survived an attack of yellow fever or who 
believed themselves "acclimated," and thus immune, by 
virtue of birth or long residence in the city did not fear 
the coming of the fever. Persons who were afraid, if they 
were financially able, fled the city during the sickly 
season each summer, or at least left town on the approach 
of an epidemic. The newcomers, the indigent immigrants 
among the working classes who always furnished the bulk of 
yellow fever's victims, left no records by which one might 
determine their relative fear or indifference; at any rate, 
few could have left the city even had they so desired.
The articulate, vocal upper classes of New Orleans 
failed to see their beloved city as the "Necropolis of the 
South." Far from considering New Orleans the unhealthy 
city described by outsiders, the commercial interests, 
newspapers, and physicians joined in defending their com­
munity's good name against all outside criticism. Further, 
they praised New Orleans as one of the healthiest cities 
in the Union--except during epidemic years. But extensive 
visitations occurred only once or twice in each decade, 
they contended, and even then the disease ordinarily 
limited its ravages to the intemperate, ignorant, unclean
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immigrant laboring classes.
Until a careful statistical study of New Orleans' 
mortality records had been made and compared with the 
records of other cities, the d.i'vçion regarding the city's 
health continued to find favrr : an article of faith among
its ardent defenders; throughout the century one can still 
find expressions of this view. But by 1850 several phy­
sicians had begun to investigate the problem and had un­
earthed and compiled enough statistical evidence at least 
to challenge the deep-rooted belief. The climax of yellow 
fever's activity in New Orleans and Louisiana, which came 
in the 1850's with four violent epidemics occurring in 
rapid succession (1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858), further 
stimulated an interest in mortality records and led many to 
question the notion that New Orleans was basically healthy. 
The indifference of previous years gradually began to give 
way to an increasing interest in public health legislation.
The epidemic of 1853 was not only the most devastat­
ing epidemic New Orleans ever experienced (claiming over 
8,000 persons in about four months' time), but it was also 
the most widespread visitation up to that time, spreading 
to many communities throughout Louisiana and the South where 
it had never appeared before. Small towns unaccustomed
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to the pestilence (which was so familiar to New Orleans) 
suffered even more, in a sense, than the metropolis. With­
in a population never before exposed to the disease, unlike 
that of the Crescent City, every individual was susceptible 
to attack. In some small communities, with the inhabitants 
falling sick one by one, day by day, there were scarcely 
enough well persons left to attend to the patients and to 
bury the dead.
At the close of the 1853 visitation, a number of com­
munities clearly traced the source of their own outbreaks 
to New Orleans. Thereby convinced of the disease's trans­
portability, they favored legislation to prevent its initial 
introduction into the state. Some New Orleans medical men, 
believing that yellow fever had been introduced from Latin 
America, began to advocate quarantine regulations, although 
the majority of the medical profession still considered 
yellow fever an indigenous product deriving from locally 
generated miasms. In spite of the prevailing medical 
opinion and the opposition of commercial interests, after 
another extensive yellow fever epidemic erupted the very 
next year, 1854, the Louisiana legislators enacted a measure 
in March of 1855 providing for quarantine regulations and 
a State Board of Health to administer those regulations.
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Thus, epidemic yellow fever resulted in Louisiana's estab­
lishing the first state board of health in this country. 
Additional legislation during the latter nineteenth century 
gradually expanded the Board's functions and increased its 
powers until it finally evolved into an active, effective, 
and vitally important state institution.
Following the epidemic'of 1858, yellow fever began 
its gradual decline in frequency and virulence, before the 
discovery of the mosquito transmitter and before the devel­
opment of an adequate quarantine system--for reasons not 
completely explicable even today. Nevertheless, when the 
absence of epidemic yellow fever in federally occupied New 
Orleans during the Civil War coincided with General Butler's 
stringent quarantine and sanitation regulations, which were 
retained and enforced to some extent by his successor. 
General N. P. Banks, many persons were persuaded that yellow 
fever had been prevented by sanitation, or quarantine, or 
both.
During the latter nineteenth century, yellow fever 
appeared intermittently in New Orleans and Louisiana, claim­
ing from one to sixty lives in some years and none at all 
in others. Five outbreaks occurred which might be consider­
ed epidemic in extent, but in spite of the larger population
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with a preponderance of unacclimated subjects, only two 
epidemics--in 1867 and 1878--could compare with earlier 
visitations in terms of mortality.
The epidemic of 1878 stands forth as the most exten­
sive yellow fever visitation ever to occur in the United 
States. Spreading throughout the South and the Mississippi 
Valley, the disease claimed approximately 20,000 lives of 
the 120,000 cases in the eleven states affected and cost 
the country an estimated one hundred to two hundred million 
dollars. This destructive pestilence resulted in an inten­
sified fear of the disease in an extensive area of the 
country which persisted through the remainder of the cen­
tury and motivated the shot-gun quarantines and the inter­
ference with railroad transportation of freight, passengers, 
and the United States mail during the outbreak of 1897.
Furthermore, the 1878 disaster led to an increasing 
demand for national action in the field of quarantine and 
public health, especially on the part of the interior 
states which no longer trusted the Gulf states to adminis­
ter an effective quarantine system. As a result, in 1879 
Congress created the National Board of Health to cooperate 
with state and local health authorities in maintaining 
strict quarantine regulations. Representing an initial
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attempt by the federal government to assume a more active 
role in public health activities, that institution failed 
within five years' time, partly because of inherent admin­
istrative defects, partly because of obstacles posed by 
defenders of states rights, chief among which was the 
Louisiana State Board of Health headed by Dr. Joseph Jones. 
Nevertheless, after the demise of the National Board, the 
United States Marine Hospital Service, a long-established 
federal agency originally designed to provide pre-paid 
medical care to American seamen, received additional duties 
and powers (in 1883 and 1893) in relation to quarantine and 
public health. This federal agency ultimately evolved into 
the United States Public Health Service (1902 and 1912), 
Following the yellow fever epidemic of 1905, the federal 
government assumed full control of maritime quarantine by 
an act of Congress passed in June of 1906. Hence, it seems 
that epidemic yellow fever not only influenced the develop­
ment of public health institutions in Louisiana (and in 
other states as well), but also served as a prime factor 
in the evolution of a concept of national public health 
and in bringing about federal action within that area.
In the epidemic of 1897, federal health officers in 
cooperation with state and local officials performed such
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valuable services as inspection of railroad freight and 
passengers, fumigation of mail, establishment of detention 
camps, and the issuance of health certificates in an attempt 
to untie the transportation entanglement resulting from 
intra-state and interstate quarantines. In 1 9 0 5  the United 
States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service actually 
took charge of the campaign against the fever in New Orleans 
at the request of the local and state authorities. Sys­
tematically employing measures based on the recently- 
formulated mosquito doctrine (announced by the Reed Commis­
sion in 1 9 0 1 )  , the federal officials worked side by side 
with local and state public health authorities to curb the 
spread of the pestilence. Since the 1 9 0 5  outbreak, no 
yellow fever epidemic has occurred in the United States.
In the realm of theory, an investigation of the ideas 
relating to yellow fever's nature, causation, and trans­
mission, and the gradual modification of those concepts 
provides a good picture of one phase of nineteenth-century 
medical thought in the process of evolution, as well as a 
view of the great transitional period in medical science 
itself. From philosophical approach to scientific method, 
from analogy and post hoc ergo propter hoc to microscopic 
observations and controlled experiments, from miasms to
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germs, and from fomites to mosquitoes, the field of medi­
cine ultimately emerged from its centuries-old cocoon of 
confusion into a new kind of confusion--but with an ever- 
increasing fund of knowledge which has been used success­
fully in preventing the recurrence of yellow fever and 
certain other epidemic diseases.
Many diverse non-medical elements may be observed 
in close association with nineteenth-century ideas and 
attitudes relating to yellow fever--such as a laissez- 
faire point of view and Social Darwinism, which seem to 
have bolstered the opposition to regulatory measures con­
cerning yellow fever, quarantine, and public health; pro­
slavery and race prejudice in connection with yellow 
fever's mild effect on the Negro; class consciousness in 
placing the blame on the lower elements of society, par­
ticularly foreign immigrants, for New Orleans’ high mortal­
ity rate, and furthermore, writing off those lives as 
expendable; sectionalism, exhibited in defending the disease- 
ridden South against criticism from the disease-ridden North; 
and states rights arguments employed to strengthen popular 
resistance to federal encroachment in quarantine operations.
Aside from epidemic yellow fever’s intellectual 
implications, the disease exerted a profound Impact on
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community life and human behavior. Its appearance in a 
community resulted in an immediate flight of the panic- 
stricken, after which many of those persons who remained 
and escaped attack devoted their attentions to those who 
were less fortunate. The medical profession and the clergy 
labored constantly in their appointed tasks. Unemployment, 
resulting from the interruption of commercial activity and 
economic activities in general, added to the critical situ­
ation produced by sickness and death. To relieve in »ome 
measure the destitution of the indigent sick and the unem­
ployed, volunteer relief organizations sprang up in many 
areas--but particularly in New Orleans. The disorder and 
desolation of a plague-stricken locality during particular­
ly violent epidemics presented a picture which observers 
later characterized as essentially indescribable.
For more than a century the Saffron Scourge was an 
integral aspect of life (and death) in Louisiana, especial­
ly in New Orleans. For its destructive toll levied against 
human life, energy, and property, this disease should be 
considered a villain in the drama of Louisiana history.
Yet no one can deny its influence in promoting the develop­
ment of public health, and for that significant contribu­
tion at least the villain must be given some credit.
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